Westminster Assembly Portrait

According to Reformed theology, on the cross Christ paid the penalty for all the sins of all and only the elect. The Westminster Confession of Faith states, “Christ, by His obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to His Father’s justice in their behalf.”¹ Those sins are all already punished, and they cannot be re-punished. According to the Reformed position, at the moment the sinner believes the gospel, Christ’s redemptive work is applied to him. “They are not justified until the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, actually apply Christ unto them.”² At the moment the sinner believers, Christ’s righteousness is permanently and irrevocably imputed to him. All his past, present and future sins have all already been ‘laid on’ Christ on the cross two thousand years ago. Therefore at the moment he believes the gospel, all his past, present and future sins have not only already been paid for; they are all forgiven.

It is not as though at the moment he believes the gospel, God says to him,

All your sins have already been paid for, but I’ve only forgiven your past and present sins; I have not yet forgiven your future sins, even though my Son has already paid for them all. When in the future you commit sins (that my Son has already paid for), you’re going to need to confess and repent of them if you want to be forgiven for them. But, even if you don’t confess them and repent of them, I can’t punish you for them, because I already punished my Son for them. Therefore you can’t go to hell. And there’s no limbo, so the only place you can go is heaven. Thus even if you don’t confess these post-justification sins, you’ll enter heaven just the same, after the instant sanctification that takes place at your death. So, it really doesn’t matter for you whether I forgive those future sins of yours or not, because you go to heaven anyway. And therefore, it really doesn’t matter whether you confess and repent of your future sins. The thing you need to keep in mind, however, is that if in the future you find yourself not confessing and repenting of your future sins, that’s a possible indicator that you were never justified in the first place, and you might have been created to show forth my wrath.

That’s not the Reformed doctrine of forgiveness. In Reformed theology, all past, present and future sins are forgiven at the moment we believe. Nor, according to Reformed theology does God impute to Christ only those sins that the sinner has already committed, and then, when the believer later confesses subsequent sins, impute those subsequent sins to Christ. No. In Reformed theology the imputation is not piece-meal or successive. It takes place once and entirely, at the moment the sinner first believes. Once the double-imputation has occurred (i.e. all his past, present and future sins are imputed to Christ, and Christ’s righteousness is imputed to him) at the moment he believes, then he is permanently and irrevocably pardoned and forgiven for all his past, present and future sins.

One problem with this doctrine is that Christ enjoins us in the Lord’s Prayer to pray daily for the forgiveness of our sins. If all our sins are paid for and forgiven, then it makes no sense to ask daily for the forgiveness for our sins. If we are supposed to believe that all our past, present and future sins were already paid for on the cross and forgiven at the moment we first believed, then to ask daily for the forgiveness of our sins is to contradict the doctrine that at the moment we first believed all these sins were already forgiven. Believing that all our sins are already forgiven is incompatible with asking daily for the forgiveness of our sins.

Referring to the Lord’s Prayer, the Westminster Confession of Faith says

God doth continue to forgive the sins of those that are justified; and although they can never fall from the state of justification, yet they may by their sins fall under God’s Fatherly displeasure, and not have the light of his countenance restored unto them, until they humble themselves, confess their sins, beg pardon, and renew their faith and repentance.³

So, on the one hand, in the Reformed view our past, present and future sins are all already forgiven at the moment we first believe. But on the other hand, in the Reformed view God continues to forgive our sins. The problem is that if our sins are all already forgiven, then there is no reason for God to keep forgiving them. If God is still forgiving them, this implies that they are not all already forgiven. So there is a contradiction here. The doctrine teaches that the sins are all already forgiven. The prayer teaches that the sins are not all already forgiven.

One way of attempting to resolve the contradiction is to make a distinction between God forgiving our sins, and restoring us to fellowship. According to this view, all our past, present and future sins are entirely forgiven at the moment we believe, and at that moment we are brought into fellowship with God. But, if we sin at any subsequent moment, then even though those sins are already forgiven, we lose fellowship with God, until we confess our sins and “beg pardon.” The idea is not that some sins are more severe than others, causing only loss of fellowship, but not causing loss of forgiveness. The WCF itself says “there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation.” (WCF XV.4) The idea, rather, is that after justification, no sin causes loss of forgiveness, but sin can cause loss of fellowship.

The problem with this position is that given the completed nature of the double imputation at our justification, there is no basis for God’s subsequent “Fatherly displeasure” and our loss of fellowship (i.e. losing the “light of His countenance”)  with Him on account of our post-justification sins. If all our sins are already paid for, and when He sees us He sees the perfect righteousness of Christ imputed to us, then there is no reason for Him to be displeased with us, unless He is peeking behind the imputed righteousness. But if He is peeking, then we’re not really covered. And if we are not really covered, then since “there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation,” and because we sin every day in thought, word, and deed, then God is severely displeased with us every day. If, however, God is ever pleased with us when peeking behind the imputed righteousness of Christ, then simul iustus et peccator is false. But if after justification simul iustus et peccator is always true in this life, then if God peeks, we are always under His Fatherly displeasure until we are entirely sanctified in heaven. Given the truth of simul iustus et peccator, the Reformed position viz-a-viz justification entails that after justification either God is always entirely pleased with us on account of Christ’s righteousness imputed to us, or God is always entirely displeased with us if He is peeking behind the imputed righteousness of Christ.

There is a third logical possibility, namely, that there are two qualitatively different levels of righteousness by which God is pleased. The first level is the forgiveness of sins and imputation of Christ’s righteousness; attaining this pleases God in a sufficient but still incomplete way. The second level of righteousness presupposes having already attained the first level; this second level is the level of pleasing or displeasing God above and beyond the perfect righteousness of Christ, by our repentance, confession of sins, and good works. One problem with this dualistic conception of righteousness is that given the truth of simul iustus et peccator, and given that “there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation,” imputation makes God pleased with the believer only if God doesn’t peek behind the imputed righteousness. But if God is peeking behind the imputed righteousness, then given the truth of simul iustus et peccator, and given that “there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation,” it follows by necessity that the believer is doomed.

A second problem with this dualistic conception of righteousness is that it makes Christ’s work insufficient to please God completely. According to this position, God is only partially pleased with us by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. He is at least pleased enough to let us into heaven, but He is not perfectly pleased with us. We have to work to merit the additional Fatherly pleasure that was not provided by the imputation of Christ’s perfect sacrifice. This situation is a bit like paying the penalty for sins in purgatory. Reformed theology doesn’t accept the notion of purgatory in large part because if we have to suffer in some way for our sins, it implies that Christ’s work was not sufficient to make us pleasing to God. So likewise, if we have to work, and confess, and repent, and do good works (and even suffer) in order to gain this additional Fatherly pleasure that didn’t come with justification, and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, this implies that Christ’s work was incomplete.

In the section titled “Of Repentance unto Life,” the Westminster Confession of Faith reads:

III. Although repentance be not to be rested in as any satisfaction for sin, or any cause of the pardon thereof, which is the act of God’s free grace in Christ; yet is it of such necessity to all sinners, that none may expect pardon without it.

IV. As there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation; so there is no sin so great that it can bring damnation upon those who truly repent.

V. Men ought not to content themselves with a general repentance, but it is every man’s duty to endeavor to repent of his particular sins, particularly.

VI. As every man is bound to make private confession of his sins to God, praying for the pardon thereof, upon which, and the forsaking of them, he shall find mercy …⁴

Logically, either these statements are limited to the time of justification, or they also refer to the post-justification period. If they are referring to a time prior to justification, then it raises the difficulty of explaining how there can be repentance by those who are still “dead in their sins.” Since Reformed theology does not distinguish between actual grace and sanctifying grace,⁵ for Reformed theology there is no possibility of repentance prior to justification. But, if these statements from WCF XV are about the time after justification, then since the believer already knows that all of his past, present and future sins have already been forgiven at justification, it makes no sense to say that he should not expect pardon for his post-justification sins, without repentance. It makes no sense to state that he should be “praying for the pardon thereof” or that upon forsaking these post-justification sins he will “find mercy.” According to Reformed theology all these sins were already pardoned at the moment he first believed, and thus he already found mercy for all these sins at that moment. The Reformed teaching that all his past, present and future sins were already paid for on the cross, and that Christ’s perfect righteousness was already imputed to him at the moment he first believed, does not fit with the notion that he needs to pray for the pardon of his post-justification sins, and that if he forsakes them he will find mercy. Either his post-justification sins are all already pardoned, in which case he doesn’t need to ask pardon (because that would be an act of unbelief), or they are not all already pardoned, in which case justification isn’t what Reformed theology teaches it to be.

Regarding this problem Reformed theologian Louis Berkhof writes:

“The usual position of Reformed theology, however, is that in justification God indeed removes the guilt, but not the culpability of sin, that is, He removes the sinner’s just amenability to punishment, but not the inherent guiltiness of whatever sins he may continue to perform. The latter remains and therefore always produces in believers a feeling of guilt, of separation from God, of sorrow, of repentance, and so on. Hence they feel the need of confessing their sins, even the sins of their youth, Ps. 25:7; 51:5-9. The believer who is really conscious of his sin feels within him an urge to confess it and to seek the comforting assurance of forgiveness. Moreover, such confession and prayer is not only a subjectively felt need, but also an objective necessity. Justification is essentially an objective declaration respecting the sinner in the tribunal of God, but it is not merely that; it is also an actus transiens, passing into the consciousness of the believer. The divine sentence of acquittal is brought home to the sinner and awakens the joyous consciousness of the forgiveness of sins and of favor with God. Now this consciousness of pardon and of a renewed filial relationship is often disturbed and obscured by sin, and is again quickened and strengthened by confession and prayer, and by a renewed exercise of faith.”⁶

Berkhof is claiming that at the moment of justification, God removes the penalty for all past, present and future sin, but not necessarily the subjective feeling of guilt for whatever sins we continue to commit after we come to faith. Because we feel these guilty feelings, even though after our justification we are no longer subject to punishment for any sins we commit, but perpetually stand entirely cleared by God’s declaration, we still feel the need (“urge”) to confess our sins and gain assurance of forgiveness. According to Berkhof, this urge we feel indicates that it is an “objective necessity” for us to continue to confess and pray for forgiveness, so that as we do so, the fact of our having been already forgiven for all our past, present and future sins will sink more deeply into our consciousness.

According to Berkhof’s position, after our justification, feelings of guilt are untrue; they have not yet caught up to what one knows by faith to be true about one’s standing before God. Therefore, it would follow that we should welcome the overcoming or cessation of such feelings. We should outgrow them as our feelings conform to the truth. At least, if we can outgrow such feelings we should. Berkhof claims that the standard Reformed position on the purpose of confessing our sins and asking God for forgiveness after our justification is not to gain forgiveness of sins, but to relieve the subjective urge we feel to confess, and to acquire the comforting feelings of assurance that our sins are forgiven.

This seems to me to be a rather Freudian/Jungian psychologizing of the purpose of “forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us” which we pray in the Lord’s Prayer, and of the Apostle John’s statement, “If we confess our sins, He is faithful and righteous to forgive our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.” (1 John 1:9) Instead of allowing these passages to revise the Reformed conception of justification, the Reformed believer uses the Reformed conception of justification to construe these passages as teaching not that we daily need our sins forgiven, but that we daily need to feel that our sins are forgiven. It sentimentalizes these passages in order to preserve its doctrine of justification. According to Berkhof, even though before God we do not need to ask forgiveness, and we know that we do not need to ask for forgiveness, nevertheless the human psyche has a primitive urge to continue to ask for forgiveness for continued sins. And this is why Jesus included this line in the Lord’s Prayer, because He knew that even though we would know that all our sins were already forgiven, we would still need to live and pray as though our sins were not all forgiven. In other words, it was on account of human weakness that Christ included this line in the Lord’s Prayer, much as it was on account of human weakness that Moses included the permission for divorce. (Matthew 19:8)

What I find most strange about this notion is that in order to convince ourselves in our feelings that all our past, present and future sins were forgiven at the moment of our justification, Berkhof encourages us to do certain acts that imply that our sins still need to be forgiven. So according to Berkhof it is good that we daily confess and ask forgiveness, and in doing so, comfort ourselves by making ourselves think that in confessing our sins daily and in asking God daily to forgive them, somehow that activity ensures that God has forgiven us, even though in actuality our past, present and future sins were all already forgiven at the moment of our justification. The problem here is that asking daily for forgiveness teaches the exact opposite; it teaches that our sins are not yet all forgiven. If we were composing a prayer that teaches that our sins still need to be forgiven, something like the line in the Lord’s Prayer is precisely what we would write. But if were composing a prayer for teaching Berkhof’s theology of justification, it would replace that line in the Lord’s Prayer with this one: “I thank you Lord that all my sins, past, present, and future were already forgiven when I first believed.” For this reason, the psychology explanation does not work; it reduces us to beasts governed by urges and instincts. If we are governed by reason, then we should speak and live according to the truth. And if the truth is that all our past, present and future sins were already forgiven when we first believed, then we should speak and live according to that truth. But if we should speak and live as though our sins daily need to be forgiven, and we should speak and live according to the truth, then it follows that at least our future sins were not forgiven when we first believed.

If Berkhof is correct that the standard Reformed position is this psychologized notion of the purpose of continued confession and asking for forgiveness, then Reformed teachers and pastors should be urging all believers to try to get over this urge to confess and ask for forgiveness. The goal should be to get over the felt-need to say that line in the Lord’s Prayer, or anything like it. True integration of mind, heart and feelings, that is, true spiritual maturity would be to get to the point where one would simply leave out that line when praying the Lord’s Prayer, and feel no guilt or compunction in doing so. Pastors, being mature, would tell their congregations that they [the pastors] no longer confess their sins or ask God for forgiveness, because they do not feel those inaccurate feelings of guiltiness any more; they are fully convinced, in mind and feelings, that all their past, present, and future sins were forgiven at the moment of their justification, and their sheep should all seek to reach that same mature state. But if that is not their belief, their practice or their goal, then they need to believe that sins are forgiven progressively, over the course of a believer’s life. But if our sins are forgiven progressively, then either our sins are progressively imputed to Christ on the cross, or the satisfaction doctrine of the Atonement is correct.

Our Father, who art in Heaven
Hallowed be Thy Name.
Thy Kingdom come; Thy will be done
On earth as it is in Heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread,
And forgive us our trespasses,
as we forgive those who trespass against us.
And lead us not into temptation,
but deliver us from evil.

In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

1. WCF XI.3.
2. WCF XI.4
3. WCF XI.5
4. WCF XV.3-6.
5. See “A Reply from a Romery Person.”
6. Systematic Theology, p. 515.

Lyrics:

Verse 1

Here’s a controversial subject that tends to divide
For years it’s had Christians lining up on both sides
By God’s grace, I’ll address this without pride
The question concerns those for whom Christ died
Was He trying to save everybody worldwide?
Was He trying to make the entire world His Bride?
Does man’s unbelief keep the Savior’s hands tied?
Biblically, each of these must be denied
It’s true, Jesus gave up His life for His Bride
But His Bride is the elect, to whom His death is applied
If on judgment day, you see that you can’t hide
And because of your sin, God’s wrath on you abides
And hell is the place you eternally reside
That means your wrath from God hasn’t been satisfied
But we believe His mission was accomplished when He died
But how the cross relates to those in hell?
Well, they be saying:

God knows He tried (8x)
(Did He try and fail, or did He succeed? Is there going to be one drop of the Savior’s blood in vain? Nah, perish the thought. The Lamb will receive the reward for His suffering.)

Verse 2

Father, Son and Spirit: three and yet one
Working as a unit to get things done
Our salvation began in eternity past
God certainly has to bring all His purpose to pass
A triune, eternal bond no one could ever sever
When it comes to the church, peep how they work together
The Father foreknew first, the Son came to earth
To die- the Holy Spirit gives the new birth
The Father elects them, the Son pays their debt and protects them
The Spirit is the One who resurrects them
The Father chooses them, the Son gets bruised for them
The Spirit renews them and produces fruit in them
Everybody’s not elect, the Father decides
And it’s only the elect in whom the Spirit resides
The Father and the Spirit- completely unified
But when it comes to Christ and those in hell?
Well, they be saying:

God knows He tried (8x)
(So if we can agree that the election of the Father is not universal, and the regeneration of the Holy Spirit is not universal, why would the atonement of the Son be universal? That would put the Persons of the Trinity completely at odds with one another. But the Triune God is completely unified.)

Verse 3

My third and final verse- here’s the situation
Just a couple more things for your consideration
If saving everybody was why Christ came in history
With so many in hell, we’d have to say He failed miserably
So many think He only came to make it possible
Let’s follow this solution to a conclusion that’s logical
What about those who were already in the grave?
The Old Testament wicked- condemned as depraved
Did He die for them? C’mon, behave
But worst of all, you’re saying the cross by itself doesn’t save
That we must do something to give the cross its power
That means, at the end of the day, the glory’s ours
That man-centered thinking is not recommended
The cross will save all for whom it was intended
Because for the elect, God’s wrath was satisfied
But still, when it comes to those in hell
Well, they be saying:

God knows He tried (8x)
(Look, at the end of the day, this is about giving God the maximum amount of glory. You know what I’m saying? We proclaim a Cross that actually saves, not makes salvation possible but actually saves. Matthew 1:21 His name shall be called Jesus because He will save His people from their sins, not might save them, not try to save, but no, He will actually save them. It is a definite atonement. And yo, this ain’t controversy for the sake of controversy, or theological nit-pickin. Salvation is of the Lord. To Him alone be the glory. Soli Deo gloria.)

H/T: Reformation Theology

Crucifixion with the Virgin and St John the Evangelist
Ugolino di Nerio (1280 – 1349)

In the last three posts in this series we have considered the three effects of sin, according to Aquinas: corruption of man’s nature, stain in his soul, and the debt of eternal punishment. By these three effects man was cut off from his supernatural end, i.e. being united to God eternally in perfect happiness and love, in what is called the Beatific Vision. Here we turn to Aquinas’ understanding of Christ’s Passion, in redeeming us from sin and its effects, and opening for us the way to the Beatific Vision. In order to understand what Aquinas says about Christ’s Passion, we must first briefly consider what Aquinas says about man’s supernatural end and why grace is needed to attain that end.

Grace and The Beatific Vision

According to Aquinas, God made man with the ultimate purpose of giving to man what the tradition calls the “Beatific Vision,” that is, seeing the Divine Essence.¹ Jesus told His disciples, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.”² The Beatific Vision is something the blessed in heaven now enjoy. Concerning the Beatific Vision, Aquinas writes, “The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the Word of God ….”³

According to Aquinas, the human intellect, apart from grace, cannot attain the Beatific Vision. The human intellect can of its own power attain an indirect knowledge of God, as knowledge of a cause can be determined from its effects. In this way we can, by the natural power of human reason, come to know that God exists, and that God is good, just, perfect, etc. But for Aquinas, the vision of the Divine Essence is natural only to God Himself. Attaining to the vision of the Divine Essence exceeds our natural capacities; no created nature is in itself proportional to the vision of the Divine Essence. This is why the vision of the Divine Essence is man’s supernatural end (finis supaturalis). We need a divine gift by which we may participate in the divine nature, and so enjoy the vision of the Divine Essence. This divine gift, by which our nature is elevated and made proportionate to the divine nature, so that we can have the vision of the Divine Essence, is sanctifying grace.⁴ If grace were merely “divine favor” in the sense of God looking upon us in a favorable manner, we could never enter heaven, because we could never see the Divine Essence.⁵ Since grace is necessary for man to enjoy the vision of God’s essence, we may now consider how, for Aquinas, the grace of salvation comes to man through Christ’s Passion and Death.

Was the Passion Necessary?

According to Aquinas, because God is omnipotent, He could have saved man without sending Christ to die for us. Aquinas writes, “God of His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways.”⁶ This would not have been contrary to justice, as Aquinas explains:

But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another–for instance, against another man, or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought mercy: “To Thee only have I sinned” (Psalm 50:6), as if to say: “Thou canst pardon me without injustice.”⁷

By satisfaction [satisfactione] Aquinas is referring to a voluntary reparation for an offense. Even if Christ had not come, God could have forgiven our debt of punishment, and this would not have been a violation of justice because our debt is precisely to God. A human judge, by contrast, cannot simply forgive the injustice of a criminal without violating justice. That is because the crime committed by the criminal was not against the judge, but against someone or something else. But if a debt is owed only to one man, then this man can freely discharge the debt, without any violation of justice. Man’s debt of [eternal] punishment was owed to God alone, and therefore without any injustice God can forgive this sin even without satisfaction.

Yet there was no more fitting way to save us than through Christ’s Passion, because Christ’s Passion most perfectly demonstrates to us God’s glory, His love, the evil of sin, human dignity, and the perfect example of loving obedience to the Father. Not only that, it also delivers us from sin and merits for us justifying grace and the glory of bliss.⁸ It was more fitting for Christ to suffer, because Christ’s Passion demonstrates God’s mercy and justice:

That man should be delivered by Christ’s Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ’s justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature ….⁹

Through Christ’s Passion, He made satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race. Christ freely suffered humiliation, pain, injustice and even death, out of loving obedience to the Father. This sacrifice of Himself out of love for His Father made reparation for all the sin of the human race, and thereby was in keeping with the order of justice. Likewise, by sending His Son to make such satisfaction for our sins, the Father showed His mercy, because we could not make satisfaction for our sins. So although strictly speaking it was not necessary for Christ to suffer in order to save mankind, yet in another sense it was necessary for Christ to suffer, in order most perfectly to demonstrate to mankind God’s mercy and justice.

Four Ways in Which Christ’s Passion Brought About Our Salvation

According to Aquinas, Christ, from the first instant of His conception, had the fullness of sanctifying grace.¹⁰ Not only that, but from the first moment of His conception was the Head of the Church.¹¹ All the graces that come into the Church come from Christ the Head of the Body.¹² Aquinas presents four ways in which Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation.

First, Aquinas says that Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit.

As stated above (7, 1,9; 8, 1,5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual, but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might overflow into His members; and therefore Christ’s works are referred to Himself and to His members in the same way as the works of any other man in a state of grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that whosoever suffers for justice’s sake, provided that he be in a state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Matthew 5:10: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’s sake.” Consequently Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all His members.¹³

Christ had grace in His soul from the first instant of His conception. Otherwise, Christ would have been in a state of original sin.¹⁴ But in that first instant of His conception Christ received grace not only as an individual man, but also as the Head of the Church, so that this grace might overflow into His members, i.e. all those who are joined to His Body, the Church. Insofar as we are joined to Christ as members of His Body, the works of Christ the Head of the Body are referred not only to the Head but to all the members of His Body, because this Body is one Body. Furthermore, if anyone in a state of grace suffers for justice’s sake, that person merits blessedness (i.e. the vision of God). Therefore, since Christ was in a state of grace, and Christ suffered for justice’s sake, it follows that Christ merited the Beatific Vision, even though He already had it.¹⁵ Hence, since Christ merited the Beatific Vision, and since those who are joined to Him as members of His Body share in His merits, it follows that Christ merited the Beatific Vision for us, and thus that He merited salvation for us.

Aquinas explains the notion of merit elsewhere, writing:

Merit implies a certain equality of justice: hence the Apostle says (Romans 4:4): “Now to him that worketh, the reward is reckoned according to debt.” But when anyone by reason of his unjust will ascribes to himself something beyond his due, it is only just that he be deprived of something else which is his due; thus, “when a man steals a sheep he shall pay back four” (Exodus 22:1). And he is said to deserve it, inasmuch as his unjust will is chastised thereby. So likewise when any man through his just will has stripped himself of what he ought to have, he deserves that something further be granted to him as the reward of his just will. And hence it is written (Luke 14:11): “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted.”¹⁶

Merit is based on justice, according to which reward is due for every obedient act, and punishment is due for every disobedient act, to chastise the unjust will. Aquinas notes that the precept of the Old Law required that the theft be paid back fourfold.¹⁷ Aquinas then proceeds to show the four respects in which Christ humbled Himself, thereby paying fourfold for the [extrinsic] glory man had stolen from God through disobedience.¹⁸

Second, according to Aquinas, Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of satisfaction.

He properly atones for [satisfacit] an offense who offers something which the offended loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above (Question 46, Article 6). And therefore Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 John 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”¹⁹

Aquinas begins here by explaining the meaning of satisfaction. A person makes proper satisfaction for an offense by offering to the offended something that the offended person loves equally or even more than he detested the offense. By giving Himself over to suffering, in love and obedience for the Father, Christ offered to the Father something that the Father loves far more than He detests all the sins of the human race. Why was Christ’s gift so greatly loved by the Father? Because of the greatness of the charity out of which Christ suffered, the great dignity of what He laid down in love for the Father, and the immensity of the grief He endured, which was far greater interiorly than all His bodily suffering.²⁰ How do we benefit from Christ’s satisfaction? Aquinas writes:

The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members.²¹

Here again, Aquinas explains that we benefit from Christ’s satisfaction by being joined to Him as members of His Body, the Church, of which He is the Head. Through being joined to Him, we become, as it were, one mystic person [quasi una persona mystica]. Just as what belongs to the hand also belongs to the foot or the ear, so what belongs to Christ the Head belongs also to the rest of His Body. And therefore the satisfaction that He offered to the Father belongs also to all the faithful, because we are members of His Body.

Third, according to Aquinas, Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of sacrifice.

The Apostle says (Ephesians 5:2): “He delivered Himself up for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.” A sacrifice properly so called is something done for that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him: and hence it is that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): “A true sacrifice is every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we can be truly blessed.” But, as is added in the same place, “Christ offered Himself up for us in the Passion”: and this voluntary enduring of the Passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity. Therefore it is manifest that Christ’s Passion was a true sacrifice.²²

A sacrifice [sacrificium], says Aquinas, is something done for the honor that is properly due to God, in order to appease Him. This falls under the virtue of religion, which itself falls under the virtue of justice, i.e. giving to each its due.²³ But not only does sacrifice fall under the precepts of the natural law, various kinds of sacrifice were also required by the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law.²⁴ These sacrifices, according to Aquinas, directed the minds of the worshipers to God as the source and end of all things. But they also foreshadowed Christ, the chief and perfect sacrifice.²⁵ How does sacrifice differ from satisfaction? Satisfaction can be made by sacrifice, but satisfaction presupposes an offense, whereas sacrifice does not. Sacrifice is what is due to God as God, and only to God. Satisfaction, on the other hand, can be made to any offended party, not only to God.²⁶

Fourth, according to Aquinas, Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption.

Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin, because (John 8:34): “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin”; and (2 Peter 2:19): “By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave.” Since, then, the devil had overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the devil’s bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God’s justice: and this, too, is a kind of bondage, since it savors of bondage for a man to suffer what he does not wish, just as it is the free man’s condition to apply himself to what he wills.

Since, then, Christ’s Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant atonement [satisfactio] for the sin and the debt of the human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations. For the atonement [satisfactio] by which one satisfies for self or another is called the price, by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin and its penalty, according to Daniel 4:24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Now Christ made satisfaction, not by giving money or anything of the sort, but by bestowing what was of greatest price–Himself–for us. And therefore Christ’s Passion is called our redemption.²⁷

Aquinas explains the two ways in which man was held captive on account of sin. In the first way, man was held captive by sin and Satan. By sinning, we make ourselves prone to sin, susceptible to its temptation, less willing to resist it firmly and consistently. Through mortal sin we make ourselves incapable of repenting, unless God provides grace. In this way, by submitting ourselves to sin we make ourselves slaves to it. Furthermore, says Aquinas, in succumbing to Satan’s temptation, we likewise subject ourselves to Satan’s bondage. We put ourselves under the devil by consenting to him.²⁸ The second way that man was held captive on account of sin was by the debt of punishment, which he could not pay.

According to Aquinas, Christ by His Passion redeemed us from both obligations. That is because the satisfaction by which one satisfies is the price by which one one ransoms from sin and its penalty. Since Christ made satisfaction by giving to God what was of maximum worth, namely, Himself, for us, therefore in doing so Christ paid a price that ransomed us both from our bondage to sin and our debt of punishment.

Aquinas sums up the four ways in which Christ’s Passion brought salvation to us, writing:

Christ’s Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ’s soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered as being within Christ’s very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice ….”²⁹

On account of the will of Christ’s soul, His Passion acts by way of merit. On account of the flesh of Christ’s body, His Passion acts by way of satisfaction (inasmuch as by it we are liberated from the debt of punishment), by way of redemption (inasmuch as it frees us from the servitude of guilt [servitute culpae]), and by way of sacrifice inasmuch as by it we are reconciled to God).

Four Effects of Christ’s Passion

One effect of Christ’s Passion is the forgiveness of our sins. Aquinas writes:

Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins [remissionis peccatorum] in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity [provocantis ad caritatem], because, as the Apostle says (Romans 5:8): “God commendeth His charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us.” But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our sins, according to Luke 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much.” Secondly, Christ’s Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption [redemptionis]. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ. Thirdly, by way of efficiency [efficientiae], inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.³⁰

Christ’s Passion causes the forgiveness of our sins in three ways or modes. First, by provoking us to charity. Through His divine demonstration of charity in the Passion, charity is communicated to us and provoked within us. And our sins are forgiven when we love God, because our will is turned back to God in friendship, away from that which we had wrongly loved more than we loved God. Second, as explained above, Christ’s Passion causes the forgiveness of our sins by way of redemption. Since Christ by His Passion offered to His Father such a great gift, therefore since He is the Head and we are the members of His Body, therefore by incorporation into His Body (and only by incorporation into His Body) we participate in what He obtained. Aquinas uses the example of a man who by the good work of his hands was able to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. Thirdly, Christ’s Passion causes the forgiveness of our sins in the mode of efficient cause. By this he means that Christ’s flesh, as the instrument of the Godhead, has within it the divine virtue (power) to drive out all evils through His actions and sufferings in His Passion.

Another effect of Christ’s Passion is deliverance from the debt of punishment. Aquinas writes:

Through Christ’s Passion we have been delivered from the debt of punishment in two ways. First of all, directly–namely, inasmuch as Christ’s Passion was sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race: but when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of punishment is abolished. In another way–indirectly, that is to say–in so far as Christ’s Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which the debt of punishment rests.³¹

This short paragraph provides a helpful distinction between the debt of punishment [reatus poenae] and the forgiveness of sins [remissionis peccati]. Christ’s Passion delivers us from the debt of punishment both directly and indirectly. It directly delivers us from the debt of punishment in that through His Passion Christ made superabundant satisfaction [superabundans satisfactio] for the sins of the whole human race, and thereby paid our debt, inasmuch as we are joined to Him as members of His Mystical Body. Christ’s Passion indirectly delivers us from the debt of punishment insofar as it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin [remissionis peccati], on which the debt of punishment is founded. The forgiveness of sin is not merely the payment of our debt of punishment. The debt of eternal punishment is continually caused by the privation of original justice in the will, by which the will is made subject to God. Therefore, in order to remove the debt of punishment, not only must the debt be paid, but the continuing cause of the debt must be remedied. So Christ’s Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins, by the gift of grace, whereby our will is again made subject to God in love. We receive this gift of grace by being united to Him as our Head, from whom flow all graces to us as members of His Body.

Another effect of Christ’s Passion is that we are reconciled to God. Aquinas writes:

Christ’s Passion is in two ways the cause of our reconciliation to God. In the first way, inasmuch as it takes away sin by which men became God’s enemies, according to Wisdom 14:9: “To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike”; and Psalm 5:7: “Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.” In another way, inasmuch as it is a most acceptable sacrifice to God. Now it is the proper effect of sacrifice to appease God: just as man likewise overlooks an offense committed against him on account of some pleasing act of homage shown him. Hence it is written (1 Samuel 26:19): “If the Lord stir thee up against me, let Him accept of sacrifice.” And in like fashion Christ’s voluntary suffering was such a good act that, because of its being found in human nature, God was appeased for every offense of the human race with regard to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the aforesaid manner (1, ad 4).³²

Here Aquinas explains that Christ’s Passion is the cause of our reconciliation to God in two ways. First, Christ’s Passion takes away sin [removet peccatum] by which men are put at enmity with God. Sin is not a stuff or substance. Sin is a privation of the due order in acts, or in the disposition of the will, such that we are turned against God and against the order of Divine justice. One way that Christ removes sin is by turning our heart (i.e. our will) back to the Father in love, such that we are no longer enemies of God, but are reconciled to Him as friends, even sons. The second way in which Christ reconciles us to God is by making perfect satisfaction, in His human nature, to the Father. The debt of punishment that was due to the human race for every offense is thereby canceled, insofar as we are “made one with the crucified Christ”. I will discuss below the way in which we are made one with Christ.

Another effect of Christ’s Passion is that the gate of heaven is opened to us. Aquinas writes:

The shutting of the gate is the obstacle which hinders men from entering in. But it is on account of sin that men were prevented from entering into the heavenly kingdom, since, according to Isaiah 35:8: “It shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not pass over it.” Now there is a twofold sin which prevents men from entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first is common to the whole race, for it is our first parents’ sin, and by that sin heaven’s entrance is closed to man. Hence we read in Genesis 3:24 that after our first parents’ sin God “placed . . . cherubim and a flaming sword, turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life.” The other is the personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal act.

Now by Christ’s Passion we have been delivered not only from the common sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to the debt of punishment, for which He paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His Passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently, then the gate of heaven’s kingdom is thrown open to us through Christ’s Passion. This is precisely what the Apostle says (Hebrews 9:11-12): “Christ being come a high-priest of the good things to come . . . by His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption.”³³

When God sent man out of Eden, He placed a cherubim and a flaming sword to guard the way to the tree of life [ligni vitae]. According to Aquinas, on account of man’s sin, the gate to heaven was thereby closed. This gate being closed to us was due not only to original sin, common to all mankind descended from Adam, but also to all actual sins committed by each person. By Christ’s Passion we have been delivered from original sin both as to its guilt [culpam] and as to its debt of punishment [reatum poenae]. Here again by the guilt [culpam] of original sin, Aquinas is referring to the privation of original justice in the will, whereby the will was made subject to God. When man receives grace, through union with the crucified Christ, this privation in the will is removed. And likewise by union with Christ the debt of punishment for original sin is canceled. Furthermore, by Christ’s Passion, we have been delivered from the guilt and debt of punishment for our personal sins. Therefore, through Christ’s Passion the gate of heaven has been thrown open to us.

Did God Hate Sinners?

Some people claim that God the Father hated sinners, on account of their sin, and therefore that God the Father unleashed this stored-up wrath upon Christ, temporarily damning Christ on our behalf. But that is not how Aquinas understands Christ’s salvific work. God the Father and Christ the Son are one in their Divine nature, and therefore one in their single Divine will. It is not as though the Father hated us while Christ the Son loved us. Aquinas says, “Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up….”³⁴ Nor is it that the Son in His Divine nature hated us, but that the Son in His human nature loved us. The distinction, for Aquinas, is at a different level. He writes:

God loves all men as to their nature, which He Himself made; yet He hates them with respect to the crimes [culpam] they commit against Him, according to Sirach 12:3: “The Highest hateth sinners.”³⁵

The three Divine Persons of the Most Holy Trinity eternally love all men in regard to man’s primary human nature [quantum ad naturam]. In other words, the Divine Persons of the Most Holy Trinity eternally love each and every human being on account of our human nature, which God Himself made in His own image. But the Divine Persons of the Most Holy Trinity hate [odit] sin, and therefore in regard to human opposition to God [quantum ad culpam], the Divine Persons of the Most Holy Trinity hate sinful man (i.e. man devoid of sanctifying grace and charity). So the Divine Persons of the Most Holy Trinity both love and hate sinful man, but in different respects. Yet their love for man is more fundamental than is their hate, because the nature of man is fundamental to man’s wickedness. Sinful man’s opposition to God is made possible by man’s rational nature. But this raises a question. If God has always loved man, even when man was turned against God, how then can Christ’s Passion be rightly said to reconcile man to God? Aquinas answers:

Christ is not said to have reconciled us with God, as if God had begun anew to love us, since it is written (Jeremiah 31:3): “I have loved thee with an everlasting love”; but because the source of hatred was taken away by Christ’s Passion, both through sin being washed away and through compensation being made in the shape of a more pleasing offering.³⁶

The reconciliation of sinners with God through Christ’s Passion was not effected by a change in God, but by a change in man. His Passion removed the cause of hatred [odii causa] in two ways. Our sin was washed away [ablutionem peccati] by His blood; this washing we receive by being joined to Him in His Mystical Body. Furthermore, Christ completely and lovingly offered Himself in His human nature as a sacrifice to God the Father. By such a sacrifice, Christ in His human nature, stands in a highly favored and exalted position before the Father.³⁷ Therefore, by being united with Christ as members of His Mystical Body, we are reconciled to God not because of a change in God, but because we are truly made one with Christ, with whom God is well-pleased.

Sufficiency and Union with Christ

If Christ through His Passion made satisfaction sufficient for the sins of every human being who has ever lived and will live, why then is not every human person saved? Aquinas writes:

It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19: “The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light”), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Romans 5:15-16): “But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification.”³⁸

Here Aquinas explains that Christ came into this world to remove both original sin and all actual sins. Not all sins are removed, he says, because men do not adhere [non inhaerent] to Christ. They choose darkness rather than Christ the light who has come into the world. Christ offered Himself up to the Father on behalf of all men, but if men reject Christ, then they are not united to Christ, and so do not partake of the salvific benefits procured by Christ’s Passion. Only by union with Christ do we participate in the salvific benefits of His Passion. Aquinas writes:

Christ by His Passion delivered us from our sins causally–that is, by setting up the cause of our deliverance, from which cause all sins whatsoever, past, present, or to come, could be forgiven: just as if a doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all sicknesses can be cured even in future.

As stated above, since Christ’s Passion preceded, as a kind of universal cause of the forgiveness of sins [remissionis peccatorum], it needs to be applied to each individual for the cleansing [deletionem] of personal sins. Now this is done by baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, as shall be shown later (62, 5).³⁹

Aquinas uses the example of a doctor who prepares a medicine by which all sicknesses, even future sicknesses, can be cured. Likewise, through Christ’s Passion, the remedy for all sin (past, present, and future) is provided. But this medicine needs to be applied to each sick person, in order to benefit the sick person. How is this medicine applied? By the sacraments of baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which have their power from Christ’s Passion [habent virtutem ex passione Christi].

When Aquinas is faced with the objection that if all men were freed from the punishment of sin by Christ’s Passion, no one would suffer eternal damnation in hell, he replies:

Christ’s Passion works its effect in them to whom it is applied, through faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. And, consequently, the lost in hell cannot avail themselves of its effects, since they are not united to Christ in the aforesaid manner.⁴⁰

Here again he shows that Christ’s Passion works its effect in those to whom it is applied, by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. But the lost in hell cannot be united to Christ by faith and the sacraments, and that is why Christ’s Passion does not free them from eternal punishment.

Aquinas then raises a similar objection. He observes that baptized persons who fall into mortal sin and then receive the sacrament of penance, are given some penance to do. According to the objection, this implies that Christ’s work was not sufficient to pay their debt of punishment, because no one whose debt is already paid should be made to pay anything additional. Aquinas then replies:

As stated above (1, ad 4,5), in order to secure the effects of Christ’s Passion, we must be likened unto Him. Now we are likened unto Him sacramentally in Baptism, according to Romans 6:4: “For we are buried together with Him by baptism into death.” Hence no punishment of satisfaction is imposed upon men at their baptism, since they are fully delivered by Christ’s satisfaction. But because, as it is written (1 Peter 3:18), “Christ died” but “once for our sins,” therefore a man cannot a second time be likened unto Christ’s death by the sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those who sin after Baptism be likened unto Christ suffering by some form of punishment or suffering which they endure in their own person; yet, by the co-operation of Christ’s satisfaction, much lighter penalty suffices than one that is proportionate to the sin.⁴¹

Here Aquinas explains that in order to secure [consequamur] the effects of Christ’s Passion, it is necessary that we be configured [configurari] to Him. And we are configured to Him sacramentally in Baptism, because in Baptism we are buried together with Him into His death, as the Apostle Paul teaches. Therefore there is no punishment of satisfaction imposed on men at their baptism, because through Christ’s satisfaction, all the punishment for their sin until that time, is canceled by their union with Christ in baptism. But since Christ died but once for sins, therefore we cannot be configured to Him by being baptized again. So those who sin after baptism must be configured to Christ suffering, by some form of temporal punishment [poenalitatis] or suffering [passionis] which they themselves endure. Yet, explains Aquinas, by the cooperation of Christ’s satisfaction [cooperante satisfactione Christi], this penance that penitents must do is much lighter than is deserved for their [post-baptismal] sins. So for Aquinas the requirement of doing penance for post-baptismal sin is not due to Christ’s satisfaction being insufficient, but rather because since Christ died only once, we cannot be baptized again as a remedy for post-baptismal sins, and so must be configured to Him by sharing in His suffering.

Christ, by His Passion has supplied the remedy for all three of the effects of sin. He has paid the debt of punishment. He has procured for us the grace by which our will is made subject to God in charity, and in this way He has removed the corruption of our will, forgiven our sins, and washed away the stain of sin from our souls. We receive this remedy in the sacraments, and especially baptism as the gateway to the other sacraments. In baptism we are joined to Christ as members of His Body of which He is the Head and from whom all graces flow. Concerning Christ’s baptism by John, Aquinas writes:

[T]he entrance to the heavenly kingdom was opened to us by the baptism of Christ in a special manner, which entrance had been closed to the first man through sin. Hence, when Christ was baptized, the heavens were opened, to show that the way to heaven is open to the baptized.⁴²

Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto. Sicut erat in principio, et nunc, et semper, et in sæcula sæculorum. Amen.

1. This should not be construed as implying that any creature can comprehend (i.e. fully or exhaustively understand) the Divine Essence. According to Aquinas, not even the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine Essence. See Summa Theologica III Q.10 a.1
2. St. Matthew 5:8
3. Summa Theologica III Q.10 a.4 co.
4. This is why for Aquinas the Beatific Vision is man’s supernatural end. In saying that the Beatific Vision is man’s supernatural end, Aquinas is not simply saying that God is supernatural. He is saying that this end (i.e. the Beatific Vision) exceeds our natural capacities. It is beyond our nature, and in that sense it is supernatural. The Beatific Vision is also beyond the natural capacity of each angel. This is also why, for Aquinas, even the angels needed grace in order to enjoy the Beautific Vision, as I discussed here.
5. See Summa Theologica I-II Q.110 a.1 in which Aquinas discusses the three senses of the term ‘grace’.
6. Summa Theologica III Q.1 a.2 co.
7. Summa Theologica III Q.46 a.2 ad 3
8. Summa Theologica III Q.46 a.3 co.
9. Summa Theologica III Q.46 a.1 ad 3
10. Summa Theologica III Q.7 aa. 7, 9
11. Summa Theologica III Q.8 a.1
12. In fact, according to Aquinas, from the first moment of Christ’s conception He was the Head of all men, but not all in the same way.

    Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ. Summa Theologica III Q.8 a.3

13. ST III Q.48 a.1 co.
14. See my discussion on original sin in Part 2 of this series.
15. Aquinas writes:

    Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God….  Summa Theologica III Q.10 a.4 co.

16. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.6 co.
17. This is why Zaccheus told Jesus that he would pay back four times as much as he had defrauded. cf. St. Luke 19:8
18. cf. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.6
19. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.2 co.
20. Aquinas writes:

    Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Isaiah 53:4: “Surely He hath carried our sorrows.” Summa Theologica III Q.46 a.6 ad 4

21. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.2 ad 1
22. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.3 co.
23. See Summa Theologica II-II Q.85 a.1 co.
24. Besides the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, there were also the moral precepts and the judicial precepts. See Summa Theologica I-II Q.99

25. Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself “delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of sweetness” (Ephesians 5:2). And for this reason all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice–the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law “often” offered “the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but” Christ offered “one sacrifice for sins, for ever.” And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.  Summa Theologica I-II Q.102 a.3 co.

26. For an excellent treatment of this subject see Matthew Levering’s Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation According to Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).
27. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.4
28. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.4 ad 2. Aquinas explains elsewhere [Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.2] that because man had sinned against God, God with justice left man under the devil’s power.
29. Summa Theologica III Q.48 a.6 ad 3
30. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.1 co.
31. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.3 co.
32. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.4
33. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.5 co.
34. Summa Theologica III Q.47 a.3 ad 2
35. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.4 ad 1
36. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.4 ad 2
37. Indeed, Christ in His human nature is seated at the right hand of the Father.
38. Summa Theologica III Q.1 a.4 co.
39. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.1 ad 3,4
40. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.3 ad 1. Two paragraphs later he writes, “Christ’s satisfaction works its effect in us inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as the members with their head….” Summa Theologica Q.49 a.3 ad 3
41. Summa Theologica III Q.49 a.3 ad 2
42. Summa Theologica III Q.39 a.5 co.

The Last Judgment (1446-52)
Rogier van der Weyden

The first of the three effects of sin examined by St. Thomas is corruption of the good of human nature. This corruption diminishes our natural inclination to virtue, which inclination is itself rooted in our fundamental nature as rational animals as we saw in Part 3. The stain of sin, which we discussed in Part 4, is a deprivation of the comeliness that fills the soul when it is rightly ordered both to reason and to God by sanctifying grace. The third effect of sin is the debt of punishment, to which we now turn.

The Debt of Punishment is an Effect of Sin

In the first article of Question 87 of Pars Prima Secundae of his Summa Theologica, St. Thomas argues that the debt of punishment is an effect of sin. He writes:

Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.¹

A random set of objects is not an ordered whole; nor is it an actual unity. But the members of an order are all, in a certain sense, actually one, in relation to the principle or head of that order. Consider, as an example, the relation of the members of a religious order, the Dominicans, to the head of their order. The members of the Dominican order are one in that order precisely insofar as they are rightly related to the head of the Dominican order. Now any order is ordered (i.e. designed) to preserve its unity in relation to the principle to which it is ordered. But for that reason, when something within an order rises up against the order, thereby threatening the unity of that order, the offender is put down [deprimatur] by the order or by the principle of that order. Furthermore, sin is, by definition, an inordinate act, i.e. an action against the divinely established order of justice in which man exists, and whose principle and head is God. St. Augustine defined sin as “a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.”² In this order, i.e. the eternal law, the human will is to be conformed to the divine will. Therefore, because sin is an action against this Divine order, and because the offender against an order is put down by the order or by the principle of that order, it follows that sin is put down by this Divine order and by God as the principle of this order. This pushing down against sin, by this order and by God as the principle of this order, is in essence what punishment [poena] is.

Aquinas then shows that there is a threefold punishment for wrongdoing, because man lives simultaneously in three orders: the order of his own reason, the order of human government (both of the household and of the state), and the Divine government according to the eternal law. He writes:

Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man’s nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.³

Regarding the first order, the remorse of conscience is the punishment that one’s own reason inflicts upon oneself, as punishment for acting against the order of reason. Regarding the second order, punishment by human government takes place under a court of human law, for actions in violation of the political order governed by that human law. And regarding the third order, God inflicts punishment on man for actions contrary to the universal order of the Divine government according to the eternal law. This divine punishment is the punishment relevant to our purpose in this series. Not every action contrary to reason is contrary to human law (i.e. the law promulgated and enforced by the state), because the human law does not extend to all violations of reason, but only to those more serious violations of justice, primarily those ‘horizontal’ injustices between neighbor and neighbor.⁴ But when we know the right thing to do, and do not do it, we act not only against reason, but also against the divine order in which our reason participates according to the mode of its nature. In doing so, we sin.⁵ Therefore punishment by God is due to man for sin, and in this way debt of punishment is an effect of sin.

Sin as the Punishment of Sin

Why not say that God does not punish sinners, but that they punish themselves, according to the dictum: sin is the punishment of sin? In Article 2, Aquinas explains that in one respect sin cannot be the punishment of sin, and in another respect sin is the punishment of sin. He writes:

We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the I, 48, 5. Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.⁶

As mentioned above, the essence of sin, according to Aquinas, is a voluntary act (i.e. word, deed, or desire) contrary to the eternal law.⁷ If the act is not voluntary, then the act cannot be a sin. A sinful act must therefore proceed from the will, because only if an act proceeds from the will [voluntas] can that act be voluntary. But for that reason, by its very nature punishment for sin must in some sense be contrary to the will of the sinner [De ratione autem poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem], otherwise punishment would not differ from reward. Therefore, because sin is essentially voluntary, and because punishment for sin must be contrary to the will, it follows that sin in its essence cannot be the punishment of sin. But then Aquinas writes:

On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above (Question 79, Article 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Romans 1:24) when he says: “Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart,” i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wisdom 5:7: “We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity.” Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself.⁸

Here Aquinas uses the essence-accident distinction to explain that although in its essence sin cannot be the punisment of sin, yet accidentally, sin can be the punishment of sin in three ways. First, when Divine grace is withdrawn on account of sin, this removes the impediment to further sins, and in this way the punishment consisting in the removal of Divine grace has the foreseen but accidental effect of allowing the resulting sins. Second, the very substance of the sinful act [substantiae actus] is such as to cause affliction [afflictionem inducit], whether interiorly or exteriorly, to the sinner. Third, the effects of sin can be a punishment of the sin. In each of these three ways, something contrary to the will is inflicted upon the will, and so in each of these three ways, sin is [accidentally] punishment for sin.

Mortal Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment

In Article 3, Aquinas argues that mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. He writes:

As stated above (Article 1), sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

First, he reminds us of what he has already stated in the first article, namely, that sin incurs a debt of punishment [reatum poenae] through turning against [pervertit] an order. For that reason, the debt of punishment must remain so long as the cause of that debt remains. In other words, so long as the sinner is turned against the order in which God has created him, the sinner is incurring the debt of punishment by that order and by God as the principle of that order.

Second, Aquinas distinguishes between reparable and irreparable disruptions of an order. Those that destroy the principle [subtrahitur principium] of the order are irreparable, while those that do not destroy it are reparable. Here he is not using the term ‘principle’ [principium] to refer to the order’s head per se, but rather to that whereby a member of the order takes part in that order [per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis] in relation to the head of the order. Now, the order in question here is the third of the three orders discussed above, namely, the order whereby man’s will is subject to God as man’s ultimate end [ultimus finis]. God is man’s ultimate end, and the supernatural virtue of charity is that by which man adheres [inhaeret] to God as his last end. Therefore, it follows that whatever sins turn man away from God so as to destroy charity, by their very nature incur a debt of eternal punishment. But mortal sins are those that destroy charity and turn man away from God. So it follows that mortal sins incur a debt of eternal punishment.

The Twofold Nature of Mortal Sin and Its Twofold Punishment

In Article 4 Aquinas explains the twofold nature of mortal sin and hence the twofold punishment due for mortal sin. He writes:

Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the “pain of loss,” which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the “pain of sense,” which is also finite.⁹

First Aquinas states that the punishment of sin is proportionate to the sin [poena proportionatur peccato]. Aquinas has already established elsewhere that sins are not all equal in their gravity; some are worse than others.¹⁰ Therefore, because sin is against an order, as explained in the first article, and because sins are not all equal in gravity, therefore the punishment due to sin for the restoration of order within that order must be proportionate to the gravity of the sin.

Second, Aquinas then claims that [mortal] sin by its very nature has a twofold movement. Every mortal sin includes both a turning away from God in some respect, and an inordinate (i.e. contrary to the established order) turning toward some finite created good. These two aspects of mortal sin entail that in the commission of any mortal sin, the sinner acts against the given order in two ways: one infinite and the other finite. And therefore there are two punishments due for any mortal sin.

Consider first the infinite way in which mortal sin violates the divine order. In turning away from God, whom he ought to love above all else, the sinner chooses not to give to the eternal God His rightful due as Head of the established order. Mortal sin is infinite precisely in this respect, that it is against the infinite God. Because the nature of the sin determines the punishment due for the sin, and because the due punishment for an infinite sin is an infinite punishment, therefore the due punishment for this voluntary turning away from the eternal God is the eternal loss of God.¹¹

Consider next the finite way in which mortal sin violates the divine order. In the very same act of mortal sin, the sinner has not only turned away from God, but also inordinately turned toward some finite mutable good. Mortal sin is finite in this respect. Only a finite punishment is due for a finite act. Therefore, the due punishment for turning inordinately to some mutable good is the “pain of sense”, which is finite. The distinction between these two debts of punishment, one infinite, and one finite, is the basis for the distinction between eternal punishment and temporal punishment, and thus between forgiveness of sin, which is absolution of our eternal debt of punishment by the merits of Christ, and reduction or elimination of our debt of temporal punishment. I have discussed this distinction and its implications in more detail here.

Some Sins do not Incur the Debt of Eternal Punishment

In Article 5 Aquinas argues that there are some sins (i.e. venial sins) that do not incur the debt of eternal punishment.

As stated above (Article 3), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.¹²

Aquinas has already distinguished above between reparable and irreparable disruptions of an order, the distinction being based on whether or not they destroy that by which a member of the order is united to the head of the order. In the order of divine justice, those sins that destroy charity cause an irreparable disorder, and incur eternal punishment, as we saw above. Here Aquinas claims that some sins are not in themselves contrary to the last end, i.e. God. The disorder in these sins is not contrariety to the last end per se, but only to the perfection of those acts directed to that end. As an example, Aquinas describes a man who is too fond of some temporal thing, but would not offend God for the sake of this temporal thing. Because these sins are not contrary to the last end per se, they do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.¹³

The Debt of Punishment Remains after Sin

In Article 6 Aquinas argues that the debt of punishment remains after sin. Aquinas writes:

Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God’s commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one’s fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.¹⁴

Aquinas first makes a distinction between the guilty act [actus culpae] and the consequent stain [macula sequens]. Regarding the guilty act, Aquinas states that the guilt [reatus] of an act remains after the sinful act has ceased. ‘Guilt’ should be understood here not as a subjective feeling, but as something objective, namely, a debt of punishment. The one who has transgressed the order of Divine justice cannot return to the ordered state within that order of Divine justice without paying some sort of penal compensation [recompensationem poenae], which restores him to the “equality of justice” [aequalitatem iustitiae]. Therefore, until such a debt of punishment has been paid, the debt remains even after the sinful act has ceased.

But does the debt of temporal punishment also remain after the stain on the soul has been removed? In other words, when the sinner repents, and turns back to God in love, does the debt of temporal punishment still remain? Aquinas writes:

But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above (Question 86, Article 1). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (6, 6). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.¹⁵

According to Aquinas, the stain of sin is not removed without the soul being united to God, as explained in Part 4. Man is united to God by his will [Coniungitur autem homo Deo per voluntatem], when man, by his will, turns to God in charity, grace preceeding. But when the will of man is turned to God in charity, then of course the will of man also embraces the order of Divine justice, for no one can love God without loving the order of Divine justice. So it follows that the stain of sin cannot be removed unless the will of man embraces the order of Divine justice. The penitent may embrace the order of Divine justice in two ways: either by taking upon himself the temporal punishment of his past sin, or by patiently bearing the punishment that God has inflicted upon him. In both of these ways, says Aquinas, the punishment has the nature of satisfaction [poena rationem satisfactionis habet]. By this he means that the punishment is no longer merely a downward action pushing down against the offender, but has also become an upward act from the penitent to the head of the order in order to make reparation for offenses against the order.

When punishment is satisfactory, says Aquinas, it loses something of the nature of punishment, because the nature of punishment [poena], as explained above, is to be against the will of the one being punished. The penitent who freely embraces his punishment, out of love for God, makes the punishment to be, in one sense, what he himself wills. And in that way the punishment loses something of the nature of punishment. Absolutely considered, the punishment is still against the will of the penitent, because insofar as it is painful it is against the natural inclination of his will. Yet inasmuch as the penitent embraces this punishment voluntarily, out of love for God, he transforms it into satisfaction. Now Aquinas answers the question: Does the debt of [temporal] punishment remain after the stain on the soul has been removed? He answers that when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of [temporal] punishment, not of punishment simpliciter, but of satisfaction.

On Being Punished for Another’s Sins

In Articles 7 Aquinas explains the way in which someone can and cannot be punished for another’s sins. He writes:

As already stated (6), punishment can be considered in two ways–simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished.¹⁶

Aquinas refers back to the previous article, and states that punishment can be considered in two ways: either simply [simpliciter], or, when voluntarily embraced to make reparation, as satisfactory. Satisfactory punishment, as explained above, is voluntary insofar as the person suffering this punishment freely embraces it in order to make reparation for offenses against the order. Then Aquinas writes a beautiful line showing how punishment as satisfaction can be born voluntarily by another through love. He says, “And since those who differ in debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love [esse unum secundum voluntatem unione amoris], it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another [poenam voluntarius pro alio portat].” To illustrate, Aquinas refers to human affairs, where men take on the debts of another, out of friendship. But Aquinas explains that if we are speaking of punishment simpliciter, in the sense of that which has the nature of punishment, this is always directed to the guilty person.

Lord Jesus, let us come to see what we owed for our offenses against you, and what you have done for us, in love, in your Passion. By your suffering for us, draw us into perfect unity with one another, as those who love much. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

The next post in this series can be found here.

1. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.1 co.
2. Contra Faust. xxii, 27
3. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.1 co.
4. In Summa Theologica I-II Q.96 a.2 Aquinas writes, “Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.”
5. See Summa Theologica I-II Q.91 a.2 co., and James 4:17
6. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.2 co.
7. Summa Theologica I-II Q.71 a.6 co.
8. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.2 co.
9. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.4 co.
10. Summa Theologica I-II Q.73 a.2
11. In rejecting God for some finite good, the sinner’s due punishment is in one sense what he wants, for he has freely chosen to reject God. But in another, deeper sense, this punishment is not what he wants, otherwise it would not be punishment. In what sense is separation from God not what the sinner wants? By his primary nature as a rational being, he is ordered to God as his ultimate end. Nothing else can satisfy him. This is why the primary punishment [poena] of hell is the loss of God.
12. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.5 co.
13. See also Summa Theologica II-II Q.24 a.10
14. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.6 co.
15. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.6 co.
16. Summa Theologica I-II Q.87 a.7 co.