I hope to tell my story simply, because it is genuinely uncomplicated. Complex, yes. Multi-layered, sure. Who’s journey in the Christian faith isn’t? But I do promise to keep the telling of it simple by concentrating on the main catalysts that gave my wife Cindy and me the courage to approach the doors of the Catholic Church and with confidence begin to knock.

Jason and Cindy Stewart, after entering the Catholic Church

With that said, let me start this introduction by beginning at the ending. Cindy and I became Catholic because we came to see that the Catholic Church is the Church established by Jesus Christ. That is the reason. In truth, this reason should be the basic motivation for anyone seeking full communion with or remaining within the Catholic Church. All the thousands of otherwise good and important reasons for being Catholic pale in comparison with this fundamental truth of her divine origin. You see, if she is that City whose founder and builder is God, then we must live within her walls. Now I realize what I’ve written to this point does not satisfy the many, many questions — and objections — Protestant Christians may have in reading a story like mine. Most certainly not. But staying true to my promise not to complicate things, I’ve begun with the ending so as to make plain the reason from the beginning.

Because this is a ”conversion” piece you have the advantage of knowing that we didn’t always accept this profound claim about the divine origin of the Catholic Church. And therein lies the curiosity of our story. I was a Presbyterian minister and pastor in a conservative denomination. My theology was solidly Reformed, having been educated at a reputable Reformed institution known both for its orthodoxy and pastoral emphasis. As a pastor I was committed in my ministry to classical Reformed belief and practice. Even now I remain grateful for the Reformed faith, as you’ll see. So the question naturally is, what happened? What instigated our study of Catholicism? What moved us to have a change of heart about the Catholic faith?

Our decision to leave Presbyterianism for the Catholic Church surprised many. We can sympathize given that in the past we’d have been incredulous if told we’d be Catholic one day. And yet looking back now from our vantage point we can trace the trajectory that led us to full communion with the Catholic Church, and it’s a trajectory that progressed naturally and imperceptibly over time - a growing appreciation for the necessity and role of the visible Church; a deepening understanding of the sacramental nature of the Christian faith; the apostolic quality intrinsic to Church authority; the unique function of the Minister of the Gospel in the liturgy and life of the Church; the inescapable dynamic of tradition within the Christian Faith; and an increasing awareness of the implications of the adjectives “one” and ”catholic” as used by the Nicene Creed to identify the Church of Jesus Christ. Each of these areas of faith track back from where we are now as Catholics to where we were when Reformed. They prepared the way for us to give serious consideration to the Catholic faith when the time came.

It would be helpful here for me to begin listing the main catalysts that prompted us to engage the claims of the Catholic Church. After noting them, I’ll present each one on its own in order to explain how it contributed to effect our change of heart concerning Catholicism.

1. The positive principles of the Protestant Reformation.
2. The writings of the Church Fathers.
3. The nature of Church authority.

Having these three areas of study laid out before us, let me emphasize here the importance of the present website in prompting our journey toward the Catholic Church. Called To Communion was at first merely a pebble in my apparently well-tied Presbyterian church shoes. For the life of me I could not fathom how these men (most seminary trained) could leave the Reformed faith for Rome. A blend of curiosity, skepticism and concern (I knew one of the men personally) inclined me to try to understand what turned them Catholic. Over time CTC became for me a mountain that permitted no clearly designated detour around it to Geneva. Facing and answering these issues on a personal level were important to me as a pastor. I had to admit that the well-reasoned arguments from the contributors of the site were substantial enough that they could not be brushed off and ignored. So I began to investigate, assured that there were biblically, theologically, philosophically, historically satisfying Reformed answers to the challenges presented by CTC.

1. The positive principles of the Protestant Reformation.

Perhaps you’ve heard it said that the Protestant Reformation was a tragic necessity, something that needed to happen, painful as the consequences may have been. This was my view. My understanding was that the fundamental spirit of the solas of the Reformation were incompatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church. This incompatibility is what I believed compelled the Protestant reformers to dedicate all their energies to unburdening the Church of Jesus Christ from what they believed to be the weight of man-made, extra- or un-Scriptural traditions that had sapped the strength of apostolic Christianity to the point of near collapse. God’s glory and the true way of salvation had been effectively smothered in the Church by the theological inventions of Catholicism, so my thinking went.

As I began to dig down to the most foundational differences dividing Protestants and Catholic, the book The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism by Louis Bouyer was recommended to me. Bouyer was a Lutheran minister who converted to Catholicism mid-last century. I was already familiar with him and appreciated his work and insights on Christian liturgy but had paid little attention to his discussions on Catholicism. What piqued my interest now was the peculiar thesis of this one book. Bouyer claimed that the Catholic Church is necessary for the full flowering of the principles of the Reformation. Put differently – Protestantism needs Catholicism in order to become all it aspires to be, which, of course, if true means the Protestant Reformation was completely unnecessary. Worse, it means that the Reformation was impossible from the outset because the reformers had unwittingly cut themselves off from the only source that could make their vision fruitful. To my Reformed and Presbyterian ears this sounded more than strange. Given my understanding of Catholic teaching, Bouyer’s idea was akin to saying a terminal illness is integral to the full flowering of bodily health. Or a fire is best fueled by depriving it of oxygen. Or the growth of a plant is impossible without rooting it in infertile soil. In my mind, Bouyer’s absurdity had to be explained, so I picked up the book and read.

What I discovered in reading the work was that the author’s claim was well founded. He demonstrates this repeatedly chapter by chapter. He enthusiastically affirms the positive principles of the Reformation showing the reader that, understood properly, each principle has its natural home in the Catholic faith. He then proceeds to critique the more negative aspects of Reformation doctrine (e.g. sola scriptura) contending that these negatives in the course of time undermined Protestantism’s positive principles, eventually giving birth to the reality known as Protestant Liberalism. Without question, I cannot do justice to the potency of Bouyer’s work in just a paragraph or two. A reflex for Reformed Christians reading this would be merely to dismiss the argument of Bouyer’s work as absurd. Recall that such was my initial reaction too, which is why I encourage you to read the book for yourself and take seriously the thesis present in its pages. Suffice it to say, he is persuasive in arguing that the positive principles of the Protestant Reformation are not antithetical to the Catholic Church but rather draw their strength and vitality from her existence.

The material found in The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism suggested a possibility I had never explored. What if the beauty of my Reformed faith was in fact the reflection of an original beauty? Could it be that I as a Protestant was seeing the Christian faith through a glass darkly? I had to find out.

2. The writings of the Church Fathers.

Another subject for study in engaging Catholicism was the Church Fathers. Catholics regularly make the claim that these leaders of the early Church are Catholic. I had a renewed interest to test this claim. My sense was that it would be easily disproved. After all, the reformers themselves had been avid students of the Fathers, quoting them in their theological works with ease and without contradiction over against Catholic teaching, right?

Going into this I had to admit that my familiarity with the actual works of the Fathers was limited. Thumbing curiously through a random volume from Schaff’s Patristics collection or culling a quote from Ignatius or Augustine or reading a history of early doctrine text for seminary coursework exhausted my contact with these ancient Christian authors. I had known for a long time that the Church Fathers did not share my Reformed theological vocabulary. But such was to be expected, I guessed. The Protestant Reformation with its precise theological formulations was many centuries away when these men wrote. So what (my thinking went) if Irenaeus or Justin or Augustine didn’t sound exactly like our Reformed creeds and catechisms? Yet now in examining their writings I began to sense that indeed there was something more profound at work than a mere difference in expression or emphasis. Was the Catholic claim right? Continued reading suggested that the actual theological substance of the Fathers was different. Certainly the Fathers didn’t seem at odds with the positive elements of the Reformation. But I noticed in my reading that they thought differently than did the reformers. Their approach to the Christian faith took another route. They seemed to cut an early theological path that when traced did not exactly connect to the one blazed by the reformers in the 16th century. I began to consider whether a person would naturally pick up the distinctive trail of the Protestant Reformation if one started with the writings of the early Church? The answer increasingly seemed to be no.

I knew the reformers had explicitly rejected much of what I was finding in the Church Fathers.

Page after page revealed a common faith during that early period in which bishops succeeded Apostles, baptismal waters regenerated, bread and wine transformed, penance was necessary and salutary, purgatorial fire cleansed, the Blessed Virgin was an active Mother to the faithful, departed saints prayed, Peter held the Keys, and the Eucharist was a sacrifice for the living and the dead. There appeared in their minds no awareness of or concern for the cardinal doctrines of the Reformation so painstakingly spelled out as essential to the gospel. Actually…the Fathers sounded Catholic.

This was unexpectedly unsettling for me because no external argument(s) in favor of a Catholic reading of the Fathers had been made in conjunction with my reading of them. The writings themselves served to give voice to the arguments. The words on the page became the witness or opponent (depending on one’s perspective). I began to ponder whether a person would naturally pick up the trail of the Catholic Church if one started with the writings of the early Church? The answer increasingly seemed to be yes.

At this point someone could object that the Church Fathers were not Catholic. My question would be, what then were they? Most certainly they did not share the peculiar faith of the Protestant Reformation. While it is possible to place a non-Catholic interpretation upon carefully selected sentences and paragraphs from the Fathers, a sustained reading makes such an interpretation impossible to maintain. In reading them one discovers that they appear to be natives of the Catholic Church. Wrenching them out of their natural Catholic context is detrimental to both the power of their witness and the proper understanding of the inquiring reader.

My suggestion here is to take up and read the Church Fathers. Read them in context. Read all of them. Allow them to define their terms. Take them at their word. Yes, this is a time investment. And it requires an open mind. But if you devote yourself to reading them, your perspective on the early Church will be forever changed and enriched. At the very least I’m hopeful you’ll come to acknowledge that these churchmen were Catholic. Better yet, you may become convinced that these Fathers are authentic witnesses to apostolic Christianity.

3. The question of Church authority.

As a Presbyterian I believed that Jesus personally appointed twelve men to the office of Apostle and sent them to proclaim the gospel (Mark 3:13-19). In giving them this office he endowed it with his own divine authority to guarantee that they would faithfully transmit his words and works to others (Matt. 28:18-20). The character of their authority is seen in any number of statements Jesus made concerning them:

“And he said to them….’The one who hears you hears me, and the one who rejects you rejects me, and the one who rejects me rejects him who sent me’” (Lk. 10:16).

“‘Peace be with you. As the Father has sent me, even so I am sending you.’ And when he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you withhold forgiveness from any, it is withheld’” (John 20:21-22).

“And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt. 16:17-18).

“Truly, I say to you, whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt. 18:18).

Clearly such a position runs contrary to the way so many Christians believe today: Men have no divine authority, right? And yet, Jesus tells them that he is received or rejected in direct proportion to whether his Apostles are received or rejected. No man can forgive sins, right? And yet, Jesus gives them his authority to forgive sins. No man’s decisions are binding on believers, right? And yet, Jesus tells them that their Apostolic decisions will accomplish God’s will and obligate believers in faith and practice.

With this divinely bestowed authority, the Apostles were called and equipped by God to be the leaders of Jesus’ Church. They were chosen by him to head up an identifiable, organized assembly/community of his followers. Given the character of their unique role in the Church, it was necessary to be in communion with the Apostles of Christ in order to be a Christian — submitting to them, worshiping under their governance, receiving their teaching, etc. (Acts 2:42; 1 John 1:1-3). Faith involved submitting to a living authority — the Apostles. These Apostles had received and submitted themselves to Jesus Christ and his teachings, and those who heard these Apostles received and submitted themselves to them and to their teachings. By receiving and submitting to the Apostles and their message the early believers were receiving and submitting to Christ and his message. To be in the Church one had to accept the living, teaching voice of the Apostles because they alone were the unique bearers of Jesus’ authority and message. An individual or group could not abandon this Church headed by the Apostles and establish its own a few blocks over. This was the nature of Church authority in the earliest period of apostolic Christianity.

So I believed, and still believe.

In light of my burgeoning study of Catholicism, I began to ponder with renewed interest this biblical portrait of Church authority and how it related to my present experience as a Presbyterian – What was the nature of Church authority today? How did it relate to the Apostles? What happened then when the Apostles died? Did the Church abruptly cease to have a living authority to guide her? Was there no longer a living teaching voice to which believers must listen? Revisiting these basic questions in light of the Catholic Church proved enlightening.

My answer to such things in the past had been that the Apostles committed and transmitted their authority in written form through the inspired documents of the New Testament. Everything necessary for salvation and the Christian life had been captured in their surviving letters and writings. Submission to the Apostles and their teachings was then measured by submission to the Bible and its teachings. Yes, as a Presbyterian I recognized there were leaders in the Church to whom obedience was due (Heb. 13:17) — being a pastor, I was one of them — but obedience to such leaders was dependent on whether or not they themselves were obeying the voice of the Apostles in the writings of the New Testament. Like the noble Bereans, each believer was to evaluate their leaders and their teachings by the Bible. To use the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith, ”The supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.” This is known as the principle of sola scriptura.

Putting this doctrine through the theological, philosophical and historical paces in the hope it would bear up under close scrutiny was uncomfortable for me. My assumption had always been that it was unquestionably true. I had believed it since a child. Now I was going to give my best effort to examine the familiar teaching from an outside perspective in order to ask its basis.

Coming at the doctrine from a different point of view, I had to admit certain weaknesses in it that ultimately changed my thinking. Here’s what I saw. First, the Bible doesn’t teach the principle of sola scriptura. The Scriptures are an incomparable guide for the moral life of the Christian, but they nowhere claim to be a comprehensive source for doctrine, worship, and the government of the Church. Second, the Church Fathers don’t teach sola scriptura. The Fathers did not promote anything resembling a “Scripture alone” position but instead recognized the necessity and authority of the traditions handed down from the Apostles. Third, the “Bible-based” fragmentation of Protestantism argues against the soundness of sola scriptura. All claim to be following the Bible. All arrive at different understandings of what it teaches. With such variety what standard shall we use to determine who is correct? The Bible? Fourth, the fact that the individual Protestant’s private judgment remains the final authority in evaluating faith claims undermines the principle of sola scriptura. Each person chooses the church group that agrees with his interpretation of the Bible. If disagreements arise within the group, a person then stays or leaves based on whether his interpretation is embraced or rejected. If rejected, the individual searches for a new church group that is in agreement with his interpretation of the Bible. Thus the individual remains the final arbiter of what the Bible teaches. Fifth, the fact that the Apostolic letters and writings give no divinely inspired indication what books are to be included in the canon of the New Testament makes impossible the principle of sola scriptura. How can the Bible be the ultimate authority when its very content is uncertain? Catholics believe the divinely guided Church was necessary to define what books belong to the New Testament.

Now I haven’t walked you through the details of the arguments for these five conclusions, but I hope you follow the links to the articles on CTC that provide clear reasons for what I’ve suggested above.

In contrast to this “Scripture alone” position, the Catholic Church teaches that the Church, not the Bible, is the pillar and foundation of the truth (1 Tim. 3:15). That by divine design it is the Church that upholds and protects the truth of the gospel throughout the centuries. The doctrine of Apostolic succession means that Bishops as successors of the Apostles are enabled by the Holy Spirit in their sacred office to preserve the Apostolic deposit of faith against every kind of error, distortion and corruption. Jesus promised to guide and instruct the ordained leaders of the Church (Jn 14:25; 16:13). The Holy Spirit’s guidance is Christ’s guarantee that the shepherds of his Church will never tamper with, pervert, or misunderstand the gospel. This is known formally as the Catholic doctrine of magisterial infallibility — the pope alone or the pope and the bishops in union with him are divinely protected from teaching error when they define matters pertaining to faith and morals.

As I studied this subject of Church authority, I began to see that the Catholic doctrine of Apostolic succession naturally connected to the biblical portrait of Church authority as it existed in the days of the Apostles. The Church wasn’t bereft of a living teaching authority when the Apostles died because these Apostles appointed qualified men to succeed them in the office of bishop, transmitting by succession a full share in the Apostolic authority so essential to the preservation and proclamation of the Apostolic deposit of faith. It became clear to me that the Bible and Church history confirm and corroborate this important teaching of the Catholic Church. Jesus gave us a Church with a book, not a book with a Church.

Conclusion

Let me begin this conclusion by ending at the beginning: My wife Cindy and I entered into full communion with the Catholic Church because we came to see that this Church is the Church established by Jesus Christ. We came to this realization in large measure by spending time in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, reading other positive presentations of Catholic teaching, and speaking with flesh and blood Catholics in all walks of life and vocations. The many misconceptions we had about what Catholics believed were cleared away as we dug deeply into the teaching resources of the Catholic Church and talked with actual Catholics. We began to recognize that all the Church taught and claimed was verified and confirmed in the Bible, by history, and in the lives of the saints. Over time we came to understand that the Catholic Church represents the fullness of what Christ wanted to reveal to his people; that it possesses all the gifts that our Lord wanted us to have; and that the Church in its liturgy, its apostolic teaching, the Eucharist, the sacraments, and its saints, serves as the definitive place where God’s grace is on full offer. The reason being — it is the Church of Jesus Christ most fully and rightly ordered through time. Yes, unquestionably a profound claim. But it is the one made by the Catholic Church in all ages, and it is the claim we have come to accept.

This is your invitation to test and see. I assure you that there is no lack of evidences for her divine origin. Such are openly verifiable and abundant. One need only the willingness to discern them. Whatever my personal story may be, the proof of the Catholic Church’s divine origin resides in the realm of history. The evidences are public, out there for you to examine. You are not at the mercy of my personal judgments concerning this claim about the Catholic Church. Instead you are free to investigate the facts of the Church’s perduring existence, her miraculous life, her divine teachings, the abiding fruit of her mission in the world from the time of Christ even down to our present day. The clues are all there; they await you. You need only begin to pursue them.

Jason Kettinger
Easter Vigil, 2011

As we survey the interesting “space” that is the internet, we find intellectual pursuits and human interactions of varying quality. This is no less so in the field of religion, where the Lord Jesus Christ is often obscured behind a veil of ignorance and even needless hostility. It is my sincere hope that this meager contribution be a step toward affirmative dialogue and reconciliation.

With my purpose stated, the humble reader turns to ask the question he wants to know: Why? What makes a Reformed future pastor toss it all aside, and become Catholic? That is of course complicated, but I’ll try to explain. The story is really one of the harmony and convergence of truth, and the place where that convergence led was the Catholic Church.

The story begins with God, as it always does. What do we do when we offend God, who has graciously given us all things? Even in light of Christ’s sacrifice for us this turns out to be a deeper question than it seems. A friend once remarked that the sacrament of Reconciliation “does do justice to the existential reality of sin.” Every Christian I know, and every Christian community of which I have been a part, understands and attempts to take account of the individual and personal dimension of sin. The individual and corporate experience of union with Christ tells us that we cannot be cavalier about sin. Our relationship with Christ is bilateral, real, and demanding. We all have done business with God; I’m not surprising anyone here, I trust.

The church family from whom I’ve learned the most taught me that what we did mattered; we had a liturgy that reflected the reality of what I’ve just written. Before we enjoy the benefits of sonship, we have to acknowledge our sins, and allow God to restore us. Then we are exhorted to walk in a manner worthy of the gospel. Then we shared the meal which proclaimed our restoration: the Eucharist. We didn’t fear to call it that, because if Eugene Peterson can do it, so can we. We were intentionally liturgical; we were intentionally ecumenical; we were doggedly Eucharistic. We believed that our life in prayer with God would lead us to ask new questions, and that the answers could lead us to revise aspects of our Reformed tradition. At the same time, if the Reformers or others gave us anything, it was that “faith once delivered to all the saints.” Truth doesn’t change; truth stands the test of time; the Church of Jesus Christ is old; His truth is both old and new. We were creedal, because the gospel was given to us, and we will give it in turn. There is a Great Tradition, we said, and we’re only a part of it. We read not only Calvin and Edwards but also O’Connor and Chesterton. I might have heard it a thousand times: “The Church did not start in 1520.” Continuity. Love. Simplicity. Jesus. There are so many stories I could tell. Just know that when I left for seminary in 2005, the unity of all Christians wasn’t some pie-in-the-sky dream; it was how we lived, and what we worked toward. Need I say more about that?

So I had an instinct for unity, and a tendency to express my theology in liturgical action. I was political, which is another way of saying I wanted my faith to make a difference in the world. We chalked up theological disagreements as historical anachronisms that awaited the clarity of God’s grace, which would show a truer, deeper unity in the times to come. I didn’t yet see the tensions which were coming to the fore.

I admit, I always enjoyed being branded as “dangerous.” But what struck me as I read more about liturgy and covenant theology was how warmly these theologians spoke of Jesus, how liturgical action was the way they not only experienced God’s love, but declared it. It was missional. If on some gut level they spoke with such resonance about the Christian life I understand, how bad could they be? If one reflects on what we’re saying here, it’s that liturgy has an ability to speak a language that bridges traditional hostilities.

If we begin theology with the simplicities of liturgy, and work outward, it is highly possible that we will face tensions with traditional formulations. The question we ask is what we will do about it. I’m not a systematic theologian; in the truest sense, I am an evangelist. The life of prayer, the liturgical life, needs settled truth to ground it as we reach out in faithfulness to God. I have never been averse to correction. What I began to experience and to attempt to describe was the inability to reconcile a contradiction, between righteousness imputed and righteousness shared. Essentially, something had to give. Either the righteousness of Christ was imputed to me by faith and fully completed, leaving the life of the church and repentance a good, but not necessary step by us, or Chapter 15 of the Westminster Confession of Faith was more correct: repentance and perseverance are an absolute requirement of the Christian life. It absolutely could not be both, despite how much we may insist on it. The buzzword “union with Christ” only makes it worse. Imputation either puts God in union with manifestly unholy people, or the participation suggested by the life of sanctification undercuts the truth of imputation extra nos. You have to choose.

What I do dare to say is that these sympathies in the direction of continual necessary repentance do undercut the principled basis for the Reformed separation in the 16th century. Why? Because we had insisted that true participation (as it was articulated in medieval Catholic theology) denigrated the work of Christ and the reality of our victory in Him. We had no cause to pretend otherwise, nor to smuggle in that which we opposed in the vanity of having a “fully-orbed” theology. Does this protest still have merit? What should we do if the battle-cries we raised once have no correspondence to our Christian lives? It is a life grounded in experience; we would not dare say that our liturgy, sustained by the interplay of repentance and forgiveness, of humility and exaltation, was a formality. In fact, this was both its liveliness, and its danger. Now on the table as never before are issues of apostasy and sacramental objectivity that never would have been asked among the Reformed. In one sense, there has always been a variety of perspectives within Reformed theology, and tensions therein. But never before have the tensions demanded an answer. Against the backdrop of my basic view of church history — continuity — the tensions or contradictions became such that questions like, “Why do we seek forgiveness for sins we say have already been forgiven?” are brushed aside at one’s peril.¹ What I’m illustrating here is a tension between historic and systematic theology, and lived experience in the pews.

If we might criticize some people with a certain lack of precision, a riposte with no good reply is that we don’t need answers to questions that no one is asking. What we were fighting about is the sacramental life versus an historic faith, with due respect, that is at its core anti-sacramental. If any of the sacraments have an objective character, the Church which gives them must also. Our communities were forged in the white-hot fire of theological disputation; our fathers in Protestant and Reformed faith would not share this new tolerance. If we have been led here because the law of prayer is the law of faith, I reasoned, it is a cause for serious discussion. I need only allude to those Reformed congregations who have opened their Lord’s Supper to Catholics and Orthodox to show that we have arrived at such a moment.² Even if the occasion only served to sober the hasty when such people refrained in obedience to their communities, the discussion will occur by necessity. In any case, we can see that the questions of the 16th century are giving way to the questions of the 21st. At the least, I assert that the issue isn’t on the front-burner. If so, maybe it’s time to lay down arms. For me, I could not stand apart on the strength of a slogan that meant nothing. Not even out of loyalty.

But what of the basic claim of the Reformers, that they had better captured the spirit and intent of the Church Fathers? It’s true that they were not ignorant of them. As for me, I knew nothing of the Fathers on their own terms. It had to be an open question, if I were to be intellectually honest. After all, any group can read history in such a way as to vindicate themselves. And this leads directly to the question of history, and because salvation history is at issue primarily, we are asking, “What is the Church?” This was a question like a shard of glass in my heart starting in 2006. The magnitude of the social and political issues we are facing absolutely demands that we reject most forms of “co-belligerence” as insufficient, because the answer to all of them is Christ; it is our love, it is our striving together in Christ and for Christ that can answer these problems. And they stem from existential questions surrounding the identity and purpose of man. If Christians do not answer these in the same way, how will people know that it is Christ who meets them? Moreover, if we do not accept one another as brothers, which Christ shall they follow? But do we dare force one another to adopt differing paradigms of the Church and salvation? How could that be anything but a failure? We may rightly say there is much that unites us. But if those things do not impel us toward one another, they are folly at best, and a violation of our consciences at worst, if we pretend the differences aren’t real. On both sides of the Catholic-Protestant divide, we conceive of the Church and of history in very different ways. Which view of history and Church does justice to the ancients?

Confessionalism may indeed preserve those ancient elements of truth which predate the schisms, but it does a terrible job of indicating how we are to pursue unity practically. This was the second thing I realized: being confessionally Reformed is in contradiction with the very definition of the Church found in the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter XXV.³ An invisible Church cannot define itself, or what it believes. But the certainty of Reformed distinctives depends on the authority of a visible Church. There is a quotation attributed to one John L. Girardeau within the essay “The Discretionary Power of the Church” that took my breath away every time I read it. It reads in part:

The delivery of Christ’s doctrines and commandments by men does not make them the doctrines and commandments of men. … Their dogmas are not man’s, they are God’s dogmas.

I’ve got to drop the guard a bit, take leave of that measured tone for which this site is known, and I beg your pardon if it sounds rude, but does that sound like an invisible church to you? Take your pick: Either the Westminster divines re-constituted the visible community that Christ established (which was obviously contrary to what I had been taught, not least the promise of Christ in Matthew 16:18) or we cannot be reasonably certain that our conclusions are more than opinion; that is, there could be also more fundamental truth possessed by those who are not us. In fact, our very definition presupposes that that is the case. In the twenty-fifth chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the first article tells us that the catholic church is invisible. The second article, by contrast, strongly asserts the visibility of that church. Moreover, the fifth article in this same chapter discusses the purity and truth of various “Churches” on Earth. First, which of the first two articles actually controls here, so that we might find out where we ought to reside, and what we are to believe? Second, what authority did this assembly have to make such a determination? The fifth article utterly depends on the invisible church asserted in Article I, but the comfort of being in the supposed household of God comes from Article II. Which is it? And who are they?

“Ah,” says the alert reader, “but Scripture is our guide.” We’ll get to that. For now, the guest post by Fred Noltie will be my answer. All this is to say that one question would not leave me alone, and it is the question that people of my generation are asking: “What is the Church?” The traditional definition for the Reformed is fine to a point, and that point is where our distinctives meet their doom against the presumption of historical continuity. If our communities as Protestants existed and subsisted on the unstated premise of ecclesial deism, then the concrete action taken in regard to history to explain it is what I call “ecclesial plagiarism.” The ancients may be dead, but we owe them at least the right to tell us what living for Christ was actually like before we retroactively re-write them into a history more amenable to the community we inhabit. I have already said that my fundamental approach to history was and had to be continuity. This is often claimed to refute the charge of schism. I had warmly sung “The Church’s One Foundation” for years as a prayer for unity, unaware that my own ecclesial commitments prevented me directly from ever realizing my hope. That may seem unfair, but I do believe the creeds themselves help explain it.

In that wonderful but critically unexamined tutelage of sympathy and continuity with history, the creeds figure prominently. In even the popular mind, we recite the creeds in solidarity with our ancestors in the faith, and even with those Christians who are separated from us. This is largely a lovely expression of catholicity, and would pass without a mention if not for the minor inconvenience of Sola Scriptura. As a principle, it does not admit any external authority for the creeds. The final authority is presumably Scripture, and the creeds would function as a norm only after they had been tested by it.

But as I heard one elder speak about the creed (the Apostles’, in this case) I came to realize — as though I had been hit by a brick in the face — the truth of this assertion that welled deep within me, first, after I read Mathison’s The Shape of Sola Scriptura, and now loudest in Sunday School just days before I entered the Catholic Church: “Derivative authority is a sham.”⁴ The elder said in effect that if we wanted to edit the creeds (to delete the word “catholic” as I recall) we could, because the Creed wasn’t Scripture. I saw then that Mr. Cross’s claim contra Mathison was true. There is no real, principled distinction between the “Solo Scriptura” that Mathison abhors, and the Sola Scriptura that he commends. If there is a difference in practice or in result, it has to do with the person’s own piety, and God’s grace lovingly keeping him from a more severe individualism. In fact, the chapter in Mathison’s book on the error of Solo Scriptura almost made me Catholic by itself. Why would I pay as much attention to the text, context, place in the canon, authorial intent, and myriad other things in order to rightly handle the word of truth, and completely ignore the same with respect to the creeds? This is the ecclesial plagiarism I mentioned. If I edit the creed, it no longer functions as an authority over me, but I over it. In this sense, we cannot say we are in solidarity with anyone, either today or long ago, in the recitation of the creeds as Protestants. Why would the ecclesiology which gave it birth and the battles therein be incidental to its meaning? Can I think that St. Augustine is with me when I spurn the Church to which he submitted?⁵ Thanks be to God for various creeds and their use in Protestant communities. But it is not altogether clear that a principled creedalism actually exists apart from the Catholic Church and the individualism of “me and my Bible.”

I have made two perhaps frustrating assumptions: that the Church of Christ is visible, and that the Catholic Church today is that Church. I can only say that Petrine primacy was rather easily established from the Fathers,⁶ and that patristic authors on the Eucharist and apostolic succession cast more than a reasonable doubt on both the authority of my community to believe otherwise (and still be the Church) and the antiquity of those particular beliefs. Some might say that I have been a rebel from day one, and there is some truth in that. However, even as I actively investigated Catholic claims, and explored Catholic life, I never lost sight of Christ Jesus. I found Him there as I went; I pleaded with Him to guide me. I gave Jesus every question.

Even as I entered RCIA last August, I was uncommitted. Yes, I had dared to walk on the dangerous ground of uncertainty of all but Jesus. Yes, I put my career on hold, and then ended what it would have been. Yes, I struggled, and hurt, and cried, and prayed. You bet, I was afraid. It wasn’t as bad as what Francis Schaeffer went through, and though he took a different path, I thank God that I never doubted Jesus as he did. I knew Him, and He knows me. But the heart of it all is that Jesus asked me to surrender everything to follow Him, even to Rome, and the vicar who sits on Peter’s chair. The intellectual and historical collided with the personal; I had to do it in the peace of conscience. In that peace, and for that peace.

The most damaging chimera, the most serious error of the Reformation, is Sola Scriptura. It caused me to kidnap our ancient brethren in the faith, to claim them as my own against their wills. I had to ask my own heritage boldly, “Who asked us?” and be willing to live with the reality that no one did. I could not live with a hermeneutic that couldn’t silence the Baptist down the street (and bring us into harmony) much less the heretic. I had to face the reality of Christian division, and the reality that these divisions were caused by false principles I’d inherited from a movement I’d thought necessary. Its animating principle conspires to make invisible and without doctrine the Church we’d rightly claimed as our mother, outside of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation. The old saw that, “If I’m wrong, I’ll be on me knees tomorrow morning outside the Vatican doing penance” is just a toothless phrase if one’s hermeneutic of Scripture, history, and Church disallows the very consideration that one is wrong.

My beloved brethren in Christ Jesus scattered in many places, let us prayerfully consider whether the convergence of truth now leads us to begin again, to return home in peace.

Memorial of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mother

1. See “Reformed Imputation and the Lord’s Prayer.”
2. For example, see Trinity Kirk’s “On Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Reformed Catholicity.”
3. See WCF XXV.
4. See, for example, “C. The Delusion of Derivative Authority.”
5. Think of his statement to the Donatists, “You know what the Catholic Church is, and what that is cut off from the Vine; if there are any among you cautious, let them come; let them find life in the Root. Come, brethren, if you wish to be engrafted in the Vine: a grief it is when we see you lying thus cut off. Number the Bishops even from the very seat of Peter: and see every succession in that line of Fathers: that is the Rock against which the proud Gates of Hell prevail not.” (PL 43.30.) See also his statement against the epistle of Manichaeus quoted in The Chair of Peter: D. Fifth Century.
6. See, for example, Steven Ray’s book Upon This Rock. Other relevant works can be found in “The Papacy” section of Suggested Reading.”

Wedding at Cana
Duccio di Buoninsegna 1308-11

Outline
I. Introduction
II. New Testament Scripture on Marriage
III. Evidence from the Tradition and the Magisterium
A. First Millennium
B. Second Millennium
IV. The Porneia Clause
V. Objections to the Sacramentality and Indissolubility of Marriage
VI. Implications
VII. Conclusion

I. Introduction

According to the Catholic doctrine, a consummated marriage between two baptized persons is absolutely indissoluble so long as both persons live. Neither the Church nor the State has the power to dissolve the marriage; only the death of one of the spouses dissolves the marriage. And because marriage is exclusive to only one other person at a time, no person who is presently married can marry another person. Therefore, if a married couple acquires a civil divorce from a judge, that divorce is such only in the eyes of the State and its laws. The couple remains truly married before God, and before the Church until one spouse dies, even though the State declares it dissolved and no longer recognizes the marriage. So if upon obtaining a civil divorce one spouse goes before a judge or a Protestant pastor, and ‘marries’ a third party while the other spouse is alive, the new union is not a marriage, even if the State calls it a marriage and treats it like a marriage. Moreover, having sexual relations with a third party, while one’s spouse remains alive, is an act of adultery. For this reason, even if a judge grants a person a legal divorce from his spouse, and he then enters a civil marriage with a third party, every sexual act with that third party is an act of adultery and therefore a grave sin imperiling the souls of those engaged in that act.² As the Catechism explains, no one in such a situation may receive the Eucharist:

Today there are numerous Catholics in many countries who have recourse to civil divorce and contract new civil unions. In fidelity to the words of Jesus Christ – “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery” the Church maintains that a new union cannot be recognized as valid, if the first marriage was. If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively contravenes God’s law. Consequently, they cannot receive Eucharistic communion as long as this situation persists. For the same reason, they cannot exercise certain ecclesial responsibilities. Reconciliation through the sacrament of Penance can be granted only to those who have repented for having violated the sign of the covenant and of fidelity to Christ, and who are committed to living in complete continence.³

This doctrine is perceived by many people in our generation as scandalous, because divorce and remarriage have become so commonplace. The notion that divorce allows remarriage is rooted in a fundamental difference between the Protestant and Catholic doctrines concerning marriage. According to the Catholic Church, Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament. This means, among other things, that Christ did not merely remove Moses’s permission of divorce (Mt. 19:7-8; Mk. 10:3-4) and restore the original order of marriage (Mt. 19:6), while leaving married couples with no additional grace to live the married life. Rather, under the New Covenant the marriage of two baptized persons is accompanied by special grace from God such that the spouses may fulfill their marital and parental responsibilities in union with Christ and His Body, the Church. In this way, Christian marriage is an efficacious sign, communicating to the couple the grace it signifies regarding the indissoluble union of Christ and His Bride, the Church. It also makes Christian marriage (i.e. marriage between two baptized persons) a matter subject to the Church, because sacraments belong fundamentally to the stewardship of the Church.

But one of the Catholic doctrines that the first Protestants rejected is precisely the Catholic teaching that Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament. The inevitable consequence of this rejection is that in societies sufficiently influenced by Protestantism, marriage comes to be conceived and treated as merely a civil matter, and hence, by default, merely as a legal contract. As the Catholic Encyclopedia article on “Divorce” states regarding the practice and belief of the first Protestants, “Jurisdiction in matrimonial affairs was relegated, on principle, to the civil law, and only the blessing of marriage was assigned to the Church.”⁴ Of course many Protestant couples are wedded in a religious ceremony before a pastor in a church building, not before a judge. But because of the Protestant denial of the sacramental character of Christian marriage, what takes place during that ceremony, from the Protestant point of view, is still only the formation of a legal bond, one that the State has the authority to dissolve.⁵ Concerning this, Fr. Peter Elliot wrote,

This sacramental understanding of the papal policy is borne out by the Reformation when the rejection of the sacramentality of Marriage was at the same time a rejection of indissolubility [of marriage]. That the Reformers and their successors gave way to social and political pressure must be balanced by their loss of the sacramental understanding of man and woman. In their view of fallen human nature, male and female did not have the capacity or dignity to be able to signify and recapitulate the indissoluble bond of Christ the Bridegroom. This pessimism concerning our nature also struck out celibacy as “impossible.” It allowed for concessions towards divorce, surrendering to that “hardness of heart” which led Moses to grant the right of divorce (cf. Matthew 19:8).”⁶

But from a Catholic point of view, both the State and Protestant ecclesial communities, by treating marriages that are indissoluble as though they are dissoluble, are allowing and even sanctioning what is in fact adultery. And this is deeply harmful not only to the souls of those persons committing adultery in this way, but also to marriages, families, spouses, children, and society. Anyone concerned about recent State legislation regarding same-sex marriage ought to be much more concerned about State-sanctioned adultery through the rejection of the sacramental character of marriage, because as I will show below, the Protestant rejection of the sacramental character of marriage lies behind and makes possible the more recent same-sex legislation.

So why does the Catholic Church teach that a consummated marriage of two baptized persons is dissolved only by death? The answer is that this is what Christ and the Apostles handed down to us. To see this, we need to examine the evidence both from Scripture and from the Tradition.

II. New Testament Scripture on Marriage

Here I will very briefly set out the relevant passages from the New Testament concerning marriage. I will not discuss the two exception clauses (“except for fornication”) here in this section; I will discuss them in Section IV below. The reason for considering the patristic evidence first is so that we may approach Scripture in and with that very same living Tradition in which it was given, rather than interpreting Scripture within a man-made tradition of our own time.

In St. Matthew’s Gospel, we find two passages relevant to this question. In the first, Jesus says:

It was also said, “Whoever divorces [ἀπολύσῃ] his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce.” But I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except for the reason of fornication [παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας], makes her commit adultery; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.” (St. Matthew 5:31-32)

I will discuss the exception clause below in Section IV, but here Jesus teaches two things. First, if anyone divorces his wife he makes her commit adultery insofar as he puts her in a position where she is for various reasons compelled to seek marriage with another man. Jesus is not saying that the wife, in that case, is not guilty of adultery when she marries another man. Rather, He is saying that the husband materially contributes to her sin of adultery, by placing her in a situation that requires her to choose between, say, starvation and adultery. Second, Jesus teaches here that if any man marries a divorced woman, that man commits adultery in doing so. Marrying a divorced person is an act of adultery when either a divorced woman marries another man or a man marries a divorced woman. This is because the sort of divorce Jesus is speaking about does not break the marriage bond, but is only a separation in bed and board (divorce a mensa et thoro). In both cases, ‘marrying’ a divorced person is an act of adultery because the divorced person is still married to the person from whom he or she is divorced, so long as both spouses are alive.

Later in St. Matthew’s Gospel we read:

And Pharisees came up to Him and tested Him by asking, “Is there any cause for which it is lawful for a man to divorce his wife?” He answered, “Have you not read that He who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother, and the two shall become one? So they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.” They said to Him, “Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?” He said to them, “For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you: whoever divorces his wife, except for fornication [μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ] and marries another commits adultery. (St. Matthew 19:3-9)

Jesus here shows that the true nature of marriage was revealed in the Garden of Eden, when God made Adam and Eve, and disclosed that in marriage the man and woman become one, not merely having been brought together in physical proximity, but more deeply, having been divinely joined together for life in a one-flesh union. Hence Jesus says that whoever divorces his wife, except in the case of fornication, and marries another woman, commits adultery. Marrying another woman, in such a case, is an act of adultery, again because the man is still married.

In St. Mark’s gospel, Jesus says:

Whoever divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery against her; and if she herself divorces her husband and marries another man, she commits adultery.” (St. Mark 10:11-12)

This is very straightforward. If a man divorces his wife, and remarries, he commits adultery against her, because he is still married to her. And if a woman divorces her husband, and marries another man, she also commits adultery, because she is still married to her husband.

In St. Luke’s gospel, Jesus says:

Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery; and he who marries one who is divorced from a husband commits adultery. (St. Luke 16:18)

Jesus again speaks plainly here. The man who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery. And the man who marries a divorced woman commits adultery. Again, in both cases what makes the man’s action adulterous is that divorce has not dissolved the marriage, and thus the third party is entering sexually into an existing marriage.

Another important passage is Jesus’ first miracle at the wedding at Cana, recorded in John 2:1-11. Concerning this event, St. Augustine writes, “And for this cause did the Lord, on being invited, come to the marriage, to confirm conjugal chastity, and to show forth the sacrament of marriage.” (On the Gospel of John, 9:2) And the Catechism states, “The Church attaches great importance to Jesus’ presence at the wedding at Cana. She sees in it the confirmation of the goodness of marriage and the proclamation that thenceforth marriage will be an efficacious sign of Christ’s presence.”⁷

In his letter to the Christians of Rome, St. Paul writes:

Thus a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives; but if her husband dies she is discharged from the law concerning the husband. Accordingly, she will be called an adulteress if she lives with another man while her husband is alive. But if her husband dies she is free from that law, and if she marries another man she is not an adulteress. (Romans 7:2-3)

The law St. Paul refers to is divine law, not Roman law. The divine law from Christ regarding marriage is that marriage is binding until one of the spouses dies. As long as the husband lives, the wife is bound to him by divine law. If the husband dies, the marriage is dissolved and only then is the woman free to remarry. If she “lives with another man” while her husband remains alive, she is an “adulteress.”⁸ And all this applies to the man as well. He is bound by law to his wife, as long as she lives. If he ‘remarries’ while his wife remains alive, he becomes an adulterer. But if his wife dies, he is free to remarry.

In his first letter to the Corinthians, St. Paul writes:

But to the married I give instructions, not I, but the Lord. A wife should not separate [χωρισθῆναι] from her husband. But if she does separate she must either remain single or become reconciled to her husband – and a husband should not divorce [ἀφιέναι] his wife.” (1 Corinthians 7:10-11)

Here again St. Paul indicates that his instruction concerning marriage comes from Christ. This divine instruction is that a wife should not separate from her husband, and a husband should not divorce his wife. If a wife separates from her husband, she must either remain single (i.e. not united to another man) or be reconciled to her husband. He remains her husband even when she is separated from him, and she remains his wife even when he is separated from her. Likewise, we may infer, if a husband divorces his wife, he must either remain sexually separated from all other women, or he must be reconciled to his wife. Divorce here is a separation that does not dissolve the marriage bond.

Later in this same chapter St. Paul writes:

A wife is bound to her husband as long as he lives. If the husband dies, she is free to marry whomever she wishes, only in the Lord. (1 Corinthians 7:39)

Again St. Paul teaches that the marriage bond endures for life, so long as both spouses live. Only if one spouse dies is the other spouse free to remarry, because only when one spouse dies is the marriage bond dissolved.

III. Evidence from the Tradition and the Magisterium
A. First Millennium

Shepherd of Hermas (early second century)

And I said to him, Sir, if any one has a wife who trusts in the Lord, and if he detect her in adultery, does the man sin if he continue to live with her? And he said to me, As long as he remains ignorant of her sin, the husband commits no transgression in living with her. But if the husband know that his wife has gone astray, and if the woman does not repent, but persists in her fornication, and yet the husband continues to live with her, he also is guilty of her crime, and a sharer in her adultery. And I said to him, What then, sir, is the husband to do, if his wife continue in her vicious practices? And he said, The husband should put her away, and remain by himself. But if he put his wife away and marry another, he also commits adultery. And I said to him, What if the woman put away should repent, and wish to return to her husband: shall she not be taken back by her husband? And he said to me, Assuredly. If the husband do not take her back, he sins, and brings a great sin upon himself; for he ought to take back the sinner who has repented. But not frequently. For there is but one repentance to the servants of God. In case, therefore, that the divorced wife may repent, the husband ought not to marry another, when his wife has been put away. In this matter man and woman are to be treated exactly in the same way. (The Shepherd 2:4:1)

Here in the early part of the second century we find a teaching on the Christian understanding of marriage. Hermas first asks the angel whether a man who discovers that his wife is committing adultery sins if he continues to live with her. The angel’s answer is that if he lives with her, while knowing that she is committing adultery, he is cooperating with her sin.⁹ For that reason, he must separate himself from her in such a case. But the angel makes clear that in such a case if the husband re-marries (while his spouse is still living), he commits adultery, because she remains his wife. If she repents, he must take her back, again, because he is still married to her. The marriage bond is not broken by infidelity. And this is why, explains the angel, neither spouse may marry when the other commits adultery.

St. Justin Martyr (d. AD 165)

In regard to chastity, [Jesus] has this to say: ‘If anyone look with lust at a woman, he has already before God committed adultery in his heart.’ And, ‘Whoever marries a woman who has been divorced from another husband, commits adultery.’ According to our Teacher, just as they are sinners who contract a second marriage, even though it be in accord with human law, so also are they sinners who look with lustful desire at a woman. He repudiates not only one who actually commits adultery, but even one who wishes to do so; for not only our actions are manifest to God, but even our thoughts.” (First Apology, 15)

When St. Justin writes, “Whoever marries a woman who has been divorced from another husband, commits adultery,” he is quoting Jesus, as can be seen in the quotations from the Gospels laid out in Section II above. St. Justin explains that according to Jesus, if one spouse has committed adultery, the spouse who then re-marries while the other spouse lives, commits adultery. Such a person commits adultery even if the “human law” (i.e. the civil law, or law of the State) permits such a re-marriage.

Theophilus, bishop of Antioch [c. AD 175]

He who marries a woman put away by her husband, commits adultery; and he who puts away his wife save for the case of fornication, makes her to commit adultery. (Ad Autolycum, III, 13)

Theophilus here echoes Jesus’ own words. Anyone who marries a divorced woman commits adultery. And anyone who divorces his wife, except in the case of adultery, makes her to commit adultery. What I will show below, in Section IV is that the sort of ‘divorce’ allowed here that in which they separate from each other, so as not to participate in the adultery of the other, but neither are permitted to remarry so long as both spouses live.

Athenagoras of Athens [c. AD 177]

Athenagoras writes:

For we bestow our attention, not on the study of words, but on the exhibition and teaching of actions, — that a person should either remain as he was born, or be content with one marriage; for a second marriage is only a specious adultery. For whosoever puts away his wife, says He, and marries another, commits adultery [Matthew 19:9]; not permitting a man to send her away whose virginity he has brought to an end, nor to marry again. For he who deprives himself of his first wife, even though she be dead, is a cloaked adulterer, resisting the hand of God, because in the beginning God made one man and one woman, and dissolving the strictest union of flesh with flesh, formed for the intercourse of the race. (Legatio pro Christianis 33)

The debate at this time was whether second marriages were allowed after one’s spouse had died. I included this quotation because it shows by an a fortiori argument that second marriages after divorce, while the other spouse was living, were out of the question for Christians of this time.

St. Clement of Alexandria (AD 202)

Now that the Scripture counsels marriage, and allows no release from the union, is expressly contained in the law, You shall not put away your wife, except for the cause of fornication; and it regards as fornication, the marriage of those separated while the other is alive. … He that takes a woman that has been put away, it is said, commits adultery; and if one puts away his wife, he makes her an adulteress, that is, compels her to commit adultery. And not only is he who puts her away guilty of this, but he who takes her, by giving to the woman the opportunity of sinning; for did he not take her, she would return to her husband. (Stromata 2, chapter 23, AD 202)

What is clear here in this quotation from St. Clement of Alexandria is that the sort of divorce permitted was not a divorce that dissolved the marriage bond, but only a separation of the spouses, anticipating eventual reconciliation. Such a separation was allowed only for fornication (i.e. adultery), and this separation did not then permit either spouse to remarry a third party.

In the following book of the Stromata, St. Clement notes that the Apostles asked Jesus “If the case of a wife be thus, it is not good for the man to marry.” (Matthew 19:10) Then, adds St. Clement, “They in making this enquiry sought to learn whether, when a wife has been found guilty on a charge of fornication, and has been put away, it is permitted to marry another.” (Stromata 3) St. Clement understood the Apostles as recognizing that Jesus was prohibiting remarriage after divorce, except if one spouse died, and that Jesus was teaching that those who re-marry, while both spouses live, commit adultery in doing so.

Tertullian

In a work titled “To My Wife,” written at or prior to AD 206, Tertullian says:

Whence are we to find (words) enough fully to tell the happiness of that marriage which the Church cements, and the oblation confirms, and the benediction signs and seals; (which) angels carry back the news of (to heaven), (which) the Father holds for ratified? For even on earth children do not rightly and lawfully wed without their fathers’ consent. (To My Wife, 2,8)

This passage does not directly address the question of divorce and remarriage, but it does show that for Tertullian, Christian marriage was not merely a civil affair. Christian Marriage was overseen by the Church, and ratified by God the Father, in very much the way pagan men and women would not wed without their father’s approval. Thus for Tertullian the Church’s approval of the Christian couple’s wedding is a sign of God the Father’s approval of the wedding. In this way we see implicitly the sacramental character of Christian marriage.

Around that same time, Tertullian wrote:

But, however, since Patience takes the lead in every species of salutary discipline, what wonder that she likewise ministers to Repentance, (accustomed as Repentance is to come to the rescue of such as have fallen,) when, on a disjunction of wedlock (for that cause, I mean, which makes it lawful, whether for husband or wife, to persist in the perpetual observance of widowhood), she waits for, she yearns for, she persuades by her entreaties, repentance in all who are one day to enter salvation? How great a blessing she confers on each! The one she prevents from becoming an adulterer; the other she amends. (On Patience, chapter 12) [c. AD 206]

Tertullian here speaks of patience as allowing a woman who has been separated from her spouse by “that cause … which makes it lawful … to persist in the perpetual observance of widowhood, to remain unmarried, so as to avoid adultery. It is possible that Tertullian is speaking of death, but if so, then a fortiori, this indicates that remarriage for the cause of divorce was seen as adultery.

In AD 207, Tertullian wrote the first edition of his work Against Marcion. In Book IV of this work, he writes:

But Christ prohibits divorce, saying, Whosoever puts away his wife, and marries another, commits adultery; and whosoever marries her that is put away from her husband, also commits adultery. (Luke 16:18) In order to forbid divorce, He makes it unlawful to marry a woman that has been put away. Moses, however, permitted repudiation in Deuteronomy: When a man has taken a wife, and has lived with her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he has found unchastity in her; then let him write her a bill of divorcement and give it in her hand, and send her away out of his house. (Deuteronomy 24:1) You see, therefore, that there is a difference between the law and the gospel — between Moses and Christ? To be sure there is! But then you have rejected that other gospel which witnesses to the same verity and the same Christ. There, while prohibiting divorce, He has given us a solution of this special question respecting it: Moses, says He, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to give a bill of divorcement; but from the beginning it was not so (Matthew 19:8) — for this reason, indeed, because He who had made them male and female had likewise said, They two shall become one flesh; what therefore God has joined together, let not man put asunder. (Matthew 19:4, 6) Now, by this answer of His (to the Pharisees), He both sanctioned the provision of Moses, who was His own (servant), and restored to its primitive purpose the institution of the Creator, whose Christ He was. Since, however, you are to be refuted out of the Scriptures which you have received, I will meet you on your own ground, as if your Christ were mine. When, therefore, He prohibited divorce, and yet at the same time represented the Father, even Him who united male and female, must He not have rather exculpated than abolished the enactment of Moses? But, observe, if this Christ be yours when he teaches contrary to Moses and the Creator, on the same principle must He be mine if I can show that His teaching is not contrary to them. I maintain, then, that there was a condition in the prohibition which He now made of divorce; the case supposed being, that a man put away his wife for the express purpose of marrying another. His words are: Whosoever puts away his wife, and marries another, commits adultery; and whosoever marries her that is put away from her husband, also commits adultery, Luke 16:18 — put away, that is, for the reason wherefore a woman ought not to be dismissed, that another wife may be obtained. For he who marries a woman who is unlawfully put away is as much of an adulterer as the man who marries one who is un-divorced. (Against Marcion, Bk IV. 34.)

Marcion had argued that Christ’s reversal of Moses’s permission of divorce indicated that the Father of Jesus is not the God of the Old Testament. Tertullian is arguing here in response that Christ’s prohibition on divorce is not contrary to Moses’s law, but perfects it, by showing that the only kind of divorce allowed is one that (a) is on grounds of adultery and (b) for which remarriage is not permitted [until one of the spouses dies].

Later in that same work, he writes:

Even Christ, however, when He here commands the wife not to depart from her husband, or if she depart, to remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband, (1 Corinthians 7:10-11) both permitted divorce, which indeed He never absolutely prohibited, and confirmed (the sanctity) of marriage, by first forbidding its dissolution; and, if separation had taken place, by wishing the nuptial bond to be resumed by reconciliation. (Against Marcion, Bk. V. 7.)

Here again he shows how Christ did not absolutely prohibit divorce, in that He allowed a separation of the spouses on grounds of infidelity. But, at the same time, Christ confirmed the sanctity of marriage by absolutely forbidding the dissolution of marriage. The marriage bond remains, even when the spouses are separated, until one of them dies. Tertullian saw that according to Christ’s teaching, the goal and hope when the spouses have been legitimately separated, is always the reconciliation of the spouses.

About five years later, then into his Montanist period, Tertullian wrote a work on monogamy. One of the beliefs of the Montantists is that remarriage is not permitted even after one of the spouses dies. But in these writings we can still find information about the general practice of Christians. For example, Tertullian writes:

They [the pagan Romans] enter into adulterous unions even when they do not put away their wives, we [Christians] are not allowed to marry even when we put our wives away.” (“De monogamia, chapter ix (c. AD 212) )

Tertullian contrasts the behavior of the pagan Romans, and the Christians. The pagans have extramarital affairs without even divorcing their spouses. The Christians, by contrast, are not allowed to marry even when they divorce. Again, this indicates that for Christians, the marriage bond remained, even after divorce. And this shows that the Christian way of understanding divorce (in marriages between Christians) is only as a separation, not as a dissolution of the marriage bond. In that same chapter he writes:

A divorced woman cannot even marry legitimately; and if she commit any such act without the name of marriage, does it not fall under the category of adultery, in that adultery is crime in the way of marriage? Such is God’s verdict, within straiter limits than men’s, that universally, whether through marriage or promiscuously, the admission of a second man (to intercourse) is pronounced adultery by Him. (De monogamia, chapter ix)

Here he shows that what makes an act an act of adultery is the existence of a marriage bond, whether or not the person calls himself or herself married. When Jesus teaches that the man who divorces his wife and then remarries commits adultery, and that the person who marries a divorced spouse commits adultery, this shows that men do not have the authority to remove the marriage bond by mere stipulation or civil law. The remarriage is adulterous in these cases precisely because the marriage bond has not been broken by the divorce. Man cannot untie or dissolve the marriage bond.

Origen (AD 248)

In his Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, Origen writes:

But now contrary to what was written, some even of the rulers of the church have permitted a woman to marry, even when her husband was living, doing contrary to what was written, where it is said, A wife is bound for so long time as her husband lives, and So then if while her husband lives, she shall be joined to another man she shall be called an adulteress, (Rom. 7:3) not indeed altogether without reason, for it is probable this concession was permitted in comparison with worse things, contrary to what was from the beginning ordained by law, and written. (Commentary on Matthew, Bk. 14, chapter 23)

Just as a woman is an adulteress, even though she seem to be married to a man, while a former husband yet lives, so also the man who seems to marry her who has been divorced does not marry her, but, according to the declaration of our Savior, he commits adultery with her.” (Commentary on Matthew, Bk. 14, chapter 24) [c. AD 248]

Here Origen points out that even some rulers of the church, presumably leaders of a local church, have allowed a woman to marry, even while her husband is still living. Origen acknowledges that these rulers likely had the intention of preventing something worse. But nevertheless, he explains, her union with another man, while her husband still lives, makes her an adulteress, according to the word of Jesus and St. Paul. And this divine prohibition on remarriage while one’s spouse remains alive is not particular to women over men, or men over women; it applies equally to both spouses. Origen clearly believes that according to the Scriptures, the marriage bond remains until one of the spouses dies. Hence the woman who seems to be married to a [second] husband, is nevertheless an adulteress while her former husband lives. And likewise, the man who seems to be married to a divorced woman, is not actually married to her, but is living in adultery, so long as her former husband lives. In both cases the new ‘marriage’ is no marriage at all, but only an adulterous union.

St. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (d. AD 258)

Concerning marriage, St. Cyprian quotes the Scripture, writing:

In the first Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: But to them that are married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, that the wife should not be separated from her husband; but if she should depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband: and that the husband should not put away his wife. (Treatise 12, Bk. 3, chap. 90)

Council of Elvira (c. AD 300)

Around the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth, we find three relevant canons concerning marriage, in the Council of Elvira held in southeast Spain:

Likewise, women who have left their husbands for no prior cause and have joined themselves with others, may not even at death receive communion.” (Canon 8)

Likewise, a woman of the faith [i.e., a baptized person] who has left an adulterous husband of the faith and marries another, her marrying in this manner is prohibited. If she has so married, she may not at any more receive communion–unless he that she has left has since departed from this world. (Canon 9)

If she whom a catechumen [an upbaptized person studying the faith] has left shall have married a husband, she is able to be admitted to the fountain of baptism. This shall also be observed in the instance where it is the woman who is the catechumen. But if a woman of the faithful is taken in marriage by a man who left an innocent wife, and if she knew that he had a wife whom he had left without cause, it is determined that communion is not to be given to her even at death” (Canon 10)

Canons 8 and 9 are self-explanatory. Women who leave their husbands and join another man, may not receive the Eucharist even at death [unless they repent]. In the case of a married couple in which both spouses are Christian (i.e. baptized), and the husband commits adultery and the wife subsequently leaves him and marries another man, she may not receive the Eucharist until the man she left has died. She is not permitted to receive the Eucharist in that state because she is living in adultery. Only when her husband dies is the marriage bond broken, and then she may marry another man, and receive the Eucharist.

Canon 10 is an example of what is known as the Pauline privilege (discussion in Objection 7 below). When two persons who are not Christian marry, then if one of them seeks to become a Christian, and the other does not wish to remain with the person becoming a Christian, the marriage is dissolved and they are free to marry another person. This is based on 1 Corinthians 7, where St. Paul writes, “But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the brother or sister is not bound. For God has called us to peace.” (1 Cor. 7:15) Such a marriage is not a sacramental marriage, because it is not entered into by two baptized persons. A non-sacramental marriage may be dissolved through the Pauline privilege. But, in Canon 10 we see that if a Christian woman marries a man who left an innocent wife, she is not allowed to receive communion even at death, because she is living in adultery.

It is worth noting here that in the first three centuries of the Church, we find not a single Church Father or writer who teaches that the Church permits remarriage after the divorce of two Christians, so long as both spouses are living. In every case we find that among Christians, remarriage after divorce is prohibited, so long as both spouses remain alive. The evidence of the first three centuries unanimously testifies to the indissolubility of Christian marriage. Divorce in the sense of separation was permitted in cases of adultery, but not remarriage. The purpose of the permitted separation was to avoid participation in the other’s sin, and always with the aim and hope of eventual repentance and reconciliation of the couple, never to permit remarriage while both spouses lived.

Lactantius (AD 303-311)

Lactantius was a convert and a tutor to Constantine’s son. He writes:

Lest anyone think that he can circumscribe the divine precepts, there are added those that take away all calumny and occasion of fraud; he is an adulterer who marries a divorced spouse, and he who dismisses his wife commits adultery (Mt. 5:32) for God is unwilling to dissociate the body. (The Divine Institutes, Bk. 6, Chap. 23)

According to Lactantius, the person who marries a divorced spouse commits adultery, as does the person who divorces his spouse. God does not treat us as though what we do with our bodies is irrelevant. Because we are embodied beings our actions in our bodies, including our sexual relations, matter; evil done in the body corrupts the heart.

In his Epitome of the Divine Institutes, he writes:

Therefore let it be observed in all the duties of life, let it be observed in marriage. For it is not sufficient if you abstain from another’s bed, or from the brothel. Let him who has a wife seek nothing further, but, content with her alone, let him guard the mysteries of the marriage-bed chaste and undefiled. For he is equally an adulterer in the sight of God and impure, who, having thrown off the yoke, wantons in strange pleasure either with a free woman or a slave. But as a woman is bound by the bonds of chastity not to desire any other man, so let the husband be bound by the same law, since God has joined together the husband and the wife in the union of one body. On this account He has commanded that the wife shall not be put away unless convicted of adultery, and that the bond of the conjugal compact shall never be dissolved, unless unfaithfulness have broken it. (Epitome, 66)

Lactantius is the first Christian writer we know of to claim apparently that adultery breaks the marriage bond.

Council of Arles (AD 314)

In AD 314, the Council of Arles met to address the Donatist schism. Canon 10 of that council reads:

As regards those who find their wives to be guilty of adultery, and who being Christians are, though young men, forbidden to remarry, we decree that, so far as may be, counsel be given them not to take other wives while their own, though guilty of adultery, are yet living. (Canon 10)

This council was held under the patronage of Constantine, and it is worded in such a way so as gently to instruct young Christian men not to follow the practice of pagans who did remarry while their spouses remained alive. It takes as given that men who find their wives guilty of adultery are “forbidden to remarry,” as long as their wives live. This is additional evidence that these bishops understood the “except for porneia” clause not as allowing divorce-with-remarriage, but only as allowing separation of the spouses, the marriage bond remaining until one of the spouses died.

Council of Ancyra (between AD 313-319)

If any one have violated a married woman, or have broken the marriage bond, he must for seven years undergo the different degrees of penance, at the end of which he will be admitted into the communion of the Church.” (Canon 20)

Council of Nicea (AD 325)

Concerning those who call themselves Cathari, if they come over to the Catholic and Apostolic Church, the great and holy Synod decrees that they who are ordained shall continue as they are in the clergy. But it is before all things necessary that they should profess in writing that they will observe and follow the dogmas of the Catholic and Apostolic Church; in particular that they will communicate with persons who have been twice married, and with those who having lapsed in persecution have had a period [of penance] laid upon them, and a time [of restoration] fixed so that in all things they will follow the dogmas of the Catholic Church. (Canon 8)

One of the conditions imposed by the ecumenical Council of Nicea upon the Cathari (i.e.”puritans”) for re-entrance into the Catholic Church is that they will communicate (i.e. maintain fellowship) with those who have been twice married. The Cathari, like the Montanists, did not allow remarriage after one spouse died. So the Church here requires them to accept this, as a condition for restoration to full communion. There is no question here of remarriage after divorce; the prohibition of remarriage after divorce was understood as given.

St. Hilary, Bishop of Poietiers (d. AD 368)

St. Hilary writes:

For whereas the law had conceded the liberty of effecting divorce by the authority of instruments, now the Evangelical Faith has not only enjoined upon the husband the desire for concord, but has judged him guilty of compelling his wife to adultery, if she is married anew to another through the stress of his desertion, prescribing no other ground for ceasing from wedded life than the defilement of a husband by the society of a prostituted wife. (Commentary on St. Matthew 4:22)

This statement gives further clarity to the meaning of Jesus’ words when He says, “causes her to commit adultery.”

St. Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis (Cyprus) (c. AD 370)

St. Epiphanius died in AD 403-404, after nearly forty years as a bishop. In AD 370, in his Panarion, he wrote:

[I]t may be tolerated in the laity by reason of their weakness, and of their inability to remain constant to the first wife, that they should be connected with a second after the death of the first. Yet he who has had but one wife is held in greater praise and honour by all members of the Church, but [not] if he could not be content with the one wife, who had died. If there has been a divorce for some reason — whether fornication, or adultery, or an evil charge, and the man marries a second wife, or the woman marries a second husband, God’s Word does not censure them or bar them from the Church and life, but tolerates them because of their weakness. The holy Word and God’s holy Church show mercy to such a person, particularly if he is devout otherwise and lives by God’s law — not by letting him have two wives at once while the one is still alive, but [by letting] him marry a second wife lawfully if the opportunity arises, after being parted from the first. ….” (Against Heresies, Bk. II, Haer. 59.)

There is some controversy over both the translation and interpretation of this passage. Some take it to be permitting divorce with remarriage while the other spouse is still alive. But, I think it is more accurate to understand it as allowing remarriage after the death of the spouse, and thus addressing the erroneous tendency of rigorists like the Montanists and Cathari to forbid remarriage even after the death of the spouse. St. Epiphanius is saying that if a man has divorced his wife [in the sense of mensa et thoro], and then [after she dies] marries another woman, they are not censured or barred from the Church. Likewise, if a woman divorces her husband, and he then dies and she remarries, she is not censured or barred from the Church. The Church does not allow a man to have two wives at once while one wife is still alive. But, after being parted from the first wife for some cause, and then the opportunity arises (i.e. the first wife dies), the Scripture and the Church allow him to remarry, tolerating his weakness.

St. John Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople (d. AD 407)

In his commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, St. Chrysostom writes:

“‘What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.’ See a teacher’s wisdom. I mean, that being asked, Is it lawful? He did not at once say, It is not lawful, lest they should be disturbed and put in disorder, but before the decision by His argument He rendered this manifest, showing that it is itself too the commandment of His Father, and that not in opposition to Moses did He enjoin these things, but in full agreement with him. But mark Him arguing strongly not from the creation only, but also from His command. For He said not, that He made one man and one woman only, but that He also gave this command that the one man should be joined to the one woman. But if it had been His will that he should put this one away, and bring in another, when He had made one man, He would have formed many Women. But now both by the manner of the creation, and by the manner of lawgiving, He showed that one man must dwell with one woman continually, and never break off from her.” (On the Gospel of Matthew, 62:1 [AD 370])

Here St. Chrysostom affirmed the divine purpose that marriage is a lifelong bond. In other words, he acknowledges that divorce (i.e. separation) is permitted in a case of adultery:

If he [i.e. the husband] have one who is a harlot and adulteress he is not forbidden to cast her out. For whosoever (saith He) shall put away his wife except for the cause of porneia maketh her to commit adultery. So that on account of porneia it is lawful to put away.” (Homily against those who fasted with the Jews)

But, when there has been such a separation, there cannot be remarriage so long as both spouses live. In his Treatise on Virginity, he writes that a wife who has separated from her husband cannot remarry so long as her husband remains alive:

[T]he husband, though he have a wife more intolerable than all besides, must needs be content with his bondage, and cannot find any release or escape from this arbitrary sway…. (Treatise on Virginity, 28)

Later in this same work he again addresses the question of remarriage after divorce:

Let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. … What then if he will never be reconciled? one may ask. Thou hast one more mode of release and deliverance. What is that? Await his death. For as the (consecrated) virgin may not marry because her Spouse liveth away, and is immortal; so to her who hath been married it is then only lawful when her husband is dead. (Treatise on Virginity, 40)

In his Homily on 1 Corinthians, St. Chrysostom writes:

Look at the propriety of the words which are used by Paul. He says that she is bound by the law as long as her husband lives, so that even though he gives her a write of separation, or leaves the house, or lives with another, she would still be an adulteress. And do not tell me that the civil law allows such practice. Because you will not be judged in accordance with the civil law, but according to those which the Lord Himself has established. (Homily on 1 Corinthians 7)

St. Basil the Great (c. AD 375)

In his Ethica, St. Basil writes:

The husband must not separate from the wife, nor the wife from the husband, except on detection in fornication (porneia), or hindrance of piety. … It is not lawful for him that hath put away his own wife to marry another, nor for her that is put away from a husband to be married to another.” (Ethica, 73)

That is the same understanding of the nature of divorce and the indissolubility of marriage we have seen all along in the Fathers. Elsewhere, he writes:

But if the man who has deserted his wife goes to another, he is himself an adulterer because he makes her commit adultery; and the woman who lives with him is an adulteress, because she has caused another woman’s husband to come over to her. (Letter 188)

If a man who has left his wife goes to another woman, then not only is he an adulterer, but so is the woman who joins him.

Concerning a woman who has been abandoned by her husband, St. Basil writes:

A woman whose husband has gone away and disappeared, and who marries another, before she has evidence of his death, commits adultery. … The woman who has been abandoned by her husband, ought, in my judgment, to remain as she is. The Lord said, If any one leave his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, he causes her to commit adultery; Matthew 5:22 thus, by calling her adulteress, He excludes her from intercourse with another man. For how can the man being guilty, as having caused adultery, and the woman, go without blame, when she is called adulteress by the Lord for having intercourse with another man? (Letter 199, To Amphiliochius)

The wife whose husband has departed may not remarry unless she has some evidence of his death, because if she ‘remarries’ while he still lives, the new union is not a marriage, but an adulterous union.

Concerning a woman who remarries while her husband is living, St. Basil writes:

If this marriage be thus manifest by witnesses and processions and in every way, but her husband be not, I say, dead; then such an one commits adultery, committing adultery thus throughout her life, if her husband continue to live; or rather abandonedly playing the harlot for the enjoyment of pleasure, but also, because her husband is living, committing adultery in transgression of the law. (On True Undefiledness in Virginity)

It is well known that the civil law, even of the Christian emperors, permitted in several cases a new marriage after the separation of the wife. Hence, without contradicting himself, St. Basil could say of the husband, “He is not condemned”, and “He is considered excusable,”¹⁰ because he is speaking distinctly of the milder treatment of the husband than of the wife with regard to the canonical penance imposed for adultery. Even though St. Basil puzzles over the lax and asymmetrical civil penalties for men and women pertaining to adultery, and he permits divorce (as separation) on grounds of adultery or hindrance to piety, he does not permit remarriage after divorce while the other spouse lives or show any sign that the Church permits remarriage after divorce so long as the other spouse lives.

Ambrosiaster (between AD 363 and 384)

The author referred to as Ambrosiaster, writes:

‘For this reason shall a man leave father and mother and cleave to his wife and they shall be two in one flesh.’ To commend this unity he supplies an example of unity. Just as a man and a woman are one in nature so Christ and the Church are recognized as one through faith. ‘This is a great mystery — I mean in reference to Christ and the Church.’ He means that the great sign of this mystery is in the unity of man and woman…. Just as a man forsakes his parents and cleaves to his wife, so too he forsakes every error and cleaves to the Church and subjects himself to her Head, which is Christ.” (In Ephesians 5:31 (before AD 384)

Ambrosiaster here explores the relationship between the sacramental nature of marriage and that of which it is a sign, namely, the union of Christ and His Bride, the Church.

Elsewhere, commenting on 1 Corinthians 7:10-11, this author [called Ambrosiaster] writes:

The husband may marry, if he have put away an offending wife; the husband not being bound by the law as the wife is; for the head of the woman is the man. It is not permitted to a woman to remarry, if she have sent away her husband by reason of fornication or apostasy … because the meaner part has not quite the same rule to abide by as the more dignified.

Ambrosiaster here recognizes that the wife who divorces her husband on account of his infidelity cannot remarry, but nevertheless allows the husband who divorces his wife for her infidelity to remarry. On this he seems to have been influenced by Roman law. In general, what we see in the Church Fathers is a strong reaction against the unequal treatment of women and men, in the laws concerning divorce. For Christians, infidelity on the part of the husband was no less adulterous than was infidelity on the part of the wife. Ambrosiaster stands out here as an anomaly, both for his affirmation of the inequality of the Roman law, and for his concession to the remarriage of the husband.

St. Gregory of Nazianzen, bishop of Sasima and Constantinople (AD 370-390)

Now the Law grants divorce for every cause; but Christ not for every cause; but He allows only separation from the whore; and in all other things He commands patience. He allows to put away the fornicatress, because she corrupts the offspring; but in all other matters let us be patient and endure; or rather be enduring and patient, as many as have received the yoke of matrimony. (Oration 37, 8)

Notice the purpose for separating from the adulterous wife: to prevent the children from being morally corrupted. The purpose is not to allow for remarriage.

St. Timothy of Alexandria Patriarch from 381-385

Asked whether, if a man’s wife becomes mad [i.e. insane] to the point of having to be put in irons, and the husband says, “I am not able to contain [myself], and desire to take another wife,” what should he do, St. Timothy replied:

In this matter, adultery comes in; and I have nothing and can find nothing, to reply concerning it. (Canonical answers)

St. Pacian (d. AD 390), bishop of Barcelona

St. Pacian writes:

And these are the nuptials of the Lord, so that like that great Sacrament they might become two in one flesh, Christ and the Church. From these nuptials a Christian people is born, when the Spirit of the Lord comes upon that people. (Sermon on Baptism, 6) [before AD 392]

Again here, we see an awareness of the sacramental character of marriage as a sign of one-flesh union of Christ and the Church, effected through the sacrament of baptism.

St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan (AD 340 – 397)

In his work On Abraham, St. Ambrose writes:

Every fornication [by a married man] is adultery; and it is not permitted to a man to do that which is forbidden to a woman. The same chastity is demanded of a man as of a woman. Everything committed with her who is not the legitimate spouse is condemned as the crime of adultery. (De Abraham Bk 1, chapter 4 [AD 387])

No one is permitted to know a woman other than his wife. The marital right is given you for this reason: lest you fall into the snare and sin with a strange woman. ‘If you are bound to a wife do not seek a divorce’; for you are not permitted, while your wife lives, to marry another. (De Abraham 1:7:59 [AD 387] )

First he shows that the sin forbidden to the wife is also forbidden to the husband. Any sexual act committed with one who is not one’s spouse is adultery. Then he enjoins his readers not to divorce, because Christians are not permitted to marry another person, while their spouse lives. In other words, don’t think about seeking divorce for the purpose of remarriage, because remarriage is not allowed while the spouse lives.

Two years later, in a letter he writes:

We do not say that marriage was not sanctified by Christ, since the Word of God says: ‘The two shall become one flesh’ and one spirit. But we are born before we are brought to our final goal, and the mystery of God’s operation is more excellent than the remedy for human weakness. Quite rightly is a good wife praised, but a pious virgin is more rightly preferred. (To Siricius, Ep. 42:3 (AD 389)

This statement is not about divorce and marriage, but it is an early witness among the Fathers concerning the notion that Christ sanctified marriage, elevating it far beyond a remedy for human weakness.

In his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke, St. Ambrose writes:

Anyone saying that one is free to marry a wife that has been put away is not a Christian; he is a Jew. (Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, 8)

In that same section, he writes:

You dismiss your wife, therefore, as if by right and without being charged with wrongdoing [by the civil law]; and you suppose it is proper for you to do so because no human law forbids it. But divine law forbids it. Anyone who obeys men ought to stand in awe of God. Hear the law of the Lord, which even they who propose our laws must obey: ‘What God has joined together let no man put asunder.” (Commentary on Luke 8:5 [AD 389])

I must first, I think, speak of the law of marriage so as to treat afterward the prohibition of divorce. Certain persons think, in fact, that every marriage is of God, especially since it is written, “What God has joined man must not separate.” So then, if every marriage is of God, it is not permitted to dissolve any marriage. Why then has the Apostle said, “If the unbelieving souse departs, let him depart?” His discernment here is admirable. He wanted no motive for divorce to remain available to Christians, but showed that not every marriage is of God. For it is not by God’s authority that Christians marry pagans, since the law forbids this. … In his wonderful way, he did not want the cause of divorce to lie with Christians; and at the same time he showed that not every marriage is from God. Christian women are not joined to pagans by the judgment of God, since the law forbids it. (Commentary on Luke, Book 8)

Here St. Ambrose shows the difference between the law of Christ, and the civil law. The civil law allowed for divorce and remarriage. But, says St. Ambrose, the divine law prohibits it. When he speaks of divine law he is referring to the law of Christ concerning marriage under the New Covenant. Then St. Ambrose speaks of non-Christian ‘marriages’ in which a Christian illicitly ‘marries’ a pagan. Since this is not allowed by the law of the Church, such a union is not a marriage.

Later in this same commentary he refers to Christ’s statement that “he who puts away his wife causes her to commit adultery,” and explains it by saying:

Because it not being lawful for her in her husband’s lifetime to contract a new marriage, sinful desire may gradually prevail against her. Suppose her to marry. The blame of the constraint she lay under is upon you: and what you account to be marriage is adultery. For what does it matter whether one commits that crime with open avowal of it, or as one who is an adulterer under the mask of a husband. Only that it is more grievous to have contrived a law to warrant crime than a secret perpetration of it. (Commentary on Luke 16:18)

That is, insofar as the husband, by divorcing his wife places her in a situation where in weakness or desperation she may give in to the sinful temptation to be united to another man, the husband bears some responsibility. But that the remarriage is in fact adultery, according to St. Ambrose, shows that the marriage bond remains, and is not broken by this divorce. Whether a husband openly commits adultery, or hides his act of adultery by divorcing his wife and seemingly marrying another woman, either way, teaches St. Ambrose, he is committing adultery.

St. Asterius of Amasea (c. 350 – c. 410 AD) was made Bishop of Amasea between 380 and 390 AD, after having been a lawyer. He writes:

These things were spoken to the Pharisees; but do you hear them now, you who do such things as these: you who change your wives as readily as your garments; who build bridal chambers as often and as easily as you build booths for feasts; who marry money, and deal in women; who if provoked a little immediately write a bill of divorcement; you who leave many widows while you are yet alive; believe me, marriage is terminated only by death or adultery. (Homily V, On Divorce)

St. Asterius recognizes that adultery is cause for divorce. But here at least, he does not clearly distinguish whether he is speaking of divorce a mensa et thoro (i.e. separation from bed and board) or the dissolution of the marriage that takes place at the death of one of the spouses.

St. Jerome (AD 346 – 420)

In 384 AD, St. Jerome wrote a letter to the priest Amandus, to answer certain questions, among which was the question, “whether a wife who has left her husband for adultery and unnatural crime, and has another forcibly imposed upon her, may without penance communicate with the Church during the lifetime of him whom she had before left.” This was an actual case, not a merely hypothetical case. St. Jerome answered:

Tell the sister, therefore, who thus enquires of me concerning her condition, not my sentence but that of the apostle. Do you not know, brethren (for I speak to them that know the law,) how that the law has dominion over a man as long as he lives? For the woman which has an husband is bound by the law to her husband, so long as he lives; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then, if, while her husband lives, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress. (Rom. 7:1-3) And in another place: the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband lives; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will; only in the Lord. (1 Cor. 7:39) The apostle has thus cut away every plea and has clearly declared that, if a woman marries again while her husband is living, she is an adulteress. You must not speak to me of the violence of a ravisher, a mother’s pleading, a father’s bidding, the influence of relatives, the insolence and the intrigues of servants, household losses. A husband may be an adulterer or a sodomite, he may be stained with every crime and may have been left by his wife because of his sins; yet he is still her husband and, so long as he lives, she may not marry another. The apostle does not promulgate this decree on his own authority but on that of Christ who speaks in him. For he has followed the words of Christ in the gospel: whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causes her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, commits adultery. (Mt. 5:32) Mark what he says: whosoever shall marry her that is divorced commits adultery. Whether she has put away her husband or her husband her, the man who marries her is still an adulterer. … Therefore if your sister, who, as she says, has been forced into a second union, wishes to receive the body of Christ and not to be accounted an adulteress, let her do penance; so far at least as from the time she begins to repent to have no farther intercourse with that second husband who ought to be called not a husband but an adulterer. (Letter 55, to Amandus:3,4 [AD 396]

St. Jerome grants that a wife is allowed to separate from her husband on account of adultery or sexual perversion (on his part) but taught that “he is still her husband and, so long as he lives, she may not marry another.” According go St. Jerome, if she divorced her husband and remarried, she and the new ‘spouse’ would be guilty of the sin of adultery. “They could not receive the Eucharist until they had done penance by agreeing to refrain from further sexual intercourse.” In order to receive the Eucharist, she would need to agree to relate to this man only as sister and brother, not sexually, at least until her husband had died.

In AD 393, he writes:

For he [i.e. St. Paul] ordains, according to the mind of the Lord, that excepting the cause of fornication, a wife must not be put away, and that a wife who has been put away, may not, so long as her husband lives, be married to another, or at all events that her duty is to be reconciled to her husband. (Against Jovianus, I.10)

Five years later, in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, specifically on St. Matthew 19:9 (i.e. containing the ‘except for porneia‘ clause) he writes:

Wherever there is fornication and a suspicion of fornication a wife is freely dismissed. Because it is always possible that someone may calumniate the innocent and, for the sake of a second joining in marriage, act in criminal fashion against the first, it is commanded that when the first wife is dismissed a second may not be taken while the first lives. (Commentaries on St. Matthew 3:19:9) [AD 398].

Clearly, according to St. Jerome, the nature of the divorce allowed in Matthew 19:9 is one of separation, since no remarriage is allowed, so long as the first spouse lives.

We learn more from St. Jerome in his correspondence with and about a woman named Fabiola. The Catholic Encyclopedia article on St. Fabiola says the following:

Fabiola belonged to the patrician Roman family of the Fabia. She had been married to a man who led so vicious a life that to live with him was impossible. She obtained a divorce from him according to Roman law, and, contrary to the ordinances of the Church, she entered upon a second union before the death of her first husband. On the day before Easter, following the death of her second consort, she appeared before the gates of the Lateran basilica, dressed in penitential garb, and did penance in public for her sin, an act which made a great impression upon the Christian population of Rome. The pope received her formally again into full communion with the Church.

Concerning her case, St. Jerome writes:

The laws of Cæsar are different, it is true, from the laws of Christ: Papinianus commands one thing; our own Paul another. Earthly laws give a free rein to the unchastity of men, merely condemning seduction and adultery; lust is allowed to range unrestrained among brothels and slave girls, as if the guilt were constituted by the rank of the person assailed and not by the purpose of the assailant. But with us Christians what is unlawful for women is equally unlawful for men, and as both serve the same God both are bound by the same obligations. … She [i.e. Fabiola] did not know the full force of the gospel in which every pretext for marriage is taken away from a wife so long as her husband is alive. (Epist. 77, To Oceanus, 3)[AD 399]

Fabiola had been justified in putting her husband away, but she had remarried, while her husband was still living. She did this, claims St. Jerome, not knowing the “full force of the gospel” regarding the prohibition on remarriage while one’s spouse is alive. But eventually she came to see the evil of her action, and made penance before the whole city of Rome, in the way described in the selection above, for the adultery she has committed in the form of her second ‘marriage’ while her husband still lived.

Apostolic Constitutions (c. AD 400)

If any layman put away his wife and marry another, or one who has been divorced by another man, let him by excommunicated. (Canon 47, [48])

Eleventh Council of Carthage (AD 407)

We decree that according to the evangelic and apostolic discipline neither a husband dismissed by his wife nor a wife dismissed by her husband may marry another; but they are to remain as they are or to be reconciled to one another. If they despise [this law] they are to be subjected to penance and on this subject an imperial law ought to be promulgated. (Canon 8)

Notice that this council teaches that the indissolubility of Christian marriage comes from Christ and the Apostles.

Pope Innocent I (pope from AD 401-417)

In a letter responding to an inquiry from Victricius, bishop of Rouen, in AD 404, Pope Innocent wrote:

The practice is observed by all of regarding as an adulteress a woman who marries a second time while her husband yet lives, and permission to do penance is not granted her until one of them is dead. (Epist. ad Vict. Rothom xiii, 15)

The reason why the wife was not allowed to do penance in such a case is because doing penance is allowed only to those who have purposed no longer to commit the sin. A wife who remained with a second man, while her husband was alive, had not ceased from the sin of adultery, and therefore was not allowed to do penance.

In another case, in AD 405, Exsuperius, bishop of Toulouse, had inquired of Pope Innocent, asking him about those who, “divorce intervening, have connected themselves with another in marriage.” Pope Innocent replied:

Your diligence has asked concerning those, also, who, by means of a deed of separation, have contracted another marriage. That these on both sides are adulterers, is evident. (Epist. ad Exsuper.”, c. vi, n. 12)

St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo (lived from AD 354 – 430)

St. Augustine recognizes that Christ allowed for a spouse to put away his or her spouse in the case of adultery.¹¹ And St. Augustine also believed and taught that remarriage after divorce (while the other spouse remains alive) is prohibited. He derives this from St. Paul’s injunction that if the wife depart from her husband (on account of adultery), she must remain unmarried or be reconciled to him. In his “Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount,” composed between AD 393 and 396, he writes:

The inference from all this is, that, whether dismissed or dismissing, she ought to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. (Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, Bk 1. 48)

Around AD 401, in the fifth or sixth year of his episcopate, St. Augustine wrote his work “On the Good of Marriage.” Regarding Jesus’ statement in Matt. 5:32 that he who divorces his wife (except for the reason of fornication) makes her commit adultery, St. Augustine writes:

This we now say, that, according to this condition of being born and dying, which we know, and in which we have been created, the marriage of male and female is some good; the compact whereof divine Scripture so commends, as that neither is it allowed one put away by her husband to marry, so long as her husband lives: nor is it allowed one put away by his wife to marry another, unless she who have separated from him be dead. (On the Good of Marriage, c. 3)

According to St. Augustine, a wife cannot put away her husband to remarry, so long as he lives, nor can a husband put away his wife to remarry, so long as she lives. Here we see clearly that according to St. Augustine, the marriage bond is indissoluble, except by death. Three chapters later he writes:

To such a degree is that marriage compact entered upon a matter of a certain sacrament, that it is not made void even by separation itself, since, so long as her husband lives, even by whom she has been left, she commits adultery, in case she be married to another: and he who has left her, is the cause of this evil. (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 6)

In the succeeding chapter he writes:

And, this being the case, so strong is that bond of fellowship in married persons, that, although it be tied for the sake of begetting children, not even for the sake of begetting children is it loosed. … (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 7)

On this point John Calvin disagreed, since he treated impotence not only as an impediment to entering into marriage, but as a justifiable cause for divorce with remarriage. (See Objection 4 below.)

St. Augustine continues, locating the cause of the indissolubility of Christian marriage in its sacramental character:

[W]ho is there but it must make him attentive to learn, what is the meaning of this so great strength [i.e. indissolubility] of the marriage bond? Which I by no means think could have been of so great avail, unless some sacramentum of a much greater reality were at work in this fragile human mortality, a sacramentum which remains unbroken for the punishment of those who desert their marriages and wish to dissolve them. Seeing that the compact of marriage is not done away by divorce intervening; so that they continue wedded persons one to another, even after separation; and commit adultery with those, with whom they shall be joined, even after their own divorce, either the woman with a man, or the man with a woman. And yet, save in the City of our God, in His Holy Mount, the case is not such with the wife. But, that the laws of the [pagans] are otherwise, who is there that knows not; where, by the interposition of divorce, without any offense of which man takes cognizance, both the woman is married to whom she will, and the man marries whom he will. And something like this custom, on account of the hardness of the Israelites, Moses seems to have allowed, concerning a bill of divorcement. In which matter there appears rather a rebuke, than an approval, of divorce. (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 7)

We can see in this that for St. Augustine, non-Christian marriages do not have the same sacramental addition, and therefore are treated as dissoluble.

That marriage can take place of persons first ill joined, an honest decree following after, is manifest. But a marriage once for all entered upon in the City of our God, where, even from the first union of the two, the man and the woman, marriage bears a certain sacramental character, can no way be dissolved but by the death of one of them. For the bond of marriage remains, although a family, for the sake of which it was entered upon, do not follow through manifest barrenness; so that, when now married persons know that they shall not have children, yet it is not lawful for them to separate even for the very sake of children, and to join themselves unto others. And if they shall so do, they commit adultery with those unto whom they join themselves, but themselves remain husbands and wives. (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 17)

Here St. Augustine contrasts marriage that takes place outside the Church, and marriage that takes place inside the Church (i.e. inside the City of our God). Christian marriage bears a “certain sacramental character” and can in no way be dissolved except by the death of one of the spouses. That bond remains even if the marriage is barren. This is why when a married couple learns that one of them is sterile, it is not lawful for them to separate and remarry a third party unless one of them dies. If they remarry while the other spouse lives, they are in fact committing adultery, because the marriage bond remains, and no new marriage bond can be formed while the original marriage bond remains.

Therefore the good of marriage throughout all nations and all men stands in the occasion of begetting, and faith of chastity: but, so far as pertains unto the People of God, also in the sanctity of the Sacrament, by reason of which it is unlawful for one who leaves her husband, even when she has been put away, to be married to another, so long as her husband lives, no not even for the sake of bearing children: and, whereas this is the alone cause, wherefore marriage takes place, not even where that very thing, wherefore it takes place, follows not, is the marriage bond loosed, save by the death of the husband or wife. (On the Good of Marriage, Chapter 32)

Here again we see a sacramental conception of marriage, according to which Christian marriage is indissoluble while both spouses live.

In Sermon 392, preached in Hippo around this time, he said the following:

You must not have wives whose former husbands are living; nor may you, women, have husbands whose former wives are living. Such marriages are adulterous, not by the law of the courts, but by the law of Heaven. Nor may a woman who by divorce has withdrawn from her husband become your wife while her husband lives. Only because of fornication may one dismiss an adulterous wife; but in her lifetime you may not marry another. Neither to you, O women, is it granted to find husbands in those men whose wives have quitted them by divorce: such are adulterous, not marriages. (Sermon 392, c. 2)

In De Genesi ad litteram, written in the first fifteen years of the fifth century, he wrote:

This [good of marriage] is three-fold: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. Fidelity means that one avoids all sexual activity apart from one’s marriage. Offspring means that a child is accepted in love, is nurtured in affection, is brought up in religion. Sacrament means that the marriage is not severed nor the spouse abandoned, not even so that the abandoner or the abandoned may remarry for the sake of children. (De Genesi ad litteram, Bk 9, chapter 7)

The sacramental character of marriage, according to St. Augustine, makes it indisssoluble while both spouses live. The marriage bond remains even when one spouse abandons the other. Nor can it be broken if one of the spouses is infertile.

In “On the Good of Widowhood” (AD 414), he writes of “the sacrament (indissoluble, so long as both live) of matrimony.” Five years later, in 419, he wrote “On Marriage and Concupiscence.”

It is certainly not fecundity only, the fruit of which consists of offspring, nor chastity only, whose bond is fidelity, but also a certain sacramental bond in marriage which is recommended to believers in wedlock. Accordingly it is enjoined by the apostle: Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church. (Ephesians 5:25) Of this bond the substance undoubtedly is this, that the man and the woman who are joined together in matrimony should remain inseparable as long as they live; and that it should be unlawful for one consort to be parted from the other, except for the cause of fornication. (Matthew 5:32) For this is preserved in the case of Christ and the Church; so that, as a living one with a living one, there is no divorce, no separation for ever. And so complete is the observance of this bond in the city of our God, in His holy mountain — that is to say, in the Church of Christ — by all married believers, who are undoubtedly members of Christ, that, although women marry, and men take wives, for the purpose of procreating children, it is never permitted one to put away even an unfruitful wife for the sake of having another to bear children. And whosoever does this is held to be guilty of adultery by the law of the gospel; though not by this world’s rule, which allows a divorce between the parties, without even the allegation of guilt, and the contraction of other nuptial engagements, — a concession which, the Lord tells us, even the holy Moses extended to the people of Israel, because of the hardness of their hearts. (Matthew 19:8) The same condemnation applies to the woman, if she is married to another man. So enduring, indeed, are the rights of marriage between those who have contracted them, as long as they both live, that even they are looked on as man and wife still, who have separated from one another, rather than they between whom a new connection has been formed. For by this new connection they would not be guilty of adultery, if the previous matrimonial relation did not still continue. If the husband die, with whom a true marriage was made, a true marriage is now possible by a connection which would before have been adultery. Thus between the conjugal pair, as long as they live, the nuptial bond has a permanent obligation, and can be cancelled neither by separation nor by union with another. But this permanence avails, in such cases, only for injury from the sin, not for a bond of the covenant. In like manner the soul of an apostate, which renounces as it were its marriage union with Christ, does not, even though it has cast its faith away, lose the sacrament of its faith, which it received in the laver of regeneration. It would undoubtedly be given back to him if he were to return, although he lost it on his departure from Christ. He retains, however, the sacrament after his apostasy, to the aggravation of his punishment, not for meriting the reward. (On Marriage and Concupiscence, Bk 1, chapter 10 [11]) [AD 420]

The marriage bond remains even through separation of the spouses, so long as both remain alive, even if they join with other men or women. If remarrying by one spouse (while the other is still living) is adulterous, this entails that the marriage bond remains, which then entails that it is adulterous for the other spouse to remarry (so long as both spouses are alive).

St. Augustine is explaining both the Catholic practice of not remarrying while one’s spouse is alive, and the injunctions in the Gospels and in St. Paul prohibiting such remarriage. The explanation for both the Catholic practice and the teaching of Scripture is the sacramental character of Christian marriage, which signifies the indissolubility of the union of Christ with His Church.

In marriage, however, let the blessings of marriage be loved: offspring, fidelity, and the sacramental bond. Offspring, not so much because it may be born, but because it can be reborn; for it is born to punishment unless it be reborn to life. Fidelity, but not such as even the unbelievers have among themselves, ardent as they are for the flesh. . . . The sacramental bond, which they lose neither through separation nor through adultery, this the -spouses should guard chastely and harmoniously. (On Marriage and Concupiscence, 1:17:19)

That same year, St. Augustine received an inquiry from a certain Pollentius. Pollentius believed that there were two types of divorce: that which was not justified by an act of adultery, and that which was justified by an act of adultery. According to Pollentius, if neither spouse committed adultery, then even though divorce could be allowed, neither spouse would be permitted to remarry a third party after the divorce. But if one spouse committed adultery, then remarriage could be allowed. St. Augustine wrote his work “Adulterous Unions” (De Conjugiis Adulterinis) in reply to Pollentius. In this work St. Augustine writes:

Neither can it rightly be held that a husband who dismisses his wife because of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery. For there is also adultery on the part of those who, after the repudiation of their former wives because of fornication, marry others. This adultery, nevertheless, is certainly less serious than that of men who dismiss their wives for reasons other than fornication and take other wives. Therefore, when we say: ‘Whoever marries a woman dismissed by her husband for reason other than fornication commits adultery,’ undoubtedly we speak the truth. But we do not thereby acquit of this crime the man who marries a woman who was dismissed because of fornication. We do not doubt in the least that both are adulterers. We do indeed pronounce him an adulterer who dismissed his wife for cause other than fornication and marries another, nor do we thereby defend from the taint of this sin the man who dismissed his wife because of fornication and marries another. We recognize that both are adulterers, though the sin of one is more grave than that of the other. No one is so unreasonable to say that a man who marries a woman whose husband has dismissed her because of fornication is not an adulterer, while maintaining that a man who marries a woman dismissed without the ground of fornication is an adulterer. Both of these men are guilty of adultery. (On Adulterous Marriages 1:9:9)

A woman begins to be the wife of no later husband unless she has ceased to be the wife of a former one. She will cease to be the wife of a former one, however, if that husband should die, not if he commit fornication. A spouse, therefore, is lawfully dismissed for cause of fornication; but the bond of chastity remains. That is why a man is guilty of adultery if he marries a woman who has been dismissed even for this very reason of fornication. (On Adulterous Marriages 2:4:4)

In short, according to St. Augustine, no matter what reason one spouse dismisses another, even for adultery, the marriage bond remains until death.¹² And for that reason, for either spouse to remarry while the other spouse is alive, is adultery. A divorced Christian is still married to the other spouse. Yes, the sin of the man who remarries after divorcing his wife because she committed adultery is less serious than that of the man who remarries after divorcing his wife for some other reason less serious than adultery on her part. But in both cases, remarrying while the spouse is living is adultery. Adultery does not break the marriage bond.

In AD 426, only four years before his death, St. Augustine wrote:

Because of the sacrament of marriage, what God has joined man must not separate. (De peccato originali, Bk 2, chapter 39)

Again, for St. Augustine, marriage between Christians is a sacrament, and this means, for St. Augustine that man cannot sever this bond. A husband may divorce his wife if she commits adultery (and she may divorce her husband if he commits adultery), but if the one who has committed adultery repents, the other spouse should receive him or her back. Moreover, the marriage bond is indissoluble, so long as both spouses live. And therefore remarriage by either spouse, while both spouses live, is not actually marriage, but adultery.

Bishop Theodoret of Cyrrus (Syria) (d. 457)

Commenting on St. Paul’s statement “Let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband,” Theodoret writes:

And he [St. Paul] strives indeed to keep the bond of marriage unbroken, but condescending to men’s weakness, he puts the person separately himself under a law of continency, in this way forbidding the dissolution of marriage. For by barring connection with another he compels the party, whichever it be, to return to the former marriage. (Commentary on 1 Corinthians 7:10,11)

St. Cyril of Alexandria (AD 429)

When the wedding was celebrated [at Cana] it is clear that it was entirely decorous: for indeed, the Mother of the Savior was there; and, invited along with His disciples, the Savior too was there, working miracles more than being entertained in feasting, and especially that He might sanctify the very beginning of human generation, which certainly is a matter concerning the flesh. (Commentary on John, 2:1)

Here too we see that Christ’s presence at the wedding at Cana, is not seen as accidental, but as an indication that Christ sanctified marriage.

Pope St. Leo the Great (AD 440-461)

And so a wife is different from a concubine, even as a bondwoman from a freewoman. For which reason also the Apostle in order to show the difference of these persons quotes from Genesis, where it is said to Abraham, ‘Cast out the bondwoman and her son: for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with my son Isaac.’ And hence, since the marriage tie was from the beginning so constituted as apart from the joining of the sexes to symbolize the mystic union of Christ and His Church, it is undoubted that that woman has no part in matrimony, in whose case it is shown that the mystery of marriage has not taken place. (To Rusticus, Epistle 167:4 (AD 459)

Here Pope Leo explains the distinction between a wife and a concubine. The marriage tie, which symbolizes the mystical union of Christ and His Church, is missing in the case of the concubine.

Pope Leo also wrote a letter to Nicetas, bishop of Aquileia, explaining that in cases where the husbands had been taken into exile by the barbarians under Atilla, and the wives had remarried (thinking their husbands to be dead), when the husband returns, in all cases the wife must return to her husband, since the second ‘marriage’ was no marriage at all. If she refused to return to her husband, and chose to remain with the man with whom she was living, she could no longer receive the Eucharist.

The indissolubility of Christian marriage was defended not only by Pope Innocent I, and Pope Leo the Great, but by other popes as well.¹³ In addition, just as the Synod of Arles (AD 314) had forbidden remarriage to Christians who divorced, while their spouse still lived, this same prohibition was repeated in other subsequent councils as well.¹⁴ In all the early Christian writers, we find only two who clearly permit remarriage after divorce, while both spouses live: Lactantius and Ambrosiaster. And they are not Church Fathers, not being saints. Among the Church Fathers, the only person with whom there is any question is St. Epiphanius. There is dispute over the proper interpretation of a paragraph in the writings of St. Epiphanius, but I have shown above that it can be understood in keeping with the traditional Catholic teaching on remarriage. So among all the Church Fathers and ecclesial writers, there is an overwhelming moral consensus regarding the prohibition for Christians of remarriage after divorce, so long as both spouses live. The Catholic Encyclopedia summarizes the matter as follows:

The doctrine of Scripture about the illicitness of divorce is fully confirmed by the constant tradition of the Church. The testimonies of the Fathers and the councils leave us no room for doubt. In numerous places they lay down the teaching that not even in the case of adultery can the marriage bond be dissolved or the innocent party proceed to a new marriage. They insist rather that the innocent party must remain unmarried after the dismissal of the guilty one, and can only enter upon new marriage in case death intervenes. (“Divorce (in moral theology)”)

In AD 673 an assembly of English bishops under Theodore of Tarsus, the archbishop of Canterbury decreed the following:

Regarding marriages: no one is to have any but a legally recognized marriage. No one is to commit incest. No one is to abandon his own spouse unless, as the holy Gospel teaches, he does so because of fornication. But if anyone dismisses a spouse joined to him legitimately in marriage, if he wishes truly to be a Christian, he is to be united to no one else, but is either to remain as he is or to be reconciled with his own spouse. (Canon 10)

Council of Trullo (AD 692)

At the Council of Trullo we read:

She who has left her husband is an adulteress if she has come to another, according to the holy and divine Basil, who has gathered this most excellently from the prophet Jeremiah: If a woman has become another man’s, her husband shall not return to her, but being defiled she shall remain defiled; and again, He who has an adulteress is senseless and impious. If therefore she appears to have departed from her husband without reason, he is deserving of pardon and she of punishment. And pardon shall be given to him that he may be in communion with the Church. But he who leaves the wife lawfully given him, and shall take another is guilty of adultery by the sentence of the Lord. And it has been decreed by our Fathers that they who are such must be weepers for a year, hearers for two years, prostrators for three years, and in the seventh year to stand with the faithful and thus be counted worthy of the Oblation [if with tears they do penance]. (Canon 87)

Council of Friuli (AD 791)

It was decreed that when the marriage bond is loosed because of fornication the husband may not lawfully take another wife so long as the adulteress lives, nor may she take another husband, whether he whom she hath shameless wronged be living or dead.

According to this council, the exception clause in Matthew 19:9 refers not to the permissibility of remarriage while one’s spouse is alive, but to the permissibility of putting away one’s spouse.

Synod of Paris (AD 829)

They who, when their wives have been dismissed for the cause of fornication, marry others are pronounced to be adulterers by the sentence of the Lord. (Concilium Parisiense VI.)

Benedict the Levite (AD 847)

In AD 847 Benedict the Levite examined and compiled the prior ecclesiastical canons concerning marriage, and sums up their teaching on the indissolubility of marriage as follows:

That during the lifetime of husband and wife neither of them be united in another marriage …. And if she have committed fornication, and her husband desire it, she is to be dismissed, but another wife may not be taken in marriage during her lifetime, because adulterers will not possess the kingdom of God, and her penitence is to be accepted. (Benedict the Levite, III.73)

B. Second Millennium

In the second millennium we find a continuity of the same teaching.

Gratian (ca. 1140)

Gratian, in his famous Decretum (written between 1139 and 1142) compiling the Church’s canon law, defends the indissolubility of the marriage bond, as a bond broken only by death:

The bond of marriage cannot be dissolved by fornication. … A marriage which, once entered into, is approved can in nowise be dissolved. … Whether the husband has departed from the wife, or the wife from the husband, for the cause of fornication, [the person so departing] is forbidden to cleave to another. … He commits adultery who presumes to marry one dismissed by her husband. … She is proved an adulteress who during the lifetime of her husband marries another. … By these authorities it is most evidently shewn that whoever shall have put away his wife for the cause of fornication cannot marry another during her lifetime, and if he shall have so married he is guilty of adultery. (Decretum c. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7)

Council of Verona (AD 1184)

All who, regarding the sacrament of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, or regarding baptism or the confession of sins, matrimony or the other ecclesiastical sacraments, do not fear to think or to teach otherwise than the most holy Roman Church teaches and observes … (Denz. 402)

In 1199 Pope Innocent III (pope from 1198-1216) wrote:

Although indeed true matrimony exists between unbelievers, yet it is not [divinely] ratified; between believers, however, a true and [divinely] ratified marriage exists, because the sacrament of faith, which once was admitted, is never lost, but makes the sacrament of marriage ratified so that it itself lasts between married persons as long as the sacrament of faith endures. (Quanto te magis, May 1, 1199)

Here Pope Innocent III makes a clear distinction between a non-sacramental marriage (i.e. between unbaptized persons), and a sacramental marriage (i.e. between baptized persons). Because baptism is never lost (and therefore never repeated), a marriage between two baptized persons is divinely ratified, such that once formed it necessarily exists until one spouse dies. And therefore, according to Pope Innocent III, in a Christian marriage, if one spouse deserts the other, or falls into heresy or apostasy, or commits adultery, neither spouse may remarry until one spouse dies.

Raymond of Penyafort (AD 1241)

Pope Gregory IX appointed Raymond of Penyafort to compile previous papal legal decisions. From this work, Raymond published what came to be called his Summa on Marriage. There he writes:

One of the effects of marriage is that once there is marriage or matrimony between two people, it never ceases to be even if one of the spouses becomes a heretic. … Although bodily separation sometimes occurs because of fornication or by mutual consent for prayer or religious life, sacramental separation is not possible unless the matrimonial bond ceases, which never happens between the faithful unless through entry into religious life before carnal copulation or, after carnal copulation through the death of both spouses or one of them. (Title II.9,12)

St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1270)

In the Supplement of the Summa Theologica, there is an article addressing the following question: Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of the natural law?

Those things which were assigned to nature when it was well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to Matthew 19:4-6. Therefore it is of natural law.

Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to sunder “what God hath joined together.” Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gathered from this passage (Matthew 19:6) it would seem that it is of natural law.

I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents’ heirs (2 Corinthians 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law.

Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently, as stated above (65, 2, ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament. (Supp. Q. 67 a.1)

In the reply we find two reasons given for the indissolubility of marriage. First is that indissolubility belongs to marriage by way of natural law. That is, the nature and purpose of the marital union itself, in the relation of parents to offspring, indicates that this union is indissoluble, and is to be treated as indissoluble. The permanence of the union of the parents in the children, and the relation of the children as the common good of husband and wife, show that the marital bond is to be entered into and treated as lifelong, and therefore as indissoluble.

The second reason given for the indissolubility of marriage is its sacramentality, in that it signifies the perpetual union of Christ and His Church. And divorce (as a dissolving of that bond) is contrary to the sacramental meaning of the marriage bond.

Second Council of Lyon (AD 1274)

The same holy Roman Church also holds and teaches that the ecclesiastical sacraments are seven: namely, one is baptism, concerning which we have spoken above; another is the sacrament of confirmation which the bishops confer through the imposition of hands when anointing the reborn; another is penance; another the Eucharist; another the sacrament of orders; another is matrimony; another extreme unction, which according to the doctrine of St. James is given to the sick. The same Roman Church prepares the sacrament of the Eucharist from unleavened bread, holding and teaching that in the same sacrament the bread is changed into the body, and the wine into the blood of Jesus Christ. But concerning matrimony it holds that neither one man is permitted to have many wives nor one woman many husbands at the same time. But she (the Church) says that second and third marriages successively are permissible for one freed from a legitimate marriage through the death of the other party, if another canonical impediment for some reason is not an obstacle. (Denz. 465)

Pope John XXII (AD 1318)

There are many other things which these very presumptuous men are said to babble against the venerable sacrament of matrimony … (Denz. 490)

Council of Florence (AD 1439)

The seventh [sacrament] is the sacrament of matrimony, which is the sign of the joining of Christ and the Church according to the Apostle who says: “This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the church” [Eph. 5:32]. … Third, there is the indivisibility of marriage, because it signifies the indivisible union of Christ and the Church. Although, moreover, there may be a separation of the marriage couch by reason of fornication, nevertheless, it is not permitted to contract another marriage, since the bond of a marriage legitimately contracted is perpetual. (Denz. 702)

Council of Trent (AD 1563)

The twenty-fourth session of the Council of Trent addressed the subject of matrimony. The Council’s teaching concerning matrimony reads as follows:

The perpetual and indissoluble bond of matrimony was expressed by the first parent of the human race, when, under the influence of the divine Spirit, he said: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. But that by this bond two only are united and joined together, Christ the Lord taught more plainly when referring to those last words as having been spoken by God, He said: Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh, and immediately ratified the firmness of the bond so long ago proclaimed by Adam with these words: What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.

But the grace which was to perfect that natural love, and confirm that indissoluble union, and sanctify the persons married, Christ Himself, the instituter and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by His passion, which Paul the Apostle intimates when he says: Husbands love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it; adding immediately: This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church.

Since therefore matrimony in the evangelical law surpasses in grace through Christ the ancient marriages, our holy Fathers, the councils, and the tradition of the universal Church, have with good reason always taught that it is to be numbered among the sacraments of the New Law; and since with regard to this teaching ungodly men of this age, raving madly, have not only formed false ideas concerning this venerable sacrament, but, introducing in conformity with their habit under the pretext of the Gospel a carnal liberty, have by word and writing asserted, not without great harm to the faithful of Christ, many things that are foreign to the teaching of the Catholic Church and to the usage approved of since the times of the Apostles, this holy and general council, desiring to restrain their boldness, has thought it proper, lest their pernicious contagion should attract more, that the principal heresies and errors of the aforesaid schismatics be destroyed by directing against those heretics and their errors the following anathemas. (Session 24)

The first paragraph teaches that by divine institution, no person can be married to two or more persons at the same time, and that the marriage bond is perpetual and indissoluble. The second paragraph indicates that Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, meriting for us through His Passion and Cross the grace given to persons in Christian marriages, so that their union would signify the union of Christ and His Church. The third paragraph affirms the sacramental character of marriage under the New Law, and notes that because ungodly men have formed false ideas about marriage, introducing “under the pretext of the Gospel” a “carnal liberty” contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church and to “the usage approved since the times of the Apostles” [i.e. the Apostolic Tradition regarding marriage] the bishops of the Council have judged it necessary to destroy these heresies and errors by directing the following anathemas against them:

Canon 1. If anyone says that matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord, but has been devised by men in the Church and does not confer grace, let him be anathema.

Can. 2. If anyone says that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time and that this is not forbidden by any divine law, let him be anathema.

Can. 3. If anyone says that only those degrees of consanguinity and affinity which are expressed in Leviticus can hinder matrimony from being contracted and dissolve it when contracted, and that the Church cannot dispense in some of them or declare that others hinder and dissolve it, let him be anathema.

Can. 4. If anyone says that the Church cannot establish impediments dissolving marriage, or that she has erred in establishing them, let him be anathema.

Can. 5. If anyone says that the bond of matrimony can be dissolved on account of heresy, or irksome cohabitation, or by reason of the voluntary absence of one of the parties, let him be anathema.

Can. 6. If anyone says that matrimony contracted but not consummated is not dissolved by the solemn religious profession of one of the parties, let him be anathema.

Can. 7. If anyone says that the Church errs in that she taught and teaches that in accordance with evangelical and apostolic doctrine the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved by reason of adultery on the part of one of the parties, and that both, or even the innocent party who gave no occasion for adultery, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other, and that he is guilty of adultery who, having put away the adulteress, shall marry another, and she also who, having put away the adulterer, shall marry another, let him be anathema.

Can. 8. If anyone says that the Church errs when she declares that for many reasons a separation may take place between husband and wife with regard to bed and with regard to cohabitation for a determinate or indeterminate period, let him be anathema.

Can. 9. If anyone says that clerics constituted in sacred orders or regulars who have made solemn profession of chastity can contract marriage, and that the one contracted is valid notwithstanding the ecclesiastical law or the vow, and that the contrary is nothing else than a condemnation of marriage, and that all who feel that they have not the gift of chastity, even though they have made such a vow, can contract marriage, let him be anathema, since God does not refuse that gift to those who ask for it rightly, neither does he suffer us to be tempted above that which we are able.

Can. 10 If anyone says that the married state excels the state of virginity or celibacy, and that it is better and happier to be united in matrimony than to remain in virginity or celibacy, let him be anathema.

Can. 11. If anyone says that the prohibition of the solemnization of marriages at certain times of the year is a tyrannical superstition derived from the superstition of the heathen, or condemns the blessings and other ceremonies which the Church makes use of therein, let him be anathema.

Can. 12. If anyone says that matrimonial causes do not belong to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema.

The first canon teaches infallibly that marriage is one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ as a means of [sanctifying] grace. The second canon condemns polygamy. The third canon addresses consanguinity (marriage between relatives). The fourth canon condemns the notion that the Church does not have the authority to determine and establish what are impediments to marriage (i.e. conditions that prevent a marriage from being formed).¹⁵ The fifth canon condemns the notion that the marriage bond can be dissolved on account of heresy or “irksome cohabitation,” or desertion. The sixth canon condemns the notion that matrimony that has not been consummated cannot be dissolved by the solemn religious profession of one of the parties.

The seventh and eighth canons are the most relevant to this article. In the seventh canon, the Church infallibly condemns the notion that the Church has erred in her teaching that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved by adultery, and that both parties, even the innocent party, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other, and that he is guilty of adultery who, having divorced his wife because she committed adultery, marries another while his spouse still lives. In the eighth canon, the Church condemns the claim that the Church has erred in allowing a separation between husband and wife with respect to bed and cohabitation. In other words, in these two canons the Church affirms both the permissibility of divorce-as-separation (mensa et thoro) and the unconditional indissolubility of the marriage bond until the death of one of the spouses.

The ninth canon condemns the claim that clerics who have made a solemn profession of celibacy can contract marriage or if they attempt to contract marriage, that their vow of celibacy is not an impediment to the formation of a marriage bond. The tenth canon condemns the claim that celibacy for the sake of the Kingdom does not excel the married state. The eleventh canon condemns the notion that it is wrong for the Church to prohibit weddings during certain periods of the liturgical year (e.g. Lent). And the twelfth canon condemns the notion that matrimonial causes (e.g. the administration of questions of marriage, impediments, annulment, divorce, remarriage) do not belong to ecclesiastical judges.

Pope Urban VIII (1623-44)

Also, that the bond of the Sacrament of Matrimony is indissoluble; and that, although a separation tori et cohabitationis can be made between the parties, for adultery, heresy, or other causes, yet it is not lawful for them to contract another marriage.

Profession of Faith which is prescribed for Orientals (i.e. Marionites) (Pope Benedict XIV, 1743)

Likewise, I profess that there are seven sacraments of the New Law instituted by Christ, our Lord, for the salvation of the human race, although not all of them are necessary for each individual: namely, baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, and matrimony; and (I profess) that these confer grace, and that of these, baptism, confirmation, and orders cannot be repeated without sacrilege. Likewise (I profess) that baptism is necessary for salvation, and hence, if there is imminent danger of death, it should be conferred at once and without delay, and that it is valid if conferred with the right matter and form and intention by anyone, and at any time. Likewise (I profess) that the bond of the sacrament of matrimony is indissoluble, and that, although a separation of bed and board may be possible between the Spouses because of adultery, heresy, and some other causes, nevertheless it is not lawful for them to contract another marriage. (Denzinger, 1470)

Rescript. ad Episc. Agriens., Pope Pius VI, July 11, 1789.

Pope Pius VI was pope from 1775 to 1799. In 1789 he wrote the following:

Hence it is clear that marriage even in the state of nature, and certainly long before it was raised to the dignity of a sacrament, was divinely instituted in such a way that it should carry with it a perpetual and indissoluble bond which cannot therefore be dissolved by any civil law. Therefore although the sacramental element may be absent from a marriage as is the case among unbelievers, still in such a marriage, inasmuch as it is a true marriage there must remain and indeed there does remain that perpetual bond which by divine right is so bound up with matrimony from its first institution that it is not subject to any civil power. And so, whatever marriage is said to be contracted, either it is so contracted that it is really a true marriage, in which case it carries with it that enduring bond which by divine right is inherent in every true marriage; or it is thought to be contracted without that perpetual bond, and in that case there is no marriage, but an illicit union opposed of its very nature to the divine law, which therefore cannot be entered into or maintained.¹⁶

Even before Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, in the state of nature marriage was divinely instituted to “carry with it” a perpetual and indissoluble bond. Hence, says Pope Pius VI, any concept of ‘marriage’ in which marriage was thought to be dissoluble by the State would not be a concept of marriage at all, but only a concept of an illicit union. When two unbaptized persons freely offer themselves to each other in a covenant they each intend to be lifelong, exclusive, and fruitful, and each party freely accepts the other’s offer, a true marriage bond is formed. This marriage bond is perpetual by divine law, and the State has not been given any power to dissolve it.

Brief to Charles of Dalberg, Archbishop of Mainz

The decision of lay tribunals and of Catholic assemblies by which the nullity of marriages is chiefly declared, and the dissolution of their bond attempted, can have no strength and absolutely no force in the sight of the Church. . . . Those pastors who would approve these nuptials by their presence and confirm them with their blessing would commit a very grave fault and would betray their sacred ministry. For they should not be called nuptials, but rather adulterous unions. . . . (Denzinger 1600-01)

Mirari Vos (Pope Gregory XVI, 1832)

In 1832, in a document titled Mirari Vos, Pope Gregory XVI wrote:

Now the honorable marriage of Christians, which Paul calls “a great sacrament in Christ and the Church,” (Heb. 13:4) demands our shared concern lest anything contrary to its sanctity and indissolubility is proposed. Our predecessor Pius VIII would recommend to you his own letters on the subject. However, troublesome efforts against this sacrament still continue to be made. The people therefore must be zealously taught that a marriage rightly entered upon cannot be dissolved; for those joined in matrimony God has ordained a perpetual companionship for life and a knot of necessity which cannot be loosed except by death. Recalling that matrimony is a sacrament and therefore subject to the Church, let them consider and observe the laws of the Church concerning it. Let them take care lest for any reason they permit that which is an obstruction to the teachings of the canons and the decrees of the councils. They should be aware that those marriages will have an unhappy end which are entered upon contrary to the discipline of the Church or without God’s favor or because of concupiscence alone, with no thought of the sacrament and of the mysteries signified by it. (Mirari Vos, 12)

Here Pope Gregory XVI teaches in continuity with the Tradition that marriage among Christians, rightly entered upon, cannot be dissolved, because God joins the spouses with a “knot of necessity” that cannot be loosed except by death.

Acerbissimum vobiscum (Pope Pius IX, 1852)

We say nothing about that other decree in which, after completely despising the mystery, dignity, and sanctity of the sacrament of matrimony; after utterly ignoring and distorting its institution and nature; and after completely spurning the power of the Church over the same sacrament, it was proposed, according to the already condemned errors of heretics, and against the teaching of the Catholic Church, that marriage should be considered as a civil contract only, and that divorce, strictly speaking, should be sanctioned in various cases; and that all matrimonial cases should be deferred to lay tribunals and be judged by them; because no Catholic is ignorant or cannot know that matrimony is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord, and that for that reason, there can be no marriage between the faithful without there being at one and the same time a sacrament, and that, therefore, any other union of man and woman among Christians, except the sacramental union, even if contracted under the power of any civil law, is nothing else than a disgraceful and death-bringing concubinage very frequently condemned by the Church, and, hence, that the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal agreement, and that it pertains absolutely to the power of the Church to discern those things which can pertain in any way to the same matrimony. (Denzinger, 1640)

For Catholics, there can be no marriage between the faithful that is not sacramental. Hence, a merely civil ‘marriage’ between Catholics is not marriage at all, but only “death-bringing concubinage.”

Syllabus of Errors (Pope Pius IX, 1864)

VIII. Errors Concerning Christian Marriage
65. The doctrine that Christ has raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament cannot be at all tolerated. — Apostolic Letter “Ad Apostolicae,” Aug. 22, 1851.

66. The Sacrament of Marriage is only a something accessory to the contract and separate from it, and the sacrament itself consists in the nuptial benediction alone. — Ibid.

67. By the law of nature, the marriage tie is not indissoluble, and in many cases divorce properly so called may be decreed by the civil authority. — Ibid.; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” Sept. 27, 1852.

68. The Church has not the power of establishing diriment impediments of marriage, but such a power belongs to the civil authority by which existing impediments are to be removed. — Damnatio “Multiplices inter,” June 10, 1851.

69. In the dark ages the Church began to establish diriment impediments, not by her own right, but by using a power borrowed from the State. — Apostolic Letter “Ad Apostolicae,” Aug. 22, 1851.

70. The canons of the Council of Trent, which anathematize those who dare to deny to the Church the right of establishing diriment impediments, either are not dogmatic or must be understood as referring to such borrowed power. — Ibid.

71. The form of solemnizing marriage prescribed by the Council of Trent, under pain of nullity, does not bind in cases where the civil law lays down another form, and declares that when this new form is used the marriage shall be valid.

72. Boniface VIII was the first who declared that the vow of chastity taken at ordination renders marriage void. — Ibid.

73. In force of a merely civil contract there may exist between Christians a real marriage, and it is false to say either that the marriage contract between Christians is always a sacrament, or that there is no contract if the sacrament be excluded. — Ibid.; Letter to the King of Sardinia, Sept. 9, 1852; Allocutions “Acerbissimum,” Sept. 27, 1852, “Multis gravibusque,” Dec. 17, 1860.

74. Matrimonial causes and espousals belong by their nature to civil tribunals. — Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” Nov. 9 1846; Damnatio “Multiplices inter,” June 10, 1851, “Ad Apostolicae,” Aug. 22, 1851; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” Sept. 27, 1852.

Arcanum (Pope Leo XIII, 1880)

In February, 1880, Pope Leo XIII promulgated an encyclical titled Arcanum, on the topic of Christian marriage. The document is directly relevant to our topic, and is a rich theological resource concerning the Catholic doctrine of marriage.

Early in the document, Pope Leo writes:

And this union of man and woman, that it might answer more fittingly to the infinite wise counsels of God, even from the beginning manifested chiefly two most excellent properties – deeply sealed, as it were, and signed upon it-namely, unity and perpetuity. From the Gospel we see clearly that this doctrine was declared and openly confirmed by the divine authority of Jesus Christ. He bore witness to the Jews and to His Apostles that marriage, from its institution, should exist between two only, that is, between one man and one woman; that of two they are made, so to say, one flesh; and that the marriage bond is by the will of God so closely and strongly made fast that no man may dissolve it or render it asunder. (Arcanum, 5)

According to Pope Leo, Christ taught that the two most excellent properties of marriage are unity and perpetuity. Christ taught that in Christian marriage, God joins the couple in a bond “so closely and strongly made fast that no man may dissolve it or render it assunder.” Christ is not saying that although man has the power to dissolve the marriage bond, he ought not to do so. Rather, He is saying that man does not have the power to dissolve the marriage bond.

Pope Leo continues, relating the evils that took place after the Fall, as human society deviated from the original divine purpose of marriage, and then showing how Christ restored marriage to its original purpose, in part by proscribing divorce-with-remarriage:

So manifold being the vices and so great the ignominies with which marriage was defiled, an alleviation and a remedy were at length bestowed from on high. Jesus Christ, who restored our human dignity and who perfected the Mosaic law, applied early in His ministry no little solicitude to the question of marriage. He ennobled the marriage in Cana of Galilee by His presence, and made it memorable by the first of the miracles which he wrought; and for this reason, even from that day forth, it seemed as if the beginning of new holiness had been conferred on human marriages. Later on He brought back matrimony to the nobility of its primeval origin by condemning the customs of the Jews in their abuse of the plurality of wives and of the power of giving bills of divorce; and still more by commanding most strictly that no one should dare to dissolve that union which God Himself had sanctioned by a bond perpetual. (Arcanum, 8)

Then he explains that this Catholic understanding of marriage was handed down in the Apostolic Tradition, received and taught by the Church Fathers:

But what was decreed and constituted in respect to marriage by the authority of God has been more fully and more clearly handed down to us, by tradition and the written Word, through the Apostles, those heralds of the laws of God. To the Apostles, indeed, as our masters, are to be referred the doctrines which “our holy Fathers, the Councils, and the Tradition of the Universal Church have always taught,” namely, that Christ our Lord raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament; that to husband and wife, guarded and strengthened by the heavenly grace which His merits gained for them, He gave power to attain holiness in the married state; and that, in a wondrous way, making marriage an example of the mystical union between Himself and His Church, He not only perfected that love which is according to nature, but also made the naturally indivisible union of one man with one woman far more perfect through the bond of heavenly love. … In like manner from the teaching of the Apostles we learn that the unity of marriage and its perpetual indissolubility, the indispensable conditions of its very origin, must, according to the command of Christ, be holy and inviolable without exception. Paul says again: “To them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband; and if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.” And again: “A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband die, she is at liberty.” (Arcanum, 9)

According to Pope Leo, the Church received from the Apostles the doctrines that she has always taught, among which are that Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, and “made the naturally indivisible union of one man with one woman more perfect through the bond of heavenly love.” In other words, the very nature of the spousal love proper to humans is to bind oneself to another perpetually. The greater one’s love for the other, the more one wants to bind oneself to the other, for the rest of one’s life, and to the exclusion of all others. That love is a human love; it is proper to human nature, and hence faithful marriage is not uncommonly found among non-Christians. But through the grace that comes to us from Christ through baptism, we receive the supernatural love called agape, and this supernatural love perfects [i.e. elevates] the natural love in Christian marriage, making the Christian marriage not merely a sign of the unity of Christ and His Church, but a certain sort of participation in that divine union, through which the couple receives sanctifying grace. Pope Leo also affirms that the unity and perpetual indissolubility of Christian marriage is something the Church learned from the teaching of the Apostles.

A little later in the document he writes:

Yet, owing to the efforts of the archenemy of mankind, there are persons who, thanklessly casting away so many other blessings of redemption, despise also or utterly ignore the restoration of marriage to its original perfection. It is a reproach to some of the ancients that they showed themselves the enemies of marriage in many ways; but in our own age, much more pernicious is the sin of those who would fain pervert utterly the nature of marriage, perfect though it is, and complete in all its details and parts. The chief reason why they act in this way is because very many, imbued with the maxims of a false philosophy and corrupted in morals, judge nothing so unbearable as submission and obedience; and strive with all their might to bring about that not only individual men, but families, also-indeed, human society itself-may in haughty pride despise the sovereignty of God. (Arcanum, 16)

Here Pope Leo claims that owing to the efforts of Satan many people are rejecting the Catholic doctrine concerning marriage, because in imitation of Satan, they think nothing so unbearable as “submission and obedience.” So they wish to be ‘free’ to act however they wish in matters pertaining to sexuality.

He continues:

Now, since the family and human society at large spring from marriage, these men will on no account allow matrimony to be the subject of the jurisdiction of the Church. Nay, they endeavor to deprive it of all holiness, and so bring it within the contracted sphere of those rights which, having been instituted by man, are ruled and administered by the civil jurisprudence of the community. Wherefore it necessarily follows that they attribute all power over marriage to civil rulers, and allow none whatever to the Church; and, when the Church exercises any such power, they think that she acts either by favor of the civil authority or to its injury. Now is the time, they say, for the heads of the State to vindicate their rights unflinchingly, and to do their best to settle all that relates to marriage according as to them seems good.

Hence are owing civil marriages, commonly so called; ‘hence laws are framed which impose impediments to marriage; hence arise judicial sentences affecting the marriage contract, as to whether or not it have been rightly made. Lastly, all power of prescribing and passing judgment in this class of cases is, as we see, of set purpose denied to the Catholic Church, so that no regard is paid either to her divine power or to her prudent laws. Yet, under these, for so many centuries, have the nations lived on whom the light of civilization shone bright with the wisdom of Christ Jesus. (Arcanum, 17-18)

These men who resist the Church’s teaching on marriage do not want marriage to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. So they seek to strip marriage of its holiness. They do this in part by seeking to attribute all power over marriage to civil rulers (i.e. the State), and thus make marriage wholly a matter of civil law. Notice that attributing all power over marriage to civil rulers (rather than the Church) strips marriage of its holiness, reducing it purely to the level of nature. It thereby denies that Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament. Because Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, the administration of marriage by baptized persons rightly belongs ultimately to the Church, since the administration of any sacrament belongs to the Church, not the State.

Pope Leo then speaks very strongly against such persons who seek to strip away the holiness of marriage by making it wholly subject to the State. He continues:

Nevertheless, the naturalists, as well as all who profess that they worship above all things the divinity of the State, and strive to disturb whole communities with such wicked doctrines, cannot escape the charge of delusion. Marriage has God for its Author, and was from the very beginning a kind of foreshadowing of the Incarnation of His Son; and therefore there abides in it a something holy and religious; not extraneous, but innate; not derived from men, but implanted by nature. Innocent III, therefore, and Honorius III, our predecessors, affirmed not falsely nor rashly that a sacrament of marriage existed ever amongst the faithful and unbelievers. We call to witness the monuments of antiquity, as also the manners and customs of those people who, being the most civilized, had the greatest knowledge of law and equity. In the minds of all of them it was a fixed and foregone conclusion that, when marriage was thought of, it was thought of as conjoined with religion and holiness. Hence, among those, marriages were commonly celebrated with religious ceremonies, under the authority of pontiffs, and with the ministry of priests. So mighty, even in the souls ignorant of heavenly doctrine, was the force of nature, of the remembrance of their origin, and of the conscience of the human race. As, then, marriage is holy by its own power, in its own nature, and of itself, it ought not to be regulated and administered by the will of civil rulers, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone in sacred matters professes the office of teaching. (Arcanum, 19)

There is something holy in marriage, even marriage between non-Christians. That is because already in the Garden of Eden, marriage was a foreshadowing of the Incarnation of Christ. Marriage is not merely a biological or social institution; it was divinely instituted as typological in nature, and therefore marriage is not rightly treated as a merely biological and/or merely social institution. Intellectually advanced societies throughout history have recognized the religious dimension of marriage, conjoining it with religious ceremonies and sacredness. And because in this respect marriage is holy in its own nature, and of itself, it ought to be regulated by the divine authority of the Church, and not the State.

He continues:

Next, the dignity of the sacrament must be considered, for through addition of the sacrament the marriages of Christians have become far the noblest of all matrimonial unions. But to decree and ordain concerning the sacrament is, by the will of Christ Himself, so much a part of the power and duty of the Church that it is plainly absurd to maintain that even the very smallest fraction of such power has been transferred to the civil ruler. (Arcanum, 20)

Because Christian marriage is a sacrament, the duty concerning administrating this sacrament belongs to the Church by Christ’s institution, and cannot be handed over to the State.

Lastly should be borne in mind the great weight and crucial test of history, by which it is plainly proved that the legislative and judicial authority of which We are speaking has been freely and constantly used by the Church, even in times when some foolishly suppose the head of the State either to have consented to it or connived at it. It would, for instance, be incredible and altogether absurd to assume that Christ our Lord condemned the long-standing practice of polygamy and divorce by authority delegated to Him by the procurator of the province, or the principal ruler of the Jews. And it would be equally extravagant to think that, when the Apostle Paul taught that divorces and incestuous marriages were not lawful, it was because Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero agreed with him or secretly commanded him so to teach. No man in his senses could ever be persuaded that the Church made so many laws about the holiness and indissolubility of marriage, and the marriages of slaves with the free-born, by power received from Roman emperors, most hostile to the Christian name, whose strongest desire was to destroy by violence and murder the rising Church of Christ. Still less could anyone believe this to be the case, when the law of the Church was sometimes so divergent from the civil law that Ignatius the Martyr, Justin, Athenagoras, and Tertullian publicly denounced as unjust and adulterous certain marriages which had been sanctioned by imperial law. (Arcanum, 21)

Here Pope Leo continues laying out his case that the oversight of marriage belongs to the Church. He explains that when Christ and St. Paul condemned polygamy, incest and divorce, they did not do so through authority delegated to them from the State. Christ did so as God, and St. Paul did so with the divine authority received from Christ. Likewise, in the generations that followed the Apostles, the laws made by the Church concerning marriage were made by that same divine authority, not by authority derived from the State. That is made more evident by the fact that the marital laws made by the Church were in many ways opposed to the lax marital laws of the Roman empire.

Furthermore, after all power had devolved upon the Christian emperors, the supreme pontiffs and bishops assembled in council persisted with the same independence and consciousness of their right in commanding or forbidding in regard to marriage whatever they judged to be profitable or expedient for the time being, however much it might seem to be at variance with the laws of the State. It is well known that, with respect to the impediments arising from the marriage bond, through vow, disparity of worship, blood relationship, certain forms of crime, and from previously plighted troth, many decrees were issued by the rulers of the Church at the Councils of Granada, Arles, Chalcedon, the second of Milevum, and others, which were often widely different from the decrees sanctioned by the laws of the empire. Furthermore, so far were Christian princes from arrogating any power in the matter of Christian marriage that they on the contrary acknowledged and declared that it belonged exclusively in all its fullness to the Church. In fact, Honorius, the younger Theodosius, and Justinian, also, hesitated not to confess that the only power belonging to them in relation to marriage was that of acting as guardians and defenders of the holy canons. If at any time they enacted anything by their edicts concerning impediments of marriage, they voluntarily explained the reason, affirming that they took it upon themselves so to act, by leave and authority of the Church, whose judgment they were wont to appeal to and reverently to accept in all questions that concerned legitimacy and divorce; as also in all those points which in any way have a necessary connection with the marriage bond. The Council of Trent, therefore, had the clearest right to define that it is in the Church’s power “to establish diriment impediments of matrimony,” and that “matrimonial causes pertain to ecclesiastical judges.” (Arcanum, 22)

The Church did not give up her authority to make ecclesiastical laws concerning marriage when the Roman emperor became Christian. The Church continued to make such laws, even when those laws were contrary to the marriage laws of the Roman empire. And this practice and understanding continued unbroken even up through the Council of Trent.

Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists have so strongly insisted upon – the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they sever the matrimonial contract from the sacrament, with intent to hand over the contract to the power and will of the rulers of the State, while reserving questions concerning the sacrament of the Church. A distinction, or rather severance, of this kind cannot be approved; for certain it is that in Christian marriage the contract is inseparable from the sacrament, and that, for this reason, the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well. For Christ our Lord added to marriage the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, whenever that contract is lawfully concluded.

Marriage, moreover, is a sacrament, because it is a holy sign which gives grace, showing forth an image of the mystical nuptials of Christ with the Church. But the form and image of these nuptials is shown precisely by the very bond of that most close union in which man and woman are bound together in one; which bond is nothing else but the marriage itself. Hence it is clear that among Christians every true marriage is, in itself and by itself, a sacrament; and that nothing can be further from the truth than to say that the sacrament is a certain added ornament, or outward endowment, which can be separated and torn away from the contract at the caprice of man. Neither, therefore, by reasoning can it be shown, nor by any testimony of history be proved, that power over the marriages of Christians has ever lawfully been handed over to the rulers of the State. If, in this matter, the right of anyone else has ever been violated, no one can truly say that it has been violated by the Church. Would that the teaching of the naturalists, besides being full of falsehood and injustice, were not also the fertile source of much detriment and calamity! But it is easy to see at a glance the greatness of the evil which unhallowed marriages have brought, and ever will bring, on the whole of human society.
(Arcanum, 23-24)

Pope Leo here teaches something that seems quite radical to contemporary ears, namely, that for Christian marriages, the jurisdiction over the matrimonial contract cannot be given wholly over to the State, even with the intention of leaving the sacramental aspect of marriage to the Church. That is because for Christian marriages, the marriage is the contract, i.e. the mutual consent between the man and woman to give themselves to each other through the offering of their own lives. The sacramental asepect is not an added “ornament” or “outward endowment.” If the State were to claim jurisdiction over the matrimonial contract between Christians, this would be equivalent to the State claiming jurisdiction over marriage, even if the State were to make no judgment concerning the sacramental quality of the marriage bond. Hence for all Christians, oversight of the marriage contract belongs ultimately to the Church, not the State.

He continues:

But, now, there is a spreading wish to supplant natural and divine law by human law; and hence has begun a gradual extinction of that most excellent ideal of marriage which nature herself had impressed on the soul of man, and sealed, as it were, with her own seal; nay, more, even in Christian marriages this power, productive of so great good, has been weakened by the sinfulness of man. Of what advantage is it if a state can institute nuptials estranged from the Christian religion, which is the mother of all good, cherishing all sublime virtues, quickening and urging us to everything that is the glory of a lofty and generous soul? When the Christian religion is reflected and repudiated, marriage sinks of necessity into the slavery of man’s vicious nature and vile passions, and finds but little protection in the help of natural goodness. A very torrent of evil has flowed from this source, not only into private families, but also into States. For, the salutary fear of God being removed, and there being no longer that refreshment in toil which is nowhere more abounding than in the Christian religion, it very often happens, as indeed is natural, that the mutual services and duties of marriage seem almost unbearable; and thus very many yearn for the loosening of the tie which they believe to be woven by human law and of their own will, whenever incompatibility of temper, or quarrels, or the violation of the marriage vow, or mutual consent, or other reasons induce them to think that it would be well to be set free. Then, if they are hindered by law from carrying out this shameless desire, they contend that the laws are iniquitous, inhuman, and at variance with the rights of free citizens; adding that every effort should be made to repeal such enactments, and to introduce a more humane code sanctioning divorce. …

Truly, it is hardly possible to describe how great are the evils that flow from divorce. Matrimonial contracts are by it made variable; mutual kindness is weakened; deplorable inducements to unfaithfulness are supplied; harm is done to the education and training of children; occasion is afforded for the breaking up of homes; the seeds of dissension are sown among families; the dignity of womanhood is lessened and brought low, and women run the risk of being deserted after having ministered to the pleasures of men. Since, then, nothing has such power to lay waste families and destroy the mainstay of kingdoms as the corruption of morals, it is easily seen that divorces are in the highest degree hostile to the prosperity of families and States, springing as they do from the depraved morals of the people, and, as experience shows us, opening out a way to every kind of evil-doing in public and in private life.

Further still, if the matter be duly pondered, we shall clearly see these evils to be the more especially dangerous, because, divorce once being tolerated, there will be no restraint powerful enough to keep it within the bounds marked out or presurmised. Great indeed is the force of example, and even greater still the might of passion. With such incitements it must needs follow that the eagerness for divorce, daily spreading by devious ways, will seize upon the minds of many like a virulent contagious disease, or like a flood of water bursting through every barrier. (Arcanum, 27, 29-30)

Pope Leo was prophetically wise, foreseeing that as Christianity is repudiated, marriage “sinks of necessity into the slavery of man’s vicious nature and vile passions,” as men and women by repeatedly violating the marriage bond, produce a social mentality in which many young people no longer have any intention to marry. He describes the magnitude of the evils that flow from a society’s permission of divorce, and shows that repeated, widespread public violations of the marriage institution change the cultural perceptions and expectations surrounding marriage, and in this way damage the marriage institution in that society. The more couples expect marriages to ‘fail’ eventually, and believe in the dissolubility of marriage, the less incentive they have to pursue marriage. They come to see marriage as a restriction on their freedom, rather than as a free expression of the highest form of love, in which each spouse irrevocably binds himself/herself to the other through a vow of perpetual and exclusive self-giving.

Attempts by members of a Christian marriage to remarry another person, while both spouses are living, fall under the following paragraph:

In like manner, all ought to understand clearly that, if there be any union of a man and a woman among the faithful of Christ which is not a sacrament, such union has not the force and nature of a proper marriage; that, although contracted in accordance with the laws of the State, it cannot be more than a rite or custom introduced by the civil law. Further, the civil law can deal with and decide those matters alone which in the civil order spring from marriage, and which cannot possibly exist, as is evident, unless there be a true and lawful cause of them, that is to say, the nuptial bond.

In the great confusion of opinions, however, which day by day is spreading more and more widely, it should further be known that no power can dissolve the bond of Christian marriage whenever this has been ratified and consummated; and that, of a consequence, those husbands and wives are guilty of a manifest crime who plan, for whatever reason, to be united in a second marriage before the first one has been ended by death. When, indeed, matters have come to such a pitch that it seems impossible for them to live together any longer, then the Church allows them to live apart, and strives at the same time to soften the evils of this separation by such remedies and helps as are suited to their condition; yet she never ceases to endeavor to bring about a reconciliation, and never despairs of doing so. (Arcanum, 40-41)

Here Pope Leo teaches that if there is any non-sacramental union between a Christian man and a Christian woman (i.e. a baptized man and a baptized woman), this union is not marriage, even if it is treated as a marriage by the State. If, for example, in a Christian marriage, the husband commits adultery, and the two are divorced under the laws of the State, and then the wife attempts to marry another man, and this new union is treated by the State as a marriage, nevertheless, teaches Pope Leo, this new union is not a marriage at all. It remains an adulterous union. According to Pope Leo, the State has no power to dissolve the bond of Christian marriage. Therefore, the Christian husband or wife who, for whatever reason is united in a second marriage while the first spouse still lives, is guilty of a “manifest crime” [of adultery]. If there comes to be a situation in which it is impossible for them to live together, the Church may allow that kind of separation, but the marriage bond remains, and hence the Church never ceases to endeavor to bring about reconciliation, so long as the spouses live. The Church cannot sunder the marriage bond between two Christians, if that marriage has been consummated.

Casti Connubii (Pope Pius XI, 1930)

In December of 1930, fifty years after Pope Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical Arcanum discussed just above, Pope Pius XI promulgated Casti Connubii, again on the subject of Christian marriage. In this document he explains that because marriage was instituted by God, and raised to the dignity of a sacrament by Christ, the Church has proper jurisdiction over Christian marriages:

[L]et it be repeated as an immutable and inviolable fundamental doctrine that matrimony was not instituted or restored by man but by God; not by man were the laws made to strengthen and confirm and elevate it but by God, the Author of nature, and by Christ Our Lord by Whom nature was redeemed, and hence these laws cannot be subject to any human decrees or to any contrary pact even of the spouses themselves. This is the doctrine of Holy Scripture; this is the constant tradition of the Universal Church; this the solemn definition of the sacred Council of Trent, which declares and establishes from the words of Holy Writ itself that God is the Author of the perpetual stability of the marriage bond, its unity and its firmness. (Casti Connubii, 5)

Concerning the nature of the marital bond, he writes:

By matrimony, therefore, the souls of the contracting parties are joined and knit together more directly and more intimately than are their bodies, and that not by any passing affection of sense of spirit, but by a deliberate and firm act of the will; and from this union of souls by God’s decree, a sacred and inviolable bond arises. Hence the nature of this contract, which is proper and peculiar to it alone, makes it entirely different both from the union of animals entered into by the blind instinct of nature alone in which neither reason nor free will plays a part, and also from the haphazard unions of men, which are far removed from all true and honorable unions of will and enjoy none of the rights of family life. (Casti Connubii, 7)

The souls of the couple are knitted together by the bond of matrimony, even more so than are their bodies. This union is effected by an act of the will by both the bride and groom, in which they freely give themselves to each other for life. When a baptized bride and a baptized groom freely offer to give themselves irrevocably to the other, and each freely accepts this offer from the other, God effects a sacred and inviolable bond between the couple that remains until one of them dies.

Later in the document, Pope Pius XI, drawing from St. Augustine, explains the meaning of the sacramentality of Christian marriage with regard to its indissolubility and its being a means of sanctifying grace. He writes:

But this accumulation of benefits is completed and, as it were, crowned by that blessing of Christian marriage which in the words of St. Augustine we have called the sacrament, by which is denoted both the indissolubility of the bond and the raising and hallowing of the contract by Christ Himself, whereby He made it an efficacious sign of grace.

In the first place Christ Himself lays stress on the indissolubility and firmness of the marriage bond when He says: “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder,” and: “Everyone that putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery, and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.”

And St. Augustine clearly places what he calls the blessing of matrimony in this indissolubility when he says: “In the sacrament it is provided that the marriage bond should not be broken, and that a husband or wife, if separated, should not be joined to another even for the sake of offspring.”

And this inviolable stability, although not in the same perfect measure in every case, belongs to every true marriage, for the word of the Lord: “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder,” must of necessity include all true marriages without exception, since it was spoken of the marriage of our first parents, the prototype of every future marriage. Therefore although before Christ the sublimeness and the severity of the primeval law was so tempered that Moses permitted to the chosen people of God on account of the hardness of their hearts that a bill of divorce might be given in certain circumstances, nevertheless, Christ, by virtue of His supreme legislative power, recalled this concession of greater liberty and restored the primeval law in its integrity by those words which must never be forgotten, “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” Wherefore, Our predecessor Pius VI of happy memory, writing to the Bishop of Agria, most wisely said: “Hence it is clear that marriage even in the state of nature, and certainly long before it was raised to the dignity of a sacrament, was divinely instituted in such a way that it should carry with it a perpetual and indissoluble bond which cannot therefore be dissolved by any civil law. Therefore although the sacramental element may be absent from a marriage as is the case among unbelievers, still in such a marriage, inasmuch as it is a true marriage there must remain and indeed there does remain that perpetual bond which by divine right is so bound up with matrimony from its first institution that it is not subject to any civil power. And so, whatever marriage is said to be contracted, either it is so contracted that it is really a true marriage, in which case it carries with it that enduring bond which by divine right is inherent in every true marriage; or it is thought to be contracted without that perpetual bond, and in that case there is no marriage, but an illicit union opposed of its very nature to the divine law, which therefore cannot be entered into or maintained.” (Casti Cannubii, 31-34)

Here Pope Pius reaffirms the Church’s teaching on the indissolubility of the marriage bond. This was the “primeval law” given to our first parents. But by the time of Moses, the people had become so benighted that Moses permitted the Hebrews to give a bill of divorce. Christ, by His divine authority, restored the primeval law concerning marriage and its indissolubility. And this applies to all marriages, whether between baptized persons or unbaptized persons. The only two exceptions are the Pauline privilege and the Petrine privilege, discussed below. Concerning these two privileges, Pope Pius XI writes:

And if this stability seems to be open to exception, however rare the exception may be, as in the case of certain natural marriages between unbelievers, or amongst Christians in the case of those marriages which though valid have not been consummated, that exception does not depend on the will of men nor on that of any merely human power, but on divine law, of which the only guardian and interpreter is the Church of Christ. However, not even this power can ever affect for any cause whatsoever a Christian marriage which is valid and has been consummated, for as it is plain that here the marriage contract has its full completion, so, by the will of God, there is also the greatest firmness and indissolubility which may not be destroyed by any human authority. (Casti Connubii, 35. )

Why then, did Christ re-establish the indissolubility of marriage? According to Pope Pius XI, Christ’s purpose in restoring the indissolubility of marriage is to signify the indissolubility of His union with His Church.

If we wish with all reverence to inquire into the intimate reason of this divine decree, Venerable Brethren, we shall easily see it in the mystical signification of Christian marriage which is fully and perfectly verified in consummated marriage between Christians. (Casti Connubii, 36)

But, Christ’s restoration of the original law concerning marriage has practical benefits for families and societies. Pope Pius describes these benefits, writing:

Indeed, how many and how important are the benefits which flow from the indissolubility of matrimony cannot escape anyone who gives even a brief consideration either to the good of the married parties and the offspring or to the welfare of human society. First of all, both husband and wife possess a positive guarantee of the endurance of this stability which that generous yielding of their persons and the intimate fellowship of their hearts by their nature strongly require, since true love never falls away. Besides, a strong bulwark is set up in defense of a loyal chastity against incitements to infidelity, should any be encountered either from within or from without; any anxious fear lest in adversity or old age the other spouse would prove unfaithful is precluded and in its place there reigns a calm sense of security. Moreover, the dignity of both man and wife is maintained and mutual aid is most satisfactorily assured, while through the indissoluble bond, always enduring, the spouses are warned continuously that not for the sake of perishable things nor that they may serve their passions, but that they may procure one for the other high and lasting good have they entered into the nuptial partnership, to be dissolved only by death. In the training and education of children, which must extend over a period of many years, it plays a great part, since the grave and long enduring burdens of this office are best borne by the united efforts of the parents. Nor do lesser benefits accrue to human society as a whole. For experience has taught that unassailable stability in matrimony is a fruitful source of virtuous life and of habits of integrity. Where this order of things obtains, the happiness and well being of the nation is safely guarded; what the families and individuals are, so also is the State, for a body is determined by its parts. Wherefore, both for the private good of husband, wife and children, as likewise for the public good of human society, they indeed deserve well who strenuously defend the inviolable stability of matrimony. (Casti Connubii, 37)

The indissolubility of marriage provides both spouses with a positive guarantee of the endurance of the marriage, until one spouse dies. And this provides stability to the marriage and the family. When couples enter into marriage knowing its indissolubility, they do so in accordance with true love, writes Pope Pius, since true love never falls away. The very indissolubility of marriage known as such by the contracting parties teaches them what true love is, and beckons them to true love, not to the selfishness which joins another only while the experience is pleasant or gratifying. The indissolubility of marriage, known as such by the couple, fortifies the couple to endure through hardships, because each spouse knows that so long as the other spouse lives, leaving and marrying someone else is not an option. And this provides stability to the marriage, to the family, and hence gives greater security to the children to be raised by both their parents in marital unity. And these benefits to families and children in turn lead to greater health and stability of societies constituted by these families. And for Christians, the indissolubility of marriage also teaches them existentially the nature of Christ’s patient and unconditional love for His Church.

What “train of evils” falls upon a society if it makes divorce [civilly] legal?

To revert again to the expression of Our predecessor, it is hardly necessary to point out what an amount of good is involved in the absolute indissolubility of wedlock and what a train of evils follows upon divorce. Whenever the marriage bond remains intact, then we find marriages contracted with a sense of safety and security, while, when separations are considered and the dangers of divorce are present, the marriage contract itself becomes insecure, or at least gives ground for anxiety and surprises. On the one hand we see a wonderful strengthening of goodwill and cooperation in the daily life of husband and wife, while, on the other, both of these are miserably weakened by the presence of a facility for divorce. Here we have at a very opportune moment a source of help by which both parties are enabled to preserve their purity and loyalty; there we find harmful inducements to unfaithfulness. On this side we find the birth of children and their tuition and upbringing effectively promoted, many avenues of discord closed amongst families and relations, and the beginnings of rivalry and jealousy easily suppressed; on that, very great obstacles to the birth and rearing of children and their education, and many occasions of quarrels, and seeds of jealousy sown everywhere. Finally, but especially, the dignity and position of women in civil and domestic society is reinstated by the former; while by the latter it is shamefully lowered and the danger is incurred “of their being considered outcasts, slaves of the lust of men. … [O]nce divorce has been allowed, there will be no sufficient means of keeping it in check within any definite bounds. Great is the force of example, greater still that of lust; and with such incitements it cannot but happen that divorce and its consequent setting loose of the passions should spread daily and attack the souls of many like a contagious disease or a river bursting its banks and flooding the land.” (Casti Connubii, 90-91)

According to Pope Pius XI, if a society gives civil permission to divorce-and-remarriage-while-one’s-spouse-remains-alive, over time this will unleash a flood of evils, because there will be nothing to check fallen man’s indulgence in the primary temptation to divorce, namely, “the power of unbridled lust, which indeed is the most potent cause of sinning against the sacred laws of matrimony.”¹⁷ When a husband finds himself sexually attracted to another woman, nothing will prevent him from divorcing his spouse and ‘remarrying.’ But when this becomes the social conception of marriage, as something lasting only so long as both spouses encounter no other person toward whom they experience more sexual attraction than they do at that time toward their spouse, then at the marriage ceremony what is entered into is no longer marriage, which essentially involves an intention of lifelong commitment, but illicit sexual unions for mutual convenience lasting only so long as the romantic feeling remains, or at least remains stronger than it does toward a third party. And when ‘marriage’ comes to be viewed that way in a society, that social situation can be only temporary because when a farce becomes recognized as such by all, there is no more social incentive even to go through the farce. More specifically, when ‘marriage’ and the ‘marriage vows’ become known by all to be a meaningless or hypocritical farce, then young people especially come to recognize that simply foregoing marriage altogether, and engaging in unions of convenience, is more honest and emotionally safe. When that happens, marriage as a social institution is lost, and the result within a society is the complete breakdown of the family as an institution, i.e. the extinction of the family. And without families, children are not properly formed, loved, disciplined, educated or prepared to enter into society. The loss of the family is the loss of society. And this is the Pandora’s box opened by the civil sanction of divorce.

What is the source of the notion that civil divorce is morally and theologically acceptable? According to Pope Pius XI, it lies both in the atheistic/deistic notion that marriage was not instituted by God, and in the [Protestant] denial of the Catholic doctrine that Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament:

To begin at the very source of these evils, their basic principle lies in this, that matrimony is repeatedly declared to be not instituted by the Author of nature nor raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a true sacrament, but invented by man. (Casti Connubii, 49)

When marriage comes to be conceived as though it were merely a civil affair such as a legal contract between business partners, it then comes to be conceived as something invented by man, and therefore subject to redefining by man. In this respect, what historically and theologically lies behind the contemporary effort to redefine marriage is the denial of the sacramentality of marriage. Pope Pius describes how this denial is at the root of the attempt to redefine marriage so as to allow divorce with remarriage while one’s spouse remains alive, and summarizes the arguments of those who propose that the State can and should make marriage dissoluble:

And now considering that the third blessing, which is that of the sacrament, far surpasses the other two, we should not be surprised to find that this, because of its outstanding excellence, is much more sharply attacked by the same people. They put forward in the first place that matrimony belongs entirely to the profane and purely civil sphere, that it is not to be committed to the religious society, the Church of Christ, but to civil society alone. They then add that the marriage contract is to be freed from any indissoluble bond, and that separation and divorce are not only to be tolerated but sanctioned by the law; from which it follows finally that, robbed of all its holiness, matrimony should be enumerated amongst the secular and civil institutions. …

The advocates of the neo-paganism of today have learned nothing from the sad state of affairs, but instead, day by day, more and more vehemently, they continue by legislation to attack the indissolubility of the marriage bond, proclaiming that the lawfulness of divorce must be recognized, and that the antiquated laws should give place to a new and more humane legislation. Many and varied are the grounds put forward for divorce, some arising from the wickedness and the guilt of the persons concerned, others arising from the circumstances of the case; the former they describe as subjective, the latter as objective; in a word, whatever might make married life hard or unpleasant. They strive to prove their contentions regarding these grounds for the divorce legislation they would bring about, by various arguments. Thus, in the first place, they maintain that it is for the good of either party that the one who is innocent should have the right to separate from the guilty, or that the guilty should be withdrawn from a union which is unpleasing to him and against his will. In the second place, they argue, the good of the child demands this, for either it will be deprived of a proper education or the natural fruits of it, and will too easily be affected by the discords and shortcomings of the parents, and drawn from the path of virtue. And thirdly the common good of society requires that these marriages should be completely dissolved, which are now incapable of producing their natural results, and that legal reparations should be allowed when crimes are to be feared as the result of the common habitation and intercourse of the parties. This last, they say must be admitted to avoid the crimes being committed purposely with a view to obtaining the desired sentence of divorce for which the judge can legally loose the marriage bond, as also to prevent people from coming before the courts when it is obvious from the state of the case that they are lying and perjuring themselves, – all of which brings the court and the lawful authority into contempt. Hence the civil laws, in their opinion, have to be reformed to meet these new requirements, to suit the changes of the times and the changes in men’s opinions, civil institutions and customs. Each of these reasons is considered by them as conclusive, so that all taken together offer a clear proof of the necessity of granting divorce in certain cases.

Others, taking a step further, simply state that marriage, being a private contract, is, like other private contracts, to be left to the consent and good pleasure of both parties, and so can be dissolved for any reason whatsoever. (Casti Connubii, 79, 85-86)

Pope Pius then explains what is wrong with those arguments:

Opposed to all these reckless opinions, Venerable Brethren, stands the unalterable law of God, fully confirmed by Christ, a law that can never be deprived of its force by the decrees of men, the ideas of a people or the will of any legislator: “What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” And if any man, acting contrary to this law, shall have put asunder, his action is null and void, and the consequence remains, as Christ Himself has explicitly confirmed: “Everyone that putteth away his wife and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.” Moreover, these words refer to every kind of marriage, even that which is natural and legitimate only; for, as has already been observed, that indissolubility by which the loosening of the bond is once and for all removed from the whim of the parties and from every secular power, is a property of every true marriage.

Let that solemn pronouncement of the Council of Trent be recalled to mind in which, under the stigma of anathema, it condemned these errors: “If anyone should say that on account of heresy or the hardships of cohabitation or a deliberate abuse of one party by the other the marriage tie may be loosened, let him be anathema;” and again: “If anyone should say that the Church errs in having taught or in teaching that, according to the teaching of the Gospel and the Apostles, the bond of marriage cannot be loosed because of the sin of adultery of either party; or that neither party, even though he be innocent, having given no cause for the sin of adultery, can contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other; and that he commits adultery who marries another after putting away his adulterous wife, and likewise that she commits adultery who puts away her husband and marries another: let him be anathema.”

If therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value whatsoever. And the objections brought against the firmness of the marriage bond are easily answered. For, in certain circumstances, imperfect separation of the parties is allowed, the bond not being severed. This separation, which the Church herself permits, and expressly mentions in her Canon Law in those canons which deal with the separation of the parties as to marital relationship and co-habitation, removes all the alleged inconveniences and dangers. It will be for the sacred law and, to some extent, also the civil law, in so far as civil matters are affected, to lay down the grounds, the conditions, the method and precautions to be taken in a case of this kind in order to safeguard the education of the children and the well-being of the family, and to remove all those evils which threaten the married persons, the children and the State. Now all those arguments that are brought forward to prove the indissolubility of the marriage tie, arguments which have already been touched upon, can equally be applied to excluding not only the necessity of divorce, but even the power to grant it; while for all the advantages that can be put forward for the former, there can be adduced as many disadvantages and evils which are a formidable menace to the whole of human society. (Casti Connubii, 87-89)

Pope Pius explains that what the Church teaches concerning the indissolubility of marriage is a divine law, instituted by Christ, and therefore unalterable by men, or by the Church. It applies to marriages between unbaptized persons as well as sacramental marriages.¹⁸ As the Council of Trent taught, not even heresy or hardships of cohabitation or even deliberate abuse of one party by the other can dissolve the marriage bond. Therefore none of the reasons offered by those who advocate the dissolubility of marriage are of any value, because those reasons are even weaker excuses than the ones address by the Council of Trent. Rather, those weaker reasons allow only, at most, a separation of the parties as to conjugal relations and co-habitation (divorce a mensa et thoro, i.e. ‘bed and board’).

One response to the Church’s dogma concerning the indissolubility of marriage is to think, as the disciples seemed to think, that if marriage is indissoluble, then it is too difficult a vocation, and that it is therefore better not to marry.¹⁹ If man is no less hard-hearted now than under Moses, then why shouldn’t contemporary man no less than the ancient Hebrews need Moses’s concession to divorce? The answer is that for all mankind, Christ has not only restored the original indissolubility of marriage as God instituted it in the Garden, but has also raised matrimony to the dignity of a New Covenant sacrament. When two baptized persons marry, or when two married but unbaptized persons both receive baptism, the marriage becomes, by that very fact and by the New Covenant sacramental economy Christ established through His Passion and Death on the cross, a sacrament.²⁰ It thereby becomes a marriage “in the Lord.” The sacrament of marriage remains even when one or both spouses commit adultery, as the soul of a baptized person does not by apostasy lose the sacrament of faith (i.e. baptism), so as to need rebaptism upon return to the faith.²¹ Only death breaks the sacramental bond. But marriage under the New Covenant is not only a sign of Christ’s union with the Church. Marriage itself, through baptism, has been made an efficacious means of a unique internal grace in both spouses. This sacramental grace “perfects natural love, it confirms an indissoluble union, and sanctifies both man and wife.”²² Hence under the New Covenant Christ has not left man without a means of grace by which he can faithfully fulfill his marital duties, and uphold the original design of marriage as indissoluble. Pope Pius XI describes the grace received through the sacrament of marriage, explaining that when a baptized man and a baptized woman marry, they

open up for themselves a treasure of sacramental grace from which they draw supernatural power for the fulfilling of their rights and duties faithfully, holily, perseveringly even unto death. Hence this sacrament not only increases sanctifying grace, the permanent principle of the supernatural life, in those who, as the expression is, place no obstacle (obex) in its way, but also adds particular gifts, dispositions, seeds of grace, by elevating and perfecting the natural powers. By these gifts the parties are assisted not only in understanding, but in knowing intimately, in adhering to firmly, in willing effectively, and in successfully putting into practice, those things which pertain to the marriage state, its aims and duties, giving them in fine right to the actual assistance of grace, whensoever they need it for fulfilling the duties of their state.²³

By this grace, they can, if they avail themselves of it, fulfill their marital duties.²⁴ The grace provided through the sacrament of marriage fortifies couples to be faithful and endure difficulties and temptations. It softens hearts, and is precisely why in the New Covenant we do not need the allowance for divorce granted by Moses under the Old Covenant on account of the hardness of their hearts. In this respect Protestant sacramentology implies that the New Covenant is no greater than the Old Covenant, because, for example, in most Protestant sacramentology baptism accomplishes no more in the believer than circumcision did in the Old Covenant.²⁵ Similarly, in most Protestant sacramentology the Supper is no greater than is the Passover meal or the manna from heaven, because intrinsically the Supper accomplishes nothing more than did they, and the New Covenant people are not expected to be more sanctified through it than were the faithful of the Old Covenant through eating the manna or the Passover meal. One could even say justifiably that in Protestant sacramentology, the Supper is lower than its Old Covenant type because the manna in the desert at least had a supernatural origin, while the bread in the Protestant Supper remains ordinary bread with a natural origin. Likewise, the Protestant notion that marriage is not sacramental, and that divorce-with-remarriage is permitted in the New Covenant, makes marriage under the New Covenant no greater than marriage under Moses. And this notion that the New Covenant is effectively no greater than the Old Covenant is a form of the error of the Galatian Judaizers. It is why St. Ambrose said “Anyone saying that one is free to marry a wife that has been put away is not a Christian; he is a Jew.” (Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, 8)²⁶

Allocution to the Sacred Roman Rota (Pope Pius XII, 1940)

The seal of indissolubility is visibly stamped in the unity of the conjugal bond. Indeed it is a bond to which nature tends, but one which is not necessarily caused by the principles of nature, being instead brought about by the exercise of free will. But the mere will of the contracting parties, though it can form the bond, cannot dissolve it. This holds not only for Christian nuptials but for every valid marriage contracted on earth through the mutual consent of the partners ….

But if the will of the spouses having contracted the matrimonial bond cannot dissolve it, can the authority which is above them established by Christ for the religious life of man do so? The bond of Christian marriage is so strong that if it has reached full stability by the use of conjugal rights, no power on earth, not even our own, that is, that of the Vicar of Christ, is able to dissolve it. It is true that we may perceive and declare that a marriage contracted as a valid one was in reality void owing to some impediment or an essential flaw in consent or a substantial defect in form. We can also in certain cases and for serious reasons dissolve marriages not having a sacramental character. We can even dissolve the bonds of a Christian marriage, rescind the “yes” pronounced before the altar, if there is a just and proportionate cause, when it has been established that the marriage has not been brought to completion through realization of matrimonial cohabitation. But once that has taken place no human agency may interfere with the bond. For has not Christ led the matrimonial common life back to the fundamental dignity which the Creator had given it at the dawn of the human race in paradise, to the inviolable dignity of marriage, one and indissoluble. (Allocution to the Sacred Roman Rota)

Here Pope Pius XII teaches that the will of the contracting parties (i.e. the husband and wife) cannot dissolve the marriage bond, and that this is true not only for Christian marriages but for every valid marriage contracted through the mutual consent of the man and the woman. With regard to marriage, the Church has a greater authority than does the couple. And so for non-sacramental marriages and for Christian marriages that have not been consummated, the Church has authority to dissolve those marriages under only two conditions (see the Pauline privilege and the Petrine privilege, discussed below). But in the case of a valid and consummated marriage between two baptized persons, the Church has no authority or power to dissolve such a marriage, for Christ has restored to marriage its “inviolable dignity,” as “one and indissoluble.”

Second Vatican Council (Gaudium et Spes, 1965)

The intimate partnership of married life and love has been established by the Creator and qualified by His laws, and is rooted in the conjugal covenant of irrevocable personal consent. Hence by that human act whereby spouses mutually bestow and accept each other a relationship arises which by divine will and in the eyes of society too is a lasting one. For the good of the spouses and their off-springs as well as of society, the existence of the sacred bond no longer depends on human decisions alone. For, God Himself is the author of matrimony, endowed as it is with various benefits and purposes. All of these have a very decisive bearing on the continuation of the human race, on the personal development and eternal destiny of the individual members of a family, and on the dignity, stability, peace and prosperity of the family itself and of human society as a whole. By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and education of children, and find in them their ultimate crown. Thus a man and a woman, who by their compact of conjugal love “are no longer two, but one flesh” (Matt. 19:ff), render mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their persons and of their actions. Through this union they experience the meaning of their oneness and attain to it with growing perfection day by day. As a mutual gift of two persons, this intimate union and the good of the children impose total fidelity on the spouses and argue for an unbreakable oneness between them. (Gaudium et Spes, 48)

The mutual gift of two persons to each other, in the matrimonial union having as its purpose the procreation and education of children, by its very nature imposes upon the spouses total fidelity, and argues for an unbreakable oneness between them. The love required for entering this union is not that of mere expediency or contingency. It requires a total gift of self in which each irrevocably bonds himself/herself to the other until death.

IV. The Porneia Clause

Recall that when we considered above the New Testament passages on marriage, we delayed our interpretation of two passages in particular, until we had examined the Church Fathers. We did this in order to approach Scripture within the Tradition, and as informed by the Tradition, rather than attempting to approach Scripture apart from the Tradition and then use our in vacuo interpretation as the standard against which to judge the teaching of the Church Fathers. The two passages in question are Matthew 5:31-32, and Matthew 19:3-9:

It was also said, “Whoever divorces [ἀπολύσῃ] his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce.” But I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except for the reason of fornication [παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας], makes her commit adultery; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.” (St. Matthew 5:31-32)

And Pharisees came up to Him and tested Him by asking, “Is there any cause for which it is lawful for a man to divorce his wife?” He answered, “Have you not read that He who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother, and the two shall become one? So they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.” They said to Him, “Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?” He said to them, “For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you: whoever divorces his wife, except for fornication [μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ] and marries another commits adultery. (St. Matthew 19:3-9)

Some persons in recent times have proposed that in these two porneia clauses Jesus is referring to cases in which a person has attempted an illicit marriage, such as when a person attempts to marry a close relative. Because consanguinity is an impediment to marriage, then in such a case no marriage has been formed.²⁷ Hence, according to these persons, the porneia clauses mean that when the incest is discovered, the other person may be put away (i.e. divorced), because there has been no marriage at all. And then both persons may marry someone else. (I say ‘marry’ rather than ‘remarry’ because in such a case it is not a remarriage, since the original union was not a marriage.) But, that interpretation of these porneia clauses is not what we find in the Church Fathers. When the Church Fathers discuss these verses, they unanimously take them to be referring to cases of actual marriage.

But even given that these passages are referring to actually married couples, there still remains a critical interpretive question. Do these two exception clauses refer to conditions under which it is both possible and permissible to sever the marriage bond and remarry while the other spouse lives, or do these two exception clauses refer to conditions under which it is only permissible for one spouse to separate from the other with respect to marital relations and cohabitation, the indissoluble marriage bond remaining until one spouse dies? The moral consensus among the Church Fathers, as shown above, is that in these two exception clauses Jesus is referring not to a condition under which the marriage bond may be severed, but only to the condition under which the couple may be separated, the marriage bond itself being indissoluble until death. Hence Haydock says:

A divorce or separation as to bed and board, may be permitted for some weighty causes in Christian marriages; but even then, he that marrieth her that is dismissed, commits adultery. As to this, there is no exception. The bond of marriage is perpetual; and what God hath joined, no power on earth can separate. (Haydock, Commentary on Matthew 5.)

And Ludwig Ott adds:

The so-called fornication clause (μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ), which in a somewhat different form is found in Mt. 5:32, also (παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας), but which does not appear in the parallel passages Mark 10:11, and Luke 16:18, does not, according to the context, imply an exception to the law of indissolubility: for it was Jesus’ intention to restore the original order, which did not know divorce, and to set up His new commandment in conscious antithesis to the lax Law of Moses (cf. Mt. 5:31 et seq.). Unless one wishes to destroy the antithesis and create a contradiction between St. Matthew on the one side and SS. Mark and Luke (such as 1 Cor. 7:10 et seq.) on the other side, one must either understand the clause in the traditional excluding sense, according to which it indeed permits, by way of exception, the putting away of the woman, but not subsequent re-marrying, that is, the so-called separation from bed and board, or in the including sense, according to which an exception from the prohibition of divorce is not laid down, but that the ground for divorce provided for in Deut. 24:1 (‘erwath dabar == something infamous) is drawn into the prohibition of divorce. (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, p. 463-464.)

Ott shows that given Jesus’s purpose in restoring the original order with respect to marriage, the porneia clauses must either be taken in the traditional sense as giving the occasion under which a separation from bed and board is permitted, or as meaning that even in the case of adultery, divorce in the sense of dissolving the marriage bond is not permitted.

The patristic evidence convinced Anglican Old Testament scholar Gordon Wenham that the porneia clauses in the Gospels should be understood as allowing only separation, not remarriage with a third party while one’s spouse remains alive. He writes:

Furthermore historians find it impossible to imagine how the early church could have come to this view, if Jesus had not forbidden divorce and remarriage to his disciples. Jews and Romans allowed divorce followed by remarriage in some circumstances. If Jesus did too, how on earth could the whole church throughout the Roman empire, within a few decades of the gospels being written, have come to the opposite conclusion? The practice of divorce and remarriage is not an erudite theological doctrine that mattered only to theologians: it potentially affected every Christian family in the church. Surely if earlier church practice had been more liberal allowing divorce and remarriage, somebody would have protested and said, ‘This is not what the apostles taught us’? But whereas there were furious controversies about some other doctrines, there is total unanimity among early Greek writers on the prohibition or remarriage after divorce. (“Jesus and Divorce: Did He permit it?)

The universal belief among the early Christians that divorce-with-remarriage is not allowed can be explained in no other way than that it came from the Apostles themselves, and thus from Christ Himself. Concerning this patristic testimony, and the importance of interpreting Scripture within the Tradition handed down by the Church Fathers, Wenham writes in another article:

Modern Protestants have by and large forgotten that their forefathers, the magisterial reformers, placed great store by the interpretations of the early church. Postenlightenment scholarship has developed a great hermeneutic of suspicion when it comes to reading the church fathers: the automatic assumption is that they have distorted the primitive gospel and its associated practices into a corrupt Frühkatholismus (early Catholicism). This was not the reformers’ view, nor of course that of the early Christian writers themselves. They believed in an essential continuity between the witness of the early church and the teaching of the New Testament. …

Among Greek-speaking fathers both pre- and post-Constantine there is total unanimity. Among the earlier group Hermas, Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, all explicitly condemn remarriage after divorce or clearly presuppose this view. The Constantinian settlement, which made Christianity the official religion of the empire, might have encouraged Christian writers to identify imperial legal practice. which permitted divorce and remarriage, with Christian values, but there is no sign of that happening. Later Greek theologians such as Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Apollinarius, Theodore of Mopsuestia and John Chrysostom all maintain the traditional Christian position that the Gospels do not permit remarriage after divorce. They regard the exception clause as authorizing or requiring separation, not permitting remarriage afterwards. That this interpretation was the way native Greek speakers understood our Lord’s teaching surely indicates that it is the most natural interpretation.

The evidence of the Latin fathers is equally impressive. It is also carefully and exhaustively analysed by Crouzel. Among those who condemn remarriage after divorce are Tertullian, Ambrose, Innocent, Pelagius, Jerome, and Augustine. There is only one dissenting voice in the West, who cannot be identified, but, because he was once identified with Ambrose, is known as Ambrosiaster. (“Does the New Testament Approve Remarriage After Divorce?“)²⁸

If Jesus were saying that adultery dissolved the marriage bond, He would be contradicting His appeal to the original divine intention for marriage to justify rescinding the Mosaic permission of divorce. Christ’s teaching on marriage would be merely a continuation of that of Moses. Moreover, if one spouse wished to marry someone else, he would have an incentive to incite his spouse to commit adultery in order to provide a legitimate justification for severing the marriage bond to ‘free’ him to marry a third party while his spouse still lived. This is why killing one’s own spouse in order to marry someone else invalidates the attempt to enter into a new marriage:

Can. 1090 §1. Anyone who with a view to entering marriage with a certain person has brought about the death of that person’s spouse or of one’s own spouse invalidly attempts this marriage. (Can. 1090)

The moral consensus of the Church Fathers laid out above shows that these two porneia clauses should be understood as allowing separation as to bed and board, but not a severing of the marriage bond. And this matches the Catholic doctrine taught infallibly at the Council of Trent concerning the indissolubility of marriage. In the Church’s present canon law, only divorce understood as separation of bed and board is allowed either for adultery (Can. 1152) or “grave mental or physical danger to the other spouse” (Can. 1153).²⁹

V. Objections to the Sacramentality and Indissolubility of Marriage

Objection 1: If marriage is a sacrament and thus a means of grace, then why do some Catholic marriages fail, such that the spouses end up living separately?

This is a more specific form of a broader objection, namely, if the sacraments are truly means of sanctifying grace, then why are many Catholics not holy people, even though they receive these sacraments? I have addressed that broader question in comment #22 of Tom’s “Sacramental Graces and Practical Apostasy” post. There I wrote the following:

The Seventh Session of the Council of Trent provides three relevant canons which must be taken together to be rightly understood:

Canon 6. If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace which they signify, or that they do not confer that grace on those who place no obstacles in its way, as though they were only outward signs of grace or justice received through faith and certain marks of Christian profession, whereby among men believers are distinguished from unbelievers, let him be anathema.

Canon 7. If anyone says that grace, so far as God’s part is concerned, is not imparted through the sacraments always and to all men even if they receive them rightly, but only sometimes and to some persons, let him be anathema.

Canon 8. If anyone says that by the sacraments of the New Law grace is not conferred ex opere operato, but that faith alone in the divine promise is sufficient to obtain grace, let him be anathema.

Some Protestants (and probably some Catholics) mistakenly conceive of ex opere operato as though the recipient necessarily receives grace by receiving the sacrament. In other words, they think that what is said in Canon 8 is incompatible with the the qualification “on those who place no obstacles in its way” in Canon 6. But that is a misunderstanding of of the meaning of ex opere operato. Ex opere operato does not entail that every recipient of the sacrament receives grace. It means that grace is always given in the sacrament, by an objective efficacy of the sacrament, as a genuine instrumental cause by divine ordination; but the grace that is given can be resisted or blocked, by the recipient who places an obstacle in the way.

The qualification “on those who place no obstacles in its way” had been previously taught by Pope Eugenius IV in his Decree for the Armenians in 1439, who explains that the sacraments contain grace and confer grace upon those who receive them worthily (i.e. do not place an obstacle in its way). (See Denzinger 695).

This general truth regarding the efficacy of the sacraments and the way in which we can place obstacles in the way of the sacrament that prevent us from receiving sanctifying grace applies also to the sacrament of marriage. Success in the marriage relationship is not guaranteed by both spouses being baptized, and thus by the marriage being sacramental. Married couples must strive to fulfill their marital duties, and in doing so, they will find the grace needed to fulfill those duties. Pope Pius XI explains:

[S]omething more is needed in addition to the education of the mind, namely a steadfast determination of the will, on the part of husband and wife, to observe the sacred laws of God and of nature in regard to marriage. … Yet in order that the grace of this sacrament may produce its full fruit, there is need, as we have already pointed out, of the cooperation of the married parties; which consists in their striving to fulfill their duties to the best of their ability and with unwearied effort. For just as in the natural order men must apply the powers given them by God with their own toil and diligence that these may exercise their full vigor, failing which, no profit is gained, so also men must diligently and unceasingly use the powers given them by the grace which is laid up in the soul by this sacrament. Let not, then, those who are joined in matrimony neglect the grace of the sacrament which is in them;[84] for, in applying themselves to the careful observance, however laborious, of their duties they will find the power of that grace becoming more effectual as time goes on. (Casti Connubii, 110-111)

Under the New Coveanant the promise for baptized married couples is that the grace they need to fulfill their marital duties faithfully is available to them through the sacrament of marriage, though they must diligently strive to make use of that grace. Those who do not strive to make use of the grace available to them, or who despair concerning the effort required to fulfill the duties of marriage, are not provided any divine guarantee of success. The grace one receives in the sacrament not only depends on not placing obstaces to the sacraments, but also on the disposition of the recipients of the sacraments. The greater the charity of the person receiving the sacrament, the greater the grace received through the sacrament. But those in a state of mortal sin (i.e. not in a state of grace) must first avail themselves of the sacrament of reconciliation. While in a state of mortal sin, one cannot grow in the grace needed for fulfilling marital duties. Hence the regular reception of the sacraments of the Eucharist and Penance will aid a couple in the grace they receive through the sacrament of marriage.

Objection 2: What about validly married Catholics who subsequently obtain from the State a civil divorce, and then obtain from the State a civil ‘remarriage’ with a third party? Isn’t that the same as divorce?

When Catholic spouses seek a civil divorce from the State, and then, while their spouse is still living, enter into a civil ‘marriage’ with someone other than their spouse, they are in actuality entering into an adulterous relationship. The civil ‘divorce’ they have obtained from the State does not dissolve the marriage bond (because the State has no authority to dissolve the marriage bond). And under the New Covenant it is impossible to be validly married to two or more persons at the same time. Therefore, when two validly married persons enter into a civil ‘marriage’ with a third person after obtaining a civil divorce from the spouse to whom they are validly married, they are in fact entering into a State-sanctioned adulterous relationship with someone who is not their actual spouse. This adulterious relationship is a grave sin, and therefore such persons are not to receive the Eucharist until they are no longer in an adulterous relationship. That some Catholics knowingly live in adulterous relationships is in no way a justification for rejecting what the Tradition teaches concerning the sanctity and indissolubility of marriage.

Objection 3: What about annulments? Aren’t annulments just another form of divorce?

An annulment is not a divorce. An annulment does not break or sever any marriage bond. An annulment is a judgment by the Church that the requisite conditions for the formation of the marriage bond were never satisfied, and thus that the couple is not yet married. For example, if one of the parties did not consent freely but only under coercion, or if one of the parties intended something other than a lifelong union, or intended never to have children, then no marital union was formed. The Catechism states:

The [matrimonial] consent must be an act of the will of each of the contracting parties, free of coercion or grave external fear. No human power can substitute for this consent. If this freedom is lacking the marriage is invalid. For this reason (or for other reasons that render the marriage null and void) the Church, after an examination of the situation by the competent ecclesiastical tribunal, can declare the nullity of a marriage, i.e., that the marriage never existed. In this case the contracting parties are free to marry, provided the natural obligations of a previous union are discharged. (CCC 1628-29)

Colin Donovan explains:

An annulment, properly called a Decree of Nullity, is a finding by a Church tribunal that on the day vows were exchanged at least some essential element for a valid marriage was lacking, such as, one of the parties did not intend lifelong fidelity to the other person or excluded children entirely. Another example would be that one of the parties was incapable of marriage (due to some constitutional weakness, such as mental illness or some psychological condition that prevented making the marital commitment – gross immaturity, homosexuality, etc.).

None of these conditions are assumed they must be proven. A Decree of Nullity does not dissolve the marriage, it cannot. It is a reasoned judgement that one never existed, and as such is capable of human error. If the tribunal is fastidious to Church law and theology and the couple and their witnesses are honest, the decision can be followed in good-faith, including a new marriage. If someone is abusing the process through deceit, however, it would be a very grave sin for that person. A person who innocently enters a second marriage would not be guilty of sin, but the person who abused the process to fraudulently obtain a decree in order to remarry would commit adultery by remarrying. (Annulment/Decree of Nullity)

Some Protestants misunderstand the Catholic teaching concerning annulment, thinking it to be the Church’s claim to have the power to dissolve a valid marriage. But that is not what an annulment is. The Church has the authority to dissolve a valid marriage in only two cases; see the paragraph below on the Pauline and Petrine privileges. The Church has no authority to dissolve a consummated sacramental marriage. Co-habitation or having children together or having joint bank accounts or even being ‘married’ in the eyes of the State do not make a couple to be truly married, if the necessary conditions for the forming of the marriage bond were never present (i.e. being available to be married, not being within the prohibited degree of consanguinity, giving free consent, having a lifelong intention, being open to children, etc.).

There have been abuses of the annulment process, both by the persons seeking an annulment and by members of the Church tribunals that decide annulment cases. But the old principle applies: abusus usum non tollit (abuse does not take away proper use). The fact that the annulment process has been abused in no way justifies revising the doctrine of marriage so as to treat marriage as dissoluble, or to reject the Church’s teaching rooted in Tradition concerning the sacramental character of Christian marriage. A decree of nullity cannot dissolve a sacramental marriage, nor is it an infallible decree. It does not change the ontological status of the couple; rather, it changes their status in relation to Church law (i.e. canon law), but divine law still applies.

For example, a husband who is validly married, and who then lies in his application for an annulment, and receives a decree of nullity based on that lie, would be committing adultery if he then ‘remarried,’ even though this adultery would be invisible from the point of view of canon law. But if a man or woman applying for an annulment believes that at least one of the requisite conditions for a valid marriage was not satisfied, and the Church tribunal determines that the requisite conditions for a valid marriage were not present, both parties can in good conscience believe that they have never been married, not only from the point of view of canon law, but also before God. And in such a case therefore they are each free either to remain single, to marry each other or to marry third parties, since they have not yet been married.

Objection 4: The doctrine that marriage is a sacrament is not in Scripture.

The primary Protestant objection to the Catholic teaching that marriage is a New Covenant sacrament is that no explicit statement that marriage is a sacrament can be found in the New Testament. Hence Martin Luther wrote:

We have said that in every sacrament there is a word of divine promise, to be believed by whoever receives the sign, and that the sign alone cannot be a sacrament. Nowhere do we read that the man who marries a wife receives any grace of God. There is not even a divinely instituted sign in marriage, nor do we read anywhere that marriage was instituted by God to be a sign of anything. To be sure, whatever takes place in a visible manner can be understood as a figure or allegory of something invisible. But figures or allegories are not sacraments, in the sense in which we use the term.”³⁰

And because Luther did not find the sacramentality of marriage made explicit in the New Testament, he concluded that marriage is not a sacrament, and therefore should not be under the jurisdiction of the Church, but under that of the State:

Know therefore that marriage is an outward, bodily thing, like any other worldly undertaking.³¹

[M]arriage is outside the church, is a civil matter, and therefore should belong to the government.³²

Similarly, John Calvin followed Luther in this same line of reasoning. Concerning marriage Calvin wrote:

Lastly, there is matrimony, which all admit was instituted by God, though no one before the time of (Pope) Gregory VII (AD 1073-1085) regarded it as a sacrament. And what sober man could so regard it? Marriage is a good and holy ordinance; so also are farming, building, shoemaking, hair-cutting legitimate ordinances of God, but they are not sacraments. For it is required that a sacrament be not only a work of God but an outward ceremony apointed by God to confirm a promise. Even children can discern that there is no such thing in matrimony.”³³

He, like many Protestants after him, mistakenly inferred from the fact that the Church Fathers refer to many sacred rites (in addition to the seven sacraments) as ‘sacraments’ to the conclusion that the doctrine of sacramental marriage in the New Covenant is a Scholastic novelty. This inference is mistaken because it treats as a novelty what was in actuality an organic development. The Church was never unaware that marriage is a sacrament, but over time the Church came to a greater precision by conceptually and semantically distinguishing between the sacraments Christ had established in the New Covenant, and what are now called sacramentals.³⁴

For Calvin, ‘refuting’ the Catholic doctrine that marriage is a sacrament was relatively easy (covering only a few pages in his Institutes), because one of his criteria for being a sacrament was an explicit statement in Scripture to that effect. He treated the Catholic case for the sacramentality of marriage as though it depended mostly on Scripture, and then showed that Scripture does not explicitly show that marriage is sacrament, at least not as Calvin himself had defined ‘sacrament.’

The fundamental mistake here, by Luther, Calvin and the other early Protestants, was not recognizing that the Apostolic Tradition was handed down not only in written form but also in the speech, training, liturgy, practice and life of each generation of the Church. The early Protestants generally assumed that the entirety of the Apostolic deposit was either contained explicitly in the Scripture, or was logically demonstrable from what was explicitly stated in Scripture. That assumption is itself neither contained explicitly in Scripture nor logically demonstrable from what is explicitly stated in Scripture. So according to its own criterion it is at best a man-made tradition. But Scripture can be rightly interpreted and understood only in the context of the Tradition within which it was transmitted. Apart from that Tradition, many things contained implicitly in Scripture are veiled, though in the light of that Tradition, they can be seen in Scripture. I have written about the Catholic understanding of the relation between Scripture and Tradition in the section titled “Scripture and Tradition” in my dialogue with Michael Horton.

In surveying that Patristic evidence regarding marriage, we find marriage elevated to something sacred and indissoluble, not, as Luther depicted it, a merely secular thing subject to dissolution by the State. Even at the end of the first century St. Ignatius of Antioch says the following regarding couples who wished to marry:

But it becomes both men and women who marry, to form their union with the approval of the bishop, that their marriage may be according to God, and not after their own lust.³⁵

Already for Christians at the end of the first century, the Church, not the State, had ultimate jurisdiction over marriage, indicating as well that for Christians marriage was not a merely secular affair, but a sacred institution, in which husbands are to love their wives as Christ loves the Church, and not reduce them to objects of lust or use. And in the early patristic evidence surveyed above, we see a continual difference between the Catholic conception of marriage with its attending ecclesial laws concerning the indissolubility of marriage, and the Roman civil laws concerning marriage, which allowed divorce and remarriage. The basis for that difference was not a mere stipulation by Christ or the Apostles concerning what may or may not be done by married couples, but a change in the very conception of marriage, as something elevated by Christ to represent explicitly in every family and to the whole world the union of Christ and His Church.

This understanding by the whole Church that marriage is a sacrament is the reason why the Eastern Orthodox also maintain marriage as one of the seven sacraments in the New Covenant. That marriage is a sacrament was never a point of contention between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church in the repeated attempts at reconciliation. And the Coptic Church, which separated from the Catholic Church in the fifth century after the Council of Chalcedon, also maintains that there are seven sacraments, and that marriage is a sacrament. The thesis that the notion that marriage is a sacrament is a Scholastic novelty of the Latin Church does not fit with these pieces of evidence. These pieces of evidence indicate that insofar as there was theological development during the Scholastic era with respect to the sacramental character of marriage, it was in organic continuity with the Tradition that had been received everywhere.

In addition, belief in seven sacraments, including the sacramentality of marriage, was both universal and explicit in the Catholic Church for four centuries prior to the rise of Protestantism. Whenever there is universal belief in a doctrine by the Church, this indicates that it has an Apostolic origin, either explicit or implicit. Tertullian explains:

Grant, then, that all have erred; that the apostle was mistaken in giving his testimony; that the Holy Ghost had no such respect to any one (church) as to lead it into truth, although sent with this view by Christ, John 14:26 and for this asked of the Father that He might be the teacher of truth; John 15:26 grant, also, that He, the Steward of God, the Vicar of Christ, neglected His office, permitting the churches for a time to understand differently, (and) to believe differently, what He Himself was preaching by the apostles—is it likely that so many churches, and they so great, should have gone astray into one and the same faith? No casualty distributed among many men issues in one and the same result. Error of doctrine in the churches must necessarily have produced various issues. When, however, that which is deposited among many is found to be one and the same, it is not the result of error, but of tradition. Can any one, then, be reckless enough to say that they were in error who handed on the tradition? (Prescription Against Heretics, 28)

And St. Augustine likewise writes:

Whatever is held by the whole Church, and was not introduced by any council, but has always been maintained, is rightly held to rest on the authority of the Apostles. (On Baptism, IV. 24)

The catholicity of the Church is itself part of the Tradition. See sections III and IV in the article titled “The Commonitory of St. Vincent of Lérins.” There are multiple aspects and implications of catholicity. Not only does catholicity mean that the Apostolic teaching goes out into every tribe, tongue, and nation; it also implies what is stated in the quotations just cited from Tertullian and St. Augustine, as well as by St. Vincent of Lérins, namely, that what has been accepted by the whole Church is “rightly held to rest on the authority of the Apostles.” And hence according to this criterion, not only the indissolubility of marriage but also its sacramentality, belongs to the Apostolic Tradition.

The sacramental nature of Christian marriage can be seen in St. Paul’s statement: “This is a great sacrament [mystery]; but I speak in Christ and in the church.”³⁶ In the Church Fathers we find an awareness that what has been revealed by Christ is not only the mystery of the union of Christ and His Church, but the significance of marriage as a type of that mystery, and therefore elevated to a higher standard than what Moses allowed. In this way sacramental marriage as sacramental (rather than as merely natural) is also a divinely revealed mystery (i.e. sacramentum), along with baptism and the Eucharist and the other sacraments Christ instituted in the New Covenant. Jesus raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament not only by showing it to signify His union with His Church, but by making it a means of grace, such that the Mosaic concession concerning divorce could be rescinded, and Christian marriages could rightly signify the union of Christ and His Church through their manifest love, fidelity, perpetuity and indissolubility.

Objection 5: The notion that marriage is a sacrament presupposes that the sexual act is intrinsically sinful.

One mistaken notion among some Protestants is that the Catholic Church’s teaching that marriage is a sacrament is based on an assumption that the sexual act is intrinsically sinful, and therefore that God had to give grace through marriage in order to forgive married couples for the sin of lust during the sexual act. There is simply no truth to this notion. The sexual act is good; it is not a sin. Nor does being in sacramental marriage grant one forgiveness for any sin, including that of lust.³⁷ The purpose of this sacrament, as well as that of the sacrament of Holy Orders, is grace for the service of others. The Catholic Catechism explains:

Baptism, Confirmation, and Eucharist are sacraments of Christian initiation. They ground the common vocation of all Christ’s disciples, a vocation to holiness and to the mission of evangelizing the world. They confer the graces needed for the life according to the Spirit during this life as pilgrims on the march towards the homeland. Two other sacraments, Holy Orders and Matrimony, are directed towards the salvation of others; if they contribute as well to personal salvation, it is through service to others that they do so. They confer a particular mission in the Church and serve to build up the People of God. Through these sacraments those already consecrated by Baptism and Confirmation for the common priesthood of all the faithful can receive particular consecrations. Those who receive the sacrament of Holy Orders are consecrated in Christ’s name “to feed the Church by the word and grace of God.” On their part, “Christian spouses are fortified and, as it were, consecrated for the duties and dignity of their state by a special sacrament. (CCC 1533-35)

Objection 6: God would never give us something too difficult to bear. But the prohibition of divorce-with-remarriage while one’s spouse remains alive would be too difficult. Therefore, God must not have prohibited divorce-with-remarriage while one’s spouse remains alive.

For Martin Luther, not only adultery but also desertion and or irksome cohabitation were a sufficient ground for divorce-with-remarriage. Calvin, like Luther, believed that adultery justified divorce with remarriage to a third party. For Calvin, Jesus’ condemnation of remarriage as adultery applied only to “unlawful and frivolous divorces.” Regarding Jesus’s statement in Mark 10:11, “And whosoever shall marry her that is divorced commits adultery,” Calvin writes:

This clause has been very ill explained by many commentators; for they have thought that generally, and without exception, celibacy is enjoined in all cases when a divorce has taken place; and, therefore, if a husband should put away an adulteress, both would be laid under the necessity of remaining unmarried. As if this liberty of divorce meant only not to lie with his wife; and as if Christ did not evidently grant permission in this case to do what the Jews were wont indiscriminately to do at their pleasure. It was therefore a gross error; for, though Christ condemns as an adulterer the man who shall marry a wife that has been divorced, this is undoubtedly restricted to unlawful and frivolous divorces.³⁸

Even though Jesus does not say that His prohibition on marrying a divorced person applies only to those divorces that were unlawful or frivolous, Calvin feels free to weaken Jesus’s prohibition by adding that qualifier. And in his “Ecclesiastical Ordinances” adopted by the Little and Large Councils of 1561, Calvin allowed three grounds (besides adultery) for divorce and remarriage: impotence, extreme religious incompatibility, and abandonment.³⁹

The primary factor in Luther and Calvin’s reasoning concerning the permissibility of remarriage to a third party after divorce, is that God would not have given us something too difficult to bear. And because Jews were allowed to remarry after divorce, it couldn’t be that persons under the New Covenant would have less liberty than did the Jews under the Old Covenant. But notice that there are two assumptions at work in that line of reasoning. One is that the grace given under the New Covenant is not greater than that given to the Jews under the Old Covenant. I discussed this above at the end of my survey of Casti Connubii, where I pointed out the way in which this assumption is the error of the Galatian Judaizers. If under the Old Covenant there was not sufficient grace given to reconcile divorced couples, then, according to this assumption, there is not sufficient grace given to reconcile divorced couples under the New Covenant, and thus they too must be free to remarry third parties. But, in fact, whatever Christ requires of us, He provides the grace for us to accomplish. And in removing the Mosaic exception for divorce-with-remarriage, Christ has provided the grace by which our hearts are softened, and divorced couples are capable of remaining continent until their reconciliation. So the premise that God will never give us something too difficult to bear is true; the mistake in this objection is assuming that Christ has not provided mankind with additional grace under the New Covenant to remain continent when separated from one’s spouse in bed and board, until reconciliation or death, whichever comes first.

The second assumption in this line of reasoning is that freedom is fundamentally the power to choose between alternatives, not the power to choose virtuously. (See “Lawrence Feingold on Freedom of the Will.”) When more grace is given, so that we are empowered to do what is right, then our liberty is increased in the sense that we are more easily able to choose virtuously, even if some or many immoral options are closed off to us. So by giving us more grace under the New Covenant, our liberty has been increased, even though the exception Moses gave to the Jews has been removed by Christ.

Objection 7: If an unconsummated sacramental marriage is a marriage, and marriage is indissoluble then either the Petrine Privilege contradicts the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage, or sacramental marriage is not truly indissoluble. Otherwise, an unconsummated relationship is not yet a marriage, in which case Joseph and Mary were not truly married.

A contracted and consummated marriage between two baptized persons is absolutely indissoluble, since not only the State, but also the Church has no authority to dissolve it. But even non-sacramental marriages (i.e. marriage between two unbaptized persons, or between one unbaptized person and one baptized person) cannot be dissolved by any civil law or civil power. Such marriages are not absolutely indissoluble, however; there are two (and only two) cases in which such marriages can be dissolved. These cases are referred to as the Pauline privilege and the Petrine privilege. The Pauline privilege derives from 1 Corinthians 7:12-16. There, St. Paul writes:

But to the rest I say, not the Lord, that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he must not divorce her. And a woman who has an unbelieving husband, and he consents to live with her, she must not send her husband away. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified through her believing husband; for otherwise your children are unclean, but now they are holy. Yet if the unbelieving one leaves, let him leave; the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God has called us to peace. For how do you know, O wife, whether you will save your husband? Or how do you know, O husband, whether you will save your wife? (1 Cor. 7:12-16)

The Pauline privilege is the Church’s authorization to dissolve a marriage contracted and even consummated between two unbaptized persons if one party of the marriage subsequently is baptized, and the other party refuses to continue to live with him or her peacefully in the married state. So the objection raises a preliminary question: If valid but non-sacramental marriages are intrinsically indissoluble, then how can there be such a thing as the Pauline privilege? The answer to this question involves an implication of the distinction between nature and grace. In the Supplement of St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica, in answer to the question “Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?” we read:

Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting–since this can be effected even without marriage–but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. One is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter. Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers. (Summa Theologica Supp. Q.59 a.2.)

The natural end of marriage can be pursued by two unbaptized persons, and hence unbaptized persons can be married. But, if two unbaptized persons enter into marriage, and subsequently only one spouse receives baptism, the immediate result is a disparity of cult in which the couple is “unequally yoked.”⁴⁰ In choosing to be baptized, he or she has, for God’s sake, at the same time freely rejected marriage-directed-only-to-a-natural-end. For the baptized spouse the marriage (as everything else he or she does) is now directed also but primarily to a supernatural end, while for the unbaptized spouse the marriage remains directed only to its natural end. Because grace does not destroy nature, the baptism of the one spouse does not remove the other spouse’s freedom to consent (or refuse consent) to union ordered to a supernatural end. If the unbaptized spouse consents (either by choosing to be baptized, or by being willing at least to live in peace with the baptized spouse and not prevent the education of the children in the faith), then the baptized spouse must not divorce him. But if he does not consent, then God dissolves the marriage for the good of the faith, and Church law considers the marriage to be dissolved when the believing spouse remarries. In sum, by the one spouse’s elevation to grace through baptism and the refusal of the other spouse to be baptized, the marriage has become one of disparity of cult, to which neither party freely consented when they initially exchanged vows. So the non-sacramental marriage is indissoluble in itself, but is dissoluble in relation to something higher than itself, namely, the authority of God for the good of the faith and the respect of the free consent of both parties to enter (or not enter) a marriage ordered by grace to man’s supernatural end.⁴¹

The Petrine privilege is the Church’s authorization to dissolve a marriage contracted but not yet consummated between (a) a baptized person and an unbaptized person, or (b) two baptized persons if one of the parties discerns a religious vocation (i.e. to become a monk or nun).⁴² Concerning this privilege canon law reads:

Can. 1142: For a just cause, the Roman Pontiff can dissolve a non-consummated marriage between baptized persons or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party at the request of both parties or of one of them, even if the other party is unwilling. (Can. 1142)

This brings us to the dilemma raised by the objection. If an unconsummated sacramental marriage is a marriage, and marriage is indissoluble how can it be dissolved by the Petrine Privilege? But if an unconsummated relationship is not yet a marriage, then how is it that Joseph and Mary were truly married?

St. Thomas addresses the question “Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph?” in his Summa Theologica, writing:

Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of its attaining its perfection. Now perfection of anything is twofold; first, and second. The first perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives its species; while the second perfection of a thing consists in its operation, by which in some way a thing attains its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring.

Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the marriage of the Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was absolutely true: because both consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. For this reason the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Matthew 1:20): “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife”: on which words Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “She is called his wife from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse.”

But as to the second perfection which is attained by the marriage act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are begotten; thus this marriage was not consummated. Wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 1:26-27: “Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a wife. The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union.” Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as to upbringing of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “All the nuptial blessings are fulfilled in the marriage of Christ’s parents, offspring, faith and sacrament. The offspring we know to have been the Lord Jesus; faith, for there was no adultery: sacrament, since there was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there was none.”⁴³

Here he explains that there are two perfections to a thing. The first perfection consists in its very essence, and the second perfection consists in its operation. Marriage in its essence is formed by the mutual giving and receiving of each party to the other irrevocably in order to live a covenant of faithful and fruitful love. The essence of marriage makes possible its second perfection, namely its operation, the begetting and raising of children. And the first act in the begetting and raising of children is the conjugal act by which the marriage is consummated.⁴⁴ For this reason, even though Mary remained perpetually a virgin, she and Joseph were truly married.

Why then, is a consummated sacramental marriage absolutely indissoluble, while an unconsummated sacramental marriage is not absolutely indissoluble? Pope Pius XI explains why a consummated sacramental marriage is absolutely indissoluble:

If we wish with all reverence to inquire into the intimate reason of this divine decree, Venerable Brethren, we shall easily see it in the mystical signification of Christian marriage which is fully and perfectly verified in consummated marriage between Christians. For, as the Apostle says in his Epistle to the Ephesians, the marriage of Christians recalls that most perfect union which exists between Christ and the Church: “Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico, in Christo et in ecclesia;” which union, as long as Christ shall live and the Church through Him, can never be dissolved by any separation. And this St. Augustine clearly declares in these words: “This is safeguarded in Christ and the Church, which, living with Christ who lives for ever may never be divorced from Him. The observance of this sacrament is such in the City of God . . . that is, in the Church of Christ, that when for the sake of begetting children, women marry or are taken to wife, it is wrong to leave a wife that is sterile in order to take another by whom children may be hand. (Casti Connubii, 36)

The absolute indissolubility of sacramental marriage is based in the absolute indissolubility of the union of Christ with His Church. The divine law concerning marriage is based, in other words on a Christological and ecclesiological truth entailing the utter falsehood of ecclesial deism. In the Supplement to St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica, in answer to the question “Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other’s consent?” we read the following:

Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.

Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him.⁴⁵

The conjugal act is not only an operation following upon marriage, but is and effects an additional union, namely, the one flesh union of the spouses. After the marriage has been ratified but prior to its consummation, the couple are truly married, but the marriage is only a spiritual union, having been formed by their mutual free acts of the will, through which their hearts are joined. At that point, their marital unity is not yet a bodily union, because they have not yet become one flesh. Hence at that point the sacramental signification of their marriage is imperfect, because it does not yet reflect the incarnation [enfleshment] of Christ and His one flesh union with His Bride, the Church. The ratified but unconsummated marriage signifies the spiritual union of Christ with the soul by grace. But this union can be lost through mortal sin. Hence even a sacramental marriage in that stage (i.e. prior to consummation) is not absolutely indissoluble. By contrast, the one flesh union of Christ with His Bride and mystical Body, the Church, is absolutely indissoluble. Consummation of a sacramental marriage makes that marriage absolutely indissoluble because in a sacramental marriage the conjugal act signifies the irrevocable one-flesh union of Christ and His Church. Once the signification of the sacrament of matrimony is perfected through its consummation, the marriage thereby becomes absolutely indissoluble.⁴⁶ This is why treating consummated sacramental marriages as though they are dissoluble is a typological denial of the indissolubility of the union of Christ with His Church, and with His human nature; it is a denial of Christ’s faithfulness and love for His Church. It is the error of ecclesial deism.

VI. Implications

The traditional patristic understanding of the indissolubility of marriage and divorce as separation in bed and board has many implications, both for understanding Scripture and for the reunion of Protestants and the Catholic Church. Once we understand that when Jesus says “whoever divorces [ἀπολύσῃ] …,” He is referring to a separation of bed and board, then we understand why it is true that “whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.” (Mt. 5:32) If by ‘divorce’ He were referring to a dissolution of the marriage bond, it would not make sense that to marry a divorced person is to commit adultery.⁴⁷

But if the Tradition is right concerning the absolute indissolubility of sacramental marriage, then Protestantism need to recover this doctrine and revise its theology of marriage. For example, the Westminster Confession of Faith claims the following concerning divorce and remarriage:

In the case of adultery after marriage, it is lawful for the innocence party to sue out a divorce, and, after the divorce, to marry another, as if the offending party were dead. Although the corruption of man be such as is apt to study arguments unduly to put asunder those whom God hath joined together in marriage: yet, nothing but adultery, or such willful desertion as can no way be remedied by the Church, or civil magistrate, is cause sufficient of dissolving the bond of marriage: wherein, a public and orderly course of proceeding is to be observed; and the persons concerned in it not left to their own wills and discretion in their own case. (WCF Chap. XXIV para. 5-6)

This notion that adultery allows for divorce with remarriage is contrary to the Tradition found in the moral consensus of the Church Fathers.

In 2009, when Neal and I argued that sola scriptura reduces to solo scriptura, one response we received is that the Reformed faith is not biblicism, because it recognizes the authority of tradition, even though it treats tradition as subordinate in authority to Scripture. One of our points had been that when a person picks his ecclesial leaders on the basis of their agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture, he has adopted only the appearance of being under their authority, because the ground for their ‘authority’ entails that he himself retains ultimate ecclesial authority. Similarly, however, when what gets to count as Tradition is only what agrees with one’s interpretation of Scripture, then Tradition is not acting as an authority, but only as a convenient accouterment to Scripture for supporting one’s own interpretation and ideology.

The Reformed faith represents itself as being in greater agreement with the Apostolic tradition than is the Catholic Church. But unless one holds some form of ecclesial deism, the claim to be in agreement with the Apostolic Tradition can be true only if one’s theology is in agreement with the consensus of the early Church Fathers. Otherwise the claim is a vacuous claim, because if one were in fact not in agreement with the Apostolic Tradition, the patristic data and one’s relation to it would be just the same.

How do we find the Apostolic tradition in the Church Fathers? Whenever the Church Fathers provide us with a moral consensus on a particular question, we can know that this belongs to the Apostolic Tradition.⁴⁸ To reject the moral consensus of the Church Fathers is to undermine the very claim to be faithful to the Tradition. That is in part because rejecting the moral consensus of the Church Fathers is exactly what it would look like to reject absolutely the authority of Tradition.

This is why, for example, the Reformed rejection of the unanimous patristic consensus concerning baptismal regeneration is problematic for the Reformed claim to be faithful to the Tradition. But as our study above shows, the Church Fathers provide a moral consensus concerning the indissolubility of marriage. So just as in the case of baptismal regeneration, the Reformed (and Protestant) rejection of the moral consensus in the Church Fathers concerning the indissolubility of marriage between baptized persons is equally problematic, because it calls into question the Reformed claim to be following the early Church Tradition allegedly abandoned by the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, and exposes Reformed confessionalism for the biblicism that it actually is. In addition, this deviation from the patristic teaching on this subject calls into question the correctness of the Protestant notion that marriage is not a sacrament. That is, if as I have shown, we cannot trust the Reformed claim that the dissolubility of Christian marriage is in keeping with the Apostolic Tradition known and practiced by the early Church, then the Reformed denial of the sacramentality of marriage is likewise called into question. The sacramentality of marriage is what grounds and guards its absolute indissolubility; rejecting the sacramentality of marriage opens the door to denying the absolute indissolubility of Christian marriage. As John Witte points out, “Because they [i.e. the early Protestants] rejected the sacramental concept of marriage as an eternal enduring bond, the reformers introduced divorce in the modern sense, on grounds of adultery, desertion, cruelty, or frigidity, with a subsequent right to remarry at least for the innocent party.”⁴⁹

The second difficulty for the Reformed position with respect to marriage is that it is ad hoc. The Reformed tradition holds that in important respects the Catholic Church departed from the Apostles’ teaching present in Scripture and the early Church Fathers. But when present Catholic doctrine is shown to be the patristic teaching (as with baptismal regeneration and the indissolubility of marriage), defenders of the Reformed faith posit an apostasy from the Apostolic Tradition by the early Church. Then, when it is pointed out to them that Protestantism presupposes ecclesial deism, they deny it and claim to stand in the Tradition found in the Church Fathers. But then when it is pointed out that their position differs from the moral consensus of the Church Fathers, they posit an apostasy and heretical accretions. So what makes this position ad hoc is that it claims to recognize the authority of Tradition, but yet it posits an apostasy whenever it holds a position contrary to the moral consensus of the Church Fathers, while denying an apostasy whenever it holds a position that agrees with the moral consensus of the Church Fathers. And this reveals that the Reformed faith is not treating the Apostolic Tradition in the Church Fathers as an authority that governs its interpretation of Scripture, but only as a useful resource from which to locate proof-textual support for its own interpretation of Scripture.

VII. Conclusion

Why has the Catholic Church always taught that marriage is indissoluble, and thus that divorce is impossible? It is no accident that there is a correlation between believing in the possibility of divorce and remarriage, and believing some form of ecclesial deism. If the bond between Christ and His Church can be broken, then how much more can the sign of that bond be broken.⁵⁰ Where we find ecclesial deism, there, undoubtedly, we should expect to find acceptance of divorce with remarriage. But where the indissolubility of Christian marriage is preserved, there we should expect to find a belief in the indefectibility of the Church. And so it is. The indissolubility of Christian marriage is a testimony to the world of Christ’s unfailing love for His Church, and therefore to the sure promise of eternal life in the world to come, for all those who believe and are baptized.⁵¹ The indissoluble union of Christ and His Church is a consequence of the indissoluble union of Christ and His human nature. Hence ecclesial deism’s rejection of the indissoluble union of Christ and His Church is an implicit denial of Christ’s resolve never to give up His humanity.⁵²

Origen explains why the indissolubility of marriage makes ecclesial deism impossible, writing:

For because of her [i.e. the Church], He Himself also became flesh, when the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, (John 1:14) and they are no more two, but now they are one flesh, since it is said to the wife, Now you are the body of Christ, and members each in his part; (1 Cor. 12:27) for the body of Christ is not something apart different from the church, which is His body, and from the members each in his part. And God has joined together these who are not two, but have become one flesh, commanding that men should not separate the church from the Lord. And he who takes heed for himself so as not to be separated, is confident as one who will not possibly be separated and says, Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? (Rom. 8:35) Here, therefore, the saying, What God has joined together, let not man put asunder, (Matt. 19:6) was written with relation to the Pharisees, but to those who are superior to the Pharisees, it could be said, What then God has joined together, let nothing put asunder, neither principality nor power; for God, who has joined together is stronger than all those which any one could conceive and name.⁵³

Because the Church is the Bride of Christ, she is also one Body with Him. And what God has joined together, no man can separate. The union of Christ and the Church is an indissoluble union, to which every other marriage points by signification. In this way the indissolubility of marriage teaches man the true nature of love. In our present society, love is often confused with emotions and feelings and sexual desire. Not uncommonly we hear a spouse seek a divorce on the ground that he “no longer loves” his spouse, or is no longer “in love.” Statements of that sort reveal an egregious misunderstanding concerning the nature of love as a mere feeling, emotion, or passion. Love, in its essence, is an act of the will; it is a choice, whether or not it is accompanied by feelings of affection, romance, attraction, passion, or fulfillment. The complete giving of oneself in the exchange of vows on the wedding day is not an exchange of testimonies concerning the present state of one’s internal emotions or feelings. That would contradict the very words that are spoken, which offer onself irrevocably and receive the other person “for better and for worse, for richer and for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death parts us.” Emotions and feelings are fickle, and can come and go, from year to year, or even day to day. Only an act of the will is that by which one can make the wedding vow; and only an act of the will, now aided by grace and the gift of agape, is that whereby such vows are kept. That is true love.

Of course love as an act of the will nurtures affection and joy in the other, seeking out and delighting in the goodness and beauty of the other. But love is not fundamentally feelings of affection or delight in the presence of the other person, or feelings of attraction to or longing for the other person. When love is conceived as a mere feeling, the other person is reduced to an object of one’s own pleasure. What is present in such a relation is only mutual egoism and self-gratification, not love. Hence the Church’s doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage preserves for society the true understanding of love, preventing society from mistaking the selfishness of mutual-use relations for love. When Protestant pastors oversee the ‘remarriage’ of divorced persons to third parties while their spouses are still living, or admit persons in such relations to the Lord’s Supper, they are complicit in the couple’s adultery, and in spreading the false doctrine that marriage is about one’s own gratification.

How do we as a society recover an awareness of the indissolubility of marriage? Christians need to return to the Apostolic Tradition concerning marriage and affirm with one voice the indissolubility of marriage, both in our personal lives and practice, and as institutions, denominations, and confessions. Recently a prominent Evangelical figure, Pat Robertson, claimed that if one’s spouse has Alzheimers, then divorce and remarriage are permissible. Robertson’s position is merely the logical extension of the exceptions allowed by Luther and Calvin; as justifications for divorce and remarriage, there is no principled difference between Alzheimers, and irksome cohabitation (Luther) and impotence (Calvin). The only solution to this problem is recovering a sacramental conception of marriage, because as the Catholic Encyclopedia notes, only a sacramental conception of marriage can ensure the indissolubility of marriage:

Those who now endeavour to reform the civil statutes in the interest of honest trials, may succeed in abating some of the evils flowing from lax methods of administering the divorce statutes in some of the states, and in obtaining restrictive legislation in all of them, but it is not probable that the demoralization will be stopped until the majority of the people of the civilized nations return to the belief in the supernatural sanction of marriage and “that it is a sacramental union, productive of the graces necessary to bear with one another’s shortcomings; and indissoluble union as that of soul and body, which can be dissolved only in death. This means a return to the Catholic view of marriage, and this return alone can remove the national evil of divorce.” (Divorce (in civil jurisprudence)

The widespread rise of divorce with remarriage over the last century has destroyed millions of families and left a wake of victims: men, women, and children. It has distorted our social awareness of the family as an essential and natural institution, and led to attempts to redefine the legal definition of marriage and the family. Only by a recovery of the ancient Christian doctrine concerning marriage, a doctrine that only the Catholic Church has retained, can the evil of divorce be overcome.

1. CCC 1614-1615, 1640.
2. (cf. 2384).
3. CCC 1650.
4. Catholic Encyclopedia article “Divorce (in moral theology).”
5. From the Protestant point of view, nothing more binding is formed during Christian weddings than during the weddings of non-Christians, nothing on the order of grace. That is also demonstrated by the fact that Protestant pastors almost always treat a civil divorce as a dissolution of the marriage bond (divorce a vinculo matrimonii).

   This is why Protestant ecclesial communities treat legally divorced persons as no longer married, and allow them to remarry other persons. They do this because in Protestantism, what marriage is, essentially, is a legal contract, not a sacrament. Whenever the State declares that legal contract to be dissolved, the Protestant ecclesial communities treat the marriage to be dissolved, and treat both spouses as free to remarry. That is true even if those couples divorced for reasons as minimal as “irreconcilable differences.” If the spouses remarry other persons, while both spouses remain alive, Protestant ecclesial communities treat those remarriages as actual marriages. And this shows that for Protestant ecclesial communities, the marriage bond is fundamentally a legal contract overseen fundamentally by the State, and that the State, not the Church, has fundamental and definitive authority to determine who is married and to whom.

   By denying the sacramental character of marriage, Protestantism takes marriage out of the domain of the Church, and makes it fundamentally a legal institution of the State, defined and governed by the laws of the State. And when marriage is conceived merely as a civil matter, it can be defined, formed and dissolved by the State. This allows divorce and ‘remarriage’ to be commonplace, especially in a society operating under the principles of political liberalism. Regarding the problems inherent in the presuppositions underlying political liberalism, see Pope Leo XIII’s Libertas Praestantissimum (On the Nature of Human Liberty).

6. What God has Joined …: The Sacramentality of Marriage, (Alba House, New York, 1990), p. 165.
7. CCC 1613.
8. Living with another man is what attempting to marry again, while her husband remains alive, would be. St. Paul uses this phrase [lives with another man] precisely because any remarriage while her husband remains alive would not be marriage at all, but would merely be living with another man.
9. An example of the justification of separation, to avoid sharing in the other spouse’s adultery can be found in St. Justin Martyr’s Second Apology, chapter 2. There, St. Justin describes the following account:

   A certain woman lived with an intemperate husband; she herself, too, having formerly been intemperate. But when she came to the knowledge of the teachings of Christ she became sober-minded, and endeavoured to persuade her husband likewise to be temperate, citing the teaching of Christ, and assuring him that there shall be punishment in eternal fire inflicted upon those who do not live temperately and conformably to right reason. But he, continuing in the same excesses, alienated his wife from him by his actions. For she, considering it wicked to live any longer as a wife with a husband who sought in every way means of indulging in pleasure contrary to the law of nature, and in violation of what is right, wished to be divorced from him. And when she was overpersuaded by her friends, who advised her still to continue with him, in the idea that some time or other her husband might give hope of amendment, she did violence to her own feeling and remained with him. But when her husband had gone into Alexandria, and was reported to be conducting himself worse than ever, she— that she might not, by continuing in matrimonial connection with him, and by sharing his table and his bed, become a partaker also in his wickednesses and impieties— gave him what you call a bill of divorce, and was separated from him. But this noble husband of hers—while he ought to have been rejoicing that those actions which formerly she unhesitatingly committed with the servants and hirelings, when she delighted in drunkenness and every vice, she had now given up, and desired that he too should give up the same—when she had gone from him without his desire, brought an accusation against her, affirming that she was a Christian.

   Also, Canon 70 of the Council of Elvira, in AD 306, reads as follows: “A husband who knows of his wife’s adultery and who remains with her may not commune [i.e. receive the Eucharist] even prior to death. If he lived with his wife for a period of time after her adultery and then left her, he may not commune for ten years.” See also the quotation from St. Gregory of Nazianzen in the body of this article, in which the moral corruption of the children is given as a reason for separating from the spouse committing adultery. In the Supplement of St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica we read, “For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace.” (Summa Theologica Supp. Q.59 a.3.)

10. Ep. clxxxviii, can. ix, and Ep. cxcix, can. xxi, in P.G., XXXII, 678, 721.
11. See his “Exposition on the Sermon on the Mount,” Bk 1.
12. The exceptions here are the Pauline and Petrine privileges, discussed below.
13. The Catholic Encyclopedia article titled “Divorce” notes:

    In these cases, also, the popes pronounced decidedly for the indissolubility of marriage, e.g. Innocent I, “Epist. ad Probum”, in P.L. XX, 602; Leo I, “Epist. ad Nicetam Aquil.”, in P.L., LIV, 1136; Gregory I, “Epist. ad Urbicum Abb.”, in P.L., LXXVII, 833, and “Epist. ad Hadrian. notar.”, in P.L., LXXVII, 1169. This last passage, which is found in the “Decretum” of Gratian (C. xxvii, Q, ii, c. xxii), is as follows: “Although the civil law provides that, for the sake of conversion (i.e., for the purpose of choosing the religious life), a marriage may be dissolved, though either of parties be unwilling, yet the Divine law does not permit it to be done.”

14. The Catholic Encylopedia article adds:

    The same declaration [that such persons are forbidden to marry] is to be found in the Second Council of Mileve (416), canon xvii (Labbe, IV, 331); the Council of Hereford (673), canon x (Labbe, VII, 554); the Council of Friuli (Forum Julii), in northern Italy (791), canon x (Labbe, IX, 46); all of these teach distinctly that the marriage bond remains even in case of dismissal for adultery, and that new marriage is therefore forbidden.

15. Such conditions include: insufficient age, antecedent and perpetual impotence of either party, already being married to someone else, being a baptized Catholic attempting to marry an unbaptized person without a dispensation, having Holy Orders, having taking solemn religious vows of celibacy, abduction, crime [having murdered the other spouse], consanguinity, affinity (in-laws), spiritual relationship [e.g. god-parent, sponsor], legal relationship [adopted parent, etc.].
16. Pius VI, Rescript. ad Episc. Agriens., 11 July 1789. As quoted by Pope Pius XI in Casti Connubii, 34.
17. Casti Connubii, 97.
18. Though see the discussion below concerning the Pauline and Petrine privileges.
19. Cf. Mt. 19:10.
20. Casti Connubii, 39.
21. Casti Connubii, 41.
22. Casti Connubii, 38.
23. Casti Connubii, 40.
24. Casti Connubii, 41.
25. See the opening line of The Church Fathers on Baptismal Regeneration.”
26. See the last paragraph in comment #106 of the “Solemnity of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary into Heaven” thread.
27. The Council of Trent decreed:

    Moreover, the holy council, moved by the same and other very grave reasons, restricts the impediment which arises on account of the affinity contracted from fornication, and which dissolves the marriage afterward contracted,[25] to those only who are united in the first and second degree; in more remote degrees it ordains that affinity of this kind does not dissolve the marriage afterward contracted. (Council of Trent, Session XXIV, Decree Concerning the Reformed of Matrimony, Chapter IV)

28. See also the book Wenham co-authored with William Heth titled Jesus and Divorce.
29. Code of Canon Law: Separation with the Bond Remaining.
30. LW: 36, p. 92.
31. LW: 45:25.
32. LW: 54: p. 363.
33. Institutes Bk. IV chap. 19. 34.
34. See the section titled “The number of the sacraments” in the Catholic Encyclopedia article on the sacraments. See also the Catholic Encyclopedia article on the sacramentals.
35. Epistle to St. Polycarp, c. 5.
36. Eph. 5:32.
37. Lust should not be conflated with sexual desire; lust is willfully entertained or engagement in disordered sexual pleasure. See the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on lust.
38. Harmony of the Evangelists, 384.
39. Ecclesiastical Ordinances, Corpus Reformatorum, x.10-14.
40. 2 Cor. 6:14.
41. For an Old Testament example of marriages dissolved by God for the good of the faith, see Ezra chapters 9-10.
42. Pope Alexander III (AD 1159-1181) writes of this in a letter to the Bishop of Brescia (see Denzinger, 395). See also the statement by Pope Innocent III in AD 1206, recorded in Denzinger 409. See also canon 6 of Session XXIV of the Council of Trent, listed above.
43. Summa Theologica III Q.29 a.2.
44. See also Summa Theologica Supp. Q.42 a.4.
45. Summa Theologica Supp. Q.61 a.2.
46. The sexual act without the spiritual union of marriage is not a consummation of anything. See the quotation from St. Leo the Great listed in the body of the article, regarding concubinage.
47. Similarly, when St. Joseph discovered that Mary was with child, he decided to divorce her privately [λάθρᾳ ἀπολῦσαι αὐτήν]. (Mt. 1:19) The verse explains that his righteousness lay behind his decision, but his righteousness is revealed in two ways. First, he did not want to shame Mary, and therefore he intended the divorce to be private. Second, he intended to divorce her, because to live voluntarily with a person who is committing fornication is to cooperate in their sin. (See footnote 9, above.) The purpose of the divorce was not to break the marriage bond so that he could remarry.
48. See my reply to Objection 4, above.
49. John Witte, “The Meaning of Marriage.”
50. Cf. Eph. 5:31-32.
51. See Apostolicam Actuositatem, 11.
52. See “Among You Stands One Whom You do not Know.”
53. Origen, Commentary on the Book of Matthew, Bk XIV.17.

The claim in the Westminster Confession of Faith that all controversies of religion ultimately are to be determined by the Holy Spirit speaking in Sacred Scripture contradicts the testimony of the Church Fathers, who repeatedly teach the necessity of judging such controversies by way of the Church and Sacred Scripture. The Westminster Confession of Faith is a classic restatement of Reformed theology born in the 17th century from an assembly of ‘Divines’ convened by the British Parliament. In its Chapter One, the Divines took up what is perhaps the clearest point of distinction between Protestant Reformers and Catholics, namely the locus of ecclesial authority to settle the doctrine of the faith.

The Westminster Confession addresses the matter this way:

The supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.¹

Robert Shaw, in his Exposition of the Westminster Confession, expounds upon this point:

That the Supreme Judge, by which all controversies in religion are to be determined, is no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture, is asserted in opposition to the Papists, who maintain that the Church is an infallible judge in religious controversies; though they do not agree among themselves whether this infallible authority resides in the Pope, or in a council, or in both together. Now, the Scripture never mentions such an infallible judge on earth. Neither Pope, nor councils, possess the properties requisite to constitute a supreme judge in controversies of religion; for they are fallible, and have often erred, and contradicted one another. Although the Church or her ministers are the official guardians of the Scriptures, and although it belongs to them to explain and enforce the doctrines and laws contained in the Word of God, yet their authority is only ministerial, and their interpretations and decisions are binding on the conscience only in so far as they accord with the mind of the Spirit in the Scriptures. By this test, the decisions of councils, the opinions of ancient writers, and the doctrines of men at the present time, are to be tried, and by this rule all controversies in religion must be determined.²

That is, for the Reformed subscriber to the Westminster Confession, every controversy of religion, and every theological decree, opinion, or doctrine, is to be put to one test: the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture. This is meant to avoid ultimate reliance upon human ecclesial authorities (specifically, the Catholic Magisterium) who, from the Reformed perspective, can, and have, erred on religious matters.

Given the finality with which the very Word of the Third Person of the Trinity must be taken, it might seem straightforward enough to rely on this Word to settle controversies. With this rule, the English Reformers were marking out a bright dividing line between the Church of England and those Churches in communion with Rome. The reformational church authorities were not over the Bible, could not declare contrary to it, and would not be taken as having a voice against the Holy Spirit. But how does this work practically, this putting a controversy of religion or theological doctrine to “the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture”?

Shaw explains that it works this way: a controversy may properly be put to the Church or her ministers, who, acting as ‘guardians’ of the Scriptures and enforcers of the law contained therein, yield ‘ministerial’ authority. However, he also cautions, their decisions on any given controversy are only binding on the believer’s conscience insofar as the decisions are in line with “the mind of the Spirit in the Scriptures.” The believer may, under this scheme, try the word of the ministerial authorities in an effort to ensure it is sound.

Because a believer-disputant can cross-check his ministerial authorities before being bound by their settlement of any given controversy, these authorities offer “final judgment” on nothing. The relationship is one of ‘guardianship,’ but the guardians are followed only to the extent that the guarded are in consent and agreement with the guardians’ interpretations. But the believer-disputant, too, is a fallible and often-erring authority, so fails the very test Shaw attempts to apply to Catholic authorities. This leaves the believer-disputant in no better position than his guardian to render “final judgment” on a controversy of religion. Given these deficiencies, what the ministerial authorities and believer-disputants cannot do individually, they cannot do in conjunction. As both authorities who could determine what the Holy Spirit has said have failed the test Shaw believes he has properly applied to the Catholic Church, there is no practical way in the Reformed scheme to settle a controversy of religion with certainty through “the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.”

With that background, I would like to explore how the Church Fathers treat the question of whether the final judge of controversies of religion, or of theological decrees, opinions, or doctrines is Scripture or the Church, or whether there is a third way. I will also briefly identify what the Catholic Church itself officially teaches on this matter.

II. Church Fathers

A great deal of extant writings from the early Church Fathers have “controversies of religion” as their very topic or subject matter. The early Church Fathers penned these works, which were mailed and passed amongst the early Churches with great zeal, to combat a host of disputes, controversies, and heresies. From them we can glean an understanding of how the early Church resolved controversies, or measured theological decrees, opinions, or doctrines. This makes for a useful comparison to the conclusion on the same subject drawn by the Westminster Divines.

The works of St. Ignatius of Antioch provide a fine example. He lived from around the year AD 50 to approximately AD 107, and wrote on the subject of resolving controversies of religion on the way to his martyrdom, just a few years after the Apostle St. John died. He wrote that:

For, all who belong to God and Jesus Christ are with the bishop. And those, too, will belong to God who have returned, repentant, to the unity of the Church so as to live in accordance with Jesus Christ. Make no mistake, brethren. No one who follows another into schism inherits the kingdom of God. No one who follows heretical doctrine is on the side of the passion.³

For St. Ignatius, returning to one’s bishop is identical with returning to the unity of the Church. One lives in accordance with Jesus Christ by way of seeking unity with the Church. There is no apparent place for conflict between belief necessary for unity with the Church and belief in accordance with Jesus Christ.

Elsewhere, he writes:

Let all follow the bishop as Jesus Christ did the Father, and the priests, as you would the Apostles. Reverence the deacons as you would the command of God. Apart from the bishop, let no one perform any of the functions that pertain to the Church. Let that Eucharist be held valid which is offered by the bishop or by one to whom the bishop has committed this charge. Wherever the bishop appears, there let the people be; as wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church. It is not lawful to baptize or give communion without the consent of the bishop. On the other hand, whatever has his approval is pleasing to God. Thus, whatever is done will be safe and valid.⁴

From this text we see how inextricably intertwined are the authorities of the Church and the Word of God. Theirs is not a non-binding guardianship over Scripture. Rather, they have the shepherd’s authority to lead. Consider St. Ignatius’ claim that “whatever has [the bishop’s] approval is pleasing to God.” Of course St. Ignatius does not have in mind a bishop who invents novel doctrines that are contrary to the deposit of faith. But nor could he mean to say that whatever has the bishop’s approval is pleasing to God only insofar as the bishop is ruling in a way that is subordinate to and fully consistent with the Bible. Since one could say the same of the determinations of non-bishops (i.e., that their decisions are pleasing to God insofar as they conform to Scripture), this incorrect interpretation of St. Ignatius would leave the Bishop with no ruling authority at all.  A third way to view this question of final doctrinal decretal authority starts to emerge – the Church and revealed truth resolve controversies of religion together; they are the inseparable, final authority.

To take up just one other brief example, the works of St. Irenaeus provide a helpful perspective on this subject. St. Irenaeus, born in the early second century, speaks with great clarity in identifying what is a proper authority to settle controversies of religion. He does not teach that the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture is our final authority in controversies of religion, as the Westminster Confession claims. Rather, he says:

Since therefore we have such proofs, it is not necessary to seek the truth among others which it is easy to obtain from the Church; since the apostles, like a rich man depositing in a bank, lodged in her hands most copiously all things pertaining to the truth: so that every man, whosoever will, can draw from her the water of life. For she is the entrance to life; all others are thieves and robbers. On this account we are bound to avoid them, but to make choice of the things pertaining to the Church with the utmost diligence, and to lay hold of the tradition of the truth. For how stands the case? Suppose there arise a dispute relative to some important question among us, should we not have recourse to the most ancient Churches with which the apostles held constant intercourse, and learn from them what is certain and clear in regard to the present question? For how should it be if the apostles themselves had not left us writings? Would it not be necessary to follow the course of the tradition which they handed down to those to whom they did commit the Churches?⁵

For St. Irenaeus, “[t]he supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are to be determined” for the individual Christian is not the Holy Spirit speaking in Sacred Scripture. In cases of controversy of religion, we should “have recourse to the most ancient Churches with which the apostles held constant intercourse, and learn from them what is certain and clear in regard to the present question.” In helping to shed light on how to resolve a dispute about an important question among the Christians, St. Irenaeus argues from a hypothetical scenario wherein the Apostles had left us with no writings (that is, imagine if there was no New Testament by which to judge a matter). In that case, he argues, Christians would be left to turn to the traditions handed down by the Apostles to the most ancient Churches. Likewise, for disputes that persist even though all disputants have the Apostolic writings in hand, his argument concludes that we must “lay hold of the tradition of the truth,” which was passed on through the apostles.

These examples are from just two of the early Church Fathers, but each of them would support this recurring theme. These are not cherry-picked snippets from the early Church Fathers, but exemplary of early discourses on this question. And this question is one that came up routinely as the early Church struggled with settling the proper procedure necessary to address substantive theological debates in a binding fashion. We learn from the ancient Church that controversies of religion are resolved by ecclesial authorities expounding upon the Sacred Scriptures and Sacred Tradition together.

III. Catholic Teaching

There are noteworthy similarities between the Reformed and Catholic doctrines on Sacred Scripture. Both would agree that Sacred Scripture is the word of God.⁶ God is its author.⁷ He chose human authors, and inspired them to write what He wanted, and nothing more.⁸ The inspired books that make up the canon teach truth, and are truth without error.⁹ The Church venerates Scripture as she does the Body of Christ itself.¹⁰ In Scripture, “the Father who is in heaven comes lovingly to meet his children and talks with them.”¹¹ The concept of personal communication from God to believer in Scripture is not antithetical nor even foreign to a Catholic understanding. The Catholic Church’s teaching and the Westminster teaching coalesce even insofar as they teach that the Holy Spirit is our interpreter of Scripture.¹²

But there is certainly a difference between Protestants and Catholics when it comes to belief about Sacred Scripture, and this difference relates to the section of the Westminster Confession I began by quoting. The Catholic Church teaches that Christianity is not a “religion of the book,” but rather a religion of the Eternal Word, a “Word which is incarnate and living.”¹³ While the Holy Spirit interprets Scripture, He does so for the Church and through the Church, not in a private-yet-authoritative fashion.

This contrast highlights an essential feature of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church does not believe that the Holy Spirit ordinarily operates directly and immediately in the heart of the individual Christian to teach Scripture and illuminate its meaning. If the Holy Spirit ordinarily operated in this way, the individual would not have need for the Church as a teaching agent of God. This view denies that Christ established a visible organ through which the Holy Spirit ordinarily operates. Such is the view of the Montanists. The Catholic Church, against Montanism, believes that Christ did establish a visible organ through which the Holy Spirit operates, including the key operation of illuminating revealed truths for the Church’s benefit so that she can, in turn, reliably and authoritatively teach the faithful.

In regard to the roles of the Church and Sacred Scripture in resolving controversies of religion, the Reformers seemingly had to reach the conclusion articulated in the Westminster Confession because they subscribed to a false dichotomy between the Scripture and the Church as the final doctrinal authority. For the Westminster Divines, and for Calvinists today, the starting point for analysis is that either the Magisterium or the Bible can settle controversies of religion, or bind upon believers a theological decree, opinion, or doctrine. It could not be both together because, they believe, any human agent cooperating with Scripture qua Word of God would compete with or detract from its Divine character.  (And it goes without saying that, for Calvinists, it could not be the Magisterium.)

According to the Catholic Church, all interpretations of Scripture — and we could say all attempts at resolving controversies of religion — are “subject to the judgment of the Church which exercises the divinely conferred commission and ministry of watching over and interpreting the Word of God.”¹⁴ While believers can and should read Sacred Scripture with great devotion, listening for the voice and guidance of the Holy Spirit while they do so, their conclusions are always subject to the guidance and correction of the Church’s teaching authority. Without Her divinely given authority, there is no safeguard on the deposit of faith from dilution and admixture of human or sinful error.

There is no middle ground between this divinely given authority of the Church to guide scriptural interpretation, on the one hand, and complete individualism in interpretation which leads to unceasing division, on the other. This is because the method dependent upon individual interpretation cannot compensate for the admixture of sinful error without resort to the Montanist’s view of the Holy Spirit’s action in guiding each individual’s interpretation of Scripture — a view which experience with diverse interpretations of Scripture betwixt the faithful, if nothing else, has proven invalid. The early Church Fathers saw the need for having resort to the Church’s teaching authority in settling controversies of religion, and they addressed this need time and again. It is this the Catholic Church sees today while it stands firm on its own teaching authority while simultaneously yearning for reunion with the separated eastern churches and Protestant ecclesial communities.

IV. Conclusion

The Westminster Confession’s claim that every controversy of religion, and every theological decree, opinion or doctrine is to be taken to none other than the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture is ahistoric. The primary subject of the extant writings of the early Church Fathers is precisely controversies of religion; this is far from an alien topic to them. And the recurring answer they give is that controversies of religion are settled ultimately from the Church and Scripture in inseparable unison. Only this position allows for binding answers to disputes within the faith. The Catholic Church has held this position steadfastly through two millennia.

1. WCF, ch. I, sec. 10.
2. Robert Shaw, Exposition of the Westminster Confession, ch. 1, available here.
3. Letter to the Philadelphians, ch. 3, MG 5, 700; FC I, 114.
4. Letter to the Smyrnaeans, ch. 8, MG 5, 713; FC I, 121.
5. Against Heresies, bk. 3, ch. 4, MG 7, 855; ANFI, I, 416.
6. Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 104.
7. Id., para. 105.
8. Id., para. 106.
9. Id., para. 107.
10. Id., para. 103.
11. Id., para. 104.
12. Id., art. 3, sec. III.
13. Id., para. 108, quoting St. Bernard, S. missus est hom. 4, 11: PL 183, 86.
14. Dei Verbum 12, sec. 3.

While other early African bishops such as St. Clement of Alexandria, St. Cyprian of Carthage, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, and St. Augustine of Hippo are better known to Christians of our day, St. Optatus is another important African bishop and theologian in the early Church. He was influenced deeply by St. Cyprian, and in turn he influenced the thought of St. Augustine, who drew substantially from St. Optatus’s writings in his own efforts to reconcile the Donatists to the Catholic Church. St. Optatus remains theologically important in our day, by providing an early testimony to the nature of Catholic ecclesiology, especially regarding the unique ecclesial authority and role of the episcopal successor of St. Peter in Rome.

Milevus (El Milia, Algeria), where St. Optatus was Bishop

Outline
I. A Brief History of the Donatist Schism
II. How We Know Which Side Went Out from the Catholic Church
III. The Donatist Claim to be the Catholic Church
IV. The Catholic Rejoinder: The Successor of St. Peter holds the Keys
A. The Donatist Bishop in Rome does not hold the Keys
B. St. Peter and his Successors in Rome hold the Keys
V. Conclusion

I. A Brief History of the Donatist Schism

On May 24 we celebrated the feast day of St. Vincent of Lérins, who wrote his Commonitory in AD 434. St. Optatus wrote his work, Against the Donatists, approximately sixty years earlier. For this reason, Protestants willing to believe that St. Vincent and St. Augustine wrote before some ‘great apostasy’ have even more reason to accept the testimony of St. Optatus concerning the apostolic faith.

St. Optatus opens Against the Donatists by explaining that Christ gave one faith to His Church.¹ Moreover, before He ascended, writes St. Optatus, Christ gave His divine peace to His Apostles, willing it to be with His Church always. (John 14:27) This peace is a peace that the world does not have; it is to be exemplified in the Church Christ founded, for all the world to see. But, claims St. Optatus, the authors of the Donatist schism disturbed this peace.²

St. Optatus is writing in reply to a person name Parmenian. Parmenian was the third in the line of succession of the Donatist bishops of Carthage. The first Donatist bishop was Marjorinus, who was succeeded by Donatus, who was succeeded by Parmenian. Parmenian had just written a book against the Catholic Church; he wrote, according to St. Optatus, to “strike an undeserved blow at the Catholic Church.”³ This book prompted St. Optatus to write Against the Donatists in reply.

Before addressing the criticisms of Parmenian, St. Optatus first presents a brief history of the Donatist schism. The Donatist schism from the Catholic Church began in the year 311. In that year, Caecilian the deacon was chosen by the people of Carthage to take the chair of the previous bishop (Mensurius), and was ordained by Felix, bishop of Aptonga. Secundus, a bishop of a nearby city, subsequently came with other bishops, and declared the ordination of Caecilian to be invalid because, according to Secundus and company, Felix was a traditor.⁴ According to St. Optatus, however, the bishops accompanying Secundus had themselves “impiously betrayed the records of the law of God.” Among these were Donatus of Macula, Victor of Rusicca, Merinus of Tibilis, Donatus of Calama, Pupurius of Limata, and Menalius.⁵ St. Optatus describes the way by which these bishops started the Donatist schism, writing:

It was not long after this, that these very persons whom I have mentioned, … proceeded to Carthage, and there, although Caecilian was already the Bishop, made the Schism by consecrating Majorinus on whose Chair, Parmenian, you sit.⁶

Secundus and the bishops with him ordained a new bishop of Carthage, a man named Majorinus, who had been a lector under Caecelian’s deaconry. At that point there were (seemingly) simultaneously two [canonical] bishops of Carthage: Caecelian, and Majorinus. As the bishops associated with Majorinus continued to ordain other bishops not in communion with Caecelian, the Donatist schism spread. The matter was then brought before nineteen bishops at a council at Rome, headed by Pope Miltiades (pope from 311-314). St. Optatus describes the events of this council as follows:

Donatus brought forth his witnesses; they admitted that they had nothing of which they could accuse Caecilian. Caecilian was pronounced innocent by the sentence of all the above named Bishops; also by the sentence of Miltiades, by which the matter was closed, and judgement pronounced in these words:

Since it is certain that those who came with Donatus have failed to accuse Caecilian in accordance with their undertaking, and since it is also certain that Donatus has not proved him guilty on any count, I judge that, according to his deserts, he be maintained in the communion of the Church, continuing to hold his position unimpaired.

It is, therefore, sufficient, that Donatus was condemned by the verdict of so many Bishops, and that Caecilian was cleared by the judgement of so great an authority [i.e. the Pope].⁷

It is not insignificant that the dispute between Caecilian and the Donatists was brought to a council of bishops assembled at Rome, and that the verdict was pronounced by Pope Miltiades. This was the authoritative decision of the Catholic Church concerning the Donatist schism. But, as St. Optatus explains, a short time later Donatus returned to Carthage and in disobedience to the decision of the Holy See, refused to relinquish his claim to the episcopal Chair at Carthage.

St. Optatus recounts the history of the Donatist schism to show that the Catholic Church did not go out from the Donatists, but rather, that the Donatists went out from the Catholic Church. He writes:

The question is about a Division. Now in Africa, as in other parts of the world, the Church was One, before it was divided by those who consecrated Majorinus whose Chair you have inherited, and now occupy. We shall have to see who has remained in the root, with the whole world; who went forth; who sits on a second chair, which had no existence before the Schism; who has raised altar against altar; who has consecrated a Bishop when another was in undisturbed possession; who it is that lies under the judgement of John, the Apostle, when he declared that many Anti-Christs should go forth without, because they were not of us, for if they had been of us they would have remained with us. Therefore, he who was unwilling to remain with his brethren in unity has followed the heretics, and gone forth without, as an Anti-Christ.⁸

St. Optatus explains that prior to the Donatist schism, the Church was visibly one. So he proposes to determine which side came to be in schism from the Church by setting up a second episcopal chair (i.e. cathedra) where there was none before, by setting up a second altar [for the Eucharistic sacrifice] where there was none before, and by consecrating a Bishop when another Bishop was already in undisturbed possession of the episcopal office in that See. In this investigation St. Optatus seeks to show likewise which side has “remained in the root, with the whole [Christian] world.”⁹ According to St. Optatus, the party in schism from the Church lies under the judgment of the Apostle John, who wrote, “They went out from us, but they were not really of us; for if they had been of us, they would have remained with us; but they went out, so that it would be shown that they all are not of us.” (1 John 2:19) St. Optatus explains that according to the Apostle John, to separate from the Church through schism is to act as an Anti-Christ. St. Optatus knows that Parmenian cannot deny that schism is the supreme evil. St. Optatus writes:

Even you will not be by any means be able to deny that schism is the supreme evil [scisma summum malum esse].¹⁰

St. Optatus is not speaking of the sort of schism in which two Christian parties break fellowship with each other, but each party remains in communion with the rest of the Catholic Church. That sort of schism can only be short-lived, for reasons explained below. He is speaking about schism from the Church, the sort the Apostle John is referring to when he writes of persons that “went out from us.” (1 John 2:19) Concerning that sort of schism, St. Optatus writes:

But schism, after the bond of peace has been broken, is brought into existence through passion, is nourished by hatred, is strengthened by envy and dissensions, so that the Catholic Mother is abandoned, whilst her unfilial children go forth outside and separate themselves (as you have done) from the root of Mother Church — cut off by the shears of their hatred — and wickedly depart in rebellion.¹¹

In this sort of schism, the schismatic party does not remain in the Catholic Church, but abandons its Catholic Mother, separating itself from “the root of Mother Church.” Thus, this kind of schism is necessarily a form of “rebellion,” because it separates from that magisterial authority by which it was established and to which it therefore owes obedience and fealty.

II. How We Know Which Side Went Out from the Catholic Church

St. Optatus’s Against the Donatists is composed of seven books (see the table of contents). After laying out the history of the schism in Book One, he turns in Book Two to the question: “Which is the One True Catholic Church and Where is it to be Found?” In what may be the most important and revealing statement in the whole of his work, he writes:

For it was not Caecilian who went forth from Majorinus, your father’s father,¹² but it was Majorinus who deserted Caecilian; nor was it Caecilian who separated himself from the Chair of Peter, or from the Chair of Cyprian — but Majorinus, on whose Chair you sit — a Chair which had no existence before Majorinus himself.¹³

How does St. Optatus show that the Catholic Church did not go out from the Donatists, but that the Donatists went out from the Catholic Church? He does so by way of the Chair of St. Peter. The bishop that remains in communion with the Chair of St. Peter in Rome is the bishop who has remained with the Catholic Church. In this particular case, the bishop of Carthage who had remained in communion with the bishop of Rome, was Caecilian and his episcopal successors in Carthage. The bishop who has broken communion with the Chair of St. Peter is the bishop who is in schism from the Catholic Church. Therefore the bishop in Carthage who had broken fellowship with the Chair of St. Peter in Rome, was the bishop in schism from the Catholic Church. In this way St. Optatus shows that because Majorinus and his episcopal successors (and all the laypeople who followed them) had broken fellowship with the Chair of St. Peter, therefore they were the ones who had gone out from the Catholic Church, and were presently in schism from the Church.

Concerning this passage, the translator, Fr. Vassall-Phillips, writes:

The manner in which St. Optatus goes first to the See of Peter and only in the second place to the local See of Carthage in order to prove that the Donatists were in schism, is a fact of the greatest significance. It is quite clear that, in the eyes of Optatus, any bishop out of communion with the See of Rome was ipso facto schismatic. Otherwise, the reference to the Chair of Peter in this connection is utterly meaningless and unintelligble.”¹⁴

Of course, in the invisible church ecclesiology of contemporary Protestantism (where no Protestant denomination claims to be the Church Christ founded), there can be no such thing as schism from the Church, because every splitting of Christian communions is a mere ‘branching’ in which each party remains within “the small-c catholic Church.” (See “Branches or Schisms?“.) Thus from within the perspective of the invisible-church paradigm, every splitting of Christian communions, though perhaps temporarily lamentable, shortly becomes a cause of celebration, as God providentially transforms it into an increase in diversity in “the catholic Church.” In this invisible church ecclesiology of contemporary Protestantism, there is not even any conceptual space for the notion of schism from the Church Christ founded. St. Optatus’ speaking of schism from the universal Church, as an action distinct from apostasy from the Christian faith, does not even fit into the Protestant ecclesial paradigm.¹⁵

The translator notes that the Protestant ecclesiology according to which there is one [small-c] catholic Church in which many different religious bodies each holding a different set of doctrinal beliefs and not visibly unified are nevertheless assumed to be invisibly united, is an ecclesial ‘option’ of which St. Optatus is entirely unaware. The translator writes:

Evidently the idea of Comprehensiveness — that the One Church could be Catholic (Universal) in the sense of comprehending various kinds of religious bodies, varying in belief and without any external bond of union (cf . ii, 3) — never occurred to St. Optatus even as a possibility. Any branch theory in which the branches were separated from the trunk or from one another (cf. ii, 9 etc.) would have seemed to him unthinkable. He agrees with Parmenian in ruling it out ab initio.¹⁶

Both the Donatists and the Catholics would have entirely rejected an invisible-church ecclesiology. But their silence concerning that sort of ecclesiology shows that it was not even on their conceptual horizon. If “visible Catholic Church” ecclesiology had been a human innovation, as a result of ecclesial deism, it had so wiped out the ‘original’ apostolic “invisible Church” ecclesiology that by the fourth century, neither the Donatists nor the Catholics even conceived of it.¹⁷ To posit such a phenomenon by bumping up the alleged ‘great apostasy’ from the fifth century to the second century, is to take on all the implications described in “Ecclesial Deism.” And of course if “invisible Church” ecclesiology had been even a remote memory or a conceptual possibility, the Donatists would have seized on it, because in this way they could have avoided the charge of schism from the Church, by claiming to be a branch within the larger ‘small-c’ invisible catholic Church. And Sts. Optatus and Augustine would not have needed to concern themselves with the Donatist schism, laboring to bring them back into the Church, because they could have simply treated Donatism as a “branch within” the invisible, small-c catholic Church. But, invisible, “small-c catholic” ecclesiology would not be conceived for another twelve centuries, not entering the discussion until the sixteenth century.

III. The Donatist Claim to be the Catholic Church

We learn from St. Optatus that the Donatists claimed to have the keys of Peter, to be the one Church of Christ, and thus to deny that those outside of themselves could baptize or celebrate the Eucharist. Parmenian recognized that the one Church of Christ cannot be among all the heretics and schismatics, so he claimed that the Church of Christ was made up of the Donatists alone.¹⁸ St. Optatus writes to Parmenian:

Rightly hast thou closed the Garden to heretics; rightly hast thou claimed the Keys for Peter; rightly hast thou denied the right of cultivating the young trees to those who are certainly shut out from the garden and paradise of God; rightly hast thou withdrawn the Ring from those to whom it is not allowed to open the Fountain. But to you schismatics, although you are not in the Catholic Church, these things cannot be denied, since you have shared true Sacraments with us.¹⁹

Parmenian had claimed that the Keys of Peter belonged to the Donatists, and that they (i.e. the Donatists) were the Garden outside of which there were no sacraments and no means of eternal life. In order to claim that the Donatists were the Church, Parmenian had to claim that the Keys of St. Peter belonged to them. St. Optatus agrees with Parmenian that having the Keys of St. Peter is necessary in order to be the Church, but St. Optatus proceeds below to show that the Donatists do not have the Keys of St. Peter, and therefore are not the Church in which are found the sacraments of eternal life.

In order to prop up their claim to be the Catholic Church, the Donatists had an anti-pope, as it were, in the City of Rome, as a way of justifying their claim to possess the keys of St. Peter. At the time Parmenian wrote, the Catholic bishop in Rome was Pope St. Damasus (366-383), and the Donatist bishop in Rome was a man named Macrobius. St. Optatus writes, “But you allege that you too have some sort of a party in the City of Rome.”²⁰ So the task St. Optatus takes up in Book Two of Against the Donatists is showing that the Donatists are not the Catholic Church, but are in fact a schism from the Catholic Church, and that their anti-pope in Rome is in fact not the bearer of the Keys of St. Peter, but a kind of anti-pope.

IV. The Catholic Rejoinder: The Successor of St. Peter holds the Keys
A. The Donatist Bishop in Rome does not hold the Keys

St. Optatus writes to Parmenian:

But you allege that you too have some sort of a party in the City of Rome. It is a branch of your error growing out of a lie, not from the root of truth. In a word, were Macrobius to be asked where he sits in the City, will he be able to say on Peter’s Cathedra? I doubt whether he has even set eyes upon it, and schismatic that he is, he has not drawn nigh to Peter’s Shrine…. Behold, in Rome are the Shrines of the two Apostles [i.e. Sts. Peter and Paul]. Will you tell me whether he [i.e. Macrobius] has been able to approach them, or has offered Sacrifice in those places, where as is certain are these Shrines of the Saints.²¹

Though Macrobius is in Rome, he does not sit on St. Peter’s Chair, held by Pope St. Damasus. Nor, claims St. Optatus, has Macrobius ever offered the Sacrifice of the mass at the altars of the shrines of the Apostles Peter and Paul. The tombs of Sts. Peter and Paul had been Christian shrines since the first century, but Constantine had built structures over them in the early fourth century, and the Catholics of Rome celebrated mass at the altars over these tombs. St. Optatus supposes justifiably that Macrobius has never offered mass at these shrines, because they belong to the Catholics, with whom Macrobius has not been in communion. This subverts the Donatist claim to possess the Keys of Peter, since they do not even have possession or ritual access to the shrines of Sts. Peter and Paul. They cannot have the Keys of St. Peter if they are not even in communion with those who have succeeded from St. Peter in unbroken continuity.

Then St. Optatus shows that the line of Donatist bishops in Rome does not extend back to St. Peter, but began with Victor of Garba:

So it follows that your colleague Macrobius must confess that he sits where once sat Encolpius; and if Encolpius himself could be questioned, he would say that he sat where before him sat Bonifacius of Balla; and if Bonifacius could be asked, he would in his turn reply that he sat where Victor of Garba sat, whom some time ago your people sent from Africa to a few wanderers. How do you explain that your party has not been able to possess a Roman citizen as Bishop in Rome? How is it that in that City they were all Africans and strangers who are known to have succeeded one another? Is not craft here manifest? Is this not the spirit of faction the mother of schism?²²

St. Optatus explains that Victor of Garba, from whom Macrobius’ episcopal line takes its origin, was not a successor of St. Peter in Rome, but came to Rome in the fourth century, at the request of some African Christians living in Rome. Further evidence for this is found in the fact that no Roman citizens had occupied this Donatist line in Rome, but only Africans. St. Optatus then continues his explanation of the history of the Donatist party at Rome:

This Victor of Garba was sent first, I will not say as a stone into a fountain (for he could not ruffle the pure waters of the Catholic people), but because some Africans who belonged to your party, having gone to Rome, and wishing to live there, begged that someone should be sent from Africa to preside over their public worship. So Victor was sent to them. He was there as a son without a father, as a beginner without a master, as a disciple without a teacher, as a follower without a predecessor, as a lodger without a home, as a guest without a guest-house, as a shepherd without a flock, as a Bishop without a people. For neither flock nor people can that handful be termed, who amongst the forty and more Basilicas in Rome, had not one place in which to assemble.

Accordingly they closed up a cave outside the City with trellis-work, where they might have a meeting-house at once, and on account of this were called Mountaineers.

Since then, Claudian has succeeded to Lucian, Lucian to Macrobius, Macrobius to Encolpius, Encolpius to Boniface, Boniface to Victor. Victor would not have been able, had he been asked where he sat, to show that anyone had been there before him, nor could he have pointed out that he possessed any Cathedra save the Cathedra of pestilence [Ps. 1:1]; for pestilence sends down its victims, destroyed by diseases, to the regions of Hell which are known to have their gates gates against which we read that Peter received the saving Keys Peter, that is to say, the first of our line, to whom it was said by Christ :

To thee will I give the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven,

and these keys

the gates of Hell shall not overcome.

How is it, then, that you strive to usurp for yourselves the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, you who, with your arguments, and audacious sacrilege, war against the Chair of Peter? ²³

As evidence that Victor of Garba was not the bishop of Rome, St. Optatus explains that in Rome, Victor had no place to worship. Of the forty or so Basilicas available in Rome in which to offer the Eucharistic sacrifice, none of them was available to Victor of Garba, because he was not in communion with the Apostolic See. Hence he made use of a cave outside Rome.

In addition, Victor could not have shown that he had an episcopal predecessor at Rome, or that he had any genuine Cathedra. Hence, claims St. Optatus, Victor had only the Cathedra of pestilence [Ps. 1:1], which leads to hell (Ps. 1:6). But for St. Optatus, St. Peter is the “first of our line,” i.e. the first in the line of Catholic bishops. And Christ promised to St. Peter that the gates of hell would not prevail over the Keys He gave to him, and hence over the one holding the keys. So St. Optatus makes an argument here to the effect that hell would never prevail over the authentic line from St. Peter, and that by setting up a second Chair in opposition to the Chair established by Christ through St. Peter, the Donatist not only “war against the Chair of Peter,” but set themselves on the very path to hell, dooming themselves to destruction by the indefectibility of the Keys held by St. Peter in the Catholic Church. To set up a second Chair in opposition to the Chair of St. Peter is to attempt to “usurp” an authority they do not have. Just as Satan arrogated to himself an authority he did not have, and so chose for himself the way to hell, so by arrogating to themselves the authority of the Keys Christ gave to St. Peter, the Donatists align themselves with the forces of hell and the end assigned to those forces. The conflict between Christ and Satan is expressed visibly in this age in the conflict between the one to whom Christ entrusted the Keys of the Kingdom, and the forces of hell that shall not prevail against the one bearing those Keys. By setting themselves up against the true holder of the Keys, and warring against the Chair of St. Peter, the Donatists thereby align themselves with the forces of hell, which Christ has assured us can never prevail over the Church, and are thus doomed to defeat and destruction.

B. St. Peter and his Successors in Rome hold the Keys

Who then, in St. Optatus’ time, holds the Keys of the Kingdom? Repeatedly St. Optatus declares that the one holding the Keys must receive them from St. Peter. First, he points out that among all the Apostles, only St. Peter received the Keys. He writes:

When He [i.e. Christ] praises One, He condemns the others because, besides the one which is the true Catholc Church, the others amongst the heretics are thought to be churches, but are not such. Thus He declares in the Canticle of Canticles (as we have already pointed out) that His Dove is One, and that she is also the chosen Spouse, and again a garden enclosed, and a fountain sealed up. Therefore none of the heretics possess either the Keys, which Peter alone received, or the Ring, with which we read that the Fountain has been sealed.²⁴

Later in the work he shows that St. Peter, the Head of the Apostles, was the first to occupy the Episcopal Cathedra in Rome, and that the purpose of this Cathedra was to preserve unity among all Christians, including even the other Apostles. He writes:

You cannot then deny that you do know that upon Peter first in the City of Rome was bestowed the Episcopal Cathedra, on which sat Peter, the Head of all the Apostles … that, in this one Cathedra, unity should be preserved by all [in qua unica Cathedra unitas ab omnibus servaretur], lest the other Apostles might claim each for himself separate Cathedras, so that he who should set up a second Cathedra against the unique Cathedra would already be a schismatic and a sinner. Well then, on the one Cathedra, which is the first of the Endowments, Peter was the first to sit.²⁵

According to St. Optatus, anyone who sets up a second Cathedra against the unique Cathedra of St. Peter in Rome, is by that very fact “a schismatic and a sinner.” Of course in addition to the bishops ordained by the other Apostles, there were many lines of bishops extending down from St. Peter. And though all bishops receive equally the sacramental office of bishop, only one line of bishops succeeding from St. Peter receives, in addition, the charism Christ bestowed uniquely on St. Peter, namely, stewardship of the Keys of the Kingdom. Only that line of bishops occupying the unique Cathedra established in Rome by St. Peter possesses this charism. And hence to set up another Cathedra in opposition to this unique Cathedra, is ipso facto to become a schismatic, because such an act takes to oneself an authority that none except the rightful occupant of that unique Cathedra possesses.

Having established the unique authority of the Chair of St. Peter in Rome, and its divinely established role as the visible principle of unity of the Catholic Church, St. Optatus then lays out the succession from St. Peter to the present pope in Rome (Pope St. Damasus [366-383] in the first edition, but Pope St. Siricius [384-399] in the second edition). He writes:

To Peter succeeded Linus, to Linus succeeded Clement, to Clement Anacletus, to Anacletus Evaristus, to Evaristus Sixtus, to Sixtus Telesphorus, to Telesphorus Hyginus, to Hyginus Anacetus, to Anacetus Pius, to Pius Soter, to Soter Alexander, to Alexander Victor, to Victor Zephyrinus, to Zephyrinus Calixtus, to Calixtus Urban, to Urban Pontianus, to Pontianus Anterus, to Anterus Fabian, to Fabian Cornelius, to Cornelius Lucius, to Lucius Stephen, to Stephen Sixtus; to Sixtus Dionysius, to Dionysius Felix, to Felix Marcellinus, to Marcellinus Eusebius, to Eusebius Miltiades, to Miltiades Silvester, to Silvester Marcus, to Marcus Julius, to Julius Liberius, to Liberius Damasus, to Damasus Siricius, who today is our colleague, with whom the whole world, through the intercourse of letters of peace, agrees with us in one bond of communion.

Now do you show the origins of your Cathedra, you who wish to claim the Holy Church for yourselves.²⁶

What is the significance of tracing the line of bishops in Rome from the Apostle Peter to the present pope? This tracing would have no purpose or significance if all bishops held equal stewardship of the Keys, or if St. Optatus believed that stewardship of the Keys ended with the death of St. Peter. Tracing the line of bishops in Rome from the time of St. Peter to St. Optatus’ own day has significance for his argument against the Donatists only if stewardship of the Keys belongs in a unique way to that line of bishops.²⁷ St. Optatus traces the line of bishops occupying the Cathedra in Rome from St. Peter down to his own time to explain why Pope St. Damasus is the present steward of those Keys, and that by setting up a Chair in opposition to Pope St. Damasus, the Donatists had put themselves in schism from the Church Christ founded, that is, from the Catholic Church.²⁸

What St. Optatus writes concerning the role of the successors of St. Peter with regard to the Keys of the Kingdom and the nature of schism from the Church, is re-affirmed by St. Augustine about twenty-seven years later, when he writes:

You know what the Catholic Church is, and what that is cut off from the Vine; if there are any among you cautious, let them come; let them find life in the Root. Come, brethren, if you wish to be engrafted in the Vine: a grief it is when we see you lying thus cut off. Number the Bishops even from the very seat of Peter: and see every succession in that line of Fathers: that is the Rock against which the proud Gates of Hell prevail not.”²⁹

Later in Against the Donatists St. Optatus continues to make theologically significant references to St. Peter. He refers again to having shown that the Catholics possess the first Endowment of the Church, namely, the unique and authoritative Cathedra upon which St. Peter first sat, and which continues in the succession of bishops in Rome. He writes:

So, of the above-mentioned Endowments, the Cathedra is, as we have said, the first, which we have proved to be ours, through Peter, and which draws to itself the ANGEL — unless, perchance, you claim him for yourselves, and have him shut up somewhere or other.³⁰

A few pages later he states this again:

For it has been proved that we are in the Holy Catholic Church, who have too the Creed of the Trinity; and it has been shown that, through the Chair of Peter which is ours — through it — the other Endowments also belong to us.³¹

To be in communion with the bishop occupying the Chair of St. Peter is to be in the Catholic Church, and thus to possess in some sense all the gifts Christ bestowed on His Church. In both quotations he shows that the answer to the question “Where is the Holy Catholic Church?” is this: All those in communion with the Chair of St. Peter constitute the Holy Catholic Church. In this way St. Optatus provides the divinely established means by which to determine where is the Church, who is in schism from the Church, and what the Church does and does not teach.

On that same page he writes:

So — to answer you — we have shown what is heresy, and what is schism, and which is the Holy Church, and that of this Holy Church there has been constituted a Representative, and that the Catholic Church is the Church which is scattered over the whole world (of which we amongst others are members) and that her Endowments are with her everywhere.³²

According to St. Optatus, God has established a Representative of His Holy Church. What St. Optatus means by this is clear from everything that he has said up to this point. Because the Pope functions as the principle of unity by which we can know where is the Church, and which groups are in schism from the Church, he likewise functions as the Representative of the Church.³³

Toward the end of Against the Donatists, St. Optatus mentions the role of St. Peter three more times. He writes:

[F]or the sake of unity, blessed Peter (for whom it would have been enough if after his denial he had obtained pardon only) both deserved to be placed over all the Apostles, and alone received the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, which he was to communicate to the rest.³⁴

Here St. Optatus first teaches that St. Peter was given the Keys of the Kingdom for the sake of preserving unity in the Church. In giving St. Peter the Keys, he was in that respect placed “over all the Apostles,” for he “alone received the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven.” But the other Apostles (and all other bishops) exercise the authority of the Keys through their communion with St. Peter and his successors. If they break communion with St. Peter and his successors, they forfeit their use of the authority of the Keys. This is why, according to St. Optatus, the Donatists do not have the keys of the Kingdom, because they have broken fellowship with the Catholic bishops, as shown by the fact that they have broken fellowship with the episcopal successor of St. Peter in Rome.

Next, St. Optatus writes:

Behold (as we have said above), when the others [i.e. the other Apostles] did not recognise he [i.e. St. Peter] alone recognised, when the others made no promises he alone promised, when the others did not deny once he alone denied and that three times, but yet, for the sake of unity, he was not to be separated from the number of the Apostles. From which we understand that all things were ordered by the Providence of the Saviour, that Peter should receive the Keys. The way of malice was stopped up, that the Apostles might not conceive in their minds that they were free to judge, and condemn with severity, him who had denied Christ. So many guiltless ones are standing upright, and the sinner receives the Keys, that the work of unity might receive its pattern. It was provided that the sinner should open for the guiltless, lest the guiltless might close [the gates] against sinners, and thus the unity which is necessary could not be.³⁵

St. Peter was uniquely chosen by God to recognize Christ as the divine Son. But St. Peter was also unique in that he denied Christ three times. Yet, for St. Optatus, this was according to God’s providence. By giving the Keys of the Kingdom to one who had denied Him three times, Christ “stopped up” the way of malice, by making it impossible for the Apostles to condemn severely a person who had denied Christ, since by divine institution they themselves were made subject to one who had denied Christ. In God’s providence, the sinner (i.e. St. Peter) “opens for the guiltless,” i.e. extends to the other Apostles who did not deny Christ the use of the Keys of the Kingdom, so that the guiltless (i.e. the Apostles who did not deny Christ) might not close the way of salvation against sinners, and thereby divide the unity of the Church.

In his final mention of St. Peter’s role, St. Optatus writes:

Now, to turn to the fact that you have thought fit to take upon yourself the character of Moses, who, as the Apostle Paul tells us, was opposed by Jamnes and
Mambres — if this be so, what is the truth, that may be found with you, which the Catholic Church opposes?

Or, what is there with us which you can prove to be a lie ? Is it that we are in one communion with the whole world ? Will you be able to prove that this is a lie? Is it that we keep and defend the true and one Creed ? Will you be able to prove that this is a lie? Will you be able to prove that the Chair of Peter is a lie and the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, which were granted him by Christ, with which we are in communion ?³⁶

In his argument against the Donatists, St. Optatus here responds to Parmenian’s claim that to him [i.e. Parmenian] belongs the role of Moses, contending against Jamnes and Mambres [or Jambres], whom Parmenian thinks apparently represent Catholics contending against him. St. Optatus, for the sake of argument, accepts the analogy, and turns the argument back on Parmenian. His argument here to Parmenian is of the following sort:

If you really are in the character of Moses, and I am in the character of Jamnes and Mambres, then let’s see you win the contention between us. Let’s see you falsify a single Catholic doctrine, or prove that we (Catholics) are not in communion with the whole world, such that the term ‘Catholic’ does not rightly belong to us, but belongs more appropriately to you Donatists. Let’s see you convict us of not keeping and defending the one true Creed. Let’s see you prove that the Chair of St. Peter is a lie, and that the Keys of the Kingdom of heaven, with which we Catholics (but not you Donatists) are in communion, are a lie. You may claim to be in the character of Moses, but you cannot refute the Catholic Church or defend your position against the evidence I have raised against you. Since you cannot concede that Jamnes and Mambres got the best of Moses in debate, therefore, your claim to possess his role is an empty one that must be retracted, lest Moses be shamed or maligned.

V. Conclusion

In the face of such evidence, the only recourse for the Protestant who wishes to remain Protestant is to propose that on account of ecclesial deism, at some point prior to the time of St. Optatus, men had wrongfully and universally imposed a visible hierarchy on the Church, treating what Christ had established to be something invisible, as though it were something visible and essentially unified in a visible hierarchical structure. The Protestant who seeks to remain Protestant must propose that the essential unity of the hierarchy of the Church and the role of the Chair of St. Peter in that hierarchical unity, to which St. Optatus refers in his writings against the Donatists, are man-made constructs that were universally imposed on the Church at some point after the death of the Apostles and prior to the time of St. Optatus.

But as explained in the ecclesial deism article, proposing that there were universal corruptions and accretions in the early Church undermines the Protestant’s ability to appeal to the Church Fathers or to the Councils as having any authority whatsoever. And the necessary implication of that effect is solo scriptura.

That St. Optatus was a Catholic is shown not only in his understanding of the unique role of St. Peter and his episcopal successors as stewards of the Keys of the Kingdom, but in many other ways as well. The translator, Fr. Vassall-Phillips, writes:

St. Optatus affirms explicitly the truth of Baptismal Regeneration; again and again makes reference to the Sacrifice of the Altar; states the doctrine of the Real Presence in words that are incapable of any misunderstanding; insists on the sacredness of Holy Chrism; writes of the adornment of altars for the offering of the Sacrifice; refers to the ceremony of Exorcism before Baptism; appeals to deutero-canonical Books as to authentic Scripture; takes the continuance of Miracles in the Church for granted; and is quite express in his references to cloistered Virginity and the difference between the Commandments of God and Counsels of Perfection.”³⁷

The Protestant who wishes to remain Protestant, can accommodate such evidence only by resorting to ecclesial deism and advancing the date of the [posited] ‘great apostasy’ to some time before St. Optatus. But if St. Optatus is right that the successors of St. Peter in Rome hold the Keys of the Kingdom, then by Christ’s infallible promise the gates of hell shall never prevail over that line of succession. In that case, there could not be, and has never been, an apostasy in that line. And all who cleave to that line in full communion, participate in that divine promise, for there is the Holy Catholic Church Christ founded. That is the alternative paradigm to ecclesial deism.

St. Optatus, please pray for all those Christians in schism from Christ’s Church, that they may be happily restored to full visible communion. In nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. Amen..

1. All pagination is from the translation by the Rev. O.R. Vassall-Phillips, (Longmans, Green, and Co.: London, 1917). That translation can be found in its entirety here.
2. Against the Donatists, p. 4.
3. Ibid. p. 9.
4. The Catholic Encyclopedia article on the Donatists explains the meaning of this term: “This word traditor became a technical expression to designate those who had given up the Sacred Books, and also those who had committed the worse crimes of delivering up the sacred vessels and even their own brethren.” St. Optatus shows later in his work that there was never any evidence that Felix was a traditor.
5. Ibid. p. 27.
6. Ibid. p. 29.
7. Ibid. pp. 47-49.
8. Ibid. pp. 30-31.
9. Ibid. p. 30.
10. Ibid. p. 39.
11. Ibid. p. 23.
12. By the phrase “your father’s father,” St. Optatus means the bishop who ordained the bishop who ordained you.
13. Ibid. pp. 20-21.
14. Ibid. p. 20.
15. That the Donatists had not committed apostasy is shown by the fact that the Catholics, including St. Optatus, continued to call them “brothers,” even though the Donatists refused to refer to the Catholics as brothers. (cf. Ibid. pp. 5-6.)
16. Ibid. p. 58.
17. And likewise, in the third century, neither the Novatians nor the Catholics thought of it during the Novatian schism.
18. cf. Ibid. p. 58.
19. Ibid. pp. 24-25.
20. Ibid. p. 70.
21. Ibid. pp. 70-71.
22. Ibid. p. 71.
23. Ibid. pp. 71-73.
24. Ibid. pp. 18-19.
25. Ibid. pp. 66-68.
26. Ibid. pp. 68-69.
27. St. Augustine likewise, in the year AD 400, traces only the bishops of Rome from St. Peter down to St. Anastasius (399-401) when he writes:

    For if the lineal succession of bishops is to be taken into account, with how much more certainty and benefit to the Church do we reckon back till we reach Peter himself, to whom, as bearing in a figure the whole Church, the Lord said: Upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it! Matthew 16:18 The successor of Peter was Linus, and his successors in unbroken continuity were these:— Clement, Anacletus, Evaristus, Alexander, Sixtus, Telesphorus, Iginus, Anicetus, Pius, Soter, Eleutherius, Victor, Zephirinus, Calixtus, Urbanus, Pontianus, Antherus, Fabianus, Cornelius, Lucius, Stephanus, Xystus, Dionysius, Felix, Eutychianus, Gaius, Marcellinus, Marcellus, Eusebius, Miltiades, Sylvester, Marcus, Julius, Liberius, Damasus, and Siricius, whose successor is the present Bishop Anastasius. In this order of succession no Donatist bishop is found. But, reversing the natural course of things, the Donatists sent to Rome from Africa an ordained bishop, who, putting himself at the head of a few Africans in the great metropolis, gave some notoriety to the name of mountain men, or Cutzupits, by which they were known. (Letter 53, chapter 1)

    St. Irenaeus had done the same in the latter part of the second century, in his Against Heresies III.3.3.

28. In the last sentence of the quotation, he challenges the Donatists to show the origins of their Cathedra, if they wish to claim be the Holy Church. This is very like what St. Irenaeus says:

    But [it is also necessary] to hold in suspicion others who depart from the primitive succession, and assemble themselves together in any place whatsoever . . . . But those who cleave asunder, and separate the unity of the Church, [shall] receive from God the same punishment as Jeroboam did. (Against Heresies IV.26.2)

    It also corresponds to the same test of apostolic succession Tertullian provides:

    But if there be any (heresies) which are bold enough to plant themselves in the midst of the apostolic age, that they may thereby seem to have been handed down by the apostles, because they existed in the time of the apostles, we can say: Let them produce the original records of their churches; let them unfold the roll of their bishops, running down in due succession from the beginning in such a manner that [that first bishop of theirs] bishop shall be able to show for his ordainer and predecessor some one of the apostles or of apostolic men,– a man, moreover, who continued steadfast with the apostles. For this is the manner in which the apostolic churches transmit their registers: as the church of Smyrna, which records that Polycarp was placed therein by John; as also the church of Rome, which makes Clement to have been ordained in like manner by Peter. In exactly the same way the other churches likewise exhibit (their several worthies), whom, as having been appointed to their episcopal places by apostles, they regard as transmitters of the apostolic seed. Let the heretics contrive something of the same kind. (Prescription Against Heretics, 32)

29. St. Augustine to the schismatic Donatists, A.D. 393, Patrologia Latina 43.30.
30. Against the Donatists p. 78.
31. Ibid. p. 86.
32. Ibid. p. 86.
33. Concerning this line, the translator writes,

    There can be no doubt that St. Optatus is here referring to St. Peter, or his successors in the See of Rome, as the Representative of the Church. This is made clear by the fact that he is giving a summary of the arguments which he has already brought forward in his book. Now amongst these arguments the representative character of St. Peter and of his Cathedra has, as we have just seen, taken a leading place. Again, no alternative explanation of Persona in this passage has ever been suggested. Further, it is well known that St. Augustine adopted this traditional view, and in several passages has written of St. Peter as representing the whole Catholic Church in his own person. ( Ibid. pp. 86-87.)

34. Ibid. p. 284.
35. Ibid. pp. 288-289.
36. Ibid. p. 294.
37. Ibid. pp. xi-xii.

Because St. Vincent writes in the time period between the two councils, one cannot non-arbitrarily accept those two councils while dismissing St. Vincent’s work as a product of some great apostasy. St. Vincent is a strong advocate of the indefectibility of the Church, and of the importance of interpreting Scripture under the authority of the Church and her universal tradition. Here I present an overview of his Commonitory, and examine the fundamental truths he communicates in it, particularly with a view to their contribution toward the reconciliation of Protestants and the Catholic Church.

St. Honorat: The island of Lérins on which St. Vincent wrote his Commonitory in AD 434.

Outline
I. Purpose of his Commonitory
A. A Response to the Subtle Craftiness of the New Heretics
B. St. Vincent’s Prescription against Heresies and Schisms: Scripture and Tradition
II. An Objection: What about the Sufficiency of Scripture?
III. The Identity and Authority of the Tradition and Magisterium
A. The Tradition
B. The Magisterium
1. General Councils
2. The Apostolic See
3. The Authority of the Church
IV. The Indefectibility of the Church
V. Schisms, Heresies, and their Antidote
A. In the Event of Schism and Heresy
B. The Cause of Heresies and Schisms
1. Cause: Wicked Novelty Subverting Well-Established Antiquity
2. Why does God permit them?
C. The Antidote: Interpret Scripture within and according to the Church
VI. The Development of Doctrine
VII. The Implications for Protestant-Catholic Reconciliation

I. Purpose of his Commonitory
A. A Response to the Subtle Craftiness of the New Heretics

At the beginning of his work, St. Vincent explains his purpose for writing it. Having attained time for studying and writing after entering the monastery, and having discerned the need of the time in which he lived, he set out to record what his forefathers in the faith had handed down to him and his fellow Catholics, and committed to their keeping. (p. 1, 3)¹ “It is most necessary,” he writes, “that I should put down in writing the things which I have truthfully received from the holy Fathers.” (p. 1) Hence the title of his work is the Commonitory, or Remembrancer. (p. 3) He does not lay out all the doctrines he had been taught. Rather, he provides the rule he had received, by which the truth of the Catholic faith can be distinguished from the falsehood of heresy. (p. 4) In this way, he addresses the second-order question (“By what rule do we rightly distinguish orthodoxy from heresy?”) that underlies the first-order questions (“Which doctrines are orthodox and which are heretical?”). He does this because of the prevalence of heresies and schism in his time: “the subtle craftiness of new heretics calls for no ordinary care and attention.” (p. 2)

B. St. Vincent’s Prescription against Heresies and Schism: Scripture and Tradition

According to St. Vincent, “to detect the frauds and avoid the snares of heretics as they rise, and to continue sound and complete in the Catholic faith, we must, … fortify our own belief in two ways; first, by the authority of the Divine Law, and then, by the Tradition of the Catholic Church.” (p. 4) In other words, the rule by which we can distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy, is found in the authority of Scripture and Tradition. But this immediately raises two questions: Scripture as interpreted by whom? And which tradition? St. Vincent recognizes those questions, and the purpose of the rest of his Commonitory is to answer them. But first he considers and responds to an objection.

II. An Objection: What about the Sufficiency of Scripture?

St. Vincent anticipates an objection in the form of a question:

Since the canon of Scripture is complete, and sufficient of itself for everything, and more than sufficient, what need is there to join with it the authority of the Church’s interpretation? (p. 5)

This question is a very important question with respect to Protestant-Catholic reconciliation, because the answer to the question bears directly on whether we must submit our interpretation to that of the Magisterium, or whether we can and must hold the Magisterium to our interpretation of Scripture. If we can and must hold the Magisterium to our own interpretation of Scripture, then Protestants can be justified in separating from the Catholic Church in protest until the Magisterium conforms to their interpretation of Scripture. But if we must submit our interpretation of Scripture to that of the Magisterium, then Protestants were not justified in placing their own interpretation of Scripture above that of the Magisterium, and are obliged before God in humility and repentance to be reconciled to the Catholic Church and submit to her teaching authority.

St. Vincent then provides the answer to his question:

For this reason—because, owing to the depth of Holy Scripture, all do not accept it in one and the same sense, but one understands its words in one way, another in another; so that it seems to be capable of as many interpretations as there are interpreters. For Novatian expounds it one way, Sabellius another, Donatus another, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, another, Photinus, Apollinaris, Priscillian, another, Iovinian, Pelagius, Celestius, another, lastly, Nestorius another. Therefore, it is very necessary, on account of so great intricacies of such various error, that the rule for the right understanding of the prophets and apostles should be framed in accordance with the standard of Ecclesiastical and Catholic interpretation. (p. 5)

His point is that because of the depth of Scripture due to its divine quality, not all persons interpret it in the same sense. In fact, there are, according to St. Vincent, almost as many interpretations as there are interpreters. When these interpretations are contrary to those decreed by general councils or taught by the consent of the Church Fathers, they are invariably heretical, and St. Vincent provides a number of examples.

A bit later in his work he provides another example. He refers to Agripinnus, bishop of Carthage, who was the first to hold the belief that baptism ought to be repeated. (p. 16) This was “contrary to the divine canon, contrary to the rule of the universal Church, contrary to the customs and institutions of our ancestors.” (p. 16) Regarding this belief that baptism ought to be repeated, St. Vincent asks whether this novelty had Scriptural support. Yes, according to St. Vincent it had “weighty support in Scripture,” but with this qualification: “only interpreted in a novel and perverse sense.” (p. 17) Of course Agripinnus and those who followed him in this belief did not think they were giving Scripture a perverse or distorted sense. They were interpreting it, presumably, according to what they believed that it truly taught. But they were deceived, claims St. Vincent, because they did not interpret it according to the tradition of the Church.

In other words, we shouldn’t expect heretics to avoid Scripture; we should expect heretics to make vigorous and copious use of Scripture. If Scripture could reasonably be read in only one sense, we would expect heretics to avoid Scripture. But because Scripture can be read in many senses, then we should expect heretics to appeal to Scripture to defend their heretical beliefs, and to presuppose (or state explicitly) that Magisterial authority is not necessary in order to interpret Scripture rightly.

St. Vincent writes:

Here, possibly, some one may ask, Do heretics also appeal to Scripture? They do indeed, and with a vengeance; for you may see them scamper through every single book of Holy Scripture—through the books of Moses, the books of Kings, the Psalms, the Epistles, the Gospels, the Prophets. Whether among their own people, or among strangers, in private or in public, in speaking or in writing, at convivial meetings, or in the streets, hardly ever do they bring forward anything of their own which they do not endeavour to shelter under words of Scripture. Read the works of Paul of Samosata, of Priscillian, of Eunomius, of Jovinian, and the rest of those pests, and you will see an infinite heap of instances, hardly a single page, which does not bristle with plausible quotations from the New Testament or the Old. (p. 64)

The plentiful use of Scripture by heretics to support their heretical claims demonstrates the need for interpretive authority in the Church. What the faithful must look for is not a mere appeal to Scripture, since any heretic can do that. The faithful must look to those whom Christ authorized to provide the authentic interpretation of Scripture for the members of His Body. St. Vincent points to Jesus’ words in the Gospel of Matthew: “Beware of false prophets who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves.” (Mt. 7:15) What is the sheep’s clothing that the false prophets use to disguise themselves? According to St. Vincent, the sheep’s clothing is the words of Scripture that the heretics wrap themselves in, to steal upon the unsuspecting sheep. He writes,

What is meant by sheep’s clothing? What but the words which prophets and apostles with the guilelessness of sheep wove beforehand as fleeces, for that immaculate Lamb which takes away the sin of the world? What are the ravening wolves? What but the savage and rabid glosses of heretics, who continually infest the Church’s folds, and tear in pieces the flock of Christ wherever they are able? But that they may with more successful guile steal upon the unsuspecting sheep, retaining the ferocity of the wolf, they put off his appearance, and wrap themselves, so to say, in the language of the Divine Law, as in a fleece, so that one, having felt the softness of wool, may have no dread of the wolf’s fangs. (p. 66)

St. Vincent explains that St. Paul also refers to such persons in his second letter to the Corinthians, where he writes, “For of this sort are false apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into apostles of Christ.” (2 Cor. 11:12) They transform themselves into apostles of Christ [i.e. make themselves out to appear as though they are apostles of Christ, when in fact they are not] by arrogating to themselves the right to interpret Scripture as they see fit, rather than under the authority of the Church in accordance with the Tradition that has been handed down from the Apostles. (p. 67) St. Vincent writes:

Therefore, according to the authority of the Apostle Paul, as often as either false apostles or false teachers cite passages from the Divine Law, by means of which, misinterpreted, they seek to prop up their own errors, there is no doubt that they are following the cunning devices of their father, which assuredly he would never have devised, but that he knew that where he could fraudulently and by stealth introduce error, there is no easier way of effecting his impious purpose than by pretending the authority of Holy Scripture. (p. 67)

Here St. Vincent shows from Scripture that the Devil quoted Scripture, and because the sons do what their father does, so the Devil’s followers likewise will quote Scripture. Hence St. Vincent writes:

[W]e may be assured beyond doubt, when we find people alleging passages from the Apostles or Prophets against the Catholic Faith, that the Devil speaks through their mouths. For as then the Head spoke to the Head, so now also the members speak to the members, the members of the Devil to the members of Christ, misbelievers to believers, sacrilegious to religious, in one word, Heretics to Catholics. (p. 68)

Just as the head of the “sons of the evil one” (Mt. 13:38) spoke to the Head of the “sons of the Kingdom” (Mt. 13:38), so the sons of the evil one will speak in the same way to the sons of the Kingdom. Thus, just as the Devil appealed to Scripture to tempt Jesus, so the heretics appeal to Scripture in their attempt to lead Catholics away from the true faith of the Church. St. Vincent sees this implied in the very nature of the narrative of Satan’s attempt to get Jesus to cast Himself down from the Temple. This, he says, characterizes the attempt by heretics to get Catholics to cast themselves down from “the doctrine and tradition of that sublime Church, which is imagined to be nothing less than the very temple of God.” (p. 69) If we ask the heretics what grounds they have for their belief, they respond, like Satan himself, by appealing to the Scriptures, interpreted according to their own novel interpretation, not interpreted according to the doctrine and teaching of the Church.

In a rather well-known passage, he writes:

And if one should ask one of the heretics who gives this advice, How do you prove? What ground have you, for saying, that I ought to cast away the universal and ancient faith of the Catholic Church? He has the answer ready, For it is written; and immediately he produces a thousand testimonies, a thousand examples, a thousand authorities from the Law, from the Psalms, from the apostles, from the Prophets, by means of which, interpreted on a new and wrong principle, the unhappy soul may be precipitated from the height of Catholic truth to the lowest abyss of heresy. Then, with the accompanying promises, the heretics are wont marvellously to beguile the incautious. For they dare to teach and promise, that in their church, that is, in the conventicle of their communion, there is a certain great and special and altogether personal grace of God, so that whosoever pertain to their number, without any labour, without any effort, without any industry, even though they neither ask, nor seek, nor knock, have such a dispensation from God, that, borne up by angel hands, that is, preserved by the protection of angels, it is impossible they should ever dash their feet against a stone, that is, that they should ever be offended. (p. 69)

The heretics cast away the universal and ancient faith of the Catholic Church because of their preference for their own interpretation of Scripture, by which, wrongly interpreted, they fall from Catholic truth into the darkness of heresy, and shipwreck their faith. To make their sect more attractive, they use Scripture to teach that in their sect, there is some greater benefit than what is available in the Catholic Church. The greater benefit can be something such as the impossibility of sinning or losing salvation.

In his summary toward the end of his Commonitory, St. Vincent writes in more detail about the two ways in which it has always been the custom of Catholics to prove the true faith:

We said above, that it has always been the custom of Catholics, and still is, to prove the true faith in these two ways; first by the authority of the Divine Canon, and next by the tradition of the Catholic Church. Not that the Canon alone does not of itself suffice for every question, but seeing that the more part, interpreting the divine words according to their own persuasion, take up various erroneous opinions, it is therefore necessary that the interpretation of divine Scripture should be ruled according to the one standard of the Church’s belief, especially in those articles on which the foundations of all Catholic doctrine rest. (p. 76)

When he includes the tradition of the Church, he wants to make sure his reader understands that he is not saying that Scripture is not sufficient to answer such questions. However, the nature of the sufficiency he is affirming is about Scripture itself. The reason why, according to St. Vincent, we need the tradition of the Catholic Church in addition to Scripture, is because of human weakness, namely, that apart from a divinely established interpretive authority guarding and preserving a divinely given tradition, people interpret Scripture according to their own persuasion. Therefore, the rule for the interpretation of Scripture must be the tradition of the Church, by which and in which Scripture is authentically interpreted. In other words, the standard for the right interpretation of Scripture is the Church’s doctrine, not one’s own opinion. To use one’s own interpretation as the standard by which to judge the doctrine of the Church is to fall into the underlying error of the heretics, who approach Scripture apart from the teaching and tradition of the Church, and so arrive at novel interpretations by which they criticize the Church and deceive some of her sheep.

III. The Identity and Authority of the Tradition and Magisterium
A. The Tradition

According to St. Vincent, to avoid heresy and schism we should hold firmly to the following two authoritative lights: the decisions of authoritative councils, and the opinions of the holy Fathers. (p. 77) So in what sense is the “Tradition of the Catholic Church” (p. 4) authoritative, and how do we identify it? St. Vincent provides us with his famous rule, also known as the “Vincentian canon:”

Moreover, in the Catholic Church itself, all possible care must be taken, that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere, always, by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense Catholic, which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare, comprehends all universally. This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity, consent. We shall follow universality if we confess that one faith to be true, which the whole Church throughout the world confesses; antiquity, if we in no wise depart from those interpretations which it is manifest were notoriously held by our holy ancestors and fathers; consent, in like manner, if in antiquity itself we adhere to the consentient definitions and determinations of all, or at the least of almost all priests and doctors. (p. 6)

The Vincentian canon is summarized as quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est (that which has been believed everywhere, always, by all). This is the very nature of catholicity, and catholicity is one of the four marks of the Church (i.e. “one, holy, catholic and apostolic”). The utility of the Vincentian canon depends on the Church being visible, such that there is a clear distinction between those in the Church and those not. Otherwise, we would not know who to include in the ‘everywhere, always, and all.’ The Vincentian canon also carries with it an implicit affirmation of the indefectibility of the visible Church (and thus a denial of ecclesial deism). In order for the Tradition held everywhere in the Church, in all times of the Church’s history, and by all in the Church, to have divine authority, it must be the case not only that this Tradition is divine revelation, but also that this Tradition is divinely protected and preserved in the Church.

St. Vincent draws this from the letters of St. Paul. Speaking of Galatians 1.8, he writes, “But what he [i.e. St. Paul] means is: Even if that were to happen which cannot happen — if any one, be he who he may, attempt to alter the faith once for all delivered, let him be accursed.” (p. 22) It means that “it is unlawful for all to receive any other gospel than that which the Catholic Church preaches everywhere.” (p. 24) According to St. Vincent, Galatians 1:8 entails that we have to trace the gospel down through the generations, from the Apostles to the present. The two possible methodological errors related to this verse are: (1) assuming blindly that the [heretical] sect one is presently in is the bearer of the Apostolic tradition, and thereby following what is, in actuality, a novel interpretation that arose in a previous generation, and in which one was raised, and (2) failing to trace the Apostolic Tradition down through the generations, but instead assuming that one’s own interpretation of Scripture is what the Apostles handed down, and thereby introducing what is in fact a novel interpretation.

Toward the end of his Commonitory, St. Vincent summarizes his point concerning the authority of Tradition:

We said likewise, that in the Church itself regard must be had to the consentient voice of universality equally with that of antiquity, lest we either be torn from the integrity of unity and carried away to schism, or be precipitated from the religion of antiquity into heretical novelties. We said, further, that in this same ecclesiastical antiquity two points are very carefully and earnestly to be held in view by those who would keep clear of heresy: first, they should ascertain whether any decision has been given in ancient times as to the matter in question by the whole priesthood of the Catholic Church, with the authority of a General Council: and, secondly, if some new question should arise on which no such decision has been given, they should then have recourse to the opinions of the holy Fathers, of those at least, who, each in his own time and place, remaining in the unity of communion and of the faith, were accepted as approved masters; and whatsoever these may be found to have held, with one mind and with one consent, this ought to be accounted the true and Catholic doctrine of the Church, without any doubt or scruple. (p. 77)

We find the true and Catholic doctrine of the Church in the Church, either by what has been decided by the authority of the Church in a General Council, or, if no decision has been made in a General Council concerning the question, in what has been held universally in the Church, especially in the Church Fathers. This is how we avoid being carried away into schism or heretical novelties.

B. The Magisterium
1. General Councils

Throughout the Commonitory we see St. Vincent refer to the authority of General Councils:

But what, if in antiquity itself there be found error on the part of two or three men, or at any rate of a city or even of a province? Then it will be his care by all means, to prefer the decrees, if such there be, of an ancient General Council to the rashness and ignorance of a few. (p. 8)

A bit later he writes:

Finally, what other object have Councils ever aimed at in their decrees, than to provide that what was before believed in simplicity should in future be believed intelligently, that what was before preached coldly should in future be preached earnestly, that what was before practised negligently should thenceforward be practised with double solicitude? This, I say, is what the Catholic Church, roused by the novelties of heretics, has accomplished by the decrees of her Councils,— this, and nothing else—she has thenceforward consigned to posterity in writing what she had received from those of olden times only by tradition, comprising a great amount of matter in a few words, and often, for the better understanding, designating an old article of the faith by the characteristic of a new name. (p. 59)

Here St. Vincent shows us what a General Council does. It does not fabricate novel teaching. Rather, typically in response to challenges from heretics, it clarifies and makes explicit what had always been believed, even if previously held in a simple or inchoate fashion. In other words, a General Council serves as an instrument in the authentic development of doctrine. Moreover, a General Council puts to writing what had previously been handed down only by [oral] tradition. So, the decisions and decrees of a General Council are a way to know what is the oral Tradition that has been passed down from the Apostles.²

Toward the end of the Commonitory he repeatedly refers to the authority of General Councils:

[I]n antiquity itself in like manner, to the temerity of one or of a very few they must prefer, first of all, the general decrees, if such there be, of a Universal Council, or if there be no such, then, what is next best, they must follow the consentient belief of many and great masters. Which rule having been faithfully, soberly, and scrupulously observed, we shall with little difficulty detect the noxious errors of heretics as they arise. (p. 70)

But it is now time to bring forward the exemplification which we promised, where and how the sentences of the holy Fathers have been collected together, so that in accordance with them, by the decree and authority of a council, the rule of the Church’s faith may be settled. (p. 75)

[F]irst, they should ascertain whether any decision has been given in ancient times as to the matter in question by the whole priesthood of the Catholic Church, with the authority of a General Council. (p. 77)

According to St. Vincent, a General Council settles questions or disputes concerning what does and does not belong to the rule of the Church’s faith. If the Church has spoken on a question through a General Council, there is no need to search the Fathers; the question is no longer uncertain or up in the air, because the Church’s decision is authoritative and binding. If a heresy has already been condemned by a General Council, then we should treat such heresies “as having been already of old convicted and condemned by universal councils of the Catholic Priesthood.” (p. 71) That could be the case only if General Councils are authoritative and binding.

2. The Apostolic See

In St. Vincent’s Commonitory we see an awareness of the authoritative primacy of the Apostolic See. In the early part of his work, in seeking to provide an example of resisting heresy by holding fast to what had been received from the Apostles, St. Vincent makes use of the example of Pope St. Stephen (254 – 257) in resisting the heretical doctrine concerning the iteration of baptism (see Section II, above):

Examples there are without number: but to be brief, we will take one, and that, in preference to others, from the Apostolic See, so that it may be clearer than day to every one with how great energy, with how great zeal, with how great earnestness, the blessed successors of the blessed apostles have constantly defended the integrity of the religion which they have once received. (p. 15)

… When then all men protested against the novelty [introduced by Agripinnus], and the priesthood everywhere, each as his zeal prompted him, opposed it, Pope Stephen of blessed memory, Prelate of the Apostolic See, in conjunction indeed with his colleagues but yet himself the foremost, withstood it, thinking it right, I doubt not, that as he exceeded all others in the authority of his place, so he should also in the devotion of his faith. In fine, in an epistle sent at the time to Africa, he laid down this rule: Let there be no innovation— nothing but what has been handed down. For that holy and prudent man well knew that true piety admits no other rule than that whatsoever things have been faithfully received from our fathers the same are to be faithfully consigned to our children; and that it is our duty, not to lead religion whither we would, but rather to follow religion whither it leads; and that it is the part of Christian modesty and gravity not to hand down our own beliefs or observances to those who come after us, but to preserve and keep what we have received from those who went before us. (p. 16)

St. Vincent notes that Pope St. Stephen was himself “the foremost” of his colleagues in the priesthood (i.e. the college of bishops). He excelled all the other bishops in “the authority of his place.” St. Vincent is speaking not of political authority or charismatic authority, but of the ecclesial authority of the Apostolic See, the place where saints Peter and Paul laid down their lives and handed down their apostolic authority. This See has greater authority than any of the others, and according to St. Vincent, Pope St. Stephen was aware that he, in virtue of being the bishop of the Apostolic See and a “successor of the blessed apostles,” excelled all the other bishops in ecclesial authority.

Later in his Commonitory St. Vincent again refers to the authoritative primacy of the bishop of Rome. In speaking of the authorities gathered at the Council of Ephesus, he writes:

And lest Greece or the East should seem to stand alone, to prove that the Western and Latin world also have always held the same belief, there were read in the Council certain Epistles of St. Felix, martyr, and St. Julius, both bishops of Rome. And that not only the Head, but the other parts, of the world also might bear witness to the judgment of the council, there was added from the South the most blessed Cyprian, bishop of Carthage and martyr, and from the North St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan.” (p. 79)

Notice what St. Vincent says about Popes St. Felix (269-274) and St. Julius (337-352); they are the “the Head,” in contrast to the bishops of the East and of Africa and of northern Italy.

In the closing paragraphs of his Commonitory, St. Vincent again refers to the authority of the Apostolic See. He writes:

The foregoing would be enough and very much more than enough, to crush and annihilate every profane novelty. But yet that nothing might be wanting to such completeness of proof, we added, at the close, the twofold authority of the Apostolic See, first, that of holy Pope Sixtus, the venerable prelate who now adorns the Roman Church; and secondly that of his predecessor, Pope Celestine of blessed memory, which same we think it necessary to insert here also. (p. 84)

St. Vincent then explains that Pope St. Sixtus III (432-440) wrote a letter to the bishop of Antioch regarding the doctrine taught by Nestorius (bishop of Constantinople). In the letter Pope St. Sixtus enjoined the bishop of Antioch to “Let no license be allowed to novelty, because it is not fit that any addition should be made to antiquity. Let not the clear faith and belief of our forefathers be fouled by any muddy admixture.” (p. 84) Likewise, St. Vincent shows the authority of Pope St. Celestine (422-430) by recounting how Pope St. Celestine wrote an epistle to the priests of France “charging them with connivance with error, in that by their silence they failed in their duty to the ancient faith, and allowed profane novelties to spring up.” (p. 85) He exhorted them to rebuke those introducing such novelties. This, according to St. Vincent, was the “sentence” [i.e. authoritative decision] of Pope St. Celestine, (p. 85).

Whoever then gainsays these Apostolic and Catholic determinations, first of all necessarily insults the memory of holy Celestine, who decreed that novelty should cease to assail antiquity; and in the next place sets at naught the decision of holy Sixtus, whose sentence was, Let no license be allowed to novelty, since it is not fit that any addition be made to antiquity. (p. 86)

According to St. Vincent, popes St. Celestine and St. Sixtus did not merely give opinions; they “decreed” and provided “decisions.” To go against them is to go against “Apostolic and Catholic determinations.” In these excerpts we see in St. Vincent’s writing a clear awareness of the authoritative primacy of the Apostolic See and its bishop, having succession from the blessed apostles.

3. Authority of the Church

More generally throughout the Commonitory we find St. Vincent referring to the authority of the Church:

An important fact truly, useful to be learned, and necessary to be remembered, and to be illustrated and enforced again and again, by example upon example, in order that all true Catholics may understand that it behooves them with the Church to receive Teachers, not with Teachers to desert the faith of the Church.” (p. 42)

Which teachers should we receive? Only those teachers who are “with the Church.” We must never follow teachers to desert the faith of the Church. Such a prescription would be worthless if “the Church” were defined only by way of teachers, and without a visible principle of unity, since every teacher would, by simply redefining ‘Church,’ claim to be part of the Church. Any heresy or schism throughout the history of the Church could have claimed to be part of the universal Church, and some did. The Arians could have done so. So could the Nestorians or the Donatists or the Marcionites or the Monophysites. But, in each case, it would have been a false claim, because by their rejection of the Church’s decision concerning their specific heresy (or in the Donatist case by their visible separation from communion with the Catholic Church) they were no longer in communion with the successor of St. Pe