The Tu Quoque
May 24th, 2010 | By Bryan Cross | Category: Blog PostsNeal and I offered a brief reply to the tu quoque objection in our article titled “Solo Scriptura, Sola Scriptura, and the Question of Interpretive Authority.” Here I provide a more thorough reply to the tu quoque objection, and open a forum for discussion of the authority argument and the tu quoque objection.
Christ Taking Leave of the Apostles
Duccio di Buoninsegna (1308-11)
Museo dell’Opera del Duomo, Siena
I. The authority argument
In various places I have argued previously that without apostolic succession, creeds and confessions have no actual authority.1 They have no actual authority apart from apostolic succession because without apostolic succession the only available basis for a creed or confession’s authority is the individual’s agreement with the interpretation of Scripture found in that creed or confession. Each person picks the confession of faith that most closely represents his own interpretation of Scripture. If his interpretation of Scripture happens to change, he is not bound by his prior choice of confession; rather, he simply picks a different confession that more closely matches his present interpretation. I have described this as painting one’s magisterial target around one’s interpretive arrow, i.e. the practice of choosing and grounding magisterial authority based on its agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture.2
But an important principle regarding authority is this: “When I submit (only when I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” In other words, agreement with oneself cannot be the basis for authority over oneself. Therefore a creed or confession’s agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture cannot be the basis for its authority.3 And this is why without apostolic succession, creeds or confessions have no actual authority. That is a simple overview of the authority argument.4
II. The tu quoque objection
The primary objection to this argument is the tu quoque [lit. you too] objection, namely, that the person who becomes Catholic upon determining that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded is doing so because the Catholic Church most closely conforms to his own interpretation of Scripture, history and tradition. In other words, in choosing to become Catholic, he has simply chosen the ‘denomination’ that best conforms to his own interpretation of Scripture, tradition and history. Hence if Protestant confessions have no authority over the individual Protestant because Protestants select them on the basis of their conformity to their own interpretation of Scripture, then neither does the Catholic Church have any authority over the person who becomes Catholic, because Catholics select the Catholic Church on the basis of its agreement with their own interpretation of Scripture, history, and tradition. But if choosing the Catholic Church on the basis of one’s own interpretation of Scripture, history, and tradition does not undermine the authority of the Catholic Church, then neither does choosing a Protestant confession on the basis of one’s own interpretation of Scripture undermine that Protestant confession’s authority. In other words, just as the person becoming Catholic claims to have discovered that those in the magisterium of the Catholic Church are the successors of the Apostles, and thereby bearing divine authority, so the person adopting a Protestant confession believes he has discovered that this particular confession is in agreement with Scripture, and thus that this confession derives its authority from Scripture. But if picking a confession on the basis of its agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture entails that this confession has no authority over oneself, then picking the Catholic Church on the basis of its agreement with one’s own interpretation of history, tradition and Scripture entails that the Catholic Church has no authority over oneself. In short, the conclusion of the tu quoque objection is that either the Catholic Church likewise has no authority, or the Protestant confessions can truly have authority.
III. Reply
A. Deciding to become Catholic should involve study of Scripture, history and tradition.
Apart from a supernatural experience, ideally an adult would come to seek full communion with the Catholic Church only after a careful study of Church history, the Church Fathers, and Scripture. He would start with the Church in the first century at the time of the Apostles, and then trace the Church forward, decade by decade, to the present day. As he traced the Church forward through the centuries, he would encounter schisms from the Church (e.g. Novatians, Donatists). In each case he would note the criteria by which the party in schism was the one in schism from the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded, and not the other way around. By such a study, and by the help of the Holy Spirit, he would discover that the Catholic Church is the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded in the first century, and that has continued to grow throughout the world over the past two millennia. But as I will show below, this study of history, tradition and Scripture by which he discovers that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded does not entail that the Catholic Church has no more authority than a Protestant confession.
So why is discovering the Catholic Church through the study of history, Scripture and tradition not equivalent to discovering a confession that agrees with one’s own interpretation of Scripture, and how does the difference explain why the Catholic Church so discovered can remain authoritative while the Protestant confession cannot? The difference lies fundamentally neither in the discovery process nor in the evidence by which the discovery is made, even though those may be different. The difference lies fundamentally in the nature of that which is discovered.
B. The basis for the difference between the authority of Scripture and Protestant confessions
Consider why, for the Protestant, Scripture has more authority than any Protestant confession. Protestants and Catholics agree that “God is the author of Sacred Scripture. The divinely revealed realities, which are contained and presented in the text of Sacred Scripture, have been written down under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.”5 Scripture is θεόπνευστος (God-breathed), whereas a Protestant confession is a merely human interpretation of the written words of God. Scripture does not have its authority on the basis of our agreement with what it says; Scripture has its authority because of who said it, that is, because of its divine source. But no Protestant thinks that any Protestant confession has the very authority of Scripture. No Protestant thinks that a Protestant confession is itself the Word of God. Protestants recognize that confessions are subordinate to Scripture because they recognize that the activity of [mere, unauthorized] men who interpret Scripture in order to construct the confession makes the authority of that confession to be different from the authority of the Scripture it attempts to interpret and explain. Because every confession is made by human interpreters, and these human interpreters are neither divinely inspired nor divinely authorized, these confessions are therefore merely human artifacts, not anything to which all men must submit on account of their divine authority. Just as every systematic theology book is a product of mere men, so every Protestant confession is the product of mere men. Some might be better than others, but none binds the conscience, because the authors were mere men, as are we, without divine inspiration or divine authorization.
Even though every Protestant confession has Scripture as its material source (i.e. that from which its authors draw), yet for anything in the confession that is not an exact re-statement of Scripture itself, the more it has merely human judgment mixed within it, with no guarantee of divine protection from error, the more it is merely a human judgment, i.e. a human opinion. In other words, because Protestant confessions were crafted by mere humans not having divine authorization, to the degree they go beyond an exact re-statement of Scripture, they are essentially human opinion, and therefore have no more ecclesial authority than human opinion, even though their subject matter is the divine Word of God in written form. For this reason Protestant confessions have no more authority than any systematic theology book, even one written by a plurality of authors. This is why a Protestant confession has its ‘authority’ only on the basis of the individual’s agreement with its interpretation of Scripture, not because of who wrote that confession.6
Protestants recognize the difference in authority between Scripture and Protestant confessions because they recognize the difference in the respective authority of their sources.7 No Protestant confession has the authority to bind the conscience, precisely because no Protestant confession has divine authority; each has only human authority. Even Protestant confessions state that they cannot bind the conscience. The Westminster Confession of Faith states, “God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, in any thing, contrary to His Word; or beside it, if matters of faith, or worship.”8 And elsewhere, “All synods or councils, since the Apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.”9 If any Protestant confession had divine authority, it would necessarily bind the conscience of anyone who knew it to have divine authority. All Christians would be obligated by that Protestant confession’s divine authority to interpret Scripture according to the rule of faith provided in that particular Protestant confession.
If the Protestant finds his conscience bound to a particular interpretation of Scripture, and he finds that same interpretation of Scripture presented in a confession, then per accidens his conscience will be bound to that confession (or that part of that confession) not because of any intrinsic authority had by the confession, but because the confession happens to express the interpretation that he presently holds to be necessary and thus conscience-binding. If his conscience ceases to be bound by that particular interpretation, the confession no longer binds his conscience. This shows that the confession has no intrinsic authority; it is not the confession that is authoritative over his beliefs; rather, his present beliefs make the confession to be ‘authoritative,’ by containing the interpretation he presently believes to be required of himself.10 The confession has no interpretive authority, because the individual is not required to conform to the confession. The confession, if it is to be the individual’s confession, must conform to the individual’s interpretation. He picks this particular confession because it conforms to his interpretation; it does not oblige him to conform to it, or, once picked, to remain conformed to it. And that is why no Protestant confession has any actual authority. Each Protestant confession merely contains a distinct interpretation which some individuals happen to believe (or at one time happened to believe) is not only true but necessary, and thus, conscience-binding. For this reason, neither a Protestant confession nor parts of it can bind anyone’s conscience; at most it is merely a record of what some people find or have found in their reading of Scripture to be the only way they can in good conscience interpret Scripture.
C. The basis for the distinction between the authority of the Catholic Church and Protestant confessions.
What the person becoming Catholic discovers in his study of history, tradition and Scripture is not merely an interpretation. If what he discovered were merely an interpretation of history, tradition and Scripture, then what he discovered would have no more authority than any Protestant confession. If his discovery were merely an interpretation, it too would be merely a human opinion. The prospective Catholic finds in his study of history and tradition and Scripture something that does not have a merely human source, either from himself or from other mere humans not having divine authorization. He finds in the first, second and third (etc.) centuries something with a divine origin and with divine authority. He finds the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church and its magisterial authority in succession from the Apostles and from Christ. He does not merely find an interpretation in which the Church has apostolic succession; he finds this very same Church itself, and he finds it to have divine authority by a succession from the Apostles. In finding the Church he finds an organic entity nearly two thousand years old with a divinely established hierarchy preserving divine authority. The basis for the authority of the Church he finds is not its agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture, history or tradition. History, tradition and Scripture are means by which and through which He discovers the Church in reality. The Church he finds in history and in the present has its divine authority from Christ through the Apostles and the bishops by way of succession.
Herein lies the critical difference between the Church the inquirer finds in the centuries following Christ, and a Protestant confession. The former, like Scripture, has a divine origin and a divine authority, whereas the latter has a merely human origin and hence a merely human authority, just as any systematic theology book has a merely human origin and a human authority, even as it draws from and seeks to exposit Scripture. Whereas a Protestant confession cannot bind the conscience except per accidens, (i.e. unless one is already bound in conscience by the interpretation contained in that confession), a divinely authorized magisterium binds the conscience per se, that is, by the divine authority it has within itself.
Consider the following example. Jesus says:
“You search the Scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; it is these that testify about Me.” (John 5:39)
Through searching the Scriptures, the reader is not supposed to find only an interpretation of Christ. The one who searches the Scripture is supposed to discover, through the Scriptures, the second Person of the Divine Trinity. The reader of Scripture who discovers only interpretations of Scripture, but does not discover Christ, has not discovered that Person to whom Scripture points. Such a reader of Scripture already knows that Scripture has divine authority, but through Scripture he has not yet discovered anything greater in authority than himself. Through his reading of Scripture he is supposed to discover something (actually Someone) more authoritative than himself, and more authoritative than his own interpretation.
The tu quoque objection does not apply to the reader who through the Scriptures discovers Christ, because in discovering Christ such a reader is not picking as an ‘authority’ something that conforms to (or agrees with) his own interpretation of Scripture. Discovering Christ through the Scriptures differs altogether from picking a confession based on its agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture. In picking a Protestant confession the individual retains interpretive authority, for the reasons I explained above. But the reader who through the Scriptures discovers the Person of Christ has discovered something more than an interpretation; he has discovered a Divine Person, Someone having authority over himself, even interpretive authority over himself. Likewise, the person who reads history, tradition, and Scripture, and discovers the Church, has not merely discovered an interpretation, but has discovered something with a divine origin and hence with divine authority, and thus interpretive authority, even conscience-binding authority; he has discovered the Body of Christ.
Every interpretation of Scripture that is made by men-without-divine authorization is the product of mere-man, and thus has no divine authority over man. No such interpretation can bind the conscience. This is why no Protestant confession has actual authority. Even the prospective Catholic’s interpretation of Scripture, tradition and history has no divine authority as such. If the prospective Catholic had only an interpretation, and a confession that expressed that interpretation, his confession would have no actual authority, nor for that reason would any community of persons formed by like-minded individuals having only that shared interpretation and a corresponding confession, even if they called themselves a ‘church’ or ‘the Church.’ But if through and beyond his interpretation he discovers the actual Church that Christ founded, filled with the Holy Spirit and retaining divine authority through an unbroken succession from the Apostles, spanning through twenty centuries “terrible as an army with banners,” bearing the trophies [relics] of the apostles and martyrs, and spread out over all the whole world, then he has discovered something that isn’t merely human. He has discovered the divine society on earth, the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded, to which not only his interpretation but his whole life must submit and conform. Just as discovering Christ through the study of the Scriptures is not subject to the tu quoque objection, so for the same reason discovering the Body of Christ through the study of Scripture, tradition and history is not subject to the tu quoque. In both cases it is the same Christ he has discovered, in His physical body which has ascended into Heaven, or in His mystical body, the Church:
A reply of St. Joan of Arc to her judges sums up the faith of the holy doctors and the good sense of the believer: “About Jesus Christ and the Church, I simply know they’re just one thing, and we shouldn’t complicate the matter.” (CCC 795.)
The Protestant method of relating the Church to Scripture defines the Church not by way of divine authority from Christ handed down in succession from the Apostles, but by sufficient agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture.11 This method of defining ‘the Church’ by its very nature does not allow ‘the Church’ any authoritative role in adjudicating interpretive disagreements, because for each disputant, if ‘the Church’ rules against his interpretation, for him she ceases to be ‘the Church,’ and hence he need not submit to her. Therefore the possibility of the Church having any authority, even “ministerial authority,” requires that the Church not be defined by its agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture. In this way, defining ‘the Church’ by way of agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture is nothing less than an implicit denial of a visible catholic Church. If Christ intended His followers to be united in one faith in a visible catholic Church, and if there can be no such thing as a visible catholic Church simply by individual appeals to Scripture apart from the exercise of magisterial authority such as in ecumenical councils, then the Church cannot be defined by its agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture. In that case there has to be another way of locating the Church, if there is to be a visible catholic Church. And the only other way available is by a succession of magisterial authority from the Apostles.
III. Follow-up Questions & Answers
Q1. But doesn’t the Protestant also claim to have discovered the Church? If so, then why doesn’t Protestantism avoid the tu quoque in this same way?
A. Protestants do believe that they have discovered the Church, but by that they mean that they have discovered other persons who have faith in Christ, or a faith in Christ that is sufficiently similar to their own.12 They do not claim to have discovered apostolic authority in an unbroken succession of bishops coming from the Apostles. And that is why they do not believe that the Church they have discovered has divine authority or interpretive authority to which all Christians should submit. From a Protestant point of view, Scripture is the only divine authority in the Church, and that is why Protestants believe that only Scripture can bind the conscience. For this reason, given the Protestant conception of the Church, the Church cannot provide divine authorization to any interpretation of Scripture, history or tradition. The individual Protestant, on the basis of his own interpretation of Scripture, always retains veto authority over whatever his ecclesial community determines, even with its highest authority.13 Because what he refers to as ‘Church’ has no divine authority, the ‘Church’ he has discovered does not and cannot give his interpretation or confession divine authorization. That is why his situation is not like that of the Catholic. The individual Protestant himself remains his own highest interpretive authority, and the particular confession he has adopted (if he has adopted one) remains subject to his acceptance or rejection of it; it has no actual authority over him. The Catholic, by contrast, upon discovering the divine authority of the Catholic Church does not remain his own interpretive authority, and the Creed and doctrines he adopts, he adopts on the divine authority of the Church that has defined them, not on the basis of their agreement with his own interpretation of history, tradition and Scripture.
Q2. The Protestant claims to have discovered the gospel. Surely that has divine authority.
A. If by ‘gospel’ one is referring to passages from Scripture, then of course these have divine authority, because Scripture is God-breathed. But if by ‘gospel’ one is referring to [merely] human judgments or opinions regarding the meaning of these passages of Scripture, then these judgments, or interpretations, or opinions do not have divine authority and therefore are not conscience-binding. This is why Protestants themselves rightly recognize that no Protestant confession has the authority to bind the conscience; their confessions (insofar as they go beyond exact re-statements of Scripture) are merely judgments of men, not divinely authorized interpretations of Scripture. So for that reason, what Protestants refer to as ‘the gospel,’ insofar as it is not an exact re-statement of Scripture, has no more authority than a systematic theology text, being a merely human opinion.
Q3. There are multiple and competing claims to apostolic succession (e.g. Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, Coptic, etc.). Isn’t the person who picks one of them as the Church that Christ founded simply picking as a [seemingly] divine authority that institution that most closely conforms to his own interpretation of Scripture, history and tradition? And if so, how is he not exactly in the same situation as the Protestant who picks the confession that most closely conforms to his own interpretation of Scripture?
A. There are three theoretically possible errors here: (1) The inquirer could think that there is apostolic succession, when there is none. (2) The inquirer could think someone has authority in succession from the Apostles when in fact he doesn’t, but someone else does. (3) The inquirer could find someone who has Holy Orders in succession from the Apostles, but is in schism from the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded. However, the theoretical possibility of these three errors does not make the position of the person who discovers the magisterium of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded subject to the tu quoque. To see that, note that it is also possible to err by mistaking a false Messiah for the true Messiah. But the possibility of mistaking a false messiah for the true Messiah does not entail that the true Messiah cannot be discovered, or that in discovering the true Messiah one has merely discovered an interpretation of Scripture. Likewise, the three theoretically possible errors just listed do not entail that the magisterium of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded cannot be discovered, or that this magisterium is just an interpretation, or that the basis for its authority is its agreement with the inquirer. Just as the Messiah is not an interpretation, so lines of succession from the Apostles are not interpretations. And just as the Messiah has His divine authority from Himself, and not from any agreement between Himself and the one who discovers Him, so likewise, the magisterium of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded has its authority in succession from Christ through the succession from the Apostles, not from any agreement between itself and the one who discovers it. So while the inquirer must use his own reasoning and judgment to interpret Scripture, history, and tradition, and while he may err in doing so, this does not entail that through his inquiry he cannot discover something [outside the text] bearing divine authority. And for the reasons explained above, if through his inquiry he discovers something [outside the text] bearing divine authority, his position is not subject to the tu quoque.
Q4. But isn’t the person who becomes Catholic using his own private judgment just like the Protestant?
A. We cannot but use our own intellect and will in interpreting evidence, drawing conclusions, discovering truths, and making decisions. In that respect, inquirers who eventually become Protestant or Catholic start in the same epistemic situation, using their own intellect and will to find the truth through the evidence available to them. Using our intellect and will in coming to believe something is not what makes the Protestant confession to be without divine authority, nor is it what makes the Catholic’s faith in the Catholic Church not subject to the tu quoque objection. What makes a Protestant confession to be without authority is that it is a product of merely human minds, minds without divine authorization, as they sought to interpret and explain the Scriptures. The Catholic Church, by contrast, is not the product of men-lacking-divine authorization. The Catholic Church was founded by Christ Himself, who is God. The Catholic Church’s divine authority was handed down to us from Christ by the Apostles whom He authorized, and then by bishops whom they authorized, down to this present day. With the help of the Holy Spirit, the inquirer who uses his intellect and will to examine history, tradition and Scripture, discovers this divinely founded entity bearing divine authority, and at that point submits to it. His own interpretation has no divine authority. But he discovers something beyond his own interpretation, something to which his own interpretation points, and which does have divine authority. He discovers the Church. The Protestant can understand this in some sense, because in discovering Scripture the Protestant too has discovered something having divine authority, even while using his own intellect and will.
Q5. What about the person who becomes Catholic because the Catholic Church teaches his own interpretation of Scripture? How is such a person not in the same epistemic situation as the Protestant?
A. He is in the same epistemic situation as the Protestant. If a person becomes a Catholic on the basis that (and hence condition that) the Catholic Church shares his own interpretation of Scripture, he is not truly a Catholic at heart; he is still a Protestant at heart. One does not rightly become a Catholic on the ground that one happens to believe at present all the doctrines that the Church teaches. That approach is a form of rationalism, not fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding). One rightly becomes a Catholic by an act of faith in which one believes all that the Catholic Church teaches, even if not fully understanding it, on the ground of the apostolic authority of the Church’s magisterium.14 When we are received into the Catholic Church, we say before the bishop, “I believe and profess all that the holy Catholic Church believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God.” We are not saying that we just happen to believe Catholic doctrines. We are not merely reporting our present mental state viz-a-viz Catholic doctrine. We are making a confession of faith, an act of the will whereby we are submitting to the apostolic authority of the Church regarding what it is that she “believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God” on the ground of her magisterial authority in succession from the Apostles whom Christ Himself appointed and sent. We believe in Christ through believing those sent and authorized by Him and His Apostles, as they teach and explain the deposit of faith entrusted to them by Christ. “Faith seeking understanding” is possible only where submission is required, but submission is not required wherever the identity and nature of the Church is determined and defined by one’s own interpretation of Scripture.15
Q6. If tomorrow the magisterium of the Catholic Church definitively proclaimed that Jesus was actually a mere prophet, not the Son of God, and did not die on a cross, you would not believe those teachings or submit to them. Doesn’t this show that you too only submit when you agree, and that therefore, you are your own interpretive authority, just like the Protestant?
A. The question presupposes that the magisterium of the Church could do such a thing. But part of the dogma of the Catholic Church is precisely that the magisterium of the Church cannot possibly do such a thing, cannot overturn or oppose any dogma of the faith. So the question presupposes the falsity of that Catholic dogma, and in that respect is question-begging, just as the question “If Jesus had sinned, would you still follow Him?” is a question-begging question for Christians, because Christians believe that the Son of God cannot possibly sin. Individual bishops can and do fall into heresy and schism. But Catholic faith includes the belief that the magisterium of the universal Church cannot do so. Orthodoxy and heresy are determined objectively by the magisterium of the universal Church, not ultimately by the individual’s interpretation. The authority of the magisterium in infallibly defining doctrines preserves those doctrines until Christ returns, because the Church has no authority to reverse or overturn what she has already defined with her full authority. So if a particular bishop were to teach contrary to what the magisterium of the Church has infallibly defined, the Catholic faithful should in that case remain true to the magisterium, and not follow the heretical bishop. That is not making oneself a higher authority than the bishop; it is remaining faithful to the still more authoritative visible magisterium of the universal Church.
Q7. Keith Mathison claimed that all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretation of Scripture. You claim that someone who becomes Catholic, after personal study of Scripture, tradition and history, discovers not merely an interpretation, but apostolic succession. How would you respond to the claim that all appeals to Scripture, tradition and history are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, tradition and history? And if all appeals to Scripture, tradition and history are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, tradition and history, then aren’t you being inconsistent in granting that the prospective Catholic can discover Apostolic Succession itself, while denying that the Protestant can discover the objective truth of “justification by extrinsic imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness” in Scripture?
A. The idea behind Keith’s claim is that when we appeal to a passage of Scripture to support a position or claim, we assume a particular interpretation of that passage. We interpret it within a web of beliefs that we bring to it, a paradigm, if you will. That’s no less true when we appeal to the writings of the Church Fathers, and to tradition and history. But that does not mean that we have no access to reality and can only access the interpretations present to our minds.16 Through his interpretation of Scripture, history and tradition the prospective Catholic discovers something other than his interpretation. His interpretation exists in his mind, but the practice of apostolic succession exists in the extra-mental world, not just in his mind. The bishops and their relations to the Apostles are not interpretations that exist in the prospective Catholic’s mind; the bishops are real, flesh-and-blood men, and there is a real, historical, organic and sacramental continuity between them and the previous generation of bishops, and between those bishops and the generation of bishops before them, and so on, extending all the way back to the divinely-authorized Apostles. Even if a Protestant thinks there is no such thing as apostolic succession, he can acknowledge that if there is such a thing as apostolic succession, it exists extra-mentally. By contrast, “justification by extrinsic imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness” is not a statement found in Scripture, but an interpretation of various statements within Scripture. This interpretation of Scripture brings a nominalistic conception of justification to the text of Scripture. That is one reason why “justification by extrinsic imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness,” whether true or false, is an interpretation of the text. In order not to be an interpretation of the text, it would have to exist extra-mentally, i.e. be explicitly stated by the text of Scripture. But it is nowhere explicitly stated in Scripture; it is an interpretation of Scripture. Because it is an interpretation of Scripture, and because it is an interpretation made by mere men without divine authorization, it has no divine authority, whether or not some people write it down as part of a confession. And that is why the Protestant position is subject to the authority argument while the Catholic position is not subject to the tu quoque objection.
May Christ by His Spirit make us one in the truth, and one in His Church. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.
- See, for example, the section of the article Neal and I wrote last Fall, titled “The Delusion of Derivative Authority.” More recently I have offered some comments on two Green Baggins threads; see my comments #78 and following in Leithart “potentially” Out of Accord, and see the comments under Determining the Doctrine of the Church. Two years ago, I wrote, “Michael Brown on Sola Scriptura or Scriptura Solo.” [↩]
- See “The Alternative to Painting a Magisterial Target Around One’s Interpretive Arrow.” [↩]
- That can also be shown by the fact that any group of heretics (e.g. Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites, etc.) could make a confession that agreed with their own interpretation of Scripture, and no such confession would be authoritative. So agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture is not sufficient to make a creed or confession authoritative. [↩]
- I’m not here speaking of ‘club authority,’ i.e. “If you want to be a member of our club, you must subscribe to this confession.” I’m speaking of catholic ecclesial authority, i.e. something to which all Christians everywhere should submit, and by which our interpretation of Scripture should be guided. [↩]
- CCC 105. [↩]
- The authors of Protestant confessions did not have divine authorization because they did not have Holy Orders. Protestants do not claim that the men who wrote the various Protestant confessions received divine authorization to do so. Nor do Protestants believe that the authority of any Protestant confession depends upon the authors of that confession having received divine authorization to do so. [↩]
- If a Protestant confession were divinely authorized, then Protestants (and all Christians) would be obligated to interpret Scripture in accordance with that confession, and could not take exceptions to the confession or adopt another confession, except by an act of rebellion against its authority or utter ignorance of its authority. If two or more Protestant confessions had divine authority, then they could not disagree with each other, because there is one God, and God cannot contradict Himself. [↩]
- Westminster Confession of Faith, XX.2. [↩]
- Westminster Confession of Faith, XXX.3. [↩]
- I put ‘authoritative’ in single quotes, because the confession, in such a case, is no more authoritative than a systematic theology text or tract or magazine that happens to state the interpretation the individual presently holds to be necessary. [↩]
- See my “The Tradition and the Lexicon,” and IV.A. of “Solo Scriptura, Sola Scriptura and the Question of Interpretive Authority.” [↩]
- For example, the Westminster Confession of Faith states, “The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation, as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children.” (WCF XXV.2) [↩]
- E.g. a general assembly of his denomination. [↩]
- See “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation of Faith to the Church.” [↩]
- This is also why ‘cafeteria Catholics,’ i.e. those who pick and choose from the Church’s teaching, are at least in a state of [material] heresy, and are in grave danger of being in a state of formal heresy, and thus not having faith at all. [↩]
- The two epistemic errors on each side of the truth are first, that we do not interpret reality and second, that we cannot know reality, because we only have interpretations. [↩]
Bryan:
Before I go to bed, I just wanted to say that this is excellent. I will take up a few of your arguments at my own blog, where I plan a post on Newman’s doctrine of conscience. Of course, if the Reformed guys at places like Triablogue and Green Baggins takes note of your post, we will end up having some intricate epistemological debates. I say: bring it on!
Best,
Mike
[...] ~ The Tu Quoque, Called to Communion [...]
Bryan,
I’ve noticed something that Catholics do all the time, which is refer to their own position as something that they “discovered,” “found,” “encountered,” or “realized.” I’m sure you can see just how that kind of thing sounds to those you’re trying to convince and/or convert, right? It’d be like me saying, “When I really rolled up my sleeves and did the research, I discovered that 9/11 was actually a huge insurance scam. You can imagine how surprised I was to find this to be the case, but once I realized that the twin towers were demolished on purpose, I had no choice but to submit to the facts that the incontrovertible evidence support.”
It’s question-begging, is what I’m saying.
The citation above assumes what it’s trying to prove. There are loads of brilliant scholars who have spent decades studying the fathers and have reached diametrically opposite conclusions than you have reached. How do you know that you have discovered truth while they are merely (mis)interpreting data? So in a certain sense I agree with you—if the Catholic church is what Rome says it is, then you’d better believe that we Protestants are culpable for not discovering this by our study of Scripture and tradition. But that’s the question: Is the CC what it says it is, or isn’t it?
But to say that you avoid the tu quoque because your study didn’t result in an interpretation of the data, but a “discovery” of the truth is just another way of saying that you agree with yourself (which seems to be what you fault us for).
I’ll suggest a thought-experiment: How would you respond to an Orthodox believer who made the exact same argument as you have made, using the exact same words and everything, but what he claims to have “discovered” is that the Petrine primacy was actually a perversion of the original deposit of faith and not a development of it?
Jason,
My purpose in this post is not to demonstrate or prove that the Catholic Church is what Catholics believe she is. My purpose in this post is only to show why the Catholic’s claim to have discovered the Church Christ founded is not subject to the tu quoque objection. Modernists claim that Christ is a human construct. In order to explain to a modernist how the discovery of Christ [as the second Person of the Trinity] is not subject to the tu quoque, I have to ask the modernist not to beg the question by assuming that the Christian’s claim [about Christ's deity] comes entirely from within the Christian as a human construct, but could possibly be divine revelation. Similarly in order to explain to a Protestant how the Catholic’s discovery of the Catholic Church as the Church that Christ founded is not subject to the tu quoque, I have to ask the Protestant not to beg the question by assuming that the Catholic’s claim [about the Catholic Church being the Church Christ founded] is a mere construct or interpretation. Whether or not the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded is a question we can debate another day. To follow my argument here (in this post), you don’t need to assume (or agree) that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded. But if you assume a priori that the Catholic’s (or Orthodox) claim to have discovered the Church that Christ founded is a mere interpretation and nothing more, then you won’t be able to see why the Catholic (or Orthodox) position is not subject to the tu quoque.
If my purpose in this post were to show the Catholic Church to be the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded, then you would be completely right that my argument in this post begs the question, i.e. assumes precisely what is in question between Protestants and Catholics. My post would also, in that case, beg the question between Catholics and Orthodox. The argument that I’m giving in this post explains why both the Catholic and Orthodox claims are not subject to the tu quoque. So, in short, my purpose in this post is not to show that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded, but only to show why the tu quoque does not apply to the person who becomes Catholic. So I’m assuming that for the sake of argument the reader is capable of seeing (generally) the Catholic (or Orthodox) claim on its own terms.
As for showing that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded, that’s not what this post aims to show. But I began to present an answer to that question here, but only got as far as the early ninth century.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan,
Look, I agree that the nature of what you have submitted to is different from that to which I have submitted, and that once the Catholic converts he surrenders the interpretive authority which the Protestant retains. I get that, honest.
But there still seems to be a naïveté on the part of the Catholic (or Orthodox) who insists that, when he goes back to the early church, he is simply discovering an objective fact rather than reaching a conclusion based on interpretation of data. There are hosts of questions that need to be answered once we finish reading the 37-volume Early Church Fathers set, but the way you present the case, it looks like you think that Catholic ecclesiology is as obvious as the expectation that Shakespeare’s King Lear will have a king in it called “Lear.”
So it seems to me that you are every bit as subject to the tu quoque as we are, at least when it comes to the most critical moment of all, namely, the interpretation of the raw data.
I may be helpful to distinguish two different times, T1 and T2, and discuss the issue of whether/how Protestants and Catholics are their own interpretive authority at those two times. Here’s what I mean. We’ll refer to T1 as that time referenced in Question 4 of Bryan’s article.
T1 = the moment at which one exercises one’s will, as that will is informed by one’s own interpretation of the data via the intellect to decide whether to be a Catholic or (a certain denomination of) Protestant.
T2 = any moment after T1
In Answer 4, Bryan seems to agree both the Protestant and the Catholic are in the same boat at T1: “We cannot but use our own intellect and will in interpreting evidence, drawing conclusions, discovering truths, and making decisions. In that respect, inquirers who eventually become Protestant or Catholic start in the same epistemic situation, using their own intellect and will to find the truth through the evidence available to them.”
The whole debate, it seems to me, is about T1. And once we agree that, at T1, both parties are in the same boat, that seems to be the end of the debate. What am I missing here?
JJS:
That criticism would only be apt if Bryan were trying to prove Catholicism to be true. But he has said, and you’ve acknowledged that he’s said, that he is not. The problem here, I suspect, is that you’re not attending to another key distinction he’s relying on.
Prior to the assent of faith in the Catholic Church’s claims for herself, the most that the sincere, objective, but uncommitted inquirer can do is study the dataset and reach an opinion about which version of Christianity it best supports. If one forms the opinion that the dataset best supports the claims of the Catholic Church for herself, then one has good reason to make the assent of faith in them. Even so, that is not the same as intellectual compulsion, as though one could only hold such an opinion as something perfectly obvious. The assent is a free choice which, as such, is not compelled by the dataset itself or by any particular interpretation of it. Yet, once said assent is made, one cannot but see the dataset as making said assent more reasonable than the alternatives. For by making the assent, one has ipso facto adopted what is, in effect, a hermeneutical paradigm (HP) within which all the relevant data are altogether explicable in Catholic terms. Prior to the assent of faith, the Catholic HP only appears as one opinion among others that also have a certain plausibility; after the assent, the Catholic HP can no longer appear just as an opinion, but as a way of understanding the dataset that, in certain areas, is divinely protected from error. That’s what it means to adopt the Catholic HP.
Everything I’ve said in the above paragraph is autobiographical as well as expository: I was once just such an inquirer as I’ve hypothesized, until I decided to assent by faith to the Catholic Church’s claims for herself. And the decision I’ve described points up the essential difference between the Catholic and Protestant HPs—a difference which you recognize, but whose significance you don’t seem to appreciate.
A Protestant as such always reserves to himself the right to judge the orthodoxy of something called “the Church” (in light of Scripture and whatever he also takes to be normative) even when he has joined what he takes to be either “the” Church or some branch thereof. Choosing to be Catholic means surrendering that putative right. If and when one comes to see the Catholic Church as the Church, and makes the corresponding assent of faith in her claims for herself, then one has chosen to have one’s orthodoxy is measured by her teaching, not vice-versa. Accordingly, a Catholic cannot see the definitive teaching of the Church as just one set of opinions over against others; nor can he see “Rome” as just one denomination or sect among others. Choosing to be Catholic means abjuring the very idea that religion is a matter of opinion, because choosing to be Catholic means joining what one has come to see as the Body of Christ, sharing in his teaching authority as her head through the bishops in apostolic succession, and thus as divinely protected from error when teaching with her full authority.
Accordingly, the key premise of Bryan’s argument in the above post is, in effect, that the object of Catholic assent is fundamentally different in kind from the object of Protestant assent, even if the process of inquiry leading up to the assent is otherwise very similar in form and diligence. To put it in succinct technical form: the terminus ad quem is radically different even when the terminus a quo is the same. The terminus ad quem here is ecclesial infallibility, which is the pivotal feature of the Catholic HP, and requires as a correlate that some visible body is “the” Church outside of which there is no salvation. If and when one adopts that HP, then one is committed to rejecting any interpretation of the data that would falsify the Catholic Church’s claims for herself. That is the stance which various Reformed critics are reacting against when they accuse Catholics like Bryan and me of “presuppositionalism” and of trying to make Catholicism “unfalsifiable.” What such critics take to be the intellectually respectable alternative to our stance as Catholics is tantamount to treating religion as ultimately just a matter of opinion; for on the Protestant HP, nobody’s teaching or profession of faith is admitted as infallible, hence all are provisional and open to future revision—by the individual, if not by the institution itself.
All this is why the tu quoque rebuttal is inapt. The difference is that Catholics as such refuse to treat everything as a matter of opinion.
Best,
Mike
Ryan,
The important thing is the difference in objectivity of the criteria used to make such decisions. Yes, both Catholics and Protestants used their intellect to decide, but they didn’t use the same criteria and hence are not in the same epistemological boat. Catholics use an objective criteria of Apostolic Succession but Protestants use a subjective criteria of ‘whoever agrees with my interpretation of Scripture.’
That’s why the “you too” argument doesn’t work. No, not us too. We don’t join whichever Church conforms to our interpretation of Scripture. We join whichever Church is objectively the same institution (per Apostolic Succession) as the one that Christ founded and then we conform our interpretation of Scripture to that Church. That’s what we believe. If you say “Apostolic Succession is false” then that’s a legitimate claim and we can debate it. But then it means we’re wrong about our objective criteria, not that we’re in the same epistemic boat and hence subject to the same criticism.
Bryan,
I enjoyed reading your post. It does address head-on some of the questions that many Protestants have. Now allow me to ask a small question, again a “thought experiment.” I am NOT asking you to elaborate on why the RCC is right and the EO are wrong here…this is purely for the sake of argument.
Following your logic, your claim that the RCC is exempt from the “you too!” argument would apply equally to any institution claiming to be the one, true Church descending from the Apostles by succession. The pure logic of the matter applies to the RCC, the EO, the OO, and conceivably could apply even to something like Mormonism…and I am not comparing Rome to Salt Lake City…just saying the logic applies :-)
So the seeker uses his intellect, hopefully prayerfully, seeking the genuine leading of the Spirit into all truth. Should he become Protestant, he has submitted himself to an institution that instructs him on the one hand to submit to its authority, but on the other hand, only insofar as it agrees with his interpretation of Scripture. In essence it’s telling him to submit, but not really. He always has the escape hatch…his eye is forever on the exit, in case he finds that one silver bullet that makes him realize that Methodists have been right all along, and Calvinists were actually in error.
OK, so let’s say that instead he “discovers” the RC or EO Church. By your logic he is now submitting to an institution claiming divine authority–this is fundamentally different from the Protestant’s position, and with your reasoning here, I agree. Now I find it is often the case that many evangelicals who become RC do so in total ignorance of what the EO teaches, or even that it exists beyond the local Greek festival. Let’s say that a year after “discovering” the RC Church, this new Catholic convert realizes there’s a branch of Christianity he’s been unaware of. If he’s truly submitted to the RC Magisterium, he can really only examine it to learn how and where it’s in error. He can in no sense be open to the possibility that he’s missed something along the way, or that he’s made the wrong selection. He has no option to act on the new information. Were he to be open to the possibility, then his eye is back on the exit and he isn’t truly submitting to Rome. Were he to remain closed, then would this not be entirely intellectually dishonest?
And of course this scenario would be exactly identical in reverse–for the EO believer who studies RC doctrine and writings. In both cases, the believer has already submitted to an authority that will tell him that his current choice is right, and all others are not.
If we saw a Mormon believer doing exactly this, we’d probably smack our collective foreheads and say “How can he be so closed-minded? He won’t even look honestly at the evidence!” Yet he would merely be consistent, right?
So I would have to conclude that, so long as we seek to be intellectually honest, and so long as we remain human, we can never fully escape the reality that on *some* level we continue to submit to our own best judgment based on available evidence, as well as subjective experience.
Your thoughts?
JJS,
(as I was writing this, I see that Michael said some similar things – but here goes anyway)
You said:
I would like to re-cast your scenario in an alternate light, and then offer a some thoughts.
A first century re-make of your dilemma:
“There are loads of brilliant [rabbinic] scholars who have spent decades studying the fathers [law and the prophets] and have reached diametrically opposite conclusions than you [disciples of Jesus] have reached. How do you know that you have discovered truth while they are merely (mis)interpreting data? So in a certain sense I agree with you—if Jesus is who he says he is, then you’d better believe that we scribes and Pharisees are culpable for not discovering this by our study of Scripture and tradition. But that’s the question: Is this Jesus Christ who he says he is, or isn’t he?”
Would you or any Protestant view the “first century” version of this dilemma as a valid self defense on the part of the Jewish religious leadership for refusing to recognize the personal authority (and therefore the teaching authority) of Jesus Christ – the Messiah? I am going to wager, that for most Protestants, the answer is no. But why no? The Jewish religious leaders did seem to espouse a theoretically plausible “interpretation” of the “data” – an interpretation that would seem to make an accusation of irrationality or “obvious” ill-will seem too harsh a criticism against them. On the other hand, Jesus Himself explicitly states that the law and prophets all bear witness to Him. Likewise, on the road to Emmaus, we are told how He “opened up the scriptures to them”. Likewise, the entire early apologetic for the fact that Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ rested upon a similar “macro” interpretation of the OT scriptural data (Peter’s sermon in acts, Stephen’s sermon at his martyrdom, etc). In fact, this “macro” apologetic informs the thinking of the earliest fathers (I think it was Irenaeus who said that wisdom consists in knowledge of the number and meaning of the covenants).
So here we have one set of data with at least two alternate (and crucially divergent) interpretations. Consider how similar this situation is to that which separates Catholics and Protestants. Catholics claim to see clear evidence in scripture and tradition for the special authority of the apostles, and Peter in particular. Moreover, they claim to see clear evidence that such authority was meant to be passed on. Catholics look at the OT, NT, and patristic data and see strong evidence that Jesus was primarily in the business of establishing a Church – a new covenant family designed to incorporate, reconstitute and expand the old covenant family – a visible, historical family capable of enduring the storms of history due to His endowment of both His personal authority and His Spirit. In short, Catholics see the Church as a living “Spirit-filled” reality (the Body of Christ) – the very means established by Christ to communicate the gospel. In that sense, the Church (the covenant family) herself constitutes an irreducible aspect of the gospel itself. This is, of course, why Catholics have such a high view of the Church – because she is understood to be a supernatural reality – both historically and in the here and now. Protestants study the same data set with apparent sincerity; yet claim to see no evidence that Christ established such a historical, supernatural reality, as the Catholic Church claims to be.
So we are left at an impasse:
Your version:
My version:
How does one bridge the gap between alternate interpretations of the data and the recognizable content of “de fide”? I think the short answer is “by an act of faith”! And here I think is the crux of the matter. What is an “act of faith”? For a Catholic, an act of faith is an “assent of the mind and will” to truths “known to be true” based upon the authority of the one making the truth claims. Faith “AS THE ASSENT OF FAITH” is not PRIMARILY predicated upon the rational plausibility or explanatory power of an interpretive account of a data set. However, it is never contrary to a rational interpretation of the data (as the Catholic position is not) That is why “faith” is never a “leap of faith” – faith is never fidiestic. As such then, supernatural faith (or lack thereof) is an assent to (or rejection of) some authority claiming to possess supernatural truths which, by definition, exceed the reach of unaided reason.
This was the case with Christ in the first century. There were two competing interpretations of the data – yes. BUT there was something more. There was a living confrontation with someone making an authority claim (either Christ himself, or His “authorized” apostles). In addition to the OT data, Christ performed miracles and even rose from the dead. Yet even these events – as events – do not rationally FORCE the conclusion that Jesus was “the Christ, the son of the living God” (some thought He was Elijah or one of the prophets, etc). Belief in Christ’s divinity, or status as Messiah, goes beyond the data (notice that it does no violence to the data – it is not unreasonable to believe that a man raised from the dead might be the son of God – its just not reasonably “inescapable”). The assent of faith is required in order to embrace the additional (i.e. “added” to that which reason can know by itself) supernatural truth about Christ’s identity which the scriptures and the events of Christ life point to – but do not force upon the mind and will. Moreover, it was precisely Christ’s claim to supernatural authority which forced the issue with regard to assent or rejection. Christ (or Christ through the apostles) forced the Jewish leadership to make a decision. Statements such as: “I am the way, the truth and the life” or “I and the Father are one” or “I am the door”, etc simply forced a decision with regard to WHO Jesus was. That decision constitutes the basic distinction between the terms “believer” and “unbeliever”. Thus, the first century Jewish religious leader was faced with one data set, two rational interpretations, AND a Person claiming divine authority and insisting that a choice be made – acceptance or rejection of said authority by an assent of faith or lack thereof (belief or unbelief)
The same situation pertains with regard to the Catholic Church. The Church makes quite astounding claims (claims – which if untrue – are the most arrogant imaginable). Someone looking into Catholic / Protestant issues is faced with one data set, (at least) two rational interpretations AND a Church claiming divine authority and insisting that a choice be made – – acceptance or rejection of Christ’s authority in the Magisterium by an assent of faith or lack thereof (belief or unbelief). Again, the data does not FORCE the conclusion that the Church is an organic, supernatural, indefectible reality – but neither does the data do violence to that supposition (indeed a Catholic would claim that the Catholic interpretation is THE best interpretation of all the data). An assent of faith is called for in order to embrace (beyond – but not against – the dictates of reason) an understanding of the Catholic Church as a divine, rather than merely human institution. This is why in the Nicene Creed we find the following:
We believe in God the Father almighty maker of heaven and earth. . . . . .
We believe in Jesus Christ the only son of the Father . . . . .
We believe in The Holy Spirit the Lord the Giver of Life . . . .
We believe in one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church . . . .
The Church is part of the deposit of faith. She is “something to BELIEVE in”, because she is the mystical body of Christ. She is tangible, both historically AND in the here and now. She makes claims, she calls for a decision, she confronts the person with a choice – just as her founder, Jesus, did. That is why, for me, one of the most potent portions of Byran’s article is the following:
.
In this way, the Catholic Church’s very existence is a kind of apologetic that calls for a response.
Pax et Bonum,
-Ray
Tim,
Thanks for your response. I’m still not seeing point though. It seems like we’re not all talking about the same thing. Let me modify a portion of your comment in such a way that my question is more clear:
“[Catholics] don’t join whichever Church conforms to our interpretation of Scripture [or history or Tradition]. [At T1] we join whichever Church is [the one our interpretation of those three things tells us to be] objectively the same institution (per Apostolic Succession) as the one that [we believe] Christ founded and then [at T2] we conform our interpretation of Scripture [and history and Tradition] to that Church.”
The Protestant joins (or chooses not to join) a given church at T1 in same way as the prospective Catholic chooses to become Catholic in the above, modified quote. The Catholic’s decision at T1, requires the decisions at T2 that are indicated above. I agree that a Protestant will have a hard time maintaining that he does the same as the Catholic at T2 above. But how does that diffuse the tu quoque? Bryan’s post seems to indicate that, at least at T1, things are the same for Protestant and prospective Catholic.
The *process* by which one becomes Catholic or (some variation of) Protestant at T1 is identical. (This is my point. I’m happy to be corrected here, if I’m missing something). If one becomes Catholic at T1, then that’ll some consequences “downstream” at T2 that the Protestant can’t plausibly say he has. “Private judgment” seems inevitable in some sense of that term.
Jason,
Here is a photo of the inside of the Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) church in what is present-day Iznik, Turkey, the city that used to be called Nicaea. Right in this building the seventh ecumenical council met at the end of the eighth century, to decide the issue of iconoclasm.
This is also the location of the first ecumenical council. During those eight centuries, it was not difficult to determine where is the Catholic Church. Yes, there were schisms from the Church (e.g. Novatians and Donatists). But even the common person on the street could tell you which church in any city was the Catholic Church. Figuring out which was the Catholic Church did not require reading 37 volumes of Church Fathers. Just a cursory perusal of the Fathers indicates that they and the whole world were quite aware of the location and identity of the Catholic Church. This is why St. Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem in the fourth century, could write:
Such a statement wouldn’t make sense if there was widespread confusion or uncertainty about the location and identity of the Catholic Church. At the very beginning of the second century St. Ignatius writes about the authority of the bishops, priests, and deacons, in all his epistles. In one place he says that “all who belong to God and Jesus Christ are with the bishop. And those, too, will belong to God who have returned, repentant, to the unity of the Church so as to live in accordance with Jesus Christ. Make no mistake brethren. No one who [knowingly] follows another into schism inherits the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9). ” (Letter to the Philadelphians) In another letter he writes, “No [Christian] who acts apart from the bishop and the priests and the deacons has a clear conscience.” (Letter to the Trallians) Toward the end of the second century St. Irenaeus writes, “But it is also necessary to hold in suspicion others who depart from the primitive succession, and assemble themselves together in any place whatsoever.” (Against Heresies, 4.26) Such statements presuppose a clarity regarding the identity of the Catholic bishop in each city.
In the third century, St. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage wrote:
In another letter he wrote:
And in his On the Unity of the Catholic Church he wrote:
St. Hilary (also a fourth century bishop and doctor of the Church) wrote:
St. Augustine states,
And elsewhere he wrote:
And again:
It was clear to all these Church Fathers where was the Church that Christ founded. It was the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church, to which they belonged, and which they shepherded. If a particular group was cut off from the rest of the Church, it was not Catholic. Catholicity is an essential mark of the Church that Christ founded. And that’s the relation between catholicity and the infallibility of the ecumenical councils. For the Fathers, ‘Catholic’ isn’t fundamentally a name; it is a quality of the Church that Christ founded. That is because if a person thinks he knows better than the universal Church in ecumenical council, he is denying the catholicity of the Church. To deny the infallibility of the councils is to deny catholicity as a mark of the Church, which is to deny that line of the Nicene Creed.
So if someone believes that the Catholic Church that convened the seventh ecumenical (and met in the Aya Sofya pictured above) was not the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church, then my immediate question to such a person would be, “Then at the end of the eighth century / early ninth century, which Church was the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church? How did it go from being a visible catholic Church in the fourth century, to being an invisible catholic Church in the early ninth century? If a person cannot locate the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church in the early ninth century, then he needs to explain at what point the visible catholic Church disappeared, how he knows this, and how he knows that his particular present-day sect (or group of sects) is the continuation of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded before it dropped off the radar of history. I don’t think that restorationists (e.g. Mormons, Campbellites, etc.) have the default position; in my opinion, they have the burden of proof. (cf. Ecclesial deism article.) That’s why I’m still waiting for Keith’s answer to this question.
(sorry for the gang-pile — know that it is a charitable gang-pile :-)
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
BT (#9):
Not to pre-empt Tim, but I think I already answered that question in my #7, and I’m sure that Tim would agree with me.
Best,
Mike
Sorry, I meant Bryan, not Tim. Since Ryan is addressing to Tim essentially the same objection that you’re addressing to Bryan, I got confused.
Michael (re. 13),
While you referenced a comment by someone other than me, you seem to be responded to one of my comments. I read your #7, and I’m still not seeing it. I’d really like to understand this because, to me, this is the critical issue in RC v. Protestant issues.
I’d like to see someone formulate the precise RC claim that is at issue in Bryan’s post in a short, syllogistic manner. That might help get at what’s being claimed here and whether the tu quoque applies.
In your #7, your wrote:
Sometimes I think that we might just have to deal with the kind of uncertainty you describe at the end of your quote. If at T1, the Catholic assents to a position that, at T2, enables them to appeal to infallibility, certainty, etc. then some real epistemological gains are made (assuming Catholicism is true). And that parenthetical seems to be the whole ballgame: Catholics only escape the tu quoque if Catholicism is true. Would you agree with that last statement?
BT, (re: #9)
I wish I had included your question in my list of questions at the end of the post. Your question requires a little explanation of the relationship between faith and reason, which, as I mentioned in passing in the Wilson vs. Hitchens post (and in this podcast), belongs to the more general category of the relation between grace and nature. There I wrote, “faith is to reason what grace is to nature.” Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. So, likewise, faith does not destroy or squelch reason, but perfects, illumines, and elevates it. Faith therefore does not cut off or block reason’s pursuit of the truth. The two errors on both sides of the truth here are rationalism on the one hand, and fideism on the other. Rationalism does not recognize a higher authority than one’s own reason. Fideism, by contrast, makes grace destroy nature by squelching or suppressing the pursuit of truth through reason. Genuine faith is neither destroyed by reason nor destroys reason, because the true God we love and pursue is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. The only two other options are the rationalism that denies the possibility of sacred revelation, or the fideism which amounts to a kind of Manichean dualism with respect to truth (i.e. there is good truth and evil truth, or there is true truth and false truth).
So our submission to the divinely authorized magisterium depends on the truth that this magisterium is in fact divinely authorized, just as a Protestant’s faith in what the Bible teaches always depends on the truth that the Bible is the word of God written. Cults (in that manipulative sense of the term) often take the fideistic path, by forbidding their members from investigating the authority of the cult. That’s not the epistemic state of the Catholic. Our submission to the Catholic magisterium does not shut us off from the possibility of inquiring into the basis for the authority of the Catholic magisterium. It can’t. Our entire submission to the magisterium is based on it being actually divinely authorized. This is why there can be (and are) so many Catholic universities. But our continuing openness to the pursuit of truth through reason doesn’t make us rationalists, nor does it mean that we are not really submitting to the Church’s magisterium. Our submission is first to God, who is Truth, and who has revealed Himself in His Son, through the Church. And therefore, our submission to the Church is based on the Church truly being what and who she claims to be, the Church that Christ founded.
So the kind of investigation you refer to (examining the Orthodox) is something a Catholic (as Catholic) can do. We can’t just assume that the first claim to magisterial authority we have bumped into is necessarily the right one. But that doesn’t mean that we must remain subordinate to no one, lest we someday happen to come across the real one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church. Nor does our willingness to investigate the claims, say, of the Orthodox, mean that we are not truly submitted to the Catholic magisterium. Faith never destroys reason; faith is based on the truth, because grace builds on nature, not on a vacuum (ala Marcionism, in which the God of the NT is not the God who created nature). If a person is not convinced that the magisterium to which he is submitted is the authentic magisterium of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded, he cannot exercise faith in Christ through trusting that magisterium. Faith, to be faith, requires that it be built on the truth. That does not mean that the believer must understand everything he is believing — that would be rationalism, and would rule out “faith seeking understanding.” But he must have good reason to believe that the magisterium he is trusting to speak for Christ is, in fact, the magisterium that Christ authorized to speak for Himself. Hiding evidence from oneself about the the identity and authority of the magisterium to which he is presently submitted would, in that respect, undermine the possibility of exercising true faith in Christ through trusting the magisterium.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Ryan, (re: #15)
You wrote:
No, I wouldn’t. See Question 3 (at the end of the post) and then comment #4. A person can be wrong about which group of persons has apostolic succession or which group of persons is the true magisterium of the Church Christ founded, but such a person is not necessarily in the same epistemic situation as the Protestant, for the reasons I explained in the body of my post. Submitting to a magisterium one believes to have divine authority, but which does not in actuality have divine authority, does not make one subject to the tu quoque. That’s because a magisterium that [allegedly] has its divine authority by apostolic succession is not the same sort of thing as an interpretation of Scripture derived by one’s own reading of Scripture, whether or not that magisterium actually has divine authority by apostolic succession. The person who submits to such a magisterium, thinking that it is the divinely authorized magisterium of the Church Christ founded, is in error, but with respect to authority he is not related to that magisterium in the same way that the Protestant is related to his [i.e. the Protestant's] confession. The former person is subordinate to it in a way that the Protestant is not subordinate to the Protestant confession.
In the case of submission to a magisterium on the basis of it having divine authority by apostolic succession, there are two ‘levels,’ as it were. In the lower level, by one’s reason one makes a judgment that this group of persons is the magisterium of the Church Christ founded. In the upper level one submits by faith to the teaching of this magisterium. The person’s judgment at the lower level about the authority of the magisterium is not based on his agreement with that magisterium’s teaching, or on its agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture. If it were, that would be Protestantism, which reduces the two levels to one. The person’s judgment at the lower level is based on whether those persons have received divine authorization to teach in Christ’s name by way of apostolic succession, i.e. whether or not they have valid Holy Orders, and are not in schism from the Church Christ founded. But if he finds out that this group of persons he thought was the magisterium is actually not the magisterium, that doesn’t mean that his two levels were just one level (like the Protestant’s authority situation). Rather, it means that the object of his ecclesial faith was misdirected. But, because he was basing his judgment that they had ecclesial authority on their [seemingly] having Holy Orders and not being in schism, then even though he turns out to be wrong, and they were not actually the magisterium of the Church Christ founded, his position is not subject to the tu quoque. There were still two levels, not one. If, however, their [alleged] authority (to him) had been based on their agreement with him, and not on divine authorization in succession from the Apostles, then there wouldn’t have been two levels, but only one. And in that case, his position would have been subject to the tu quoque.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Ryan (#15):
I was addressing BT in my (#13), and in #14 I immediately corrected my error about the person he was addressing. I got confused about who was speaking to whom because your objection to Tim’s argument was essentially the same as BT’s to Bryan’s. Since Bryan has now answered BT on his own account, and you’ve now addressed me directly, I’ll answer you directly.
You wrote:
As you know, the question whether Catholicism is actually true is distinct from the question what epistemic attitude, if any, distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism. Before the former question can be usefully addressed, we need a clear answer to the latter. I think that Bryan, Tim, and I have answered the latter clearly, but your whole comment indicates that our point is still not entirely clear to you. So I’ll try again here.
Epistemically, what distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism is the sort of assent each involves. Since the Protestant recognizes no individual or ecclesial authority as infallible under any conditions, even when he considers Scripture inerrant (which not all Protestants do), the Protestant must inevitably regard as provisional any assent he might render to doctrinal statements, whether those statements are offered as mere expositions of Scripture or go beyond that. If he considers Scripture inerrant, he will of course say that his assent to the truths contained in Scripture is absolute not provisional. But to the question what the truths we can extract from Scripture actually mean or imply for doctrinal purposes, he can answer only by citing expositions and interpretations that represent his own or others’ opinions. Affirming that Scripture is inerrant, therefore, affords the Protestant as such no basis whatsoever for saying that we know what, exactly, God is revealing to us through Scripture in a manner that can be expressed by doctrinal statements. He might of course glean, from his own reading of Scripture and the work of his preferred scholars, a pretty fair idea of what the human authors of Scripture intended by their words. But given his rejection of infallible interpretive authority, the Protestant leaves himself in no position to distinguish reliably between de fide doctrines—i.e., the doctrines to which God calls for our assent—and the theological views of both authors and interpreters. Hence the Protestant as such has no way in principle to distinguish clearly the assent of faith, which is a divine gift involving assent to statements made with divine authority, from mere human opinions about what various “sources,” primarily Scripture, actually transmit to us as divine revelation.
This means, among other things, that the Protestant sees something called “the Church” in a fundamentally different way from Catholics. Given how he conceives assent to divine truth, the Protestant cannot see something called “the Church” as a sure guide to discerning it. Since “the Church” is fallible under all conditions, her orthodoxy is to be judged by what this-or-that person or group takes to be the doctrinally correct interpretation of Scripture (and other sources too, on some accounts), rather than vice-versa. Ultimately, the Protestant’s assent involves submission not to “the Church” but to himself as his most reliable guide to discerning divine revelation. “The Church,” from this point of view, is simply the set of people who ascribe to the “correct” interpretation of the sources, where what’s “correct” is what the individual believer provisionally accepts as such. The claims of this-or-that church to a certain kind of authority thus form no part of the deposit of faith; rather, what counts as “the Church” depends on its conformity to the deposit of faith, when said deposit is understood in a manner logically independent of any ecclesial claims to authority. Thus “the Church” is not strictly necessary for knowing Truth himself. It might be educationally useful for some, and is certainly pastorally useful for many. But that’s about it. In principle, it’s quite possible to read the Bible alone in a room and thereby learn all that God wants us to know for our salvation. Of course that sort of thing yields a variety of opinions whose holders like to call “doctrines” given by the Holy Spirit. Many of those opinions are, of course, mutually incompatible. That’s why we have more Protestant denominations and sects than anybody, including Protestants themselves, can agree on how to count.
When the Catholic, on the other hand, makes his assent of faith, he is among other things assenting to the claims made by a visible, historically continuous body that it is the Body of Christ on earth, authorized by him as her Head to teach in his name and thus, when speaking with her full authority, protected by his Spirit from requiring belief in propositions that are false. Accordingly, the Catholic does not, because as such he cannot, claim to know the deposit of faith in a manner logically independent of the claims the Church makes for herself. He does not, because he cannot, claim to know the “true doctrine” from the sources without depending on the authoritative certification of the sources as such by the Church, and the authoritative interpretations thereof by the Church. Thus for the Catholic, faith in the risen Christ, acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God, and faith in the teaching of the Church as that of the Body of Christ are logically inseparable from each other. And so the Catholic does not judge the orthodoxy of the Church; rather, he submits to the Church as, among other things, the judge of his orthodoxy.
We are now in a position to address the question why the Catholic mode of assent should be preferred to the Protestant’s. But we cannot settle that question just by learning the historical dataset and deciding, with our own human judgment, whether it best supports Catholicism or some version of Protestantism. Most people are in no position to take in all the relevant data, and even those who are in such a position disagree on how to interpret it for the purpose at hand. From a historical point of view, the question is which hermeneutical paradigm to adopt for the purpose of interpreting the data: the Catholic, or some Protestant version.
Now the question which HP to adopt cannot be answered by appeal to the dataset itself, for the question is precisely which manner of interpreting the data is preferable. The question can only be answered, I believe, by asking ourselves which HP is better suited to distinguishing the propositionally expressible content of divine revelation itself—assuming there is such a thing as divine revelation—from mere theological opinions, and thus to facilitating the assent of faith as distinct from that of opinion. Now as you say, if Catholicism is true, the answer to that question is obvious. But if Catholicism is false, we are left only with provisional opinions. And if we are left only with provisional opinions, then we have no reliable way to distinguish from human opinion that which God actually wants us to believe.
Best,
Mike
Sorry, I didn’t cut and paste from Wordpad the last paragraph of my previous comment. Here it is:
“That result is the epistemic aspect of the Protestant HP. History amply demonstrates that it doesn’t leave us with any single, self-consistent body of doctrine; it yields a variety of mutually incompatible ones. Now on the assumption that there is such a thing as a definitive divine revelation, and that even (or especially) the simple person can identify and assent to it by faith, such a result is hardly satisfactory. One would only feel obliged to accept it if one were convinced there was no alternative but to accept the idea that the Christian religion is just a matter of opinion. But there is such an alternative: Catholicism. And that fact, by itself, is a good reason to prefer Catholicism’s epistemic stance to Protestantism’s.
Bryan (reply to #16),
I really hope you’re right about the Catholic’s right to continue seek truth. However, I’m seriously skeptical of this claim. I have a few reasons for this.
The first is Cardinal Newman, who said in his “Grammar of Assent”
The second is Vatican 1, as quoted at Catholic Answers, which says.
My third comes from Catholic moral wisdom as I’ve seen from various sources. It has seemed to me, in my time as a Catholic, that examinations of conscience and Catholic apologist alike advise against entertaining doubts, reading books from “the other side”, and other actions that would necessarily be involved in an investigation like this. We all know that there have been times when specific books have been entirely forbidden by the Church.
These quotes seem to imply that Catholics have been a “special grace” so that they should not have to conduct any such investigation of their beliefs. If they do so with an open mind, don’t they fall under the condemnation of Newman and Vatican I? Wouldn’t this be willful doubt and the cultivation of doubt as condemned in the Catechism in point 2088?
Bryan,
Excellent post – my “deep” questions are still percolating, so I’ll ask an easier one. Recently I bumped into sedevacantism and was…intrigued. Well, that and vaguely horrified (this coming from a Protestant!) I guess it seems like once one swims the Tiber, it seems really bizarre and arbitrary to say that the Papacy went empty post-Vatican II.
But then something “clicked” when reading your Q5. I’m don’t know if you can speak for sedevacantists or Catholics on the whole about this, so how do you as a Catholic make epistemic sense of sedevacantism? Do you think that such people were “Catholic Protestants” who were only willing to go along with Catholicism only insofar as it agreed with their preexisting interps of Scripture or their ideas what the Church “should” believe? Or is there some other way you/Catholics epistemically account for sedevacantism?
~Benjamin =)
What the person becoming Catholic discovers in his study of history, tradition and Scripture is not merely an interpretation. If what he discovered were merely an interpretation of history, tradition and Scripture, then what he discovered would have no more authority than any Protestant confession. If his discovery were merely an interpretation, it too would be merely a human opinion. The prospective Catholic finds in his study of history and tradition and Scripture something that does not have a merely human source, either from himself or from other mere humans not having divine authorization. He finds in the first, second and third (etc.) centuries something with a divine origin and with divine authority. He finds the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church and its magisterial authority in succession from the Apostles and from Christ
Bryan,
Our communions part way at the Reformation. You would say that you have studied the Church at the Reformation and made the assessment that the RCC at this point in time (and all other times) is the same one, holy, catholic, apostolic Church of the early centuries of Christianity. I would look a the RCC at the Reformation and my assessment would be just the opposite. So do you think that your assessment is not an interpretation of history but my assessment is an interpretation of history, as you have used the term “interpretation?” So how is your assessment not an interpretation of history?
In a very real way, I agree that at the outset we need to look at the RCC at the Reformation (or today or at any other time in history that may interest us) and ask whether it measures up to the one, holy, catholic, apostolic criteria. The critical difference between Protestant and Catholic is not that one does this and the other does not, but rather in the way we go about this assessment. My disagreement with you is not that you make such an assessment, but rather in the criteria you use to make the judgment.
TDC (re: #20),
You wrote:
Inquiry is incompatible with assent when the term ‘inquiry’ is being used in the sense of presupposing that the inquirer does not yet believe something to be true, and the term ‘assent’ is being used in the sense of implying that the assenting person believes to be true that to which he assents. I’m not claiming that someone can be inquiring and assenting (in those senses of the terms) about the same thing at the same time. That would be a contradiction. I’m saying that a Catholic can by faith assent to what the magisterium says, while investigating, for example, the evidence for and against the Orthodox claim to be the Church that Christ founded, and investigating the evidence for or against the apostolic authority of the Catholic magisterium. So what I’m saying is not incompatible with what Newman is saying, properly understood. Newman isn’t opposing fides quaerens intellectum.
I’m not saying that a Catholic may rightly suspend faith until he has demonstrated the credibility of his faith. That would be rationalism. That would collapse the two levels into one. (See comment #17.) What I am saying is quite compatible with what Dei Filius is saying. I’m saying that the Catholic can, while maintaining faith (not suspending faith) that assents to the magisterium of the Church, truly investigate the evidence for or against the apostolic authority of the magisterium. He can also, while maintaining faith, seek to understand the basis for the doctrines of the faith taught by the magisterium. Faith does not nullify the “seeking understanding” dimension of reason, because grace does not destroy nature.
I agree with you here, that not everyone is able, ready or equipped to do this. It requires the resources and guidance and equipping to be able rightly to evaluate these things. Many people do not have that sort of equipping and guidance, and can easily be led into confusion and doubt by such an investigation. They need qualified guidance like the Ethiopian eunuch needed Phillip. But my claim was not that every Catholic is in a condition to do this, or that every Catholic should do this, but that in principle it can be done by Catholics. Of course willful doubt of the authentic teaching of the persons one knows to be the divinely authorized magisterium of the Church is a sin. As Jesus said, “He who rejects you rejects Me.” But that does not mean that in principle we cannot study Church history, or study the Church Fathers, etc., in order to understand better the evidence for (and against) the Catholic Church’s claim to be the Church that Christ founded, and the evidence for and against other sects, denominations or religions. I agree that a person who is weak in his faith in Christ should not read material that makes him doubt what in his heart he knows to be true. But, fideism is not the solution to weak faith. A Catholic who is not well-catechized, and doesn’t know whether the Catholic Church is the Church Christ founded, would be well-served, in my opinion, to read through Warren Carroll’s Christendom series, and Jurgens’ trilogy on the Faith of the Early Fathers. That would be the “seeking understanding” way of exercising his faith. Catholicism is neither rationalism nor fideism. The Catholic is not like the Mormon BT describes in comment #9, but neither is the Catholic a rationalist. He avoids both errors.
You mentioned paragraph 2088 of the Catechism, which reads:
Doubt is not the same thing as the seeking understanding part of “faith seeking understanding.” Nor is doubt the same thing as investigating the evidence and arguments for or against the authority and authenticity of the Catholic magisterium. Doubt could motivate one to do so (and in that case such an investigation would be wrong), but such an investigation need not be motivated by doubt. I agree with you that not every Catholic can do such an investigation, because not everyone is equipped to do so. But if doing so were intrinsically opposed to faith, then Catholic scholars could not rightly investigate the claims and arguments and evidence used against the Catholic Church. And Catholics, scholars or not, need to be prepared to give an answer for what we believe, and why we believe it, not just for the sake of helping others come into the Church, but also for the sake of the strength of our own faith. Faith is strengthened (in one way) the more we know the motives of credibility. Grace not only perfects nature, it builds on nature. And for that reason faith not only perfects reason, but it builds on reason, without reducing to reason. And that’s how rational investigation into the motives of credibility strengthens faith.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan (re: #23),
Thanks for the clarification. I won’t press the issue much further, because I don’t want to take the thread off topic, but the Catholic view that you described above seems to put the doubter in a bind. A Catholic who has a strong faith may investigate the evidence in order to strengthen his faith, but if a Catholic genuinely doubts that Catholicism is true, it sounds like a fresh investigation of the evidence with a mind open to the possibility that Catholicism is wrong would be a sin. He must simply accept that Catholicism is true. That sounds intellectually dishonest, and the perfect environment for confirmation bias.
If the only time a Catholic can investigate the evidence is to see why its true (faith seeking understanding), and never to see whether its true or false (a doubter’s investigation), I don’t see how it is an improvement on fideism.
I may just be misunderstanding you, but I think this is a problem. What then, should the Catholic who finds himself in serious doubt about the faith do? Only read Catholic sources? That seems like it would assume the very thing that the doubter is questioning, the truth of Catholicism. How can the doubter continue on while being intellectually honest?
Thanks for your time
[...] is a bit of the problem over at Called to Communion. Bryan is talking about the philosophy of Protestantism and Catholicism. But it isn’t ringing [...]
TDC (#24):
I was once a Catholic who genuinely doubted that Catholicism is true. So I conducted “a fresh investigation of the evidence with a mind open to the possibility that Catholicism is wrong.” My investigation was not limited to Protestantism; along the way, I found that I could not take it seriously as an intellectual proposition. My investigation wasn’t limited to Christianity or even to theism. In the end, though, I worked my way back to theism, and then to Christianity; the choices for me then came down to Orthodoxy and Catholicism. In the end, I found that the only intellectually honest choice I could make was Catholicism. So, from an investigation which started with doubt about, nay disgust with, Catholicism, I emerged with a stronger Catholic faith than before.
I can’t say that I know Newman would approve of such a thing, but I doubt he would have disapproved. I’m sure the present pope would approve.
Best,
Mike
“All synods or councils, since the Apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.”
And, of course, this claim may err as well. So, according to Protestantism, becoming Catholic is a legitimate option, since the basis for rejecting Catholicism may be in error as well.
This may be a crude analogy. But for me, the difference between being Protestant and being Catholic was the difference between dating and getting married. As long as I was dating, I was never truly wedded and bound to my love.
TDC,
If you are in doubt you should not act like you have faith. That would be putting faith against reason. True faith has confidence that the truth he ascents to can stand up to reason. Running from scrutiny is the mark of a lack of faith. But how should you do the scrutiny? You might not be qualified to assess the data. You need to recognize that as well. So you get help from Catholics who have the expertise.
What role to non-Catholic works play? They have wisdom. The Holy Spirit gives all humans insight into God so we can profit from listening to protestants, atheist, moslems, anyone. But prudence plays a role. We can learn from lions and we can be eaten by lions. We need to learn how to do the former and eliminate the risk of the ladder. Same goes with non-Catholics. You need to learn what you can and learn how to access the people who know a lot more. They will ask questions that stump you. That is part of how you learn.
Francis says: according to Protestantism, becoming Catholic is a legitimate option, since the basis for rejecting Catholicism may be in error as well.
Francis – Of course it is a legitimate option. And is attested too by the myriads of Catholics turned Evangelical, the option of going the other way is legitimate too. The question really boils to down to what Bryan says concerning looking at the Catholic Church today and determining whether this is the same “one, holy, catholic, and Apostolic” Church that Christ founded. What I’m hoping is that Bryan can tell us why this determiniation for the Protestant turned Catholic is not an “interpretation” of history as Bryan uses the term.
Dr. Beckwith,
I had thought the same thing before (#27).
I agree with Bryan that there is an essential distinction that is too often being conflated. I distinguish them by the names “private interpretation” and “private investigation.”
-”Private Interpretation” is in regards to claiming for oneself the *authority* to make binding *interpretations* of Scripture. The Protestant has two options here: either each individual has the power to make authoritative interpretations, or else a select group (i.e. Magisterium) does. In disregarding the latter, the Protestant has unwittingly made each individual their own pope. One clear problem (aside from the double standard) with this is that if everyone is just as *authoritative*, there is no way to objectively settle disputes. When we take the words “This is My Body,” the Church can step in and *authoritatively* say the faithful must believe this to be taken literally; however, in Protestantism, it’s one individual’s claim versus another on that same phrase, with the result being a perpetual stalemate.
-”Private Investigation” is the individual’s process of looking at the available evidence to seek out Christ to the best of one’s ability. This requires the component of faith because no Christian doctrine can be proven by reason alone. This does require an ultimately subjective choice, but it’s fallacious to say all choices are equally informed (as anyone can see that a Biblically informed seeker has better grounds to make a choice than a Biblically uninformed individual). Using Scripture, History, and Reason, the ‘investigator’ has the dual duty to look for possible candidates while ruling out others. For example, the first thing to realize is that Christianity didn’t start with *me*, and ‘assuming’ Jesus isn’t a failure, we would expect His True Church to exist in every age. Now, which bodies meet this criteria? The (Roman) Catholic Church is at *least* a candidate. Or how about this whopper: Does the church you’re investigating at least CLAIM to be the Church Jesus founded? If not, run away. (You’d be surprised how Protestants readily concede their denomination is not the One True Church.) Another example of investigation, does the foundational doctrine of Protestantism, Sola Scriptura, make sense Biblically, Historically, and Rationally? If not, then Protestantism cannot be the correct path. With this overall approach, the Private Investigator begins to arrive at the most reasonable conclusion, even if his conclusion is fallible.
I think a better way to look at this is to see the whole thing in terms of Passive Interpretation versus Active Interpretation. One taking a Passive approach is simply looking at the evidence, one taking the Active approach is making authoritative judgments binding on others.
Andrew (#30):
I’ll spare Bryan the trouble. The answer to what you, in first sentence above, call the question is brief: if the Catholic Church ever was “the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” Church, it always was and always will be. That’s because, as such, she would be the subject of Christ’s promise in Matthew 16:18.
As for your second question, you’re either ignoring or misunderstanding what Bryan (and I, and Tim, and Ray) have already said. The interpretive investigation leading up to the assent of faith in the Church is indeed just that: interpretive, and thus it yields only an opinion. But once the assent of faith in the Catholic Church is freely made in light of such an opinion, one cannot see oneself as assenting merely to an interpretation, as if it were just one legitimate interpretation among others incompatible with it. For what one is assenting to is either altogether and perniciously false, or divine authority itself. If one doesn’t see that, then one has not yet chosen to make the assent of Catholic faith.
Best,
Mike
Andrew writes:
Francis – Of course it is a legitimate option. And is attested too by the myriads of Catholics turned Evangelical, the option of going the other way is legitimate too. The question really boils to down to what Bryan says concerning looking at the Catholic Church today and determining whether this is the same “one, holy, catholic, and Apostolic” Church that Christ founded. What I’m hoping is that Bryan can tell us why this determiniation for the Protestant turned Catholic is not an “interpretation” of history as Bryan uses the term.
Reminds me of that old line: “Believe in infant baptism? I’ve seen it happen!”
Hello Benjamin (re: #21),
Asking me about sedevacantism isn’t necessarily asking me an easier question. :-) I have known a couple sedevacantists, and from what I have gathered, they aren’t all alike in what they believe, and why they believe it. So, that makes it quite difficult to give you a cut-and-dried answer that explains why sedevacantists believe that they believe, and how it relates to this post. If I had to generalize, I would say that they are like the person I described in #17. They aren’t Protestant; they don’t deny apostolic succession. But they are confused and mistaken about the present locus of magisterial authority.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Andrew (re: #22)
You wrote:
I’m intrigued by your claim that “our communions part way at the Reformation.” Since Luther nailed his 95 theses on the Wittenburg door in 1517, does that mean that you believe that the Catholic Church in 1516 was still at that time (i.e. in 1516) the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded? If not, then what year, in your opinion, was (roughly) the last year the Catholic Church was the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded?
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
TDC (re: #24)
You wrote:
We’re equivocating on the term ‘doubt,’ and that’s what is causing the confusion. Doubt is said in two ways: one pertaining to reason, and the other pertaining to faith. ‘Doubt’ pertaining to reason is, in this sense, just ignorance, i.e. lack of knowledge. If the Apostle Peter walks up to me, but I don’t know that he has been divinely authorized to speak for Christ, I cannot exercise faith in what he says. That is, in that epistemic condition I cannot trust Christ by trusting what this man [Peter] says about Christ. For all I know this fishy-smelling man could simply be the local fisherman. In that situation I have no reason to believe that he is a divinely authorized spokesman for God. So in such a situation, my not exercising faith in what he says is not culpable doubt; it is just lack of knowledge of his divine authorization. Doubt of that sort is not culpable, unless by negligence I have chosen not to learn what I should have learned.
But the other kind of doubt pertains to faith. This is what the Catechism is describing in 2088-2089:
Just as faith presupposes some degree of knowledge of the divine authority of that which is being believed (e.g. Scripture and the Church), so doubt (at the level of faith) presupposes some degree of knowledge (at the level of reason) regarding the identity and authority of the Church and Scripture. In other words, there is no such thing as culpably doubting (at the level of faith), without knowing (at the level of reason) that the source of the doctrine in doubt is in some way divine or divinely authorized (e.g. Scripture, magisterium). Voluntary doubt and incredulity are sinful, because they are a choice of the will to reject or neglect what one knows to be divine or divinely authorized. The solution to voluntary doubt and incredulity is repentance. Involuntary doubt is still at the level of faith, and is a spiritual condition, for which one should seek the help of a priest or spiritual director. A person struggling with involuntary doubt should pray for the gift of faith, and should make use of the sacraments as means of grace. But involuntary doubt can also possibly be helped by studying the motives of credibility, precisely because grace builds on nature, and hence an increase in knowledge of the motives of credibility can strengthen our faith.
But, doubt (at the level of reason) is not in itself a spiritual problem, nor is it a sin (unless it is a result of culpable negligence). A person who does not know (from the evidence of history, tradition and Scripture) that the Catholic Church is the Church that Christ founded cannot exercise faith in Christ through the magisterium of the Catholic Church. So doubt (at the level of reason) makes faith impossible. Faith builds on reason. This is why Ralph McInerny’s book is titled Praeambula fidei (preambles of the faith). It helps provide the evidence (to reason) upon which the informed person can then make an act of faith.
The solution to doubt (at the level of reason) is not repentance (unless the doubt is due to willful negligence), nor is the solution a [fideistic] leap. The solution to doubt (at the level of reason) is studying the evidence, including the motives of credibility. The individual should study all the evidence, the best evidence, from all the different points of view. Why? Because his goal (at the level of reason) is to find the truth about the locus of divine authority. Only if he has good reason to believe that the bishops of the Catholic Church are the successors of the Apostles can he exercise faith in Christ by trusting the guidance and teaching of these bishops.
I hope that helps clear up the matter.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan (re: #37),
Your distinctions were very helpful. It clarified alot for me.
I have one final question. According to Catholicism, can someone who has made an informed decision to follow Christ through the Catholic Church in the past ever innocently (without sinning) come to a point in which he no longer believes due to doubt (at the level of reason) and needs to conduct a fresh study to find the truth (as you described above)? It seems that the quote I provided in point #20 from Vatican I denies this, which would mean that every informed Catholic who reaches that level of disbelief/doubt (at the level of reason) is somehow culpable.
Your thoughts?
what year, in your opinion, was (roughly) the last year the Catholic Church was the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded?
Bryan,
I really can’t say. This would be my answer if you asked me what year Israel stopped being faithful. I would say Israel was faithful in the days of Solomon when the shekinah glory filled the temple, but then she (those who were in succession from Solomon) was not faithful when Jesus came on the scene as per the words of Jesus.
So would you say that the RCC when the Reformers came on the scene could equally claim to be 1) one, 2) holy, 3) catholic, and 4) Apostolic as could the Church in the Apostles time? My sense is that that Catholics don’t really make any sort of assessment, and the Church at a given time is said to possess the four marks based solely on the succession of her bishops, which succession is termed “sacramental.”
Do you think that it is reasonable (to use Mike’s term) for the Protestant churches to historically and theologically dig into the details of what it means to be characterized by the four marks and make some sort of assessment of the Church at a given age based on these marks? And then lastly, when our respective communions make judgments on how to utilize the four marks and then apply them to the facts of the history of the Church in a given era, are we not both positing a certain interpretation of the tradition of the Church? To me this seems quite obvious, but while I think you might agree that the Protestants are engaging in historical interpretation, somehow the Catholics are not.
Bryan
You wrote:
Is it okay with you if I respond to this question as part of the main response I’m writing to the Solo/Sola paper you and Neal wrote? I’ve already realized that this response is also going to have to include comments on your Ecclesial Deism paper and now also this Tu quoque paper. I’m hoping I can finish it before you write any more papers I need to add to the list :-)
I’m not making any concerted attempt to follow all these combox discussions here and on other blogs. It seems like everytime I log on to one (sometimes after several days away), there’s 150 new comments, and I have no interest in scrolling through all of them. Time constraints leave me the choice between responding to your main papers here on the CtC site or trying to keep up with several combox threads. I’m going for the former.
Keith
what year, in your opinion, was (roughly) the last year the Catholic Church was the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded?
“So now I say to you: You are Peter and on this rock I will build My Church. And the gates of the hell can never hold out against it.” Mt 16:18
I found myself reading about the problem I once had. When Jesus said that the gates of hell would not prevail against the Church, the Protestant and LDS positions are that the gates of hell did prevail against the Church. The underlying assumption is that God was not able to do what He said He would do, which leads to the Protestant and LDS position: Now I/we have to do it for Him.
Having defined God’s inability to accomplish what He said He would do, we went further and defined how we would tap into God and get what He wants to accomplish done. Literally we would do it for Him. If the first redefinition did not work, well we would redefine it again and again and again (virtually ad infinitum) until it worked the way I/we think it should work. Having not trusted Him in the first place, we found we were justified in not trusting Him now, and in not trusting anyone else who also did not trust Him but was seeking an outcome that we deemed competitive or unsatisfactory.
We would write meaningless creeds which could be safely ignored. We would split over nit items. Having arrived at unsatisfactory conclusions and recognizing exactly that, a portion of us would begin begging God to come back and straighten everything out, while condemning those who irritated us. It is an amazing contempt for people, no matter their position vis-à-vis God, who are made in God’s image and likeness and deserving of the dignity of that wonder. However love of neighbor was not always our strong point. You are saved by grace through faith. A display of faith through works (James), the working out of our salvation in fear and trembling (Paul), the very idea of feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, or visiting the sick (Jesus) was anathema to our revised idea of salvation. Luther had one misunderstood idea which stuck, it was that faith alone was sufficient. Hope and love were thrown overboard as unnecessary at best and peripheral at worst.
We were the Donatists of the new age of Christianity. We believed that a perfected individual could not fail, and when we could not find perfected individuals who fit our criteria of perfection, we demanded our view of perfection and parted ways with them. There was really no need of the forgiveness of sins and no need of someone representing Someone Who could not be trusted to effect that forgiveness on our behalf.
The alternative is that the Oneness, Holiness, Catholicity and Apostolicity of the Church was never lost and continues on from Peter through Benedict 16. The manifold failures of the Church’s sons and daughters throughout the ages notwithstanding, it is a trustworthy God Who makes this work of His endure, and has done so from the time He founded It.
A mention was made of Israel and its failure. Simeon and Anna were not failures. Eleven of the first twelve apostles, weakness notwithstanding, were not failures. The 3000 who were added to the Church and baptised after hearing Peter preach were not failures. The Mother of God is not a failure.
John the Baptist is in the tradition of the prophets who called Israel back from their waywardness. They always had someone to call, and that call always met a proper response by some. God did not abandon Israel anymore than He abandoned the Church.
I was not and am not the arbiter of who is saved and who is not. I am a penitent, a being in need of salvation, who found Someone standing at the door of my heart knocking. That door was opened and I found both a confessor and a Meal. It is a humbling experience and humility is virtue. I am also a man who needs to be called back, repeatedly, and suspect that will be true to the end of my days here.
Donald,
You articulated virtually the same idea as Bryan in a post on his other blog “Principium Unitatis” in regards to the “bottom-up” Tower of Babel approach to Church. Forgive me, Bryan. I’ve forgotten the actual title of the post and I do not have a link. If you think it’s relevant to this discussion, could you post a link to it?
FYI, here are a couple brief thoughts in response to Tim’s argument that, even though both Cath’cs and Prot’ts employ private judgment, we are not in the same epistemic boat since the Cath’c criterion for locating the true church is objective, while the Prot’t criterion is subjective:
http://www.creedcodecult.com/2010/05/some-thoughts-on-tu-quoque.html
TDC (re: #38)
You wrote:
In my opinion, that paragraph from Vatican I (Session 3 Canon 6) does not answer this question that you’re asking here. That paragraph is teaching that the person who has attained to the Catholic faith is not in the same epistemic condition as one who has not yet attained to the Catholic faith. The person who has not yet attained to the Catholic faith is still at the first level (i.e. the level of reason alone) — see comment #17. The person who has attained the Catholic faith is not only informed by the natural light of reason, but also by the supernatural light of faith. He is informed by two lights, one natural, and the other supernatural. So a person who has attained to the Catholic faith (and thus knows the magisterium to be divinely authorized) cannot have a just reason for [suspending the Catholic faith until he, by way of reason, demonstrates its credibility or veracity]. If he could legitimately do so, that would imply that there is no divinely authorized magisterium and that he was in the same epistemic state as the rationalist.
But, in my opinion, that does not tell us whether he must sin in order to lose Catholic faith. That’s because, as I mentioned above, there are two general ways to doubt the Catholic faith: one, by denying or rejecting what one (in one’s heart) knows to be divine authority, and the other, by not knowing whether the Catholic magisterial authority is in fact a divine authority. Doubt of the first sort would surely involve sin. But canon 6, in my opinion, does not entail that coming to a state of doubt of the second sort would necessarily require sinning. Imagine a poorly catechized Catholic who stumbles across a section of Jack Chick tracts/comics in a ‘Christian’ bookstore. He starts reading them, and they cause him to wonder whether the Catholic Church is what he thought it was. Maybe he then meets with some nice people who are much more educated than himself, and they tell him he has been deceived in being raised Catholic. They invite him to a Bible study, and they tell him that the Catholic Church has denied the gospel and is the Whore of Babylon and that the Pope is the Antichrist, etc. Perhaps he has no awareness of or access to informed Catholics who can explain what’s wrong with these claims. At that point, he might no longer know whether his local priest or bishop (or the Pope) is the authentic magisterial authority of the Church. He might be completely confused and uncertain, and right back at square one trying to figure out this whole Christianity thing.
You might say that he sinned in starting to read those materials. But, if he wasn’t well-catechized, it seems quite possible that he might not have known that given his state, these materials would be a stumbling block to him. (This sort of thing happens not infrequently to poorly catechized Catholics.) Anyway, I don’t think Canon 6 is attempting to address the question of whether a person who comes to doubt, in this [second] sense, necessarily sinned in the process. (But, I’m open to being corrected on this point.) I think Canon 6 is condemning the notion that the Catholic is essentially in the same epistemic situation as the rationalist, and that the [divine] teaching authority of the Church is subject to the authority of human reason.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Keith (re: #40),
That’s fine. No rush. I look forward to reading your reply.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Jason,
You wrote:
Well, not exactly. If my criterion for discerning the rightful ruler from a passel of pretenders is *having red hair*, then, whether or not I used private judgment to figure out this criterion in the first place, and whether or not it is true that the rightful ruler will have red hair, my criterion is objective.
Tim Troutman had already anticipated this sort of objection to the objective aspect of the AS criterion when he wrote:
My response (above) is also a sort of knock off of something that Tim wrote elsewhere, with regard to this very issue.
Since you admit that AS is at least somewhat objective, the heart of this particular tu quoque is that Catholics have to use private judgment, say, personal study of the relevant data, before submitting to the Church. Thus, you write:
This argument proves too much, since it renders every act of faith, which has been preceded by a period of study, a matter of private judgment. In other words, your argument entails the non-distinction between faith and opinion. This is a problem, not only for the Catholic who claims not to be his own ultimate interpretive authority, but for everyone who claims to have faith at all.
As to the personal study (private judgment) involved in seeking out the merits of the case for AS (or anything else divinely revealed), your point in this post is essentially the same as the point you made in the Green Baggins thread, to which I subsequently responded. An expanded version of that response can be read here.
Mike said in #33:
if the Catholic Church ever was “the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” Church, it always was and always will be
That’s very nice, Mike. You are just defining the RCC today to be the true Church. But what if she isn’t by any reasonable (your term) criteria by which we measure the adjectives 1) one, 2) holy, 3) catholic, and 4) Apostolic? I hope you see the implications of what you are saying here, Mike. No matter how much the Church strays from the four marks of the Church, by your measure she still is the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church by definition. In other words “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” become meaningless as adjectives as applied to the Church. And Matt 16:18 only promises the the gates of Hell won’t prevail again the Church. This hardly means that the successors of the Church today would remain faithful to the principles of Apostolic Church. It just means that God will preserve His Church. Is that Church the RCC? Well, that’s just the point under consideration, no?
As for your second question, you’re either ignoring or misunderstanding what Bryan (and I, and Tim, and Ray) have already said.
Mike – you are just misunderstanding what I am asking. I’m trying to get Bryan to answer me as to why we both come to different conclusions after considering the same data, but his conclusion is “not merely an interpretation” while mine is? I get the fact that Bryan has made the “assent of faith,” OK? So now we are both looking at what it means to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic and Bryan says that there is no interpretation in his case. I’m asking him to explain this. Perhaps, like you, Bryan has defined the RCC to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. If so, then that’s the end of the conversation, isn’t it? Bryan and you have your definitions and there is no debate. If so, OK, but I would like to hear Bryan say this.
Joe (re: #42),
I’m not sure. You may be referring to “Is the Church a Democracy?” or “Institutional Unity and Outdoing Christ,” or “Day 7 of the Church Unity Octave.”
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Andrew M (re: #39)
You wrote:
This is what allows you to try to have it both ways. On the one hand, you claim that “Our communions part way at the Reformation.” (comment #22) But, since you have absolutely no idea when the Catholic Church [allegedly] ceased to be the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded, you feel free to start rejecting from the first and second centuries onward, whatever the Catholic Church taught and practiced that doesn’t agree with your interpretation of Scripture. That way your theological methodology is indistinguishable from the ecclesial deism of the Restorationists, while you simultaneously claim to reject ecclesial deism, and insist that “Our communions part way at the Reformation.” If you don’t know when the Catholic Church ceased to be the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church that Christ founded, then you don’t actually know that “Our communions part way at the Reformation.” Your theology implies that theologically you parted ways at least twelve hundred years earlier, after which point those posited, secret, faithful Bible-believing few kept the “biblical faith” quite separate from the [allegedly] apostate Catholic Church during those many long centuries. By your picking and choosing from the Catholic Church (e.g. rejecting the distinction of bishop and presbyter, rejecting baptismal regeneration, rejecting Real Presence, etc.), you are theologically parting ways already at the time of St. Ignatius of Antioch at the beginning of the second century. If you want to claim that “Our communions part way at the Reformation” then you need to believe and accept what the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church Christ founded had defined and established up to that point. Otherwise while historically the separation may have occurred in the sixteenth century, theologically, you went out from us long before that.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Andrew (#47):
I am doing no such thing. What I’m defining is the concept: one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church (OHCAC). It belongs to such a concept that whatever is the OHCAC always was and always will be the OHCAC. But in the comment you’re criticizing, I did not assert that the Catholic Church is the OHCAC; nothing I said in my comment ruled out the possibility, for instance, that the Orthodox communion is the OHCAC. That’s why I said: “…if the Catholic Church ever was “the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” Church, it always was and always will be.” Really, this is elementary logic: the sort of thing I once had to work hard to get across to college freshman, and probably will again soon, because there’s plenty of work in that area. I shouldn’t have to instruct a college-educated adult like you in it. But apparently I do.
I agree that Matt 16:18 does not mean that each and every bishop will remain “faithful to the principles” of the apostolic church. In fact, nobody ever said it does mean that. What it does mean, among other things, is that whichever communion of churches was once the OHCAC will always, by divine promise, remain faithful as a whole to the principles of the apostolic church–a church which, it cannot be denied, was itself the OHCAC. So, if we can identify some later, visible communion of churches as the OHCAC, we know that that visible communion is continuous with the apostolic church and has remained faithful as a whole to its principles.
But as a Protestant, such a move is not open or even, apparently, conceivable to you. You cannot first identify some visible communion of churches as the OHCAC and then, citing Matt 16:18, infer that that communion has remained faithful to the principles of the apostolic church. No, you first have to determine for yourself what those principles are, then you have to decide which church is faithful to them, and then you infer that that church is the OHCAC. (That’s assuming, of course, that you can specify any visible body or communion as “the” OHCAC, which I’ve never seen you do, despite having been asked more than once by more than one of us.) But if what I’ve called the “concept” of OHCAC is accurate, then no Protestant church could qualify as OHCAC. The oldest of them go back only to the 16th century; whereas the apostolic church was OHCAC, and by Matt 16:18, whichever “church” was once OHCAC always will be OHCAC.
Of course you will reply that my exposition of the concept of OHCAC is inaccurate. That’s because you interpret the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed’s phrase “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic” differently from me. But what authority is there to adjudicate between our respective interpretations of that non-biblical phrase? Unlike you, I recognize the episcopal authority which propounded that creed as infallible in doing so, and the present-day authority that I acknowledge as continuous with that 4th-century authority is more similar to it, in both doctrine and structure, than those of your church. I know this on many grounds, not least of which is that I sometimes worship in Eastern-Catholic and Orthodox churches, which use the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom in forms little changed since AD 400. The churches which use that liturgy are, and always have been, much more like the Roman Church than the PCA.
So Bryan’s challenge to you is, I should think, apt. If you can’t specify when that which was once OHCAC ceased to be OHCAC (which I consider an impossibility anyway, given my reading of Matt 16:18), and you aren’t prepared to tell us which communion or body is now OHCAC, what that tells me is that your very concept of OHCAC is useless–even aside from the question which church actually is OHCAC.
Jason (re: #43)
Perhaps I can add a bit to Andrew P’s comments. You wrote:
Sure, but we can’t just count scholarly noses. Many scholars believe that Noah’s flood was a myth, that the Garden of Eve was a myth, that Adam was a myth, that the crossing of the Red Sea was a myth, etc. etc. For those scholars who think apostolic succession is a myth, it is important to consider what role theological skepticism (and rationalism) is playing in their evaluation of what the Church Fathers say about apostolic succession. It is worth considering whether these scholars are the same ones who think the NT books were written long after the deaths of the Apostles, by ecclesial communities, etc. because of course they couldn’t have been written by the Apostles. I’ve been around such scholars — their modus operandi is skepticism about the activity of the supernatural. They are always looking for naturalistic explanations for all things supernatural. They doubt that King David ever existed, until they are forced by archaeology to admit that he may have existed. They doubt that the walls of Jericho tumbled after the Hebrews marched around it, again until archeology shows that the walls had collapsed. They doubt virtually everything that was written in Scripture, always attributing it to later redactors and redacting communities. And they treat the tradition of the Church in the same way, with the same skepticism and revisionism.
When we set aside all the nay-saying of the skeptics, and we look at the fact that no one doubted apostolic succession for virtually 1500 years, then the testimony of the Fathers and the unanimous practice and tradition of the Church all over the world for 1500 years is not just one opinion among a cacophony of competing opinions. To deny apostolic succession is to assert that Christians all over the world, wherever the Church spread, got it wrong, for 1500 years. Such a denial is not just skeptical; it is arrogant, claiming that the whole Church, throughout the whole world, for fifteen centuries, was wrong about something as fundamental to the Christian faith as the basis for ecclesial authority, and that we enlightened few know better. Such skepticism cannot be compartmentalized. (This is what led to the liberalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.) It continues to creep out into everything, calling into question the miracles of the NT, the historicity of Jesus, the canonicity of various books of the Bible, etc. If the whole Church could be so wrong for so long about something so fundamental to the faith as the basis for ecclesial authority, then anything she says and has ever said could be wrong, and absolutely everything about her and within her can be called into question. That’s liberalism. It is the opposite of faith. It isn’t just passive with respect to faith; it actively seeks to tear down and destroy the faith.
Or, he could simply ask whether for the first fifteen hundred years of Church history, this is what all Christians believed, i.e. that apostolicity as a mark of the Church required apostolic succession. Determining the answer to that question would not be “investing” the fact of apostolic succession with ecclesiological significance. The very meaning of terms such as “ecclesiological significance” depends on the answer to this question, because of course the Church didn’t just pop into existence in the sixteenth century. What it means to be “ecclesiological” depends on what the Church was for fifteen hundred years, and how people identified it in each generation. The Church is not something the moderns made up; it was handed down to us over the ages, from those who came before us. So what the Church is and how to identify it, necessarily depends on how the men before us identified it, unless we think of the Church as Platonic and atemporal and inorganic.
The reason why the Catholic is not subject to the tu quoque is not because the Catholic sorts through the evidence differently, or reaches a different conclusion from (1) or (2), even though, of course, he does reach a different conclusion from (1) and (2). We cannot but use our intellect and will in these inquiries, as I explained in my answer to Q4 at the end of the post. Of course we use our intellect and will, and study the evidence of the Fathers, Scripture, history, tradition, etc. And of course some people reach different conclusions than we do. If that summarized the situation, then we’d be strapped with the tu quoque. What makes the Catholic not subject to the tu quoque is that he discovers something outside himself, having greater authority than himself, whereas the persons reaching (1) or (2) do not. The presumption in your objection here is (seemingly) that if private judgment (intellect and will) are used in an inquiry, then the inquirer cannot discover something outside himself greater in authority than himself. But that would mean that intellect and will have no role in discovering Christ (i.e. fideism), or it would mean that Christ is a mere man (Ebionitism). But if you agree that fideism and Ebionitism are false, then you are granting that it is a least possible for the intellect and will to have a role in discovering something outside oneself greater in authority than oneself. And that means that even if you yourself don’t find a divinely authorized Church in the first millennium of Church history, it is at least possible for others to do so. And if they do so, then they aren’t subject to the tu quoque, for the reason I explained in the body of the post.
No, it doesn’t matter when you start the clock. An interpretation of a text is a different sort of thing than a succession of bishops from the Apostles and Christ. The former cannot be authoritative over me (for the reasons I explained in the body of the post) while the latter can.
Yes Catholics have to interpret texts in order to discover the succession from the Apostles. But the fact that we have to interpret texts in order to discover the succession from the Apostles does not entail that the succession is just an interpretation; it isn’t an interpretation.
The objection is something like this. At some early stage in your inquiry, you interpreted the data of Scripture, history and tradition in such a way that you decided that apostolic succession is the proper criterion for locating the Church Christ founded, rather than “justification by faith alone” as the proper criterion. That was your interpretation of that data. Therefore, you are basically doing the same thing as the Protestant, treating as “the Church” that which conforms to your interpretation of Scripture, history and tradition.
When I gave up ecclesial deism, then (over some period of time) the Fathers’ interpretation of Scripture became more authoritative than my own interpretation of Scripture. And when that happened, I saw that they did not believe that the proper criterion for locating the Church was looking around to see who taught justification by faith alone (let alone extrinsic imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness). As you know, Alister McGrath has pointed out that the Reformation understanding of the nature of justification by “faith alone” was unknown from the time of St. Paul to the Reformation, calling it a “genuine theological novum.” The Fathers all believed in justification through baptism, though of course baptism presupposes some sort of faith (except in the case of infants). According to the Fathers, the marks of the Church are the four stated in the Creed, and they understood ‘apostolicity’ to require apostolic succession. So, the question then is whether to go with a criterion that was unknown for 1500 years, or go with what all the Church believed for fifteen hundred years to belong essentially to the marks of the Church.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Amen. And when I have seen certain apologists quote such scholars as authorities on historical matters where the Catholic and Reformed person disagree and pointed that out to them I’ve never gotten a response.
Andrew- You said (to Mike Liccione):
In this line you refer to the “Church” (the OHCAC). Then you go on to suggest that it’s even possible for this OHCAC to stray from the very attributes intrinsic to its nature. And that’s where you lost me. Is the Church, by her very nature unconditionally safeguarded from “straying from the 4 marks” of the herself?
That’s why the “if” in Dr. Liccione’s statement above (#33) makes all the difference in the world. IF the Catholic Church was ever the OHCAC, then she remains so to this day. The OHCAC simply cannot cease being the OHCAC.
And this is the reason why it’s becoming more and more apparent that the Achilles’ heel of Reformed theology lies in its ecclesiology which on the one hand affirms the public, visible, institutional nature of the OHCAC, and on the other hand, bears the burden of explaining how it’s possible that at some mysterious point between 107 AD and 1563 AD the OHCAC went “underground” and was “rediscovered” in the Post-Tridentine era.
It’d be easier to simply say that the Church was always “underground” and that Christ’s prayer for our unity was unrealistically idealistic. But you’ve got way too much integrity to say that!
thanks for your time.
Andrew P (#46):
Rebutting Jason, you wrote:
As I’ve been saying for months, nay years, this is the heart of the matter. If Protestantism of whatever form is true, then there can be no principled distinction between faith and opinion, and therefore no principled way to distinguish between that which is held by faith–i.e., de fide doctrines–and that which is held by opinion–i.e., interpretations of the sources. Given as much, the essence of my argument against Protestantism is that it precludes knowing when one is assenting to a proposition as a true expression of divine revelation rather than human opinion.
The difference between a liberal and a conservative Protestant is that the former recognizes and embraces this consequence while the latter has not.
Best,
Mike
Bryan and Andrew M.,
I’m relatively confident you two are talking past each other (Talking past each other? On the internet? Say it ain’t so!) ;-)
I’m pretty sure Andrew’s larger point was that there is no “bright line” answer one could give in response to your (Bryan’s) request. Truthfully, when I read Bryan’s query, I myself thought it a tad odd (“Does he really want a date, even an approximate one? Like the church was OHCAC in 1514-ish but not in 1515-ish? There was OHCAC on May 22, 450AD but on May 23, man, everything started going downhill!…”?) I phrase my thoughts facetiously because it struck me that Bryan’s request was, at best, a bit odd and probably one that Andrew M is not in a position to answer well unless he’s got a PhD in medieval or early modern European history – it’s just too complicated an issue!
That said, when I saw Andrew’s reply, (I think) I understood what he meant, but also saw that it was failing to answer (in Bryan’s opinion) one of the more important questions out there. *chuckles* So though I might agree with Andrew’s response, I can totally see how it might come across as one which ducks precisely the issue under contention.
I surely don’t mean to chide or berate either of you gentlemen and I hope it’s not coming across as such. Perhaps just take this as an encouragement to keep striving for understanding, not only of Christ but also of our brethrens’ positions. In reading your exchange, though, it occurred to me that you might be unaware of the degree to which, at least to this observer, you both seem to be talking past each other. There – you now have my $0.02, for what (little) they’re worth… :-)
Sincerely,
~Benjamin
Andrew,
I think a fair question(s) to you is: Which Church does the promise of Matthew 16 apply to? Which Church is the one, holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church? If you say the Church that preaches the Gospel and rightly administers the Sacraments, the next legitimate question is, according to whom?
I am doing no such thing. What I’m defining is the concept: one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church (OHCAC). It belongs to such a concept that whatever is the OHCAC always was and always will be the OHCAC. But in the comment you’re criticizing, I did not assert that the Catholic Church is the OHCAC; nothing I said in my comment ruled out the possibility, for instance, that the Orthodox communion is the OHCAC.
Mike,
You are evidently not comprehending what I am getting at, and I wish you would drop the insults about teaching me logic particularly since you are missing my point. Nobody is arguing against the fact that the modern RCC can trace the succession of its bishops back to the 1st century. And nobody is arguing that the Church in the 1st century was not, generally speaking, true to the words of Christ. But for you this connection means that the Church will always be true and always be the one, catholic, catholic, apostolic Church. You have ended the debate by stating the matter this way and gutted the words “one, holy, catholic, apostolic” of their meaning. It really does not matter how dis-unified, unholy, etc that RCC was at any given time. We are apparently supposed to ignore this and say that she is the one, catholic, catholic, apostolic Church, all evidence to the contrary not withstanding. The Protestants want to discuss whether the faith of the Church at Rome was, to take one of the four marks, connected to the faith of the Apostles with what she professed at Trent and elsewhere. But given your starting point that discussion is useless, it cannot possibly go anywhere. If you will agree with this last statement than that’s all I was looking for. Then all I can say is that I hope that all conservative Catholics such as yourself have not painted themselves into such a corner and there is some hope for dialog.
I agree that Matt 16:18 does not mean that each and every bishop will remain “faithful to the principles” of the apostolic church. In fact, nobody ever said it does mean that…
Right Mike, including me! What on earth did I say that would make you think that I believed this?
But as a Protestant, such a move is not open or even, apparently, conceivable to you. You cannot first identify some visible communion of churches as the OHCAC and then, citing Matt 16:18, infer that that communion has remained faithful to the principles of the apostolic church.
It is not inconceivable that the Church of Rome could be that visible entity which Christ ordained to unify His Church. But by what criteria is the Church is later centuries supposed to use to evaluate this? The RCC posits the four marks and so the Protestant communions took this and ran with it. In the Reformation they attempted to test the RCC in the Renaissance/Reformation era by these criteria and from what they could see the RCC failed by any reasonable dictionary definition of the terms, 1) one, 2) holy, 3) catholic, and 4) apostolic. But you are entering at this point and saying that no, if the RCC can trace her roots to apostolic origin and she was OHCAC then, she is OHCAC now. End of story, case closed – forget about what the obvious definitions of the four marks.
No, you first have to determine for yourself….
Now come on Mike, I’ve only said this to you how many times? It’s not about me, it’s about the criteria that the Protestant vs. the Catholic communions utilized.
If you can’t specify when that which was once OHCAC ceased to be OHCAC
So then if I cannot specify when leaders of Israel ceased to be faithful then I must conclude that the Sanhedrin was faithful to the religion of Abraham? Really, does it make any sense at all to challenge the Protestants with such a question? Why do I need to come up with an exact point in time when the Church at Rome was no longer faithful? If for sake of argument, we can say (which I think we can) that the Church of Rome in the Renaissance/Reformation era was not characterized by OHCAC as was the Apostolic Church then how is that proof affected if I cannot state whether it was the 8th or 12th, etc century where she went astray? Why does this exact point affect the argument of whether the 16th century RCC was or was not faithful?
you aren’t prepared to tell us which communion….
Your assumption here is that the Church which finds her genesis in the Scriptures was administratively one, but that’s something that has to be proven rather than assumed. The visible Church that Christ ordained is defined in the Scriptures. I’m sure you know the passages. There is nothing about Rome here or in the period immediately following the Apostles. Was the Church that Christ found meant to be administratively unified by Rome? That seems to me to be a very tough case to make given the historical data we have. But I think that you want me to show you one entity that is the VC if the RCC is not, correct? And if I cannot show you this one entity then the RCC must be that entity by default despite the fact the foundational ecclesiological documents of the Church never mention one administrative entity. Perhaps what is inconceivable for you is that Christ founded a Church without such a unifying administrative center?
Bryan,
OK, I think I’ve finally figured out (in my head, at least) why I think your argument is moot. But, of course, comments and thoughts from a fellow philosopher (or anyone else, for that matter) are always welcome.
The point of your article is to respond to a hypothetical Tu Quoque charge against your/the traditional Catholic position. In every logic textbook I can conveniently lay my hands on, however, the tu quoque fallacy is an informal, not a formal fallacy. So even if your position *were* committing a tu quoque fallacy, it wouldn’t affect the validity of your position in the first place!
Allow an illustration: A standard textbook definition of a tu quoque charge would be Bill Clinton saying “It’s morally right to not have adulterous affairs”. To which a hypothetical interlocutor responds “But you yourself had just such an affair!” Of course, this certainly looks bad – but as I always emphasized with my Intro to Critical Thinking students that this is, at best, a charge of hypocrisy and not a charge of logical invalidity – in fact, Clinton’s advice still is good, even though he himself chose not to follow it.
So in other words, unless you’re construing the Tu Quoque as some kind of formal logical fallacy (like affirming the consequent, etc), then I’m pretty sure your argument here is trivial. You claim that your position does not entail a Tu Quoque, which is fine, but even if a Tu Quoque *were* being committed, the validity of your argument would still not be affected (If invalid before, it would still be invalid; if valid before, it would still be valid regardless of whether or not a Tu Quoque was committed). Make sense? Thoughts?
~Benjamin =)
Benjamin,
The tu quoque being an informal, rather than a formal fallacy, does not make my argument here “moot,” or invalid, or “trivial.” The conclusion of the authority argument (see above) is that “without apostolic succession, creeds and confessions have no actual authority.” But if the tu quoque objection were correct, then the conclusion of our authority argument would be moot, because in that case the Catholic Church would likewise have no actual authority, and so with respect to authority we’d all (i.e. Catholics and Protestants) be in the same boat, so to speak. So, showing (here, in this thread) that the tu quoque objection is not correct is not “moot” or “trivial,” because whatever shows that something else is not “moot” or “trivial” is itself not “moot” or “trivial.”
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Essentially the tu quoque is not a defense of protestantism but an argument for functional atheism. That is not to say Sola Scriptura is right but to say that all faith is really opinion and divine revelation is not objectively knowable. Most protestants don’t get that. They are thinking that if they knock Catholicism down then people will naturally become protestants. They might but why? Not because protestantism offers them more truth about God. That has not been argued. What it offers is more power for my own opinion. The idea being that if we don’t know what truth is we might as well believe something that is agreeable.
Bryan,
No doubt I’m misunderstanding something – big surprise there. :-) I take it we agree that the TQ is an informal, not a formal logical fallacy. Its being so entails that the validity of the underlying argument is wholly unaffected by whether or not a TQ (or any other informal fallacy) is committed. (Correct? I think we agree on that claim too, but I might be wrong…)
So while I (think I) understand your response, and I can see why it does seem to matter, this doesn’t quite jive with what it means to be an informal fallacy. After all, if your argument’s validity is unaffected by whether or not a TQ is committed (as is entailed by the definition of an informal fallacy), then how is it not moot?
A possibility occurs to me: Perhaps we are understanding TQ’s differently. Your comment seems to suggest that this TQ attack “matters” in some larger sense than most TQ’s do (“Normal” TQ’s, if there were such a thing, tend to be [mere] “You too!” retorts which don’t affect the truth/falsity of the original claim [as in my Clinton example.] We seem to be dealing with a “You too!” retort which DOES affect the truth/falsity of the original claim). Hence, perhaps, we’re not dealing with a TQ but some other kind of fallacy? (Or perhaps recursive claims which do affect the validity of the underlying argument are TQs? I’ve never heard of such used before, but that’s not saying much…)
I find our responses here rather ironic, if I may so observe. :-) Had I written this article, apparently I would have said “TQ’s don’t affect the validity of the underlying argument, hence cannot be used to refute the Catholic position.” You have written saying, in essence, “There is no TQ here, hence it cannot be used to refute the Catholic position”. It’s ironic, at least to me, that our conclusions are not nearly as incongruous as they might otherwise be… :-) Have a blessed Memorial Day!
Sincerely,
Benjamin =)
Benjamin, (re: #61)
You wrote:
Correct.
Because of the broader context of the argument, not just the argument itself. (Philosophers are very good at abstracting away things, but if not accompanied by wisdom this ability can become a weakness, when it makes us lose sight of the forest for the trees, or become like the blind men and the elephant.) The soundness of the authority argument is worthless (with respect to resolving the Catholic – Protestant disagreement) if the tu quoque objection is true. The broader context is the Protestant – Catholic disagreement. So, given that broader context, refuting the tu quoque objection is not moot.
Correct.
When two positions are being compared, then in order to show the superiority of the one, it is not enough to show a problem with the other. We must also show that the one is not subject to that same problem.
There is a broader context, and hence a broader question on the table than merely “does the rejection of apostolic succession entail that creeds and confessions have no actual authority?” That broader question is the Protestant-Catholic question. If you take a step back, and see the larger context, then I think you’ll see why it is essential that I show why “there is no TQ here.”
A blessed Memorial Day to you as well. And a blessed Feast of the Visitation.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Andrew (#57):
No Andrew, you continue to misconstrue my argument. My argument that whichever church was once OHCAC will always be OHCAC does not depend on any claim that the Catholic Church retains apostolic succession. My argument is that, given the very concept of what it is to be OHCAC, then whichever church was once OHCAC will always be OHCAC, whether that church is the Catholic Church or some other communion. That you still don’t get that is only further indication that you lack competence in the logical analysis of arguments. That’s not an insult. Logical analysis is a skill which takes some training, and evidently you haven’t had that.
Ask yourself this, Andrew: why do you think it even matters how the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed’s phrase ‘one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church’ is understood? Is it because the men who propounded that creed had the authority to bind Christians to what they meant by that phrase? If so, why is that? If it’s not because they enjoyed apostolic succession, then their opinion has only human authority and does not bind us; we are free to redefine the phrase OHCAC as seems fit to us, which of course is what Protestants did and do. But opinions having only human authority don’t bind Christians. If, on the other hand, the bishops at Constantinople in 381 did enjoy apostolic succession and were teaching with the Church’s full authority, then Christians are bound even today by what they meant, and it behooves us to understand the phrase OHCAC as they intended it. The only way to be sure we understand it as it was intended 1, 630 years ago is not by scholarly debate alone, which can yield only opinions, but by identifying how it’s understood by the men today who have inherited the same authority as the men who propounded it. The only candidates for such authority are those who can trace their apostolic succession back to those who propounded it, and beyond. Accordingly, your construal of OHCAC means nothing to me, and your church’s construal of OHCAC means nothing to me, because neither of you have any authority other than that of human opinion, which in matters of dogma has no authority. Opinions are like certain other things that everybody’s got.
If you’ll notice, I didn’t ask you to state the precise date when the Catholic Church ceased to be OHCAC. That’s because I know perfectly well that, whatever it was that causes you to believe that the Catholic Church had ceased to be OHCAC, no precise date can be put on that development. But you’ve now answered the question with as much precision as your position allows.
And where does that leave us? Do we have to say that the property of being-OHCAC is something that can be gradually lost, or gained, like the property of being hot or cold, so that no particular point can be specified when a church become one or the other? And if so, why should I accept your account of the property of being-OHCAC as opposed to the account of a church which has apostolic succession? What authority does your account have, as opposed to that of my church? That of Scripture? Don’t you mean your interpretation of Scripture, the one on the basis of which you selected the church you worship in? Why should I accept that as an authority? Until you can demonstrate that your interpretation of the sources–in this case, Scripture and the Creed of 381–can claim the full authority of a church with apostolic succession, it means nothing whatsoever to me.
I did ask you another question, however, which called for a fairly precise answer and which is a perfectly fair question: which visible body or communion is now OHCAC? You answered:
Basically, your answer rejects my question by rejecting what you take to be an assumption underlying that question. Now for one thing, I made no such assumption; I asked which visible body or communion is OHCAC, and mere visibility does not entail what you seem to mean by “administrative unity,” as the Orthodox could tell you. That’s precisely why I framed my question as I did; since you seem to reject that idea that being-OHCAC requires administrative unity, I asked you which visible body or communion (other than the Roman communion, which you reject) is the one you regard as OHCAC. Besides myself, several of the authors of this blog have asked you essentially that same question before. You never answered it, and you still haven’t answered it. That’s because you have no answer. And that alone suffices to show that your concept of OHCAC is useless.
As requested, I’ve come over here and intend to interact with this article, the thing is… I’m through 3.B right now and have a boat load of corrections and errors to address. Would it be better if I did a 3 part response (Foundations, Claims, and Q&A) or all in one mammoth chunk? Either way, I’m sure a lot will get lost in the following combox firestorm.
Eddie,
The best way to do this would be to present your objections one or two at a time, which we then discuss, and then you present your next one or two objections.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan,
Thank you. I want to start by saying that I realize my last post might have sounded a bit strong and I didn’t mean to. I want to preface these comments, as well as postscript my prior, that I apologize if any of these things have been dealt with elsewhere on the site (since I’m new here) and were hashed out in the combox above. I’ve skimmed the combox and I *think* I’m coming from a different place than the comments above, but please forgive me if I rehash anything.
I’ll start then with a couple comments on section 1, which I already know is in reference to something else, so please forgive if you’ve said something before and just left it out rather than repeat yourself. As I understand your principle regarding authority and if I might reword it a little, “If I only submit when I agree, then the one to whom I submit is actually myself.”
If that is correct, then I would ask:
1) Is it true? I tried running through some examples in my head and I’m not so sure it is. Are there cases of disagreement that may cause one to not submit, while not submitting only to yourself? I’m thinking of the Christian’s submission to the governing authorities of the world. I agree to submit to the government when I agree that its policies are not forcing me to sin. If I don’t submit them, is it myself that I am really submitting to? God’s Law? The Church?
Or perhaps if you would like a positive example: Coming to faith in Christ. Can one submit to Christ without agreeing with His Church? His teachings? Who He claims to be? Most of us would say that you need to actually agree and assent to the truths of Scripture before you could call yourself a Christian. Yet if my agreement to submit to Christ is because I’m convinced He is the Messiah, am I really only submitting to myself?
Now, before you answer that (because the answer will probably be related to what is next), there is another underlying theme/problem I saw which started in this section, and carried forward a good ways:
2) There seems to be no differentiation between *recognizing* the truth, and declaring something to be truth due to one’s own personal interpretation.
Now I’m not concerned (at this point) about whether or not the Protestant does one thing in practice and says another with his mouth. That’s for the discussion of the Protestant position later in 3.B. Rather we establish the fact that something has authority because of what it is (ontologically), not because of what someone says about it (which I’m pretty sure is where you’re going in 3.C, but I have set that aside for the moment to type this out).
So if we’re going to discuss whether or not a creed or confession has any real authority, we need to get down this fact that I didn’t see thus far: It has it’s authority and is binding insofar as it agrees with God’s Word. The Church has its authority because it is Christ’s body, it has authority because of what it is. The Bible has its authority because it is God’s Word, it has authority because of what it is. Yes, these appeals are circular, but so are all ultimate appeals, they are self justifying (ex: God deserves glory because He is God).
This is important because the Protestant would claim that a creed or confession has an inherent authority insomuch as it agrees with Scripture. It does not depend upon my views or my claims, it stands and falls on its own. Whether or not one recognizes that authority IN NO WAY diminishes the authority it has. Just because someone turns their back on God doesn’t mean God loses His authority over that person or the world. The same goes for confessions and creeds.
If this is right, then:
3) Your statements seem to show a conflict between Rome’s teachings and Christ’s if you deny this recognizing of inherent authority. For Rome teaches that Protestants (CC 838), Muslims (CC 841), and various other non-Christians (CC 847) are actually saved. This means that those who would follow Christ and would if given a chance, would recognize Christ’s voice to them (John 10:1-18). CC 841 makes it rather explicit that if they found Rome, they would follow and convert.
So why then, can a new convert, studying the bible, who is “seek[ing] God with a sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they know it,” NOT recognizing Christ’s voice in creeds and confessions? Why *must* it be personal interpretation instead of Christ’s sheep recognizing His voice, His truth, His Word, in these creeds and confessions?
Granted, man is prone to error and his sinful stains may prevent Him from seeing the full truth on his own. However this in no way negates his ability to recognize Christ’s voice to at least SOME degree, and to recognize God’s authority in a creed to be able to submit to it. A submission which would be according to how much of Christ’s voice they recognize in it, and not according to how much it submits itself to their mere opinion.
Eddie, (re: #66)
Regarding “When I submit (only if I agree), the one to whom I submit, is me,” you wrote:
In the case of the government, there is a higher authority (natural law, and divine law). But the fact that we must always obey the higher law does not mean that we only obey the government when we agree with what the government says. Otherwise, the government would have no authority whatsoever. Rather, it means that the government’s authority is limited, not absolute. It can only legislate within the boundaries of higher law, not beyond those boundaries. But that does not mean that we are the higher law.
The basis for the divine authority of Christ is not one’s agreement with Christ, even though those who recognize Christ’s divine authority immediately in the obedience of faith begin to conform their minds to His. We agree with Him because He has authority; it is not that He has authority because we agree with Him. His authority is not based on our agreement with Him, even though our agreement with Him necessarily follows from our recognition of His authority.
I make this distinction quite clearly, later in the post.
No disagreement here.
Yes, but you really need to read the rest of the post in order to see what I say about the “inasmuch as it agrees with Scripture.”
No it doesn’t. Read those paragraphs again, more carefully this time.
CCC 841 says no such thing.
Grace isn’t a substitute for nature. This is precisely why authorized shepherds are needed in Christ’s Church. Otherwise, if the Spirit taught all things immediately and directly, all those who believe in Christ would be agreed on all things theological. But grace does not replace nature. We still need human teachers, even after we have the Spirit. And if we have no teachers, or we have bad teachers, we will be confused or misled. This is why heretics and schismatics are so dangerous; they do not just harm themselves, but lead many people into error. Just look around. Turn on Christian television and watch Benny Hinn for a while; it cures the notion that the Spirit alone is sufficient to teach everyone the truth, apart from the Church. Of course the Spirit has the power to do this. But the Spirit does not do this, because Christ has given a certain responsibility to the Church, a responsibility that the Spirit does not replace, but through which the Spirit ordinarily operates.
See my precious comments immediately above.
Protestantism is living in large measure on the continued inertia of what it brought with it from Catholicism. But that inertia is largely spent. That’s why confessional Protestantism has degenerated into liberalism and Evangelicalism, the latter which is now degenerating into Emergentism.
If they were all listening to Christ’s voice, then they would all agree. But that bosom-burning thing just doesn’t work. The facts of the last five-hundred years of history shows that bosom-burning (i.e. Montanism) is not a reliable way of following the Spirit, because He is the Spirit of Truth, and truth cannot contradict truth. And yet by bosom-burning, everyone contradicts everyone else, in chaos. How shall they hear without a preacher? (Rom 10:14) They won’t. We need preachers of orthodoxy in order to know what orthodoxy is.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
To Bryan and others familiar with this site,
I’ll respond tomorrow, but it will be much easier if I knew how you guys did all that bold, italics, and quoting. I tried clicking on some links at the bottom, but none of them seemed to tell me how to do it!
Thanks for the help in advance,
Eddie
Hey Eddie,
If you hover your mouse over “About” at the navigation menu, you’ll see a drop-down containing a link to “Comment Formatting.” That should answer your questions about italics, quoting, etc.
Pax Christi,
David
David, thank you for pointing out where I could go for the formatting, I appreciate it! That’s one of those things that earns a “facepalm” once you discover it!
Bryan,
I apologize for taking so long to reply. I didn’t forget you! Life just got hectic this last week and I didn’t get a chance to come back here. I did get a chance to finish reading your article above and I’ll have a comment on it in my replies here. Please forgive any formatting errors I may make in this reply as well!
That is exactly my point though. A confession’s authority is limited vs. absolute because it only “legislates within the boundaries of higher law.” Therefore disagreeing with it can be just like disagreeing with the government, without doing damage to it’s authority whatsoever. I submit to God’s Word, and not the confession.
Again, this proves my point. My submitting to Christ because I agree that Christ is who He said He is, does not mean that I am submitting to myself. In fact, your statement here appears to undermine your entire article because a confession really DOES have authority whether or not we agree with it (your major sticking point as to why Protestant Confessions don’t have actual authority).
I’m not so sure you do, but I’m just focusing on the foundation right now, your first section.
I have now, but claiming that is not what is actually being done assumes what you’re trying to prove. Something Jason brought up earlier in the comments. Ok, Ok, I’ll try to focus again. It looks like my 2nd point is getting brushed aside for later, but if you can direct me towards what you’re thinking of specifically, I can address it better than taking a guess as to which paragraph you’re referring to.
Now hold on a minute. Your persistent claim in this article is that one WOULD find Rome as the true Catholic Church with the help of the Holy Spirit (3.A.1 and pretty much all of 3.C). In fact, to claim that to find Protestantism is one’s opinion, and to discover Rome is a work of God, assumes that Rome is where the Holy Spirit leads believers (vs. being led by nature and mere personal interpretation elsewhere). If that is true, and if all of Christ’s sheep know His voice (John 10), then when one discovers Christ, the 2nd person of the Trinity in the text (3.C.4, right after the quote from John 5:39), they will naturally turn to Rome. Because otherwise they only would have discovered an interpretation of Christ, and not Christ Himself, and it’s not Christ’s voice if it is a personal interpretation.
This leaves us with a few options: 1) Protestants aren’t really Christians because they never discover Christ, but you never claim that and neither does Rome. 2) Your summary of Rome’s teachings are incompatible with Christ’s teachings. Or 3) Protestants actually can and do discover the 2nd person of the Trinity making Rome’s Catechism correct in regards to a Protestant’s salvation, and Scripture correct in regards to recognizing Christ’s voice, but your argument against the tu quoque incorrect about this only happening in Rome.
Granted, I didn’t stick to just the first section as I wanted to, but you wanted me to consider the whole article… so I did. ;^)
That’s quite unfair historically speaking. Pelagianism, popularized in America by Finney, mixed with Congregationalist/Anabaptist views of the Church has brought about this degeneration. Neither of which started with Protestantism but came out of Rome might I remind you… but we’re getting sidetracked.
I fully agree that teachers are needed and that God has ordained specific ways for His people to be taught His Word. This does not negate God’s people from recognizing Him however on their own, as it would appear even Rome acknowledges in those Catechism segments I referenced before.
Eddie,
That is true of Protestant confessions. But, there is an important difference between disagreeing with a law of the US government, and disagreeing with a dogma defined by the Church. By our very nature we have access to a higher law than the human laws of the US government. This higher law is called natural law. This is precisely how, even apart from supernatural revelation, we are able to judge that some particular human law is unjust. But, we don’t, by our very nature, have access to the deposit of faith, which is supernaturally revealed. Because the deposit of faith is supernatural in what it reveals, and supernaturally revealed, it is not naturally known or naturally knowable. It was entrusted to the Church, and is rightly known through the Church. The Churchs’ authoritative interpretation of the deposit of faith establishes the authoritative interpretive boundaries of the deposit of faith. To disagree with the divinely established interpretive authority (i.e. the magisterium) or to oppose it, is to make ourselves the higher interpretive authority. But that is not the case when it comes to human law, because in the case of human law, we by nature have access to the higher law. When it comes to the deposit of faith, however, we have authorized access to it only through the magisterium. So disagreeing with the magisterium is not just like disagreeing with the government. Not only does the magisterium have a higher authority than does the government, but in the case of the government we have natural access to an authority (i.e. natural law) higher than the government, while in the case of the magisterium, regarding the rightful interpretation of the deposit of faith, we do not have natural access to an authority higher than the magisterium. Scripture is not naturally knowable; it is known rightly and truly only with supernatural aid. And Christ gave this charism to the Church, and in a special way to her magisterium. Hence to oppose the Church (in matters of faith and morals) is to oppose God. But to oppose the US government is not necessarily to oppose God.
I agree. But notice the difference between agreeing that Christ is who He says He is (based on discovering Him to be divine), and agreeing with His teachings. If you ‘submitted’ to Him because you agreed with His teachings, you would not be submitting at all. You can truly submit to Him if you do so because you believe He is divine; but you cannot submit to Him if you do so because you agree with His teachings.
As I pointed out in the post, insofar as a confession simply re-states what Scripture says, then (on those points) it has the same authority as Scripture. But insofar as a confession interprets Scripture, and the interpretation is made by humans without divine authorization, then the confession has no divine authority. It has no more authority than a systematic theology book.
I included the statement about the Holy Spirit because faith (not only in Christ but in-Christ-through-the-Church) is not something that human reason can come to on its own. Faith requires the aid of the Holy Spirit. I do believe that everyone who is following the Spirit will [eventually] become Catholic, but I’m not making that claim in this post.
That conclusion does not follow, not only because knowing Christ is a matter of degree (not all or nothing), but also because Christ can be known in various ways through different means, e.g. Scripture, sacraments, prayer, tradition, community, service. Christ can even be known (in some degree) through incorrect interpretations of Scripture. “Hearing Christ’s voice” does not necessarily mean “perfectly hearing Christ’s voice.” Hearing Christ’s voice correctly about one truth within the deposit of faith, does not entail hearing His voice correctly about every truth within the deposit of faith. So a person can truly come to know and love Christ, without yet knowing that the Catholic Church is the Church Christ founded and into which all Christians should be incorporated in full communion. (cf. CCC 846)
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan,
You appear much faster at replying than I, so I hope you’re not bored to tears because I take so long!
I wasn’t saying anything about ecclesiology, merely inherent authority and how a confession can have actual authority. The fact you agreed that it is true of Protestant confessions seems to place you at odds with your prior statements saying a confession has no actual authority.
I’m tempted to address your point on the deposit of faith, but I fear it would detract/sidetrack from the point at hand.
I think you’re trying to squirm out of this one. ;^) I submit to Him because I agree with what He taught about Himself!
Now hold on, this is what happens when you chop a paragraph in half. You can lose the intent of what it was talking about! I was referring to something having authority in and of itself, whether or not we agree with it. Which flies directly in the face of one of your opening sentences:
“[Creeds and confessions] have no actual authority apart from apostolic succession because without apostolic succession the only available basis for a creed or confession’s authority is the individual’s agreement with the interpretation of Scripture found in that creed or confession.” (emphasis mine)
Your opening statement is that it is one’s agreement with the confession that is its “only available basis” for authority. I was pointing out that this isn’t true because authority doesn’t rest in agreement. If you agree that authority doesn’t actually rest in our agreement with it then my case is made, and your initial assertion is false.
You don’t have to make the claim at this point, we’re dealing with your foundational assumptions in section one.
I was never talking about agreeing on all points of doctrine. This is another one of those paragraph chop jobs. Here’s the important part that got left out:
“In fact, to claim that to find Protestantism is one’s opinion, and to discover Rome is a work of God, assumes that Rome is where the Holy Spirit leads believers (vs. being led by nature and mere personal interpretation elsewhere).”
I find it odd that you left it out, because you asserted almost this very thing just above. The part you replied to even starts with, “if that is true,” referring back to this statement. It means that Christ, and His Voice that His people recognize, are leading them to Rome as well. So the question remains… why not? You claim it is because of personal interpretation. Tu quoque says that it’s because we both use our interpretations. So that even if you want to claim that Rome’s interpretation is correct and Spirit led, it is still an interpretation, the same method, and the tu quoque stands firm.
Eddie,
I’m not bored. :-) I prefer it when those making comments take their time, because generally such comments are more thoughtful and careful. Let me see if I can clear up something.
A photocopy of the Bible is not a confession; it is another copy of the Bible. In this post, I’m making a distinction between those parts of a Protestant confession that are direct quotations from Scripture, and those parts that are interpretation of Scripture. The parts that are direct quotations from Scripture have authority because God is their author. But strictly speaking, they are not a confession; they are just small ‘photocopies’ of parts of the Bible. There is only a Protestant confession if there is more than a collection of Bible verses. If it were a collection of Bible verses, it wouldn’t be a Protestant confession, because all Catholics could affirm it. The other parts of the confession (besides the direct re-statements of Scripture) have no authority, because the only possible basis for their authority is that someone agrees with them, and ‘agreement with oneself’ is an insufficient basis for authority over oneself.
So when I say that Protestant confessions have no authority, I’m not talking about the parts that are direct quotations from Scripture. That’s not what makes them Protestant confessions. I’m talking about everything other than the direct quotations from Scripture.
You [rightly] don’t agree with what everyone says about themselves. (Many examples are available, but David Koresh comes to mind.) Before you start trusting persons’ statements about themselves, you have to determine that they are trustworthy and truthful. So it is only per accidens that you submit to Christ because you agree with what He taught about Himself. First you determine that He is divinely authorized, and then, because of His divine authority, you submit to what He says. Your agreement with what He says is not the basis for your submission; your submission is the basis for your agreement with what He says. Once you believe (not on the basis of your agreement with Him, but on the basis of the miracles He performs and the prophecies He fulfills) Him to be divinely authorized, then you submit to Him (including what He says about Himself) not because He agrees with you, but because of His divine authorization. Otherwise, if you ‘submitted’ to Christ only because what He says (even about Himself) agrees with what you think, then you wouldn’t actually be submitting to Him; you would ultimately be ‘submitting’ to yourself.
I agree that authority cannot rest in our agreement with that authority. That’s one of the premises of my argument. When I say that agreement with oneself is the only available basis for the authority of Protestant confessions, I’m not saying that in this case agreement with authority can ground authority. I’m saying rather that the only remaining option for explaining a Protestant confession’s ‘authority’ is agreement with oneself. And precisely because agreement with oneself cannot ground authority, therefore Protestant confessions do not have actual authority.
Why not what?
I don’t know what you are referring to with the ‘its’ in these two sentences. So, I’m not sure what you are saying in these two sentences.
Here in this post I’m not talking about “Rome’s interpretation.” If there is a divinely authorized teaching magisterium, then the authority of the magisterium’s interpretation of Scripture is not the same as mine. My interpretation has no authority, but if there is a divinely authorized magisterium, then the magisterium’s interpretation of Scripture is divinely authorized. So the person who has not discovered that there is a divinely authorized magisterium is in a position in which no confession can have authority (except of course those parts of it that are direct quotations of scripture), since the only [broadly] possible basis for a confession’s authority would be agreement with himself, and that cannot in fact serve as a basis for its authority. By contrast, the person who has discovered that there is a divinely authorized magisterium is in a position where confessions can have authority. And that’s why the tu quoque does not apply. He has discovered a divinely authorized magisterium, which is not an interpretation of Scripture, tradition and history, just as Jesus of Nazareth is pointed to by Scripture, tradition and history, but is not merely an interpretation of Scripture, tradition, and history.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Eddie J and Bryan Cross
I’m not sufficiently educated in Philosophy and Theology to generally keep up with the conversation here at C2C, but I’d like to offer some thoughts on this discussion. So far the discussion has focused on the very formal logical principles to either support the claim that there IS something different in regards to ‘submission to authority’ in becoming Roman Catholic as opposed to formally declaring oneself a member of most of the non-Catholic confessions.
Eddie, I see that you can’t see the difference from the logical arguments that Bryan is presenting. I am not capable of making a better logical argument are explaining Bryan’s logic more clearly, I can only follow it myself. As important and helpful as pure logic and rational argument are, I think there are times when we need to look up and see the forest for the trees a bit.
Bryan is presenting the claim that when a thinking and discerning Protestant with prior knowledge of the Gospel and the Bible and some theology (though not necessarily a scholar or extremely knowledgeable) ‘discovers’ that the Catholic Church is true, they are doing something functionally different than when the same individual or similar individual in similar circumstances ‘discovering’ that the Lutheran or Presbyterian or Anglican confession of faith is true.
In Bryan’s words:
I believe that real life observations can illustrate that ‘discovering’ the truth of a confession is very different that ‘discovering’ a true Church.
I have sponsored three former Protestants through RCIA, talked with friends and family about the Church, including some who did convert and an Anglican Priest that hasn’t – yet – but who was struggling to understand why his seminary friends have. I also have participated in these online ecumenical discussions off and on since 1990 (USENET days). I especially enjoyed to vigorous discussions over at InternetMonk back in 2007 or so when Michael was really baring his soul in trying to understand Catholicism and the rationale of those becoming Catholic.
“But what if the Pope infallibly declares X, Y or Z tomorrow and I can’t accept that.” In my experience this is a common objection of those Protestants who find themselves becoming sympathetic and open to the Church’s claims and are unwilling to go further. Such people rightly recognize that if they become Catholic they do so because they have come to believe that the Catholic Church is exactly what it claims to be, and if that is so then Magisterial and Papal Infallibility is also true. This response from people who find themselves attracted to and persuaded by Catholicism to some degree makes clear that to become Catholic means to them precisely what Bryan is trying to show by logic. I submit that any catechized Protestant who wrestles with the decision to become Catholic regardless of their ultimate decision has to confront this issue: “If I proclaim my faith in the Catholic Church, part of that is professing that the Church can infallibly teach doctrine and whether by council or by an infallible Papal statement I am by conscience binding myself to accept in faith what the Church teaches clearly not only today but in the future as well.” For many the honest answer is “No WAY! I can’t profess to believe in a Church that might teach something that I will then be compelled to believe.”
I think this gets precisely to the point of difference that Bryan is trying to show logically. A sincere Catholic Convert isn’t merely assenting to agree with what the Church clearly teaches today but also tomorrow. My observation is that even for those who have come to share much or most of the Catholic Faith, this is a heart stopping proposition. Why? Because that is inherently something different than the relationship of faith in a Statement of Confession. For precisely the reasons that Bryan presents very logically above. In fact, I know this is precisely the reason that some (and likely a good many) conservative Anglo-Catholics continue to, and will continue to stay out of the Catholic Church no matter how crazy the Anglican Communion and various fragments get.
2) In the many Protestant families and churches becoming Catholic is seen as a much bigger deal than changing from Baptist to Lutheran or Anglican. Although there are various reasons for this both cultural and doctrinal, we can’t deny that the authority of the Pope representing the Magisterium is one of the biggest reasons. Why?? A Baptist may be able to list a dozen each of doctrines and practices that Lutherans and Anglicans get ‘wrong.’ Why is becoming Catholic going so much further than becoming Lutheran or an Anglican? I claim that the answer is Authority. A Lutheran or an Anglican can (and a few do) believe every single dogma the Catholic Church teaches except Authority. Teaching with Authority changes everything. More Protestants would be interested in the Catholic Church if it weren’t for the Marian Dogmas. I know some who would even be okay if Catholic’s commonly believed exactly as we believe about Mary, as long as the immaculate conception wasn’t Dogma. After all, such things aren’t “essential to salvation.” But it is precisely because these dogmas are taught with Authority that makes them so difficult to abide.
Isn’t this even the point of the contentions about the Catholic Church regarding ecumenism: That the RCC refuses to compromise? There are two assumptions inherent in that perspective. The second (less obvious) inherent assumption is that the correct path to unity is to focus on central truths (minimize or eliminate to make the list of dogmas short) and state things broadly (easy to leave wiggle room for various interpretations). In fact this sounds like it could be the approach that some Protestants take to holding a church together with a Confession: make it a short list and keep it broad enough to let people in in. BTW, the first and obvious assumption is that the Catholic Church doesn’t have the authority she claims which is schizophrenic because being the One True Church and having authority is not just a side issue, that is the nature of the Church it can’t be negotiated AND why would anyone who believed such a claim was false want to compromise on anything ELSE with a church with such a false self identity?
3) Although certainly we can agree that we shouldn’t judge any church by the behavior of individuals, I think that even looking at the behavior of not so exemplary Catholics also shows that there is a difference. Clearly many Catholics act in practice act as if the Church has little or no authority to teach at least some things, especially against contraception. Such examples show in practice that many Catholics practice Solo Mia rather than fidelity to the Magisterium. What is germane to this discussion is how they talk about themselves and their relationship to the Church. “I am Catholic, but not a very good one” is a common statement. How often do you here of someone who is a self-proclaimed “bad Baptist” or “bad Anglican?” Such statement acknowledge that there is a standard – a Canon – in Catholicism that looks to the Church. There is a world of misunderstanding about that standard and the theology of calling yourself “a bad Catholic” according to the standard, but it makes clear that even the laxest Catholics understand that the Church itself (not just the Bible) proclaims a standard. So there is something about being Catholic that even for the complacent is different than being _____ AND even poor examples and rebels KNOW there is an authoritative (or authoritarian in some eyes) institution which sets the bar.
Finally
I am guessing that most people on Eddie’s side of this debate can even find some contradiction in their own personal thoughts and statements. If you find yourself in agreement with certain statements about Catholics and Faith that go to authority, then you already acknowledge the difference between a living authority and a confession of faith. Statements like: Catholics follow the Pope not the Bible; or Catholic’s aren’t allowed to think for themselves; or Catholics don’t have to understand they just follow. You can’t have it both ways! Either a conscientious Catholic is bound by something more that just mere personal agreement with what the Church teaches OR they are actually doing something fundamentally different in professing faith in the Church than agreeing intellectually to a few propositions.
So although I admit this is in no means logical proof that Tu Quoque does not apply in this case, I think it is good evidence of what Bryan is saying: that people in actual practice DO recognize that becoming Catholic is submission to actual authority and that Confessing membership in a non-authoritative church is something different. I think I do show that in the real world outside of philolosophical debate people on both sides recognize that becoming convinced in conscience that the Catholic Church not only teaches true doctrine but has the authority (past, present and future) to teach is different than becoming convinced of a particular Confession of Faith or choosing to confess the truth of a confession that you have chosen to match your own interpretation.
Under the circumstances, I’d say Bryan’s argument even without my thoughts is sufficient to put the burden of accusation back on the Tu Quoque side. From the beginning Bryan has advanced the argument that becoming Catholic is indeed different and as I have tried to show that conforms with the way people actually react and behave regarding the Church.
- I believe The Church is of divine origin and has divine authority.
- I believe that Catholic Church is THE one, THE holy, THE catholic and THE apostolic Church.
- I believe that the Catholic Bishops are the actual living magisterial authority in succession from the Apostles and from Christ.
Because I believe all the above, even when my judgment or interpretation contradicts the Church I will trust the Church first and prayerfully seek to understand. In practice when my efforts to understand drift, I don’t follow them. I explore them, study issues, pray, and maintain the faith. Yes, I suppose theoretically that I could leave the Church but in order to do that I’d have to be convinced not only that the Church is wrong about X, Y, and Z but ALSO that apostolic succession is meaningless; that even Paul was being silly by ordaining successors to lead his local Churches and never intended them to have the guidance of the Holy Spirit required to do the job; that Jesus didn’t ever intend even a shred of visible unity in his Church; that Christ intended his body on earth to me something effervescent with visible reality. In fact I do find some things hard. Sola Fide arguments can sway my thinking for a while. I question all the time. But I still accept and believe what the Church teaches because of she is The Church through Apostolic Succession FIRST and for more practical reasons second.
The Tu Quoque charge needs to be substantiated by proving logically that professing faith in those precepts and a Church you believe embodies those things that it claims is indeed the same as confessing to a statement of faith as a PCUSA after leaving the ELCA because I disagreed with the profession of faith and thereby knowing full well that I can reserve the option to leave the PCUSA at any time and join the TEC which was my other choice. What Bryan is making clear is that the Catholic Church is not just one similar choice among the many, and the real world bears this out.
One of these things is not like the others, one of these churches isn’t the same. LOL
Thanks for the great discussion. I am thankful to both sides for helping me learn more all around.
I apologize again for the delay. I wish I could say it is because I thought about this for 2 weeks, but life just got busy for me!
Bryan,
I think I had better tie all this into the main post or we’ll never get there! I understand your point about considering a source trustworthy first, in order to trust what it is saying/claiming in regards to Christ. I think you’re just pushing things backwards in time though. If it’s not my interpretation of His sayings, it’s my interpretation of who He is (trustworthy or untrustworthy) before He speaks (faith seeking understanding).
Let me address the main of the post then, and I’m going to have to get mathematical to do it. So let’s see how much “higher math” and Philosophy I’ve remembered:
L = Lutheran
P = Presbyterian
R = Roman
then also:
A = Student
B = Scripture, history, and tradition
C = Student’s interpretation of B
So there seems to be a problem when it appears that:
A + B = L
A + B = P
A + B = R
Now there are a couple ways to account for such a discrepancy, and this article deals with one way. All parties involved agree that Scripture, history, and tradition exist outside themselves and are set, unchangeable unless later evidence proves otherwise (corrected text, contrary evidence, etc.).
The Tu Quoque claims that the equation is the same for everyone. Your post argues from the conclusion. That because L, P, and R are different, it is an incorrect formula. Or in more basic math terms, if 1+1 seems to equal 2, and 3, and 4, then the problem lies not in the answers, but in the 2nd number. So that the 2nd number must be 2 to have it equal 3, or 3 to have it equal 4.
The problem is however that you don’t actually address the formula or the methodology the tu quoque is appealing to. I understand your point, but it misses the mark of what the Protestant is trying to say in return. You do touch on the methodology some in Q&A 5 and 7, but that’s the only spot I found it (outside of stating what it was in section 2).
Aside from the complaint that you are not comparing apples to apples (confessions and creeds to confessions and creeds, or church tradition to church tradition), does this post really address the Tu Quoque? I’m not so sure it does. Here’s how the conversation would go as I understand it (and perhaps we have evidenced so far in our conversation):
This post, “It’s not the same process because the results are the same.”
Random Protestant, “But that’s the point, the same process produces different results.”
This post, “Which should be proof that the processes are different because we start in the same spot.”
R. P., “No, it proves that the starting points/people are different, thus using the same process you get different results.”
Ironically, the positions are flipped when looking at where one puts their emphasis.
R. P., “I accept this view of tradition/history because I accept this view of Scripture.”
This post, “I accept this view of Scripture because I accept this view of tradition/history.”
Same interpretation with different starting points? Or Different interpretations with same starting points? How many licks to the center of a tootsie roll pop?
Paul,
I hope my above post helps make clear what I am saying as well. I’m pretty sure that Bryan and I are understanding each other, just coming at it from different angles. Please also ignore the letter C in my “givens” above. I reworked the formula a couple ways but then decided to just KISS. I forgot to erase “C” in the process.
I like your distinction in #1 about accepting teaching today AND tomorrow. I think you need to remember what most Protestants hear when that is said: invisible vs. visible church. Thus the distinction between the Church and the church. The Church being the one, holy, (invisible) Catholic Church, and the church being the localized or denominational visible church. So one always submits to the Catholic Church, wherever it is found. Some believe that is Rome (thus the rest of the name), others believe it is elsewhere (Bible Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, etc.).
As for #2, in the nicest possible way, the reason becoming Roman is so much more serious than becoming another Protestant denomination is because of that 6th Council of Trent. In the eyes of many, when Rome decided to change what it meant to be justified, it was playing with (hell)fire. Thus denying that one’s salvation is by grace alone through faith alone in Christ alone, is tantamount to what Paul called “another gospel” and therefore anathema.
Lastly, in regards to #3, I think such comments typically refer to one’s standing in light of the Law. One reason you don’t hear about it very much in Protestant circles is because we don’t believe in a “state of grace.” We don’t believe in working back to a right standing with God because we don’t believe that you need to be good/holy/just in order to be declared good/holy/just by God (the difference between imputation and infusion of grace).
Eddie, (re: #75)
You wrote:
The question of “who He is” is a question of identity. The question of “trustworthy or untrustworthy” is a question not of identity, but of character. Of course the question of His identity is related to the question of His character; if He is the Son of God, then His character is impeccable. But the two questions are distinct. Your objection seems to be that even if our determination of Christ’s divine authority is not based on our agreement with what He says, nevertheless, our prior determination of Christ’s identity is still an interpretation.
Imagine a person living in AD 30, who witnesses Christ’s preaching, sees His miracles, and comes to see that Christ has been sent from God and is the Son of God. What is the basis for Christ’s authority in this case? The basis for Christ’s authority is not agreement with this man’s interpretation of the evidence. The basis for Christ’s authority is Christ’s identity and divine authorization. The means by which the man discovers Christ’s authority are not the basis for Christ’s authority, but rather are evidences of Christ’s authority. The discovery of Christ is not just an interpretation of data; it is that which is revealed through the interpretation. It is an encounter with the One who is Truth, an insight, an illumination, an enlightenment. The Christian martyrs didn’t lay down their lives for a mere interpretation, but for Christ Himself. Just as the means by which the first Christians discovered Christ’s divine authority was not the basis for Christ’s authority, so likewise the means by which a person discovers the Apostles’ authority (and that of their successors) is not the basis for their authority. Our agreement with the Apostles is not the basis for their authority; the basis for their authority is their divine authorization by Christ. That is why our interpretation and doctrine must conform to theirs. So likewise, our agreement with the successors of the Apostles is not the basis for their authority. The basis for their authority is their divine authorization from Christ through the Apostles. And that again, is why their divine authority is not based on our agreement with them; instead, their divine authority is the reason why our interpretation and doctrine must conform to theirs.
No, actually, this post does not make that argument. The authority argument (to which the tu quoque is a response) is explained at the beginning of this post. The gist of the authority argument is that agreement with a confession is not a sufficient basis for its authority, and yet without apostolic succession, agreement with a confession is the only available possible ground for a confession’s ‘authority.’ And that entails that Protestant confessions have no authority, because Protestants reject apostolic succession.
Instead of saying that the problem is that I don’t do something (which turns your statement into a criticism of me), show how what it is you think I don’t do refutes my argument against the tu quoque. In other words, instead of criticizing me, show what’s wrong with my argument, and why my argument does not refute the tu quque objection.
Merely asking questions about my argument doesn’t show that my argument does not refute the tu quoque.
In this post, I’m not claiming that “it’s not the same process because the results are the same.” (I don’t even know what the referent of your ‘it’ is in that sentence.) Nor am I claiming that “the processes are different because we start in the same spot.” I’m explaining why the Creed, for Catholics has actual authority, while for Protestants the Creed and confessions can have no actual authority. Merely because study of history, tradition and Scripture is involved in becoming Catholic, does not mean that the line of successors [from the Apostles] the inquirer discovers is an interpretation, just as Jesus Christ is not an interpretation. Discovering the authority of the Apostles and their successors is, in that respect, like discovering the authority of Christ. By contrast, the parts of Protestant confessions that are not direct quotations from Scripture, are interpretations, and can be nothing more than interpretations, even where true.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Eddie J,
Thanks for the reply.
I find this a bit odd. It seems to me you are pointing out the clear difference between Protestant Ecclesiology and Catholic Ecclesiology and then saying that even though they are fundamentally different, that adhering to one is the same as adhering to another.
Protestants believe there IS an invisible Church and that there INS”T a single visible Catholic Church. Protestants ‘submit’ to an ecclessial body they believe to teach correctly in their judgment but they don’t claim to be the single, visible Church. In fact I am sure you are well aware that many Protestants very soundly criticize the Catholic Church for making such claims.
The Catholic Church IS the ONE, THE Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. Catholics are VISIBLY united with the Church in the Sacraments. There is visible Apostolic Authority.
No, this is exactly what we are dancing around. Believing that the Catholic Church was founded by Christ, that his promise that” the Gates of Hell will not prevail against it” applies to that Church. Etc. etc…. Is fundamentally different than believing that true church is invisible and choosing one of the 75 local Protestant options to ‘submit’ to.
The point of my comment #74 was just that, the Catholic Church is not just another Church and Protestants and Catholic both know that. I am sure you know it as well. I can understand that you are fully convinced that the claims of the Catholic Church are false. However, can you imagine how you would respond if an angel appeared to you and told you the Catholic Church is exactly what she has always claimed to be?
Bryan / Eddie,
I would like to chime in here in order to suggest that perhaps the foundational disagreement or misunderstanding with regard to the nature and force of the “tu quoque” objection has to due with the much wider theological conception of “faith and Reason” – especially as it pertains to our understanding of “faith” or “the assent of faith”. To explain what I mean, let me recap a few comments in this thread which I hope will bring me to my point of departure. For brevity and (I hope clarity) I will be joining some comments together. I invite correction if anyone believes that my “splicing” has distorted their intended meaning.
Bryan said:
Tim T. said:
Michael Liccione said:
Notice two common elements in all the above comments: all three Catholics acknowledge that the epistemic methodology and tools are the same for both the Catholic and the Protestant. However, all three Catholics maintain that although the “process of the inquiry” is the same, the conclusion is radically different precisely because the Catholic concludes to an “object” that is “outside himself”.
However, Jason (presumably Protestant) responds [text in brackets is mine]:
And Ryan, along similar lines, offers the following framework for considering the “tu quoque”:
Now both Jason and Ryan concede to the Catholics that ”given” the nature of the object of discovery reached by the inquiry process (the epistemic point in time Ryan refers to as T2), the Catholic has in hand a basis for authority (the authority of Christ inhering in the successors of the apostles) which inoculates him against the “authority argument”. Hence, both Jason and Ryan seem to acknowledge that in this respect the “tu quoque” charge does not work against the Catholic. However, it is that ”given”, which causes all the trouble. How does one KNOW that the current day successors of the apostles actually possess the charism of Christ’s authority? One cannot “see” Christ’s authority in a person as something one can study empirically through a process of inquiry – historical or otherwise. One can study historical apostolic succession as an outward act (unbroken, successive, historical ordination by laying on of hands from one bishop to another); but one cannot study whether the supernatural quality/charism of Christ’s authority was passed on simultaneous to each such act of ordination. This is because knowledge of such a quality/charism is beyond the competency of reason alone; rather, it is attained by an assent of “reasonable” faith (which is ultimately where I think this discussion will lead).
The fundamental dispute is epistemological. Both the Catholic and the Protestant seem to agree that they are limited to the same epistemic methodology and tools. Moreover, both the Catholic and the Protestant would (presumably) admit to their own fallibility when employing such tools and methodology. From the perspective of both Jason and Ryan, this seems to create an inescapable epistemic prison which necessarily prevents the Catholic from reaching his infallible authoritative object. In short (so the thinking goes), the underlying fallibility of the discovery process (T1) undermines the possibility of arriving at an “infallible” object.
Some thread commentators seem to have approached the question this way: “how can the “object” discovered possess a quality superior to that possessed by the one making the discovery?” But as Bryan and others have pointed out; our interpretation of the data (the result of the inquiry process) does not determine whether the successors to the apostles possess Christ’s authority or not. Objectively, they either do or they do not – independent of what we “discover”. Hence, it is logically possible that the object of the discovery process possesses a quality superior to the one making the discovery. The more precise question is “how can the fallible discoverer “KNOW” that the object of his discovery possesses an authority which speaks infallibly (under certain conditions) on matters of faith and morals? This, I believe, is the epistemic concern at the heart of Jason’s and Ryan’s objections, which lead them to assert that, upon further inspection, the Catholic position IS still liable to the “tu quoque” charge – albeit indirectly and at the epistemic, rather than the ontological level. This is why Jason still asserted:
And why Ryan still asserted [brackets mine]:
Now it should be pointed out that just because we are “fallible” in the use of our intellect and will during any “inquiry process”; it does not follow that we must necessarily err when arriving at a conclusion. Such a position would entail radical skepticism which can be shown to be logically incoherent. Fallibility only entails that we have the potential>/i> for error. In fact, many (perhaps most) of our attempts to discover the truth about some aspect of reality succeed. Still, the fact that we might be wrong in our conclusions (fallibility) forces we humans to assess the level of “Certitude” we attach to our conclusions. Thus, the Catholic might be wrong, or he might be right, concerning his conclusion that the successors of the apostles possess Christ’s teaching authority: but how can he know it to be so with certainty? The question can then be clarified as follows: “how can the fallible discoverer “KNOW WITH CERTITUDE” that the object of his discovery, possesses an authority which speaks infallibly (under certain conditions) on matters of faith and morals?” The most powerful form of the Protestant “tu quoque” objection will then go something like this:
1. The Catholic (like the Protestant) is fallible when conducting his historical-theological inquiry
2. This fallibility entails that the Catholic cannot know “with certitude” that the successors of the apostles possess Christ’s teaching authority
3. Thus when the Catholic claims he is submitting to the successors of the apostles because they possess Christ’s divine teaching authority, he is really submitting because he has a personal level of certainty that Christ’s authority is, in fact, located in the successors of the apostles
4. But a “personal level of certainty” is a subjective assessment
5. Hence, he is really submitting to his subjective assessment of the authority which inheres in the successors of the apostles
6. But submission to a subjective assessment is precisely what the Catholic accuses the Protestant of doing
7. The “tu quoque” objection succeeds
I am convinced that the resolution to this dilemma rests with a proper understanding of the relationship between “faith and reason”; and most especially with a proper understanding of the nature of divine revelation and the “assent of faith” which responds to it.
Before I get into such subjects, I wonder Eddie if you feel I have accurately represented the best Protestant form of the argument?
Bryan, do you think I have overlooked something crucial so far?
Pax et Bonum,
-Ray
Ray (re. # 79),
Thanks for such a great post. That took a lot of work, and the comment is an instance one of the reasons I think CTC is so fruitful: it’s filled with intelligent, devout Christians trying to arrive at the truth. I’ll have to think on your post for a little longer before responding to it, though I’m interested in what others have to say about in the meantime.
Ryan:
In my comments #7 and #18 above–the latter of which was addressed to you–I merely adumbrated the argument I offer here: http://mliccione.blogspot.com/2010/06/bad-arguments-against-magisterium-part.html.
Best,
Mike
All:
I went back and re-read some of the key comments in this thread. And here’re my thoughts. I think I agree with Bryan (et. al) that the RC is not subject to the tu quoque, though I think the reason for that has been obscured in some of the posts. There seems to be an important distinction between epistemic and ontic levels that sometimes gets overrun.
Having re-read Bryan #17, I think he’s responded to (at least my) objection regarding the tu quoque. It seems to me that the dialectic goes something like this:
So here’s where things either go awry or just get plain confusing to the Protestant. There’s two types of similar—though, for the Protestant, materially different—responses that the RC offers:
Response 1—epistemic + ontic
I’m calling this the “epistemic + ontic” response because of the bolded section. Some of the responses so far to the Protestant’s tu quoque objection, have been written in such a way that they tie the epistemic point to the truth of RC. In other words, they seem to say that the RC is not in the same epistemic boat simply because he’s right: viz. the RCC is the true church. And so that’s what made me ask, “So your rebuttal of the tu quoque only works if RC is true?” in comment # 15. Mike, your response to that question is a kind of “epistemic + ontic” response (if I’m reading you correctly). In your #18, you wrote:
So, it seems like you’re tying your rebuttal of the tu quoque the truth of the RCC. That’s partly why the RC response seems so unsatisfying, I think. That’s partly why this sort of response is so unsatisfying to the Protestant.
But there does seem to be a direct response that’s been offered that doesn’t assume the truth of RC. It stays on the epistemic level, you might say. So the other response that I’ll call “epistemic only” is essentially found in Bryan’s #17. To finish out the imaginary conversation, it’d go like this:
Response 2—epistemic only
I think that “epistemic only” response does it. Thus, I drop my tu quoque objection. Thank you, brothers.
Ray:
I’m still interested in hearing what you had in mind regarding the relationship between faith and reason.
[NB: Please don’t anyone misread this comment as me pitting various RC commenters against each other. That’s not my intent. I’m just trying to show that, from the Protestant perspective, there seems to be two different lines of responses, and that’s why the responses seem unsatisfying. I’ve learned a lot from all the commenters on this site, and hope to continue to do so. The “epistemic + ontic” response still works to rebut the tu quoque, it’s just that the Protestant won’t accept the condition that RC is true. So the “epistemic only” response will more likely be accepted by the Protestant.]
Hi Ray:
We are indeed making progress here. But I still think there’s a need to get clearer about the issue.
You quoted me thus:
Your reply was:
I think you missed my point, which was strictly “epistemic.” For purposes of argument, I did not assume that Catholicism is true. My point, rather, was that whether or not Catholicism is true,, the nature of the assent one makes to the claims of the Catholic Church is essentially different from the nature of the assent one makes as a Protestant—whichever version of Protestantism one happens to assent to.
When one assents to the claims of the Catholic Church, one chooses to let the Church be the measure of one’s own orthodoxy. That’s because one has accepted her claim to be what I said in the above quotation. But a Protestant as such continues making his own interpretation of the sources the measure of any church’s orthodoxy. Thus one joins a church not because it claims to the “the” Church in the sense in which the Catholic Church does, but because the church one joins seems, overall, to uphold criteria of orthodoxy which one has adopted independently of the claims of any particular church.
I think you recognize as much in accepting the argument of Bryan’s that you also quote and that I have endorsed elsewhere. I just don’t think you’ve read enough of what I’ve written—such as the post to which I linked in #81—to see that. You’ve taken just one remark of mine out of context.
Still, there is an ontic correlate of the epistemic difference. For a Catholic, one cannot know the Incarnate Word, who is the Truth itself, without explicitly or implicitly joining a visible Body, the Body of Christ, that extends the Incarnation throughout earthly time and space and thus shares in his divine authority as she claims. For a Protestant, on the other hand, no visible communion of believers, no matter how large, is ontically coextensive with the Body. The question who “really” belongs to the Body is accordingly either unknowable or left strictly to opinion. And so if Catholicism is true, then the identifiable subjectum of the deposit of faith is, itself, an item of the deposit of faith; whereas in Protestantism, it is not.
Best,
Mike
Thanks, Mike. (I assume your last comment was directed to me; Ryan not Ray.) You wrote:
Could you flesh this out a little? What do you mean my “explicitly or implicitly joining a visible Body”? Is this language meant to encompass the “ecclesial communities” countenanced in the Catechism?
Again, you could flesh this out a little more? It seems to me that the RC is also committed to the claim that we can’t identify every member of the Church. Or perhaps, you’re referring to the ‘hierarchy’ of the church as being “either unknowleable or left strictly to opinion” on the Protestant view?
Ryan:
Yes. See Lumen Gentium §14-16 and Unitatis Redintegratio.
From the fact that we cannot identify each and every member of the Church, it does not follow that no visible church is ontically co-extensive with “the” Church. What follows, rather, is that if there is a visible church ontically co-extensive with “the” Church—which is what Catholics claim—then whoever belongs to the Body of Christ belongs to “the” Church either explicitly or implicitly, to some degree or other.
Best,
Mike
I think this question should go to the apostolic succession article, rather than the Tu Quoque article – but I haven’t seen the apostolic succession article, so here it is:
It seems clear to me from the scriptures that Christ passed on some sort of authority to the apostles. And it seems clear from scripture and the writings of the early church that the apostles selected other bishops/presbyters to succeed them.
An authority can be considered rightful, but that declaration doesn’t mean that the authority is necessarily infallible or any other good thing.
What I am confused about is the determination that the authority given to the apostles necessarily included the charism of infallibility. Who came up with this belief, and why? What did they mean by infallibility?
Second question is this: What is it about the “passing on” of authority that makes the authority given to the successors to have the same weight as the original authority given to the apostles?
So what was special about the apostles, how did people come to the conclusion that the apostles were infallible, and how did people come to the conclusion that the infallibility was passed on?
Thanks!
Regarding this last question I posted about infallibility, I just found the original very similar question I asked in another thread. (the article on St. Thomas and Faith). I had lost that post, couldn’t remember the name of the thread, and had not until now seen Bryan Cross’s response.
Thanks to google “site” search, I found it.
Bryan, thanks for the response. If someone else wants to comment, please ignore this repeat – and feel free to go to the other page.
MG (and Perry),
Thank you for your long and thoughtful response over on the “Orthodox” thread. I will being by saying that I agree with many of the things you stated in your post. However, I believe that you underestimate the force of the epistemic problem. As a result, you have proposed a distinction without a difference, at least with regard to the specific epistemic problem at play with regard to the recognition and explication of divine revelation.
The distinction between “authority” and “accuracy” that you suggest works perfectly well “given” the existence of some “authority”. However, that given IS the epistemic problem. You wrote:
Of course, and I have argued much the same in detailed exchanges with Reformed Christians in comments which you are welcome to survey in prior portions of this and other threads. Our Protestant brothers and sisters, however; point out that both the Catholic and EO assertion that there is an instrument of divine authority per se; is itself a subjective, fallible, conclusion upon which the entire edifice of both the RCC and EO understanding of “defined” or “orthodox” dogma rests. Remove that first, fallible, subjective claim regarding the divine authority grant inhering within the RCC or EO ecclesia; and the edifice caves in. You wrote:
The problem is not that some fallible person might not possibly “get it right” with regard to recognizing some “infallible authority”. No doubt, some postulated “infallible authority” source might – ontologically speaking – possess the authority so postulated. A fallible individual’s affirmation or denial of such an authority does not determine its ontological reality – it simply is what it is (or is not). The broader problem is that persons (such as you and I) who affirm the existence of such authorities have no better guarantee for the “accuracy” –as you call it – of such affirmations, than is common to the human condition. That is – such affirmations are our opinions (even if we believe them to be well considered – “competent” – opinions) because it is we who make the affirmations. The actual accuracy of such a proposition [that there is an infallible authority] rests precisely upon an intellectual competence that just is, in fact, fallible. The problem is not ontological – we might be right – but rather epistemic – having to do with the level of certitude with which we hold and affirm such propositions. It is a problem that does not go away just because Protestants fail to posit the existence of such an authority in the first place; whereas Catholics and EO do.
Now I submit that this seems to present an inescapable epistemic bubble from which there is no escape – and there is a perspective within which that assessment is correct; namely, from the perspective of the capacities of human reason [in this sense, I am in agreement with both MG and Perry that we are all in “the same boat”]. However, there is another perspective from which that assessment is not entirely correct; namely the perspective gained by making an “assent of faith”. The “assent of faith” assisted by divine grace is the only possible means by which the concomitant lack of certitude [which Perry describes as a physiological issue] derived from the inherent fallibility of the knowing subject might be transcended, so as to enable the grasp of truths which are, by nature, beyond the reach of human reason with a certitude at least sufficient for a living orientation toward God. However, to get a perspective on exactly how something called the “assent of faith” might even “in principle” be understood to effect such a transition between fallibility and a “lived” certitude without appearing as an utter fideistic leap; it is paramount to consider what the “object” of such an assent might be (i.e. faith in Whom or what); and whether the very constitution of such an object is itself indifferent with regard to the epistemic problem at hand. I maintain that, given the nature of the case, not any old object will do. However, to see this, I believe our thought horizons must be widened.
Nearly all of the debates that separate Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christians can be distilled down to the problem of “authority”. The trouble is that our discussions (here at CTC and elsewhere) almost always work within an insufficiently wide framework for surveying the “authority” problem in all its dimensions. Such discussions implicitly assume that:
a.) some divine revelation has been given and
b.) some means exists by which said revelation can be recognized as revelation and its content reliably distinguished from human opinion.
Thus, we are implicitly working within the framework of systematic theology – never questioning whether there is such a thing as divine revelation, nor questioning that it can be recognized as such, or its contents clarified over against human opinion. Such a framework is naturally appropriate for sites like CTC which are designed to drive discussion among persons who have already embraced some form of Christian theism. Unfortunately, that framework is too narrow to resolve baseline authority disputes that ultimately arise among the different Christian communions themselves. The question is not merely, “how in principle, short of some infallible interpreter (read infallible authority), might the “de fide” content of revelation be distinguished from mere human opinion?” That is an excellent question GIVEN the fact of a “revelation” from God. It is an excellent question as posed to Protestants who attempt to locate the content of divine revelation in a written codex; failing, thereby, to recognize the inherent interpretive problem involved in extracting the God-intended meaning from a text: a problem for which they explicitly deny, in principle, any non-fallible solution whatever.
However, the wider and more useful question for the problem at hand is: “how, in principle, might a divine revelation, assuming (ex hypothesis) one is given, be recognized or distinguished from mere human opinion?” That question forces us outside the scope of systematic theology proper and requires us to consider the nexus between faith and reason. Focusing upon this wider question, I maintain, sheds light on the “authority” problem and the epistemic puzzle presented by the tu quoque rebuttal, in a way that disputes occurring exclusively within the context of systematic theology cannot. This is what I had in mind when I indicated in my last post to Perry (and within my last post in this thread) that the depressing epistemic lurch presented by the tu quoque is not the last word on the matter. Since Perry has not responded to my post, I will go ahead and indicate here what I think remains to be said. Accordingly, we need to take this debate “outside” if you will. We need to exit the world of systematic theology and look at the problem as a pagan would (in fact, as modernity does) by considering the very idea of a “divine revelation” and the potential means by which human beings might recognize and respond to it as such.
Why should human beings have any interest whatsoever in something called “divine revelation”? It is because human beings very much desire answers to questions of human meaning and purpose given on some better authority than mere human opinion. This is Christianity’s claim to fame. This is the attraction of the very idea of “divine revelation”. If we were an entirely pagan civilization, this truth would be clearer to us. The fact that we are running on the inertia of a passing Christian ethos means that many who are still coming to Christian faith do not explicitly pay attention to the question: “what is revelation and why do I care?” If you disagree with this initial claim, I would be happy to discuss it in more detail: for now, however, I will simply assume that everyone recognizes that the very idea of a “divine revelation” entails the notion that there is highly valued information that one cannot obtain from natural sources: hence, the need for something to be “revealed” from a “divine” source. Notice that it is the “authority” on which a given disclosure of “human meaning and purpose information” is given that is of primary epistemic concern with regard to our embrace of “divine revelation” – not simply the “content” of whatever it is that is being “revealed”. Whatever value we might place upon the content of such a purported revelation will be secondary and dependent upon our assessment that such content is, in fact, given on divine authority.
But what is involved in giving or communicating a “revelation” in the first place? For human beings to receive a communication of any kind (regardless of the communicable content): that communication must necessarily present itself to the human mind by a means recognizable to the human intellect itself. In short, both the method and instruments of communication must condescend to the mind’s natural means of knowing. Hence, if God is going to reveal Himself, He will, presumably (given the way in which He has designed human beings), use instruments found among the created order to do so.
Let’s stop for a minute and consider the implications of all of the above with regard to the “act” of, or “assent” of, “faith”. Given the inherent fallibility of every human being, the only way to overcome the temptation to epistemic agnosticism predicated upon our unavoidable lack of certitude with regard to large scale questions of human meaning and purpose, is to make an “assent of faith” in something or someone proposing to answer such questions on something better than mere human opinion. Notice that the immediate “object” of faith” is not the content of revelation, but the authority status of the revelatory source – though the reason for the assent of faith is to gain access to the revelatory content as a divine, rather than human, disclosure. Secondly, though God is the formal or remote object of the “assent of faith”, being the ultimate revelatory cause behind any communication He introduces within the natural order; the immediate or “instrumental” object of the “assent of faith” is the created instrumentality through which such a revelatory communication must necessarily be delivered if it is to be recognized and comprehended by the human intellect. It is this immediate or instrumental object of the “assent of faith” which requires attention, since it is our only tangible means of access to anything that might be called “divine revelation”, and also because it is the identity of just this “object” which sits at the center of the “authority” problem within Christianity.
Continued . . .
What sort of immediate “object” would be capable of acting as an instrument of God’s revelatory deliverances such that the human mind might recognize that object’s “in principle” ability to distinguish the content of divine revelation from mere human opinion? Will any object do? Given that we are dealing with Christian revelatory claims rather than other revelatory proposals; we may immediately narrow our options by noting that Protestantism, Catholicism and Orthodoxy each recognize something loosely described as “the deposit of faith”, by which is meant the totality of God’s self revelatory disclosure to mankind, whether implicitly or explicitly conceived: a deposit culminating at or near the end of the apostolic age. Moreover, all three of these forms of Christianity assert that the very reason that such self-disclosure was given or “revealed” in history was so that the content of said disclosure might be communicated both geographically and through time. Accordingly, let me crystallize the central question as follows:
“What sort of instrumental “object” would be capable of acting as an instrument of God’s revelatory deliverances such that the human mind might recognize its “in principle” ability to distinguish the content of divine revelation from mere human opinion while simultaneously dispersing God’s revelatory deliverances both geographically and trans-historically?”
I submit that any instrument or “object” which cannot make that crucial distinction while simultaneously spreading the content of God’s revelation both geographically and trans-historically is insufficient and inappropriate as an instrumental “object” of the “assent of faith” for a Christian. If any so called “object” is incapable of distinguishing between the content of God’s revelation and mere human opinion, it is inappropriate for any sort of “assent of faith” whatever because it cannot “in principle” deliver the very thing which constitutes the reason why any “assent” might be given in the first place. If, on the other hand, some instrumental object did possess an “in principle” capacity to make the appropriate distinction between the content of divine revelation and mere human opinion, but made no proposal to distribute such content geographically and trans-historically, it would be an inappropriate object of a Christian “assent of faith”. So let’s consider how the three primary Christian proposals with regard to the instrumental object of an “assent of faith” fare when view from this wide angle epistemic perspective.
Might a book in which a revelatory content is ostensibly embedded make the necessary distinction we are looking for? Absolutely not, for two reasons: First, because such a medium or instrument is non-dynamic. Any content embedded therein, must necessarily be extracted by means of an interpretive effort if we are to have access to the “meaning” of the word symbols, or other signs, utilized to embed such a meaning. This is the problem inherent to both the “solo” and “sola” interpretive approach within Protestantism. Secondly, unless the medium itself (whether individual writings or the entire canonical codex) somehow contains within itself an indication that it just is some sort of “divine production”; then the ascription of such a quality to the text must derive from an external source, which must in turn answer for its own authority status: hence, the “inspiration problem” and the “canon problem” within Protestantism. Notice also that the “interpretive problem” applies just as well to the non-dynamic productions of ecumenical councils, popes, etc: productions which were, after all, necessary in light of divergent biblical interpretations to begin with. Being non-dynamic by nature, just like the text of scripture, such monuments of Christian tradition will likewise require interpretive extraction of whatever embedded meaning they contain. It is precisely this interpretive problem with regard to non-dynamic monuments of Christian tradition which makes application of the dictum of St. Vincent of Lorens practically useless for resolving the epistemic problem at hand – an insight which John Henry Newman develops in a detailed fashion within his “Apologia Pro Vita Sua”.
What does all of this point up? It entails that any proposal recommended as an appropriate instrumental “object” of a Christian “assent of faith” must possess an “in principle” capability for distinguishing the content of revelation from mere human opinion through a dynamic (living?) instrumentality that remains present to the human race both geographically and trans-historically from the time of the original revelatory deposit down to the present and into the future. The only two candidates for such an “object” or instrument appear to be the respective ecclesial bodies of the RCC and EO. To my knowledge, there are no other dynamic instruments (communions or otherwise) within the orbit of Christianity even making a claim to possess the needed authoritative capability.
In the EO proposal, the dynamic, trans-geographical, trans-historical object presented as an immediate “object” for the “assent of faith” is a subset of men (bishops) said to possess a divine authority (the authority of Christ – the ultimate source of the original revelatory disclosures and the formal object of any “assent”) which is operative in an infallible way specifically when such bishops are gathered in an “ecumenical council”. The difficulties within EO as regards our overarching epistemic problem are twofold. First, the EO proposal provides no “in principle” arbitrating authority by which to distinguish from among all those who claim to be “bishops”, any specific set of “bishops” which count for the purposes of convening an “ecumenical council” – the sole mechanism by which the content of divine revelation can be distinguished from human opinion – given the EO proposal. Since the only authoritative mechanism by which the content of divine revelation can be distinguished from human opinion is an ecumenical council; and no means exists by which to determine what makes a council ecumenical; should bishops or lay persons disagree over some aspect of the content of divine revelation there is “in principle” no dynamic arbitrating authority within the EO proposal by which such disagreements might be adjudicated. Without a current day means by which to recognize any given gathering of bishops as ecumenical, the practical result is that the “d fide” content of revelation remains embedded within textual monuments such that it must be extracted by fallible, subjective, appeals to the textual renderings of prior councils (those currently recognized as “ecumenical”); an appeal which suffers from all the interpretive problems noted above – leaving both bishops and lay persons with only fallible, interpretive, theologico-historical constructs with regard to the explication of the content of divine revelation. Without a present-day means by which to adjudicate between competing or variant interpretive constructs from these authoritative sources, one is left with no “in principle” means by which to differentiate between contrary positions either now or for the foreseeable future. Hence, the EO proposal ultimately presents as an immediate “object” of the “assent of faith”, an instrument which “in principle” has no capacity to distinguish between the content of divine revelation and mere human opinion in the here and now – which is where we need it in order to address our wide angle epistemic problem. Thus, the EO proposal is an inappropriate “object” for the “assent of faith” – again because it is an object which “in principle” has not the capacity to deliver a rendering of the “de fide” content of revelation on an authority basis distinguishable from human opinion – which constitute the very reason for which one would make an “assent of faith” in the first place.
By contrast, the Catholic Church’s proposal does not appear to suffer from the epistemic shortcomings inherent within the EO paradigm due to its unique understanding of the Petrine ministry. By asserting that Christ gave a unique authority grant to St. Peter and his successors over and above that given to the rest of the apostles and their successors specifically as a principal of unity within the Church; the RCC immediately presents herself as possessing an “in principle” capacity for distinguishing which councils are “ecumenical” for purposes of normative doctrinal determinations – namely, those approved/recognized by the bishop of Rome. Further, she retains a means by which to arbitrate between contrary interpretations of the content of divine revelation that might arise among bishops themselves – that is – by means of a direct intervention by the bishop of Rome, who is personally posited to have the capacity, via his unique divine authority grant, to distinguish between the content of revelation and human opinion under specific conditions. In short, the Catholic Church’s proposal with regard to an instrumental “object” for the “assent of faith” does indeed provide an “in principle” capacity, namely the Petrine ministry, by which the RCC might distinguish, in the here-and-now, between the ‘de fide” content of divine revelation and mere human opinion. As such, the Magisterium of the Catholic Church is “in principle” an appropriate instrumental object for the “assent of faith”, since, IF ONE GRANTS HER CLAIMS, (which is what an “assent of faith” would entail), one would have in hand a means by which to access answers to questions concerning the meaning and purpose of human existence on something better than mere human opinion.
Now I want to be clear that this kind of argument in no way eliminates the need for an “assent of faith” per se. Just because the Catholic Church puts forward a specific proposal with regard to the immediate object of an “assent of faith” that would IF TRUE, resolve the original epistemic dilemma I have been tracking: it does not, of course, follow that her claim IS true. The authority of Christ inhering in the successors of Peter and the apostles is not something one can see or test empirically. Thus, no amount of historical, theological, or other evidence one might martial in support of the Catholic Church’s claims for herself will ever amount to a demonstrative proof. Though, of course, I and other Catholics believe there are many motives of credibility which render such an “assent” eminently reasonable. Ultimately, however, to bridge the gap between probability and living certainty, one will have to make a grace-assisted “assent of faith”.
What I believe the argument does show, however, is that within the orbit of Christianity, only the Catholic Church’s proposed “instrumental object” has an “in principle” capacity to distinguish between the content of revelation and mere human opinion in a way that corresponds to the very reason that one might make “an assent of faith” in the first place. Other proposals, by their very nature, appear to insert an identifiable, unavoidable, element of human subjectivity and fallibility between the knowing subject and the immediate instrumental object of the “assent of faith”. Even if one were to grant the entire EO understanding of authority; one would still have to make a personal historical tour into the counciliar data, etc to “fish-out” the totality of divine revelation embedded therein – which seems to be precisely Perry’s approach as indicated by his positive explanation as to how the OC adjudicates theological claims. This would not be the case, IF, within EO there were some living authority, universally recognized among the EO as having divine authorization to adjudicate between variant interpretations of the relevant sources. Likewise, if there were some living, real-time authority recognized as having the divine authorization to approve a given council of bishops as “ecumenical”, then such a vehicle could be employed in the here-and-now should then need arise. Lacking either of these capabilities it is seems to me that what is, or is not, considered “orthodox” doctrine must always be a point of debate and contention among the various EO communions. This why, given competent, extensive defenses of the motives of credibility in support of both the RCC and EO conception of authority, I make an assent of faith in the claims of the RCC: because here at least, should the claims be true, one has an authority mechanism able to deliver a non-fallible rendering of divine revelation. It seems to me that the same cannot be said for the EO approach.
Pax et Bonum
Ray
“Since Perry has not responded to my post”
Perry, I wrote this addressing MG before you responded to me last evening and I forgot to remove it from my response. Please ignore as I acknowledge that you have responded to me.
Pax et Bonum,
Ray
Ray:
I’m glad to see that somebody else gets the point I’ve been making for years. But you really should have your won blog. Burying thoughts like this in a combox, and leaving it at that, isn’t going to attract much attention.
One remark of yours struck me particularly:
I addressed the Vincentian-Canon issue two years ago: http://mliccione.blogspot.com/2008/07/of-what-use-is-vincentian-canon.html. I’d love to know what you think.
Best,
Mike
Mike,
Excellent VC article. I especially concur with the following – which I take to be a core element of your analysis:
If one begins with no idea whatever as to the identity of something called “the Church” or her legitimate spokesmen or monuments, how does one decide “what counts” or “who counts” when applying the VC? Use of the VC within a given ecclesiological context makes good sense; whereas the idea of polling the Christians of the past (or the monuments of antiquity) for the purpose of determining just what is, or is not, “de fide” – that does seem like a recipie for endless dispute. And if the polling should become aimed at determining ecclesiological perogatives themselves – well look out because that is a recipie for division.
Pax et Bonum,
Ray
Dr. Liccione, (sorry, forgot to address you formally in the previous replies)
This is a re-posting of my final word on the thread “I Love the Orthodox too much to be Orthodox”.
Your ecclesiastical “problem of the criteria” seems to resemble some skeptical arguments and skeptical though-experiments. It reminds me of the problem of how to distinguish between different physical objects. We all have a relatively good idea of what the difference is between one object and another; but this isn’t because we have formulated perfectly general criteria for what constitutes one physical object as different from another before we start looking at the world. Instead we start with an awareness of the differences between physical objects. We can immediately identify many particular cases of physical objects. And then we can formulate plausible criteria that capture most of the cases. But criteria have their limits, and there are always some counterexamples, or apparent counterexamples, or potential counterexamples (on this point, and the suggestion that follows, I am partly indebted to the excellent book “Reason in the Absence of Rules”). But we can get past these counterexamples by developing in our own awareness of physical objects. We learn when the criteria apply and when they don’t by developing our intellectual and sensory abilities in an intellectually virtuous way. This also involves interaction with people that are more intellectually virtuous than we are, and imitation of them in an attempt to learn the requisite intellectual skills. As always, a healthy dose of particularism can cure skepticism; methodism is a placebo.
I think the same thing goes for how we identify institutions and how we identify an institution’s official teachings. The fact that there’s not universal agreement on what precisely the criteria are for identifying the teaching of the Church doesn’t seem to have any effect on whether we can in fact identify the teaching in a way similar to how we identify the teaching of any institution. We start with some particular obvious cases of people in an institution, and then build criteria that seem to roughly capture our idea of how we identified these people as members. Then we increase in our familiarity of that institution so as to know how to apply the rules correctly and catch the exceptions to those rules. Its not hard to figure out some of the basic things that Orthodoxy teaches and who some of its adherents are. And you can go from there and get quite a ways without running into constant ambiguity (even if there are some isolate cases where you’re not 95% sure who’s in and who’s out).
I don’t think a Roman Catholic is in any better of a situation either, because one must use common sense to identify the fact that the criteria given by the Pope in Vatican I and elsewhere are indeed official teaching. This can be brought out by the question, “Why think that the Pope, instead of some council held in South America, is the formal official teacher of the Roman Church?” Consider someone named Bob who has never met a Roman Catholic before, or heard what Rome’s stance on any issue is. This person meets two Catholic theologians—Hans and Joseph—walking in a park, who begin to tell him about Rome’s teachings. Hans is a bizarre heterodox Catholic, who says that Councils can trump the Pope in a way incompatible with Vatican I’s decree. Joseph is theologically conservative and tells the standard teaching of Vatican I as is. How does Bob figure out if Hans or Joseph is right? It might seem like the answer is “by checking what the Pope says in Vatican I”; but remember that Bob doesn’t know that the Pope is the official teacher of Rome yet. How would Bob get over the conflicting sources of information that tell him divergent things? I think its by the same process of institution-familiarization that I am talking about above. It would be no problem to figure out what’s going on, because he can simply go check what the vast majority of Rome’s previous documents and teachers—especially the ones that present themselves as official and foundational—say about the subject, and who they recognize as the official spokesperson. One will be able to detect a kind of deference to papal authority. And with enough familiarization with the various people that acknowledge papal authority, you can figure out that these guys are not the exception to the rule, but that they correctly perceive the actual teachings of the Roman Church.
And a similar Bob problem can be made for how to identify the existence of the Roman Church. Suppose Bob meets two people, both claiming to be Roman Catholic priests. But they are not in communion with each other. One claims that his group (which is actually schismatic) is the Roman Church; the other (who is not schismatic) is in the Roman Church. Both present various arguments, and Bob can’t immediately tell the difference between them. Does this mean Bob can’t ultimately figure out what the Roman Church is? No, it just means he needs common sense and experience of the institutions and documents in question to discern real from apparent instances of the Roman Church. He would need to look for a time in history when the Roman Church’s identity was easy to locate, and then trace a continuity of structure and aim to one of several competing claimants among present day hierarchies.
In terms of having formulated criteria for how you identify the Orthodox Church, one suggestion that seems plausible is that we have an implicit criteria for knowing what the Church is in the ecclesiology of Fathers like Clement, Ignatius, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hippolytus, etc. when they speak about continuity of doctrine and continuity of the episcopacy via succession. But again, our ability to recognize that there exists such a criteria depends on a kind of common-sense approach to how we identify the official teaching of a visible society. And it depends on our ability to identify the doctrine of a given institituion. With sufficient familiarity, this is no problem usually. And again, we have St. Vincent to thank for criteria for teaching-identification; and the receptivity that later theologians had to his ideas help signify that his is indeed the official view.
And if I were Bob, researching in a library, coming across competing *apparently representative, official* Roman statements about the relationship between Rome and the East couldn’t I say that Roman theologians don’t agree about whether the East is a group of real churches or not? For aren’t there probably some weird, exceptional, perhaps hyper-traditionalist or pre-Vatican II Catholics that would claim that the official teaching of Rome is that the East is in heresy and schism? I’m not saying such people are right, or likely to be right, or that we should listen to them as though they are actually representative voices. All I’m saying is it takes common sense and experience to figure out that they aren’t to be taken seriously. And similarly, it takes some common sense and experience to figure out what’s official Orthodox teaching. So I think we are at least equal on this point; I don’t think Rome has an advantage.
Also, would your above argument have been a principled reason for choosing Rome over the East pre Vatican I? And even if I’m wrong about common sense and experience putting us on even playing field, if the Orthodox formulated explicit criteria, couldn’t that change things so that we are evenly-matched?
Ray,
I think you will find my post (originally on “I Love the Orthodox Too Much to be Orthodox” and now on this thread–once such comments have been approved) in response to Dr. Liccione makes an attempt to deal with your arguments, given how similar they are to his. I’d be interested to hear your response.
Ray,
Michael is right, don’t hide this in a combox.
This personal tour is exactly what DOES NOT appeal to a convert from Protestantism looking to choose between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. I could just remain Protestant if I want to “fish out” divine revelation from a set of data.
I’m not a very good angler.
Peace,
David Meyer
I will try to state a high-level description including the subject in Ray’s last long posts. Basically we are discerning between Systems.
A System is comprised of (the examples of Sources and Institutions are from the RCC):
- Sources of Divine Revelation: Scripture and Tradition
- Institutions: Bishops, Ecumenical Council, Pope
- Corpus: definitions from Institutions. They mostly interpret the content of Sources, but they also identify Sources.
- Rules: Subset of Corpus defining Institutions, how they work, and particularly how they define the Corpus.
The System must exhibit several levels of logical consistency:
- functional: with its mission of identifying Sources, interpreting its content and spreading it.
- historical: abidance by Rules
- internal: definitions from Corpus must not contradict the content of Sources
- external: definitions from Corpus must not contradict physical laws and historical facts.
I posit that all four levels of logical consistency are relevant in principle to discern between Systems, although in some practical cases the evidence from looking at one of the levels might be strong enough to dispense with the need to look at the others. Thus, while in comment #89 above Ray discerns between the Protestant, EO and RC by looking at consistency at the functional level, in several comments at the “I love the Orthodox…” thread I looked at consistency at the internal level (specifically with biblical passages), but I discarded the OO on the basis of just historical consistency, by looking at historical context for the Council of Chalcedon. And it is quite clear that if the RCC had ever defined geocentrism as dogma the situation today would be very different (external consistency).
Since in my previous comment I mentioned discarding the OO option by just examining historical consistency, and since my examination thereof in the comment at the “I love the Orthodox …” thread was extremely cursory, here is the full version:
- Second (“Robber” for RCs and EOs) Council of Ephesus in 449: 130 attendants. Council of Chalcedon in 451: at least 370 attendants, who in their overwhelming majority signed its confession of faith.
- Was the high number of diophysite attendants in Chalcedon due to the diophysite side having embarked on a massive consecration of bishops during the run-up to the Council in order to tilt the vote to their favor? No.
- Were many of those signing the diophysite position pressed in any way by the Emperor so as to render their vote invalid? No.
Notably, in order for the EO Churches to exhibit historical consistency, it is critical for them to claim that in Lyon II (1274) and Florence (1439) the third point applied to the Eastern bishops, who were either pressed by the Emperor in the first case and practically bribed by the Pope, in the context of the Ottoman threat, in the second. Sure enough that claim does not cause the RC Church to exhibit historical inconsistency, because the Western bishops were under no pressure.
I add to #94 that internal consistency also requires that definitions in Corpus must not contradict previous definitions in Corpus, a claim usually made about Vatican II by the SSPX side, particularly on the topic of religious liberty.
Needless to say it also requires that there is no contradiction in the content of Sources themselves, which is not an issue in Christianity but is in other Systems (e.g. LDS).
In the formal description of my previous comments, probably “Entities” is a more appropriate notion than “Institutions”.
MG,
I tend to agree with your basic description of our basic epistemic approach to common objects. I am quite Aristotelian when it comes to what I will call “fundamental” or ground floor epistemology. Your description is Aristotelian in many ways (you might already know this). The trouble is that as we humans move from tangible objects that exist on the ordinary plane of human existence and begin via abstraction and intellectual effort to work our way toward large scale ethical and metaphysical assertions, we very easily lose our way. Moreover, I maintain that specific questions we most desire to know such as the meaning of our existence and our destiny (if any) are strictly beyond the capability of human reason to grasp “in principle”. Metaphysics can go far, but not far enough. Thus we need, and God has provided, a “divine” revelation. The history of philosophy is simply littered with wannabe macro explanations about the meaning of human life. This naturally leads to a general despair with regard to large scale human questions – I give you modernity as a prime example. The point is that we need divine revelation to beat this temptation to despair regarding human destiny. This is not epistemic skepticism at the fundamental level, rather it is epistemic skepticism at what might be called the religio-existential level. It is the affirmation that the capacities of the human intellect are limited. It can go far, but not far enough. Not only that, but the farther it goes, the more prone to error it becomes and the more careful we must be.
But then consider what this means in terms of divine revelation. Since we are to start with seeking precious information from a supernatural source, there simply will be no way whatever to rationally demonstrate that any supernatural authority inheres in any instrument within the natural order. Such a quality is strictly unobservable. An “act of faith” will become absolutely necessary at some point, and as directed to some specific object, no matter how much effort one puts into rounding up good motives of credibility for accepting a given authority claim. My overall point is that if a given instrument claiming to be a repository of God’s revelation cannot put forward a mechanism which can be recognized by the inquirer as having an “in principle” ability to distinguish between the “de fide” content of revelation and human opinion in the here and now; then given the very purpose of an “assent of faith”, such an instrument is insufficient. The EO position, IMO, by relegating the content of divine revelation to textual monuments (past codifications of ecumenical councils) necessarily requires that a fallible interpretive effort be put forth to extract the “true”, “orthodox” doctrinal content from those sources. EO proposes no present-day divine authority source to arbitrate between conflicting renderings from these historical counciliar documents. The RCC on the other hand does provide such an authority: hence, the RCC is an appropriate object for an “assent of faith”, whereas EO is not. You said:
Right, if the Orthodox had an authoritative means by which to determine who / which bishops count as “Orthodox”, AND if they then proposed some explicit criteria, then yes that might present a potential alternative with regard to making an “assent of faith”. It is at THAT point that a tour into history to ascertain the respective credibility of the two claims would make sense to me.
Pax et Bonum
Ray
MG (#93):
I’m unsure whether you read the comment of mine to which I linked you over in the Orthodoxy thread. That’s because I don’t think the parallel you try to draw really engages my point. You write:
Your ecclesiastical “problem of the criteria” seems to resemble some skeptical arguments and skeptical though-experiments. It reminds me of the problem of how to distinguish between different physical objects.
Now like Ray just above, I mostly agree with the way you resolve “skepticism” about distinguishing physical objects. But the kind of argument I was making is not amenable to the same sort of resolution.
I had begun my case by arguing, in effect, that in order to make a rational choice between the Roman and Orthodox communions’ respective claims to be “the” Church” that sometimes teaches with the infallible authority of Christ himself, one needs to compare the two communions with respect to how clearly and consistently each propounds criteria for distinguishing infallible from non-infallible acts of teaching. What I went on to argue, in the comment of mine to which I provided you a link, is that the Roman communion does that better than the Orthodox communion. This is not to say that it’s impossible to know that a given body of Orthodox teaching meets that communion’s criteria for infallibility. The “seven” ecumenical councils do so, and some Orthodox argue that other authorities do too. But the burden of my comment was that the Orthodox criteria for the ecumenicity of councils are not as clear and consistent as the Roman. In fact, there is no consensus in Orthodoxy about what actually makes a council ecumenical as thus binding on the whole Church; there is only consensus that seven councils of the first millennium are ecumenical. I do not say that that approach is unreasonable, but I do say that the Roman criteria are clearer and more consistent, and thus more reasonable. And that is my sole reason for preferring the claim of the Roman Church to be “the” Church in which the Church founded by the Lord “subsists” as a perduring whole.
The difficulties you raise about don’t strike me as particularly cogent. First, you write:
I’ve already answered that common claim here, and I find nothing in your comment to make me reconsider my answer.
Second, you write:
It’s interesting that you pick that example. For the question how churches other than “the Church” relate to “the Church” is one of the chief points on which official Catholic teaching just is much clearer
than official Orthodox teaching. In fact, as far as I know, there is no Orthodox teaching on the subject which Orthodox in general consider binding and irreformable, on whether the Catholic Church is a communion of true churches or not. Some Orthodox bishops and theologians say no; some say yes (their view of Protestantism, of course, being much like the Roman). The ecclesial status of the Roman communion seems to be a matter of opinion within Orthodoxy, such that both opinions are considered within the ambit of Orthodoxy. Again, I have written about this topic , and I see no reason to reconsider what I wrote.
Finally, you ask me:
To answer your question: yes, but not as clearly as afterward. Long before Vatican I, it was taken for granted in the Catholic Church that general councils whose dogmatic decrees were ratified by the papacy, at whatever point that came about, are irreformable and bind the whole Church. Thus, such decrees were exercises of the Church’s infallibility–but only because they were ratified by the papacy.
I don’t think it accidental that the Orthodox have not held an “ecumenical” council of their owon since the eighth century. For after that, the eventually decisive break with Rome began developing, starting with the 9th-century “Photian” schism and culminating in that of 1054. Now if the Orthodox developed criteria of ecumenicity and infallibility as clear and consistent as the Roman, and could agree on how to invoke them, then yes, the two communions would be on an epistemically level “playing field.” But they haven’t, and I see no reason to beieve that, without Rome, they will.
Best,
Mike
MG, Mike, David, Johannes, others,
I have read a great deal of John Henry Newman in my lifetime. However, I have to confess that somehow I have overlooked his discourse on faith and its object which you can read in the link below. It has shocked me. So much so, that I defer the very essence of my argument above to the far wiser and eloquent rendition presented by the venerable Cardinal convert, who was once one of the world’s greatest defenders of the Vincentian Canon. For those of you who have never read it, I cannot recommend it highly enough. It is the sort of thing every kind of Christian theist should think deeply about before wading into theological discourse; for it forces us to ask “just what kind of thing is Christianity and on what basis do I embrace its claims”.
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/discourses/discourse10.html
Pax et Bonum,
Ray
Ray,
Thank you for these posts. I appreciate them very much. I am not a convert, I was baptized as an infant in the Catholic Church and I have recently found myself confronted on a personal level with Orthodoxy, something I never gave much thought to before. Some non-Catholic members and a baptized Catholic member of my family are becoming Orthodox and I am finding myself in the position where they are offended by my non support of this decision. I personally do not have any animosity towards the Orthodox Church I just believe that there is One Church and that Church is the Catholic Church. I think the media and ecumenical meetings between the Holy Father and the Orthodox are misunderstood by people. They see and hear these things and led to believe that the only thing standing between the two is the Holy Father and it does not really matter which Church you belong to as long as the sacraments are valid.
As a Catholic I am confronted between choosing to appease those who I love and the world or offending the Church (which for me is not much different then offending the Lord himself) almost daily. Those of my family who are becoming Orthodox are offended because I choose not to participate in their decision or attend their initiation into the Orthodox Church. I would attend a non-Catholic service ordinarily, but because the one who is baptized but not a practicing Catholic would be renouncing the Catholic Church and would at that very moment cease to be a Catholic ,as told to me by a Priest, I am told by the Church I can not participate in this act by attending their service. Would I risk offending those I love for just a Church? Absolutely not.
I just wanted to let you know that your posts and the link you provided have given me much comfort and peace and clarity. During personal times when feelings and those who we love are involved in these issues, the truths we know can be hard to see through the fog of opinions, media and lack of knowledge of all things that exist around every turn. I have prayed for answers to many questions, and your posts answers them all.
God bless you and thank you.
Renee
Michael L,
Perspicuity doesn’t imply truth, so even if it were the case that the Catholic position were clearer, it wouldn’t imply that it is true. If the Catholic position were right, then the lack of it on the Orthodox side would be a marker of a real deficiency, but that would only be so if we knew the Catholic position was right first. So even if the Catholic position more clearly puts forward its principles, this doesn’t give one side a leg up.
Further, such principles are fairly only recently promulgated with the kind of clarity referred to here. At the Great Western schism such was not the case. Such was not the case at the Fifth council which asserted that the council was the “only way” that such a normative judgment could be reached.
You claim that there is no consensus in Orthodoxy about what makes a council ecumenical. First we need to scrape away the ambiguities. It surely doesn’t refer to what every theologian or cleric says. If so, Catholicism would fail by the same token. If we take “consensus” in the sense of say the consensus partum where there it is taken in the sense of a normative judgment, then the lack of such an articulation by Orthodox writers is neither here nor there since the theory admits that such persons will not be sufficient to establish as much. What we would need to look for is where said councils of the church articulated or gave evidence for what makes a council ecumenical. An Orthodox could point those out as articulation of what makes a council normative. Where in the first thousand years do any of the councils of the church do so one way or another? They seem to promulgate normative judgments on all major theological areas, but did they miss that one? Or was it to be for a later date, in which case the church functioned quite well and gave normative judgments without such an articulation?
As for Saint Vincent, if we reject his account here, we will have to reject his account of doctrinal “development” also for similar reasons. As for what is held “everywhere” it seems to me that he thinks of it in terms of what is held in unity between the apostolic sees. This, like Irenaeus and Tertullian, seems to take “the church” to be the church of the apostolic sees in unity. The method those writers recommend to finding the truth in disputes is not by looking to whatever Rome judges, but by looking at what all the apostolic sees teach in unity.
As for Rome’s status, there exists to my knowledge no statement that attempts to be binding on all sorts of issues, such as the status of Mormon baptism. Yet all the Orthodox reject it and do so on an adequate normative basis, that is, the tradition relative to heretic and schismatic baptism. When some body or see goes into heresy or at least schism, it doesn’t seem plausible that we need an ultimately normative judgment on such matters every single time. So it is not as if Rome’s status is in limbo (PUN!). Encyclicals from the Patriarchs up into the 19th century and going back at least as far as Florence and even earlier declared Rome to be in schism and to put forward heresy. What individual clerics or theologians (in the academic sense) say can’t trump those judgments. So I think there is a lot less ambiguity here. Even the official ecumenical documents of the joint theological commission from the Orthodox side speak of Rome resuming her place in the Church-that is, she isn’t in the Church.
As far as not having an ecumenical council since the 8th century, of course plenty of normative teaching documents from the Orthodox church say otherwise, particularly in reference to the 8th council. But by the same token, it is no accident that Rome has not stopped having councils, even when there is no new heresy to combat. If Rome were in communion with the other sees, I seriously doubt that they would have had as many as they did. It was only when theywere free of responsibility to the other sees (and initially the emperor) that they did so. So it is no accident that Rome keeps having such councils, even if their implementation is to their own practical and spiritual detriment.
Further in terms of epistemic playing field, I think there is a point that is missed. In terms of finding out which is the true church, the playing field is level in so far as any person has to do the leg work. With respect to what in fact is true and not merely perspicuous, only the facts can tell and not our a priori need to address epistemic worries. If the facts aren’t according to the latter then we aren’t free to disregard them and a clearer articulation won’t change that. We willcreate a mythology just for ourselves if we do. (Que the Grand Inquisitor) Further, plenty of doctrines even on Catholic principles were not “clearly articulated” for centuries (some still aren’t) and said doctrines turned on the finest points of language and thought at times. If the Orthodox Church’s position is unclarified, it would be in no worse position in maintaining that it can call an ecumenical council without Rome than when the Church professed faith in the Trinity prior to giving of the Nicene Creed. The situation has always been “messy” in this way. And since the Catholic position doesn’t address all that we’d like epistemologically, but only what is revealed, there is no a priori reason to select Catholicism based on its theoretical success at addressing our epistemic worries. The question is whether reality is that way or not. If it is not, then you have to learn to live with reality.
With respect to the consensus partum and your post on your blog, if we take the route you suggest, then practically the entire Catholic apologetic for patristic support for how to understand various biblical texts relating to the Papacy and what was believed is useless (or question begging) and cannot establish Catholic claims since there are a plurality of interpretations of say Matt 16:18. If the sole sufficient criteria is if Rome judges them to be part of the consensus partum, then we cannot use the consensus partum to come to find out that Rome is what she claims to be. In short, we can’t “discover” the Catholic Church by going into history “deep” or otherwise. No amount of studying, as recommended in the “Tu Quo Que” article here could provide a rational basis for discovering the Church apart from that principle. That is, the same dilemma you posit for Vincent afflicts your own position. We’d need to know that Rome was the Church first in order to know what the consensus partum was in interpreting the Bible, the Fathers or any other piece of evidence. What then can we use to find out if Rome is the church if not the above?
This is so clear: the Apostles did not go around handing out Bibles. (Actually there were no Christian Bibles, as the NT had not been written yet.) Clearly St JHN’s discourse is targeted to a Protestant audience, who basically hold a position of “ecclesiastical deism”: today there are just no such “messengers from God” like the Apostles, no such thing as a “living authority” or “living oracle” to whom we must submit. (Actually there has not been such thing since the Apostles died.)
On the other hand, the issue between RCs and EOs is a completely different one: who is today this “living authority”, this “living oracle” that “comes from God”? Who are today the true full successors of the Apostles? Are they the Pope and RC bishops, or the EO bishops? (Actually which of the two lines HAS ALWAYS BEEN that since 1054 or a couple centuries earlier or later?)
To note: St JHN specifically mentions miracles as one of the reasonable motives of credibility:
Accordingly I add a fifth level of logical consistency we should look for to discern the right System = {Sources, Entities, Corpus, Rules}, so that they are:
1. Instrumental: capacity to identify the content of the divine revelation in the Sources (and the Sources themselves), and to transmit that content trans-historically and geographically (Ray’s posts #88 & #89).
2. Historical: abidance by Rules.
3. Internal: absence of contradiction between definitions in Corpus and content of Sources, and between definitions in Corpus themselves.
4. External ordinary: absence of contradiction between definitions in Corpus and physical laws or historical facts.
5. External extraordinary: confirmation by occasional targeted breakings of physical laws (miracles).
Regarding the fifth level, either the RCC has been forsaken by God as playground for the dark side, or it has received ample confirmation. (BTW, I am talking only about RCC-approved miracles like Lourdes. I perceive Medjugorje as a purely human phenomenon in the very best case.)
Perry (#104):
That would be a cogent objection if it were an objection to my actual argument. But it isn’t. The question to which I offered my argument as an answer is how to locate the living, visible subjectum of infallible teaching authority, namely something called “the Church.” I refrained from claiming that the relative perspicuity of the Catholic criteria for infallibilityestablishes that the Catholic Church is that subjectum, partly because, as you imply, perspicuity alone does not establish truth. My claim, rather, was that it’s “more reasonable” to identify the Roman communion as that subjectum than the Orthodox communion. That’s because, ceteris paribus, greater relative perspicuity is a good reason for preferring the Roman to the Orthodox communion. The question then becomes, of course, whether all other things are indeed equal.
In approaching that question, the first thing to note is that it couldn’t even have become a question for inquirers until after the East-West schism had become firm. For until then, the concurrent courses of history and doctrinal development did not really permit the question to be asked. It had been taken for granted in both East and West that something called “the Church” had the living, visible, divinely granted authority to bind consciences in matters of doctrine, but it wasn’t until the schism had become firm that the question which communion relevantly counts as “the Church” could even have been raised. It was no accident that the question of papal infallibility also began to be raised in the West around that time. For if only one of the two communions counted as that “Church” with the living, visible authority to bind consciences in matters of doctrine, there had to be a clear reason to favor one over the other; and if it was to be the Roman communion, that could only be because something about the papacy gave it that status. There was some historical evidence for the Catholic answer; but precisely because the question itself didn’t get raised until the Middle Ages, the evidence could not have been decisive in itself. It still isn’t; and in the very nature of the case, it could not be.
Yet for the same reasons, the evidence for the opposite answer isn’t and couldn’t be decisive either. So in order to argue, from an Orthodox point of view, that the “other things” aren’t equal, and that in fact they favor the Orthodox communion, one is going to have to argue that the falsity of at least some distinctively Catholic doctrines is clearly apparent from what had been held in common in the first millennium. Such an inference cannot, however, be a matter of deductive necessity—partly for the reason I’ve already given and partly because, if it were such a matter, then generation after generation of Western doctors and theologians must have been much duller and more ignorant than in fact they were. Nor can one argue that it’s clearly apparent all the same because “the Church,” meaning the Orthodox communion, authoritatively interprets the common doctrinal patrimony so as to make the falsity of Catholic distinctives apparent. That would simply beg the question. No, the question is simply one of authority—specifically, what reason would there be to favor one communion’s claim to the relevant sort of authority?
The only such reason I can see on the horizon is precisely the one I originally appealed to: perspicuity. For there is no way to show that the “other things” aren’t equal unless one first settles the question of relative perspicuity.
This is where what I see as your main objection comes in, at the end of your comment:
That overlooks the importance of the distinction I’ve been invoking. There can be what you call a “rational basis” for preferring one communion’s claim to authority over the other that doesn’t amount to “establishing” or proving said claim. The via media here between proof on the one hand, and lack of any rational basis on the other, is the relative perspicuity and explanatory power of the two competing paradigms of authority. The superiority of the one over the other cannot be such as to compel intellectual assent. It’s more a matter of a species of induction, namely “inference to the best explanation.” That’s the only sort of argument available, and it has to focus on the question of authority. That’s because trying to settle the matter just by building and following one’s own hermeneutical paradigm for interpreting the sources implicitly rejects the question at issue, which is precisely that of interpretive authority. And that’s why I’ve consistently focused over the past five years on the relative perspicuity and explanatory power of the competing models of authority.
Best,
Mike
Michael L,
Here is another reason for thinking that it isn’t more reasonable in a non-question begging way. Because the principles that motivate the claimed perspicuity are not common between the two models. The move from an identifiable authority to necessarily a singular authority is grounded in some of the controversial theses that plurality entails composition and composition undermines or precludes the possibility of an ultimately normative authority. These seem to be some of the principles upon which the Catholic position turns that are not common to the Orthodox position. Without them the Catholic position relative to perspicuity seems hobbled. You just can’t get there from here. Without them being common it seems harder to claim that one side is more reasonable without assessing the truth of those principles.
I disagree that it couldn’t have become a question prior to the schism. The question was certainly a live one for centuries relative to various sects and sees in times of heresy spread across and outside of the Empire. Where was the church and what identified it?
Further, we have examples where Popes acted on what they perceived as a universal jurisdiction and/or a supreme authority only to receive a rebuke or an excommunication, even at the level of an ecumenical council and even when they claimed their judgment was “irreformable.” When supreme synods in rebuke to popes say things like, that there is “no other way” for a supreme judgment to come about collegially, it is hard for me to understand what space there is for the Catholic position.
And in fact, the Papacy has not argued this way in its official documents. In Satis Cognitum for example, it is stated that,
“Wherefore, in the decree of the Vatican Council as to the nature and authority of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, no newly conceived opinion is set forth, but the venerable and constant belief of every age.” (sec.15)
It is further stated that the doctrines of papal infallibility, supreme and universal jurisdiction and that by divine right were instituted and known by the church since its inception at Pentecost. It is not a later development. And because of this belief, Catholic apologists, along with various Catholic documents have argued from various points in history that the question was “answered” with sufficient clarity over and over again. This is apparent if we look at the Monophysite and Nestorian schisms (and here I do not mean to deny their status as heresy). If there was a time in which the question could be asked, those periods certainly seem sufficient. The same is true during the Monothelite controversy when imperial officers pressed Maximus that they had the assent of all the sees, including Rome. And what “communion” there counted as “the Church” was asked and answered and Catholics have claimed, both popularly and officially that their answer is the one that was given such that to separate from them was schism from the church.
So it seems to me false to say that the theological stance of East and West did not permit the question to be asked. If this were so, then all of the apologetic claims from patristic and conciliar data that the question was “answered” in the affirmative relative to the Catholic position are not only idle, but obviously mistaken since there was only something called “the Church” and the papal dogmas were only materially so at the time, but not yet held in all of the principle sees.
Also, ff the church is essentially visible, then this is good reason to think the papacy would be so from its earliest days. It is not like a doctrine found in texts or expressed in liturgies, but a visible office, like that of a bishop. Without question the threefold offices were openly manifest by the time of Constantine (I’d argue and I’d think you’d agree, long prior to that.) The Catholic Church and Catholic apologists have routinely claimed such was the case for the office of the pope relative to the necessary conditions for being in communion with and a member of the church. The employment of the Formula of Hormisdas by Rome and Catholic apologists does not give evidence of something called “the Church”.
I do agree that it was no accident that the question of papal infallibility was asked after the schism. It seems quite a reasonable question to ask considering two facts. The first being that Rome was operating alone apart from both the heavy hand of the Imperium and the other Apostolic Sees and second being the mess that was the Great Western Schism.
So I honestly can’t see how the gloss you’ve provided is available to you. It is not that I think you’re dishonest Mike, but that I don’t understand how you put the two together.
You are right that the Orthodox side will have to argue not only the falsity of various Catholic doctrines and that they weren’t in fact held in common, but also that some important Fathers and saints in the west were wrong on some important points of theology. That isn’t in principle problematic nor does it license something like a stalemate that you seem to be offering. Here’s why. We’ve done the same (along with Rome) concerning lots of other Fathers and saints, including no less illustrious names as Gregory of Nyssa. Second, Rome has done the same with Augustine. Third, Rome is in the same position reciprocally with respect to Orthodox fathers and saints she claims as her own.
From the position of finding the truth of the matter (as opposed to making an ultimate normative judgment) the reason one could have isn’t on par with the principle of parsimony, but what the facts turn out to be, no less than is the case with evaluating Protestant claims about what the Church was thought to be in ages past. Such is also the case for rival claims (albeit absurd) of apostolicity among restorationist bodies like the Mormons. Otherwise we are where I pointed to previously. All of the historical data that Catholics employ is idle and they should therefore cease from using it in an argumentative fashion (except of course to show how their view comports with it) to win over either Protestants to their position or Orthodox. There is then no ground in the consensus partum for licensing either position, and this will also be true in rendering Catholic arguments against Protestantism from the “consensus partum” idle. This consigns so far as I can see a good amount of Catholic apologetics to the circular file.
So I am not sure thoughtful Catholics will be willing to give up the idea of “establishing” or proving their position. Nor is it clear to me that various authoritative documents allow them to do so. Further, this is why I alluded to the “end run” earlier. The perspicuity claim cannot be put forward without a demonstration of the controversial theological principles I gestured at above. They are prima facia false in a good number of cases so that the question is whether a good argument can be put forward to show with supplementary principles that they hold good in this case. I think that will likely end in more question begging.
I agree that your route might provide some sort of edge and it would be between the Scylla of a proof and the Charybdis of the absence of reason if the perspicuity claim didn’t rest on question begging principles itself.But if we remove those principles, there is nothing left to the claim of perspicuity. Which is “clearer” becomes far murkier.
Now it may be the case that following one’s own hermeneutical paradigm for interpreting sources may reject the question at issue, at this juncture, but that isn’t a reason for thinking that it won’t pop up somewhere else, somewhere more critical. I think it does and in place that places it either prior to or nestled within an implicit inconsistency in a given model. If this weren’t the case, then Catholics would not be arguing that Orthodox lacks a normative teaching office.
The upshot is that I don’t think the perspicuity claim works because it doesn’t in fact turn on neutral principles. The dice are loaded from the get-go.
Perry:
One problem here is that I don’t recognize Catholicism in your characterization of certain aspects of my position—any more than, in other contexts, I recognize Orthodoxy in certain aspects of your position. That’s important because, for apologetic purposes, we must distinguish our particular theological and philosophical views from what our respective communions teach definitively and irreformably. Let’s take it from the top.
I had said that the relatively greater perspicuity of the Catholic account of ecclesial authority was my “sole reason” for preferring Catholicism to Orthodoxy. I stand by that. You now reply:
First, neither I nor the Catholic Church hold that plurality always entails composition. To take the most basic instance: the Trinity is a plurality, yet that plurality does not entail that God is put together out of parts. Of course plurality entails composition when the elements composed are material, and therefore numerically plural; but we agree that the divine persons are not material entities. The Catholic teaching, rather, is that God in se, as distinct from the God-Man himself, is not composed of parts in any of the various ways in which something can be composed of parts. That just follows from God’s aseity. Now as metaphysicians, you and I might well disagree about what such concepts as “plurality” and “composition” really involve. You find Aquinas’ account wanting, which it may well be, just as I find Palamas’ account wanting. But that sort of disagreement is a matter of scholarly opinion. In itself, it implies nothing about what our respective communions teach as definitive and irreformable.
Second, and regarding ecclesiology, neither I nor the Catholic Church derive papal authority from the generalization that “composition undermines or precludes the possibility of an ultimately normative authority.” We hold that there are such things as “particular churches” and that there is such a thing as the Church Universal, so that there’s a sense in which the Church Universal is composed of particular churches. The disagreement between Catholicism and Orthodoxy is not about whether there is composition here, but about the nature of the composition itself. So the Catholic understanding does not depend on any false generalization to the effect that composition “precludes any ultimately normative authority.” The disagreement is about how to relate the authority exercised in “churches” to that of “the Church.” But whatever the truth of that matter may be, it’s not one that can be determined by prior philosophical commitments.
I also think you’ve misidentified what I call “the question.” You write:
As I posed it, the question is whether the Roman communion or the Eastern Orthodox communion is “the Church.” (I did not include the Oriental Orthodox in that because I accept the now-common EO view that the OO schisms were based largely on verbal misunderstanding.) Obviously, what I’m calling “the question” could not have been clearly posed before the two communions were clearly distinct, which wasn’t until at least the 11th century. Therefore, the fact that Eastern patriarchs and councils sometimes rebuked popes before then does not address the question. And the fact that some of them held, in effect, that there’s “no other way for a supreme judgment to come about collegially” is not dispositive from a doctrinal standpoint. For, as an empirical generalization, their position was unexceptionable. Before modern communications, and simply as a matter of fact, there was indeed no other way for supreme judgments to “come about collegially.” But from a doctrinal standpoint, that doesn’t tell us what role the See of Rome does or does not have in doctrinal rulings that normatively bind the whole Church.
I also think you’re mischaracterizing what counts as definitive and irreformable Catholic doctrine. You write:
If Satis Cognitum be understood to mean that a doctrine formally equivalent to Vatican I’s dogmas on papal authority was professed by the communion of particular churches from the beginning, then that assertion is simply false. In fact, there never has been such a time. But if SC be taken to mean that an understanding materially equivalent to the pertinent dogmas was always present in East and West, then that must be true if Catholicism is true. And we have evidence for that going back to at least St. Irenaeus, who learned his doctrine from St. Polycarp in Asia Minor, took up a see in France, and had direct interaction with Rome. Of course the Orthodox disagree that the first-millennium evidence as a whole should be interpreted that way. But that merely raises anew the question of interpretive authority. It does nothing settle that question.
That is the main reason why the following misses the mark:
When the occasion arises—as it inevitably does—I have argued that, if the Catholic teaching on the authority of the Magisterium could be “established” or “proved” in the sense you’re invoking here, that teaching would actually be self-refuting. For it would be justified only if unnecessary. Why?
The Catholic teaching is that that “Tradition, Scripture, and the teaching authority of the Church are so linked…that none can stand without the others” (Dei Verbum §10). That implies that nothing which Scripture and Tradition tell us is de fide can be properly understood apart from the teaching authority of the Church—which, of course, includes the teaching about the authority of the Church herself. But by the same token, neither can that authority stand by itself apart from Scripture and Tradition; it would be mere positivism, indeed plain silly, to maintain otherwise. The upshot of DV’s teaching is that Scripture and Tradition supply a coherent, non-arbitrary rationale for the Magisterium that does not, just by itself, intellectualy compel assent to the Magisterium’s claims for itself. Hence the proper task for Catholic apologetics would not be to show that such assent is compelled by way of “proof” from sources independent of such claims; there are no such sources, and there could not be if DV’s teaching is true. Rather, the task is to show that the Catholic way is a reasonable way to interpret the sources as a whole. Any claim stronger than that would entail denying that the Magisterium is necessary for properly interpreting Scripture and Tradition, which is contrary to what the Magisterium teaches about its own authority.
That’s an outline of what I’ve called the Catholic “hermeneutical paradigm.” About that HP, you write:
As I indicated at the top of this comment, the “perspicuity claim” does not rest on the principles you say it does. In fact, a neutral inquirer need not assume, as truths, any peculiarly Catholic principles in order to see the Catholic HP as one that makes sense. He need only entertain them as hypotheses. That won’t mean he’s thereby convinced that the Catholic HP is correct. It means only that he can find some rational basis for accepting the Magisterium’s claims for itself. And what I’ve argued is that its greater perspicuity, relative to the Orthodox HP, is a good reason for seeing it that way.
Best,
Mike
Having read the article, I’d like to give my reply. I’ll try to be irenic, yet forthright; as well as succinct.
First, the main thing that struck me in Bryan’s article was the apple-to-oranges comparison he makes between the Roman Catholic Magisterium and Protestant confessions. An apples-to-apples comparison would be the RC Magisterium and the Protestant Bible. For Protestants don’t submit to confessions, ultimately – we submit to the Holy Scriptures, ultimately.
Secondly, as I see it, the case Bryan presents to explain away the Protestant’s Tu Quoque objection is never proven. For he tries to explain it away by appealing to what the prospective Catholic discovers – i.e. the Divinely instituted RC Magisterium. Yet, what they discover has nothing to do with the Tu Quoque objection. The Tu Quoque objection concerns the act of interpretation, not the result of it. In other words, the Protestant, upon being accused of being his own interpretive authority, replies that the Roman Catholic is as well since the Roman Catholic used his/her own interpretation to come to trust the RC Magisterium.
Grace and peace.
Brad
Brad (re: #109),
Regarding your first point, I’m responding to Protestants who claim that Protestant confessions do have [subordinate] authority, under Scripture. And there is no authority to which no submission is due. So the first question on the table was the authority of Protestant confessions, which I argued was null, as you can see at the beginning of this post. In response, I received the tu quoque objection. So by definition the tu quoque to which I’m responding is about the authority of Protestant confessions, not about the authority of Scripture. Hence your “apples-to-oranges” objection is about a different tu quoque (i.e. a response to a claim that Scripture has no authority), not the tu quoque I’m addressing in this post.
In your second point, you wrote:
The tu quoque is not only about the act of interpretation, but also about an alleged parity of interpretive authority. The argument I make here is precisely that the nature of what is discovered makes a difference with respect to whether or not one retains ultimate interpretive authority. And this difference answers the tu quoque objection.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Thank you Bryan (#110).
In regards to you responding to the claim that Protestant confessions have authority, then okay. I don’t think that gets to the heart of the matter, however. But if that’s what the article is about, then I’ll leave it there.
You said:
I agree that the Catholic doesn’t “retain” interpretive authority. But I disagree that he doesn’t retain “ultimate” interpretive authority. The very fact that he initially interprets Scripture, tradition and history as pointing to the RCC proves this much. He just relinquishes further interpretive authority.
Note: I’m not sure what “parity” means. :)
Grace and peace.
Brad
Brad (re: #111),
If Jesus and you were reading Scripture together, and you said that a passage means x, and He replied, “No, Brad, it doesn’t mean x; it means y” would you reply, “Well, Jesus, we’ll just have to agree to disagree, you and I, because I retain ultimate interpretive authority, since I initially used my interpretation of Scripture, tradition and history to find you.”? I think not. So, as I explained in the post, just because one initially uses one’s interpretation of Scripture, tradition and history to find something, it does not follow that one retains ultimate interpretive authority. Whether one retains ultimate interpretive authority depends on the nature of what one finds.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Bryan (#112)
Good reply! That’s a great example and made me laugh out loud (not because I disagree with it (which I do), but because of the absurdity of telling Jesus that I’d disagree with his interpretation!).
Okay, after that tid bit.
I disagree with you here because of your claim that the RCC Magisterium is authorized by Jesus. I would disagree with this. And in its place I would put Scripture, without the RCC Magisterium. Your objection then is: The Protestant thus retains interpretive authority, while the Catholic does not.
I disagree on two counts:
First, the Catholic still must interpret the Magisterium, even though it’s living. All communication is thus. Communication, whether oral or written, must be interpreted, whether metaphor, prose, et al.
Secondly, yes, the Protest retains interpretive authority. Yet, you make it sound like the Protestant, by retaining his own interpretive authority, is not being subject to Jesus. And with this I disagree. The very fact that Protestants will take action (even when they don’t naturally want to) based on their interpretations of Scriptures, bears this out. It shows that a Protestant who is sincerely searching the Scriptures is subjecting himself to Christ (whose Word we believe is found in the Scriptures). Thus, our interpretive authority does not equate with being our own authority.
Grace and peace.
Brad
Brad (re: #113)
Yeah, it was a bit tongue-in-cheek. :-) But, my point by that example was that the nature of what one discovers does (or can) determine whether one retains ultimate interpretive authority. If one discovers someone with greater interpretive authority than oneself, then one does not retain ultimate interpretive authority.
Ok. The purpose of this post ["The Tu Quoque] isn’t to show or establish that the Magisterium is divinely authorized. This post takes the divine authority of the Magisterium as a given, in order to focus on the tu quoque. Regarding the divine authority of the Magisterium, we do have an article on apostolic succession in the works. In the mean time, I make an initial case for apostolic succession in this section of my reply to Michael Horton.
Indeed, the Catholic must still interpret the Magisterium. But, it does not follow that the Catholic retains ultimate interpretive authority, just as from the fact that if Jesus were presently on earth among us, it would not follow that we would retain ultimate interpretive authority. The necessity of interpretation on the part of each individual does not entail parity of interpretive authority among interpreters. Just as Jesus would (and does) retain ultimate interpretive authority were He physically present here on earth today, so those He has invested with His teaching and interpretive authority over the members of His Body, the Church, retain interpretive authority over those whom He did not give such authority.
I agree that a Protestant who does not know about the Magisterium Christ established, but who seeks to obey Christ through subjecting himself to [his own interpretation of] Scripture, is subjecting himself to Christ, as best as he knows. But, if Christ established a Church with an authoritative Magisterium, and if concerning this Magisterium it is true that: “The one who listens to you listens to Me, and the one who rejects you rejects Me; and he who rejects Me rejects the One who sent Me” (Luke 10:16), then, in that respect, the Protestant is, by not listening to the Magisterium, in that respect not listening to Christ, and is, by [unknowingly] rejecting the Magisterium, in that respect [unknowingly] rejecting Christ. In other words, if Christ established certain shepherds over His Church, and these shepherds represent Him, and we are to submit to them as to Christ, then a person who does not submit to them but makes himself his own ultimate interpretive authority is [in that respect] being his own authority when he should be [in that respect] submitting to Christ. Those who through no fault of their own are unaware of the Magisterium and its divine authority, are not culpable for not following Christ in this respect. That is not the case for those who know Christ authorized and sent Apostles, but reject them, or who knowingly reject the successors of Christ’s Apostles authorized by them. Just as rejecting the Son is rejecting the Father who sent the Son, so rejecting the Apostles is rejecting the Son who authorized and sent them. And so likewise, rejecting the bishops whom the Apostles authorized and sent is a rejection of the Apostles, which is a rejection of the Son, which is a rejection of the Father. But all this depends on the question of apostolic succession, which is something I’m assuming in this article, not seeking to establish or demonstrate here.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
It does not follow that such a protestant is submitting to Christ. It only follows that he is submitting to something. That something can be his own interpretation. It can be a protestant interpretive tradition. But just because he acts against his natural instincts does not mean his interpretation is correct.
It also does not mean he does not ultimately control which interpretation he embraces. People respond differently to doctrinal uncertainty. Some respond by taking the easiest road. Essentially assuming God’s answer is always Yes. Some respond by taking the harder road and assume God’s answer is No or at least that it might be No so that is the safer coarse. The first group ends up in liberalism. The second in fundamentalism.
Brad,
If I may briefly hop in here. Your discussion with Bryan seems to be developing in the way I outlined in comment # 82. Please do read that comment, as I think it may help.
(You seem to also have in mind the T1/T2 distinction I tried to draw in comments ## 6 and 11. Please do read those comments and the responses from Bryan (#17) and Ray (#79). Perhaps that will clear up the argumentative structure.)
I fear that in many of these issues the Protestants and Catholics are not really understanding each other when they ‘disagree’. So the disagreements are merely apparent. Much work has to be done to ensure we’re understanding each other; especially given the medium of ‘the combox’. I think the issue of ‘interpretive authority’ is *the* issue on which all other issues [in these kinds of discussions] rest. If Catholics are correct in their claims regarding interpretive authority (as I now believe they/we are), and if the Protestant tu quoque fails (as I now believe it does), then one of three consequences obtains. Protestants (1) must admit a lack of any true authority; or (2) they must advert to a burning in the bosom; or (3) if the former two are unacceptable (and they are), then Protestants can no longer remain Protestant.
Dear Brad,
Please consider reading my comment #78 in the “Sola Scriptura: A Dialogue between Michael Horton and Bryan Cross” article, which addresses – very specifically – the problem you are honing in on regarding the fact that the Catholic SEEMS to have the equivelant epistemic problem as the Protestant -at least as regards the initial subjective “choice” to recognize the authority of the succesors to Peter and the apostles. I very much believe that the central problem is that many of our Protestant brothers have failed to reflect deeply on the purpose and nature of Divine Revelation generally, and its relationship to biblical “faith” or the “act of faith”. Beside that comment, I highly recommend a short article by John Henry Newman entitled “Faith and Private Judgment” which will, I hope, shed further light on this sub-strata epistemic issue. Here are the links:
My comment link: http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/11/sola-scriptura-a-dialogue-between-michael-horton-and-bryan-cross/#comment-13836
The short Newman article: http://www.newmanreader.org/works/discourses/discourse10.html
Pax et Bonum,
Ray
Ray, Ryan, Randy, Bryan:
Forgive me if I’m slow or unresponsive. Life beckons and/or preference for other things might win out.
But thank you for your thoughts and pointers.
Grace and peace.
Brad
Cross#17
Italian: Qua ci sono due aspetti diversi.
1) il rapporto del protestante e del cattolico con la propria autorità ecclesiastica, 2) la natura e la metodologia del processo decisionale.
Per quanto riguarda la natura del rapporto del protestante e del cattolico rispetto alle proprie autorità ecclesiastiche (1) si può dire senza dubbio che è diversa nella sua natura. (2)Sia il cattolico che il protestante devono elaborare criteri di giudizio nel suo processo decisionale. Il protestante, la propria interpretazione della Scrittura. Il cattolico trova nella “successione apostolica” il suo criterio di giudizio. La mia tesi qua è che la scelta della successione apostolica come criterio di giudizio è per sua natura una scelta dottrinale e quindi predetermina in partenza l’esito della ricerca.
English translation: Here there are two different aspects.
1) the relation of the Protestant and the Catholic with his ecclesial authority, 2) the nature and methodology of decision-making process.
With regard to the nature of the relationship of the Protestant and Catholic with respect to their ecclesial authority (1) one can say without doubt that it is different in its nature. (2) Both the Catholic and Protestant, should develop evaluation criteria in their decision making. The Protestant, by his interpretation of Scripture. The Catholic locates it in the “apostolic succession” as his criterion for judging. My argument here is that the choice of apostolic succession as a basis for judging is by nature a doctrinal choice and therefore at the start predetermines the outcome of the research.
Cross#17
Italian: Innanzittutto, e riferito a questa frase (in the lower level, by one’s reason one makes a judgment that this group of persons is the magisterium of the Church Christ founded) se c’è un giudizio, e il giudizio inevitabilmente c’è, ci dovranno anche essere dei criteri in base ai quali l’individuo fa questo giudizio. E questo giudizio, previo a qualunque sottomissione a un magistero, è un giudizio privato.
Il cattolico non usa il proprio giudizio per determinare il contenuto della propria fede (poi vedremo che neanche questo è vero), ma usa il suo giudizio privato per determinare i criteri che gli permetteranno di affidare il proprio giudizio a un altro.
Comunque, e tralasciando anche questo aspetto, arriviamo al nodo della questione.
La scelta della successione apostolica come criterio di giudizio presuppone l’accettazione a priori di una data ecclesiologia. La sola scelta della successione apostolica come criterio di giudizio equivale a limitare la nostra scelta alla Chiesa Cattolica o a quella Ortodossa (e a pochissime altre) perché solo queste Chiese hanno un’ecclesiologia in cui l’autorità si trasmette sacramentalmente e quindi sono le uniche chiese in cui la successione apostolica è possibile. Quindi, quando si sceglie la “succesione apostolica” come criterio, non si sceglie un freddo e inappellabile criterio esterno alla questione, ma si sta già scegliendo ipso facto un’ecclesiologia ben precisa carica di tante implicazioni dottrinali. Di conseguenza, il criterio della successione apostolica è un criterio pieno di implicazioni dottrinali. La chiesa scelta dovrà avere per forza l’ecclesiologia da me imposta nel mio criterio di giudizio, criterio che è stato deciso prima di qualsiasi sottomissione a nessun magistero (io decido la dottrina prima di sottomettermi a nessun magistero e quindi divento l’autorità ultima).
Da questo si evince che non è vero che chi sceglie questo criterio non faccia considerazioni sul contenuto dottrinale del magistero di quella chiesa (the person’s judgment at the lower level about the authority of the magisterium is not based on his agreement with that magisterium’s teaching, or on its agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture). Applicare la successione apostolica come criterio di giudizio vuol dire stabilire a priori una certa ecclesiologia e quindi decidere a priori su questioni dottrinali.
English translation: First of all, and referring to this sentence (“in the lower level, by one’s reason one Makes a Judgment That this group of persons is the magisterium of the Church Christ founded”) if there is a judgment and the judgment is inevitable, there will also be a basis on which the individual makes this judgment. And this judgment, prior to any submission to a Magisterium, is a private judgment. The Catholic does not use his own judgment to determine the content of his faith (we’ll see that even this is true), but uses his private judgment to determine the criteria that will allow him to entrust his own judgment to another.
However, and ignoring this aspect, we come to the crux of the matter.
The choice of apostolic succession as the criterion for judging presupposes the acceptance of a particular ecclesiology. The sole choice of apostolic succession as a basis for judging is equivalent to limiting our choice to the Catholic Church or the Orthodox (“and few others”) because only these Churches have an ecclesiology in which the ecclesial authority is transmitted sacramentally and therefore are the only churches in which apostolic succession is possible. So, when you choose “apostolic succession” as a criterion, do not choose a cold and final criterion external to the issue, but it is ipso facto already choosing a precise ecclesiology with many doctrinal implications. Consequently, the criterion of apostolic succession is a policy full of doctrinal implications. The church should have the choice to force the ecclesiology set by me in my assessment criterion [The sense is that the criterion used ("apostolic succession") determines the ecclesiology of the church we choose, not that the church has the choice to force the ecclesiology], a criterion that has been decided prior to any submission to any teaching (“doctrine before I decide to submit to any teaching and then became the ultimate authority”) .
From this it appears that is not true that those who choose this criterion do not make considerations about the doctrinal content of the magisterium of the church (“the person’s Judgement at the lower level about the authority of the magisterium is not based on His Agreement With That magisterium’s teaching, or agreement with ITS on His Own interpretation of Scripture”). To apply apostolic succession as a basis for judging means to establish a certain ecclesiology and therefore decide a priori on doctrinal issues.
Cross #17
Italian: In conclusione, la successione apostolica non è un criterio neutro e autoevidente, ma presuppone scegliere a priori il contenuto dottrinale che dovrà avere la chiesa scelta. Quindi anche tu (tu quoque) sei nella stessa posizione epistemologica del protestante perché hai scelto la tua chiesa in base a criteri dottrinali da te stabiliti prima di sottometterti a nessun magistero e diventando te stesso di conseguenza l’autorità ultima delle tue credenze.
English translation: In conclusion apostolic succession is not a neutral criterion and self-evident, but presupposes the a priori choice that the church should have the choice regarding doctrinal content. Then you too (tu quoque”) are in the same epistemological position as the Protestant regarding why you choose your church based on doctrinal criteria you selected before submitting to any magisterium, and therefore making yourself the ultimate authority as a result of your beliefs.
Luis, (re: #119)
You wrote:
There is an ambiguity in the words “doctrinal choice” [scelta dottrinale]. The discovery of a divine authority has doctrinal implications, and in that sense is a doctrinal choice. But such a discovery is not a decision between two sets of propositions, and in that sense it is not a doctrinal choice. If through historical investigation I discover that the early Church practiced apostolic succession and that there is an unbroken succession of bishops extending from the Apostles down to the present day, and a practice of ordination that unites them in a chain, that discovery of this line of bishops obviously has doctrinal implications. But it is not a decision between doctrines, just as discovering the divinity of Christ is not a decision between doctrines, even though it obviously has doctrinal implications.
That is true, as I pointed out repeatedly in the post. The difference is that in sola scriptura, the individual remains his own ultimate interpretive authority, whereas upon discovering and submitting to bishops having apostolic succession, the individual no longer retains ultimate interpretive authority. And that’s why the Catholic is not subject to the tu quoque objection. No one is denying that both inquirers (i.e. the person becoming Protestant, and the person becoming Catholic) begin with private judgment.
You are again playing on the ambiguity in the “doctrinal content” [contenuto dottrinale]. The discovery of apostolic succession in the Church Fathers, and of the bishops today whose unbroken line of succession extends back to the Apostles, has doctrinal implications, but it is not a choice between two doctrines. We cannot (without begging the question) use a doctrinal criterion to decide whether or not apostolic succession is true (although biblical evidence can be found to support it within the paradigm). Rather, apostolic succession is discovered in reality [i.e. in the world], in the Church Fathers (and throughout the universal Church until the time of Protestantism) and in the present-day bishops. For the inquirer then, if there is such a thing as apostolic succession, and this is the way the early Church understood ecclesial authority to be transmitted, then he knows he must conform his doctrine to what the Church governed by these successors of the Apostles says. But if there is no apostolic succession, then he can form his doctrines as he pleases, according to his own interpretation of Scripture.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Cross#120
Italian: Lei presenta la successione apostolica come criterio di giudizio per determinare qual è il vero magistero. La mia obiezione è che la scelta di questo criterio implica aver dato già risposta a questioni dottrinali sulle quali il cattolico, per non cadere nel Tu Quoque, non dovrebbe pronunciarsi prima di sottomettersi al Magistero . Se il criterio di giudizio contiene nelle sue implicazioni dottrinali il risultato di ciò che si cerca, allora il criterio di giudizio non è un più un criterio di giudizio, ma è una presa di posizione mascherata da criterio di giudizio.
English translation: You are presenting apostolic succession as the criterion of judgment to determine what is the true magisterium. My objection is that the choice of this criterion implies already having given answers to doctrinal questions regarding which the Catholic, in order not to fall into the Tu quoque, should not comment before submission to the Magisterium. If the criterion for judging contains in its doctrinal implications the result of what you are looking for, then the criterion of judgment is no longer a criterion for judging, but it is a statement of position masquerading as a criterion for judging.
Italian: Tant’è vero che il suo criterio di giudizio per decidere qual è il vero magistero corrisponde millimetricamente all’insegnamento del Magistero Cattolico sulla fonte della propria autorità (e cioè l’apostolicità della Chiesa). Se in una ricerca per trovare la vera autorità, uno adotta un criterio che corrisponde esattamente al criterio adottato da una particolare chiesa nel definire la fonte della propria autorità, è evidente che quel criterio condurrà inevitabilemente a quella stessa chiesa di cui si è adottato il criterio.
English translation: So true is it that your criterion of judgment for deciding what is the true magisterium corresponds very precisely to the teaching of the Catholic Magisterium regarding the source of his authority (that is, the apostolic Church). If on a quest to find the true authority, one adopts a criterion which exactly corresponds to criterion adopted by a particular church to define the source of its authority, it is evident that this criterion will inevitably lead to the same church of which we have adopted the criterion.
Cross# 120
Italian: Lei ha “scoperto” la divinità di Gesù senza fare decisioni dottrinali? E come ha fatto?
E può “scoprire” la successione apostolica senza fare scelte dottrinali sulla natura dell’autorità nella Chiesa? Senza decidere nulla sulla natura dei sacramenti e in particolare dell’Ordine Sacerdotale?
Dice il Catechismo della Chiesa Cattolica:
1087 Thus the risen Christ, by giving the Holy Spirit to the apostles, entrusted to them his power of sanctifying:10 they became sacramental signs of Christ. By the power of the same Holy Spirit they entrusted this power to their successors. This”apostolic succession” structures the whole liturgical life of the Church and is itself sacramental, handed on by the sacrament of Holy Orders.
. . . is present in the earthly liturgy . .
Come ha “scoperto” che per la Potenza dello Spirito, gli apostoli conferiscono tale potere ai loro successori senza fare scelte dottrinali sulla Trinità? O sulla missione dello Spirito Santo in tutto questo processo? O sulle parole di Gesù a cui si saranno neccessariamente riferiti tanti testi da Lei studiati? Lei ha semplicemente “scoperto” ciò che struttura tutta la vita liturgica della Chiesa! Come ha fatto a non prendere decisioni dottrinali? Tanti secoli di ricerca e riflessione teologica, e Lei mi dice che ha “scoperto” tutte queste realtà senza fare decisioni dottrinali?
Sono veramente incuriosito della natura e della metodologia di queste “scoperte” (e non solo io!).
English translation: You have “discovered” the divinity of Jesus without doctrinal decisions? And how did you do this?
Can you “discover” the apostolic succession without making choices about the nature of the doctrine in the Church? Without deciding anything about the nature of the sacraments and in particular the Order of Priests?
The Catechism of the Catholic Church says:
1087 Thus the risen Christ, by giving the Holy Spirit to the apostles, entrusted to them his power of sanctifying:10 they became sacramental signs of Christ. By the power of the same Holy Spirit they entrusted this power to their successors. This”apostolic succession” structures the whole liturgical life of the Church and is itself sacramental, handed on by the sacrament of Holy Orders. . . . is present in the earthly liturgy . .
How did you “discovered ” that by the power of the Spirit, the apostles gave that power to their successors, without making choices about the doctrine of the Trinity? Or about the mission of the Holy Spirit in this process? Or that the words of Jesus to which you may cite, necessarily refer to the many texts you have studied? You have just “discovered” the structure of the entire liturgical life of the Church! How did you not make doctrinal decisions? Many centuries of research and theological reflection, and you say you “discovered” all these realities without making doctrinal decisions? I’m really curious about the nature and methodology of these “discoveries” (and not just me!).
Italian: Mi scusi, ma Lei per giungere al suo criterio di giudizio ha dovuto realizzare una ricerca storica. Nello studio storico si deve necessariamente decidere sulla verità di set of propositions contrastanti. E necessariamente per adottore il criterio di giudizio da Lei scelto, ha anche dovuto prendere decisioni tra i set of propositions dottrinali contrastanti nei suoi testi di studio (niente di meno che i Padri della Chiesa!). È impossibile adottare quel criterio, per la natura stessa del criterio, senza prima aver fatto scelte dottrinali rispetto alla natura e alla fonte di autorità della vera chiesa. Il criterio stesso presuppone quelle scelte e quindi, se Lei è arrivato tramite la ricerca storica a quel criterio, in un qualche momento della sua ricerca avrà dovuto fare decisione dottrinali (e non poche e di non poca rilevanza).
English translation: Excuse me, but for you to arrive at this criterion of judgment you had to carry out historical research. In the historical study you must necessarily decide about the truth of conflicting set of propositions. And necessarily to adopt the criterion of judgment of your choice, you also had to make decisions between the conflicting set of doctrinal propositions in your textbooks