Church and State: Some Reflections
May 4th, 2010 | By Andrew Preslar | Category: Blog PostsIn his recent article on the ecclesiology of the Ravenna Document, Ansgar Santogrossi, O.S.B., mentions four historical forms of relation between the Church (or some sort of religion) and the State. (Ansgar Santogrossi, O.S.B., “The Ecclesiology of the Ravenna Agreed Statement: Analysis and Correction,” The Thomist 73 [2009]: 437-54.) Fr. Santogrossi presents this material in the course of explaining the philosophical assumptions under-girding the “ecclesiology of communion” model which largely informs this agreed statement of Catholic and Orthodox theologians. My purpose here is not to interact with the main thrust of Fr. Santogrossi’s article, which is a critical appraisal of the Ravenna Document. Rather, I want to focus on the bit about Church and State, including the ecclesiological implications of the various ways in which that relation has been construed.
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For the sake of convenience, I have provided a descriptive label for each period or category described by Fr. Santogrossi.
1. Corporate Union of Church and State
The ancient city subsumed economy, culture, and religion under an authority seen as divinely established–in modern terms, there was no distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. ["Geselleschaft" denotes self-interest pursued in a rationally ordered society. "Gemeinschaft" denotes communal life maintained by the organic, traditional bonds of family, kinship and religion. See this article for further elaboration of these sociological categories.]
2. Cultural Integration of Church and State
Christendom introduced the supernatural power of the Church over man in his transcendent dimension, thus allowing the political power to be seen as distinct and ordered to earthly peace as its proximate end. Nevertheless Christendom everywhere saw the political power as God-given and meant consciously to serve man’s eternal salvation in indirect ways as its remote end, insofar as historical circumstances and the capacities of the majority allowed. This was publicaly manifested and accepted by all, in the liturgical coronation of rulers and in myriad other ways.
3. Separation of Church and State
The liberal revolutions ruptured the ordering of earthly justice and prosperity to man’s eternal end, effectively privatizing religion and setting up the modern state, founded on the consensus of individuals seeking mutually to secure their lives, property, and freedom.
4. The Church-Haunted State
Idealist and Romantic thought in turn accepted modern political society as a given, eventually calling it Gesellschaft, but wanted to cultivate Gemeinschaft, that is, human beings somehow one in spiritual communion and not reducible to a sum of individuals contracting to found a coercive power for the sake of self-defense and property. Law and power came to be associated exclusively with Gesellschaft, while spiritual communion was the realm of natural and organic unity in freedom. Thus, instead of retrieving and enriching the classical Christian philosophy of society which saw human beings integrated through relations of subordination and authority in view of the true human and common good, relations which had constituted societies from a multitude of families and institutions, Romantic philosophies tended to posit a false opposition between the juridical and the spiritual-personal, a dichotomy conceived in reaction to liberalism and alien to both premodern life and the history of the Church. They concluded to a quasi-collective spirit that would somehow constitute the essence of a given organic society. And instead of deepening their understanding of hierarchical relations (the juridical element) and integrating them with the mission of the Holy Spirit and supernatural grace (the spiritual and personal element) as Pius XII and Charles Journet would do in their teaching on the Mystical Body, theologians influenced by Romanticism tended to imagine the Church as an “organic” entity, collective life or spirit, to which hierarchical relations would accrue more or less as excrescences.
The “corporate union” view has the obvious attraction of simplicity. For those who believe in the existence of both, the bifurcation of this world and the world to come is bound to create some cognitive dissonance. The union of Church and State in one governing body overcomes this problem. Some Christians find support for this view in the precedence of Israelite theocracy. One could argue that the Byzantine Imperial Church and the Protestant Church of England are Christian examples of this ancient tendency to conflate religion and politics.
The cultural integration view, as articulated by Santogrossi and exemplified, to one degree or another, in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, features some of the same attractions as the corporate union view (i.e., holistic), but with more flexibility, with two distinct bodies whose “integration” is not not corporate, but cultural. This view emphasizes the spiritual and moral subordination of the State to the Church. However, even in this ideal relation, the State remains essentially distinct from the Church, having its own distinct government and proper end (the temporal well-being of its citizens). On the cultural integration view, the Church, in relation to the State, can “know how to be brought low, and how to abound,” as an authentic expression of her essential being and mission. Both suffering and glory, humiliation and exaltation, belong to the mystical Body of Christ. There is no divine mandate for Christians to create a theocracy or Christian State, but neither is there any Steel Curtain between this world and the next. The ends of Church and State are sufficiently commensurate to allow for mutual influence, but not the absorption of one body by the other.
According to the third view, the liberal conception of society, all public transactions and relations are reduced to a matter of individual preference and convenience, with government (hence hierarchical relations) serving only a negative function. This conception of social life strikes some people as hopelessly banal, while others regard liberalism as the only means of preserving peace among people with competing conceptions of what is true, good, and beautiful. The classical liberal view recognizes that purely political plans and mechanistic means cannot bring about the right ordering of a community. Thus, the error of modern socialism is rejected. The liberal State, however, is similar to the socialist State in that all political arrangements are based upon entirely mundane principles. For the religious believer who subscribes to this view, the result is a sort of double-mindedness, since his ultimate aspirations bear little or no relation to the cultural expressions and political ordering of human society (and vice versa).
The fourth view really does not feature a universal Church that can be definitely related to the State. Minus a hierarchical structure of its own, the universal Church would be reducible to a mere aggregate of local churches, a quasi-entity that sort of manifests itself here and there in various (often mutually incompatible) beliefs, organizations, communal actions, and religious enthusiasms. This is much like the Protestant conception of an invisible “catholic” Church, and may be subject to the same criticisms that apply to that notion. (See the article, Christ Founded a Visible Church.)
The cultural integration view is arguably superior to the other forms of relation between Church and State. The universal Church, on Catholic ecclesiological principles, is visibly distinct from every State, and yet visibly present in all. She is a communion of local churches, but she is more than this by virtue of her visible unity in faith, sacraments, and government at the universal level. The Catholic Church, without being a political empire, brings the citizens of the nations together in a sublime yet tangible unity. The powers of this present world have never been very comfortable with this spiritual kingdom visible on earth; hence, the tension persisting between the Catholic Church and the State, even during the best of times.
The Catholic Church, as a spiritual communion that enjoys visible unity at the universal level in faith, sacraments, and ecclesial government, reconciles Gesellschaft (the hierarchical-juridical) and Gemeinschaft (the organic-communal) in the present form of the kingdom of God. (For a summary analysis of the relation of Church and Kingdom, see Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., “The Church and the Kingdom: A Study of Their Relationship in Scripture, Tradition, and Evangelization.” Letter & Spirit 3 [2007]: 23-38.) The synthesis of self-orientation and community-orientation that takes place in the Catholic Church is quite different than the ancient syntheses, in that Catholicism recognizes the equality, freedom, and dignity of every human person. However, the human person is not conceived merely as an autonomous, preference-having individual, but precisely as a rational being designed to be in rightly ordered communion with God and neighbor (indeed, with all of creation), in both the present world and the life to come.
The Catholic Church, being what she it, cannot help but reckon with the State, which also exists to promote human happiness. The social and cultural matrix formed by the interaction of these two kingdoms, the heavenly and the earthly, will necessarily be complex. If the account given of her in Sacred Scripture is true, then it is safe to say that the Church is stronger than the State, even when she is weaker. This strength is not absorbing, nor is it repelling. It is sanctifying. (I argue for this last point in the post, Kingdom(s), Cult and Creation. See especially the third section, “Cult and Creation: Some Reflections in Prose.”)
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Andrew,
Wonderful article! This paragraph reminds me once again how crucial our Catholic self-understanding is. It seems to me that union with mankind (and through mankind the entire created order) as individual persons WITHIN a communion (family); constitutes the very intentions in the mind of God with respect to the act of creation. The fulfillment of these divine intentions result in our final beatitude (and through us the fulfillment of the created order): again as individuals within a communion (family) in the eschaton. It should be no surprise then, that between the act of creation and the consummation of all things, this “I/we” relationship to God and one another should be the fundamental framework for God’s activity within history. Thus, the “chosen People” of the old covenant as God’s first-born among the nations (serving as an elder brother and exemplar to “the nations” – those also potentially His children); followed by the expansion and fulfillment of the old covenant promises in the new covenant via the Church – the trans-national, trans-historical (even transcendent) covenant family of God. I am becoming more and more convinced that this vision of the human person within the divine covenant family represents an interpretive key to history and the cosmos (a narrative understanding of the meaning of life) which can serve both as a powerful challenge to the nihilistic human narrative espoused by modernity AND as a gravitational core towards which the fractured pieces of Christendom can be drawn – the true paradigm for ecumenism. The template is so powerful; it can do “double lifting” in the interests of both separated Christians as well as divided humanity generally. Enough rambling . . . I am simply amazed by the gift that the Church is.
Pax et Bonum,
-Ray
Ray,
Thanks for pointing out the “double-lifting” effect of the life of the Church. That is the sort of thing I was driving at in my thinking on the “hierarchical integration” model. I agree that the family is central to the biblical narrative of redemption–”kinship by covenant” and all. My hunch is that this integrated relation between Church (divine society) and State (human society) is somehow related, in theory, to the truth of the Incarnation, as revealed in Sacred Scripture and specified in the ecumenical councils, and is not merely an accidental by-product of the Middle Ages. Our Medieval Fathers, and the society they helped to build, were, in this sense, much more “Christian” than we have become–and rightly so.
In Christ, God enters fully into the human family, thereby implicating all humanity in redemption, such that, though many have turned away from God, preferring idols, all human beings, in their legitimate communal structures, have been brought into a new relation to divinity (2 Corinthians 5:14-21). The sanctification of the State falls within the purview of the Church, which, although a visible society among other societies, is not simply another among them, nor conflated with any one of them, or all collectively (the “essential union” error). Rather, she is constituted and called to serve all, because she is greater than all (Matthew 23:11). The proper response of the State is, in turn, to serve the Church, recognizing that their respective ends, though not identical, are harmonious, and closely related, insofar as both are the servants of humanity, and human nature is one, and that nature has been assumed by a divine person.
Good Article.
From this article it is hard for me to understand how you are defining “state”. It’s my opinion that the state is essentially a unit of force, compelling, directly or indirectly, individuals to certain actions. At least I believe it is their function. The issue I always had with the church/state “dilemma” is at what point do you allow individuals to act free from state force even when their actions are selfish or immoral? I am no anarchist, I believe there are certain actions that we have no right to do that the state, however large or small, formal or informal, has a proper moral imperative to bring about just punishments (i.e.: in obvious cases like murder/theft).
But I also do not believe that all moral actions should be legislated by state officials precisely because for me to act moral, I have to act freely. So my main questions is:
Do you think the state should force individuals to act in a Christian manner? If so, in what areas of life?
Andy,
In the article, I use “State” in a sort of abstract, or collective, sense, to denote the set of all (relatively) autonomous, political bodies having power to make and enforce laws within a definite geographical territory. Each member of this set is a (concrete) State.
Acting freely is perfectly consistent with obeying the law, and vice versa. Of course, since the State has a certain power to enforce its laws, there is a point at which the State could use that power to force, or all but force, someone into compliance with the law, e.g., emperor worship or paying income tax or not working on the Sabbath.
I am not sure what you mean by “act in a Christian manner,” so I cannot answer the question of whether the State should “force people” to act this way. I do believe, in the words of Fr. Santogrossi (cited above) that the State, as an instrument of God, is “meant consciously to serve man’s eternal salvation in indirect ways as its remote end, insofar as historical circumstances and the capacities of the majority allowed.”
Now, that is pretty dense, and nuanced, statement, and deserves some unpacking. But not by me, not this morning.
Andrew,
Thanks for the response.
What I mean by “acting in a Christian manner” is simply acting as a Christian should by obligation act in every area of his life. I should not steal, murder, commit adultery, etc. I should give to the poor, take care of the sick, etc. The whole dilemma I brought up is where do state governments have a right to legislate punishments for certain moral offenses and where do they allow men to freely break the moral law, God’s law.
I agree that acting freely and obeying the law are compatible. But if a state passes a law demanding that people not work on the sabbath, if I obey this law because I do not want the punishments the state threatens to levy against me. Then my obedience is not a free obedience but obedience by compulsion. My not working on Sunday also lacks the merit of being a good act because its not that I desire to obey God’s law, it is that I desire not to be punished by state force. In this example nothing good occurred because of state intervention.
I do believe, because of original sin, a state government’s policing powers are necessary. I also agree that the state governments should be an instrument to serve man’s eternal salvation as its final cause. As it should be the purpose of any institution, community, or individual action. What I am concerned about in these issues is where does the government’s policing powers have a legitimate function that best serves this goal. I am especially interested in the Catholic view point.
Andy,
It looks like your concept of acting in a Christian manner is basically equivalent to following the moral law, which is (in my view) known by reason/conscience, and by faith in divine revelation, together with the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. To this (i.e., following the moral law), I would add such specifically Christian behavior as participation in the liturgical life of the Church.
Regarding your second paragraph, I think that it is possible to have more than a single motive for performing a single action. Thus, I pay my income taxes both in order to avoid punishment by the State and in order to please God by obeying his laws (e.g., concerning honesty, paying taxes to whom they are due, etc.). It is true that an action proceeding entirely from the motivation of servile fear is not a meritorious action. However, most people, myself included, actually need the extra motivation, by which I mean to say: most people, myself included, are not saints (in the fully realized sense of sainthood). If State intervention becomes, for me, the sole motivation for performing an (objectively) righteous act, the problem lies partly (I would say mostly) in me. The most direct solution to this problem is not to abrogate laws, but to purify motives. The same thing goes for divine law. For example: We are commanded to be believe and be baptized. He who does not believe will be condemned. Thus, it is possible that some will believe and be baptized solely on the motivation of a servile fear of Hell. But this does not mean that God should make these things optional. Same goes for canon law.
I am not arguing that everything a Christian man is required to do should be required by State law. Thus, I share your concern about discerning “where does the government’s policing powers have a legitimate function that best serves this goal.” However, I think that this discernment should be guided by principles in addition to the consideration of the pervasive effects of original sin. Those additional principles must be worked out by theological reflection upon divine revelation as experienced in the life of the Church on earth, together with prudential assessment of the exigencies of the day.
A few particular considerations: (1) The Catholic Church prohibits forced reception of the sacraments, since this would mitigate against the inner harmonies of the sacramental system, e.g., the demand that the one receiving the sacraments be properly disposed to do so, and, I suspect, because of concerns about sacrilege. (2) The Catholic Church is not sabbatarian. I just used that as an example of what some folks believe to be obligatory for Christians. (3) As a prudential matter, there may be times and places when State should refrain from legislation and/or enforcement of some aspect of the moral law. (4) Widespread, ingrained schism/heresy could create such circumstances in which in would be imprudent for the State to punish schismatics/heretics, although I do not believe that such punishment is always, everywhere, wrong or even imprudent.
Of course, the schismtics/heretics all claim that their punishments are unjust persecutions. And in the event that the State does punish members of the (true) Church, precisely for upholding the Church’s Faith (which comes from Christ, by the Holy Spirit), then these are wrongful persecutions, though they redound to the glory of God, particularly when culminating in martyrdom. God has guaranteed to preserve the Church in the unity of truth, but he has made no such guarantee to the State, which is why we must always be prepared to suffer persecutions, as Christians have done throughout history.
My opinion is that the State should serve the Church, by promoting and participating in her life, making for a society in which all human goods are integrally and harmoniously related. By this, I do not mean that the Church should be integrated into the State, nor the State into the Church. The integration–a better word might be interpenetration–that I have in mind occurs in human culture and society. The reason for insisting upon a *hierarchical* interpenetration is that the Church militant is the visible embodiment, one might say the “sacrament,” of the eschatological Kingdom of God, while the kingdoms of this world are passing away. The Church is the locus and bearer, for those in this present world, of the permanent things, even though she too is in transit. But her destination is the heavenly Kingdom, in its plenitude, and she is now collecting and taking up, carrying forward, all that can be taken up. I believe that this includes, in some way, the more noble aspects of earthly life.
To return to the matter of schism and Church–State relations: We live in a post-Protestant Reformation society, which involves not only the separation of Protestants from the Catholic Church, but the proliferation of Protestant ecclesial communities. This makes it much more difficult for the State to serve the Church, since there is no longer a single claimant, generally recognized by citizens of the State, to be the Church. Nevertheless, State reformation/revolution along secular lines is not necessarily the best response to widespread schism and heresy. Religious toleration can coexist with establishment of religion. Even those Christians whose particular ecclesial community/form of religion does not enjoy the direct benefits of establishment, could conclude, as a prudential matter relative to circumstances, so long as they are at least tolerated by State, that the greater good of society and the (true) Church requires that some form of Christian religion/ecclesial community be established. In the mid-19th century, J. H. Newman argued along such lines, against some of his fellow Catholics who supported the movement for the disestablishment of the Church of England. He did not, of course, believe that the C of E was a genuine Church, but he did believe that its establishment, at that time (though not originally), augured better things for society as a whole, including Catholics, than would disestablishment.