Solo Scriptura, Sola Scriptura, and the Question of Interpretive Authority

Nov 4th, 2009 | By Bryan Cross | Category: Featured Articles

According to Keith Mathison, over the last one hundred and fifty years Evangelicalism has replaced sola scriptura, according to which Scripture is the only infallible ecclesial authority, with solo scriptura, the notion that Scripture is the only ecclesial authority. The direct implication of solo scriptura is that each person is his own ultimate interpretive authority.

Christus Pantocrator in the apsis of the cathedral of Cefalù

Solo scriptura is, according to Mathison, an unbiblical position; proponents of sola scriptura should uphold the claim that Scripture is the only infallible authority, but should repudiate any position according to which individual Christians are the ultimate arbiters of Scriptural truth. In this article we argue that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura with respect to the holder of ultimate interpretive authority, and that a return to apostolic succession is the only way to avoid the untoward consequences to which both solo scriptura and sola scriptura lead.

Contents:

I. Introduction
II. Description of Solo Scriptura and What is Wrong with It, According to Mathison
III. Mathison on Sola Scriptura, and How It Differs from Solo Scriptura
IV. Why There Is No Principled Difference Between Sola Scriptura and Solo Scriptura

A. Direct and Indirect Ultimate Interpretive Authority
B. The Contradiction Internal to the Sola Scriptura Position
C. The Delusion of Derivative Authority

V. Objections and Replies

A. Tu Quoque: “The Catholic Position Does Not Avoid Solo Scriptura
B. Sola Ecclesia: The Church is Autonomous, a Law unto Itself, and Unaccountable

VI. Implications

I. Introduction

Sola scriptura is arguably the most foundational point of disagreement underlying the nearly five-hundred year rift between Catholic and Protestant Christians. The Catholic Encyclopedia identifies sola scriptura, alongside sola fide and the ministerial priesthood of all believers, as one of the three fundamental principles of Protestantism; and nineteenth century Church historian Philip Schaff, in agreement with many Protestant thinkers, describes sola scriptura as the “formal principle” of Protestant theology.¹ The doctrine may be viewed as a “dangerous idea” by some, or as an exhilarating and liberating one by others.² But there can be little doubt that sola scriptura is an essential component of historic Protestant theology, and that it is crucial to the justifiability of the sixteenth-century schism and the perpetuation of this schism today.

Catholic critics of sola scriptura have argued that sola scriptura is essentially a denial of ecclesial authority, and hence that sola scriptura necessarily leads to a fragmentation in which each person interprets Scripture as seems right in his own eyes. In this way, they argue, sola scriptura is largely responsible not only for the separation of Protestants from the Catholic Church, but also for the vast number of schisms between Protestants. But a relatively recent book has given Protestants a way of replying to these criticisms, by seeking to accommodate the Catholic critics’ legitimate concerns while simultaneously repudiating their vision of the relation between Scripture and Tradition. That book is titled The Shape of Sola Scriptura, by Keith A. Mathison, the associate editor of Tabletalk.

In his book, Mathison distinguishes between sola scriptura, which he claims to have been the belief of the early confessional Protestants, and what he calls solo scriptura, which Mathison believes is a deviation of the last one hundred and fifty years from the belief and teaching of the early confessional Protestants. As a result of Mathison’s book, in our experience, Protestants now more commonly respond to Catholic arguments against sola scriptura by claiming that these are arguments against solo scriptura, not against sola scriptura. In other words, the common Protestant response to the Catholic critique of sola scriptura is that the Catholic argument aimed at sola scriptura criticizes a straw man, critiquing solo scriptura instead of sola scriptura.

We understand and appreciate the prima facie significance of the distinction Mathison wishes to draw between solo and sola scriptura. However, as we shall argue below, there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura with respect to the locus of “ultimate interpretive authority:” sola scriptura, no less than solo scriptura, entails that the individual Christian is the ultimate arbiter of the right interpretation of Scripture. This implies that what Mathison calls ‘solo scriptura‘ is in fact a more clearly distilled manifestation over time of the true nature of sola scriptura. Moreover, we shall show that the only way to avoid the solo/sola position (and the unbiblical consequences to which it leads) is by way of apostolic succession.

The overall structure of our article is as follows. In the second section we present an overview of Mathison’s account of solo scriptura, explaining exactly what he believes to be wrong with solo scriptura. In the third section we present Mathison’s explanation of sola scriptura, and describe the putative contrast between solo scriptura and sola scriptura. In section four we show why there is no principled distinction between sola scriptura and solo scriptura. In section five we consider some objections to our argument, and show why they do not refute our argument. Finally, in section six we lay out a few noteworthy implications of our argument, including the implication that all the criticisms Mathison levels at solo scriptura apply equally to sola scriptura.

II. Description of Solo Scriptura and What Is Wrong with It, According to Mathison

In his book and his related article, Keith Mathison criticizes the position he calls ‘solo scriptura,‘ namely, the position that “Scripture [is] not merely the only infallible authority but that it [is] the only authority altogether.”³ He describes the solo scriptura position as rejecting altogether even “the true but subordinate authority of the church and the regula fidei“ (i.e., the “rule of faith”).⁴ Mathison admirably demonstrates various significant problems with solo scriptura, including a hermeneutical problem, a set of historical problems, and a Scriptural problem. Because we agree substantially with Mathison’s critique of solo scriptura, we shall present his criticisms with scant commentary before turning our attention to his account of sola scriptura.

Hermeneutical Problem with Solo Scriptura

Mathison begins his criticism of solo scriptura by pointing his readers to the widespread “hermeneutical chaos and anarchy” caused by the existence of conflicting interpretations of Scripture. Why is this “hermeneuetical chaos” a problem? One primary reason, according to Mathison, is that the divisions and disagreements between Christians undermine the credibility of Christians and the gospel. He writes:

One of the most obvious facts facing any intelligent person who has been a Christian for more than a few days is the reality of multitudes of conflicting interpretations of Scripture. . . .

Is there any way to ever resolve the hermeneutical chaos and anarchy that exists within the Protestant church largely as a result of its adoption of radical individualism? Most Protestants do not seem to have taken this question seriously enough if they have considered it at all. If we proclaim to the unbelieving world that we have the one true and final revelation from God, why should they listen to us if we cannot agree about what that revelation actually says? Jesus prayed for the disciples that they would be one (John 17:21a). And why did He pray for this unity? He tells us the reason, “that the world may believe that You sent me” (17:21b). The world is supposed to be hearing the Church preach the gospel of Christ, but the world is instead hearing an endless cacophony of conflicting and contradictory assertions by those who claim to be the Church of Christ. This is the heart of the hermeneutical problem we face in the Church today.⁵

The fact of so many different conflicting interpretations dims the light of the gospel to the world.⁶ This “cacophony of conflicting and contradictory assertions” leaves even the Christian bewildered and uncertain, groping about to find the way, the truth and the life of Christ and His gospel. Mathison writes:

Almost every Christian who has wrestled with theological questions has encountered the problem of competing interpretations of Scripture. . . . Each man will claim that the other is in error, but by what ultimate authority do they typically make such a judgment? Each man will claim that he bases his judgment on the authority of the Bible, but since each man’s interpretation is mutually exclusive of the other’s, both interpretations cannot be correct. How then do we discern which interpretation is correct?⁷

The cause of this hermeneutical chaos, according to Mathison, is solo scriptura. Solo scriptura creates this hermeneutical chaos because it leaves no interpretive authority by which interpretive disputes may be definitively resolved. He writes:

The typical modern Evangelical solution to this problem is to tell the inquirer to examine the arguments on both sides and decide which of them is closest to the teaching of Scripture. He is told that this is what sola scriptura means-–to individually evaluate all doctrines according to the only authority, the Scripture. Yet in reality, all that occurs is that one Christian measures the scriptural interpretations of other Christians against the standard of his own scriptural interpretation. Rather than placing the final authority in Scripture as it intends to do, this concept of Scripture places the final authority in the reason and judgment of each individual believer. The result is the relativism, subjectivism, and theological chaos that we see in modern Evangelicalism today.⁸

According to Mathison, then, when each person is deciding for himself what is the correct interpretation of Scripture, Scripture is no longer functioning as the final authority. Rather, each individual’s own reason and judgment becomes, as it were, the highest authority, supplanting in effect Scripture’s unique and rightful place. Can we avoid this result simply by letting Scripture interpret itself? According to Mathison, the answer is no:

All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture. The only real question is: whose interpretation? People with differing interpretations of Scripture cannot set a Bible on a table and ask it to resolve their differences. In order for the Scripture to function as an authority, it must be read and interpreted by someone. According to “solo” Scriptura, that someone is each individual, so ultimately, there are as many final authorities as there are human interpreters.⁹

This is a fundamental insight. All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture. But, according to Mathison, adherents of solo scriptura have not realized that all appeals to Scripture are in fact appeals to interpretations of Scripture. Because they fail to appreciate this fact, Mathison charges that:

Ultimately the interpretation of Scripture becomes individualistic with no possibility for the resolution of differences. This occurs because adherents of solo scriptura rip the Scripture out of its ecclesiastical and traditional hermeneutical context, leaving it in a relativistic vacuum. The problem is that there are differing interpretations of Scripture, and Christians are told that these can be resolved by a simple appeal to Scripture. . . . The problem that adherents of solo scriptura haven’t noticed is that any appeal to Scripture is an appeal to an interpretation of Scripture. The only question is: whose interpretation? When we are faced with conflicting interpretations of Scripture, we cannot set a Bible on a table and ask it to resolve our difference of opinion as if it were a Ouija board. In order for Scripture to serve as an authority at all, it must be read, exegeted, and interpreted by somebody.¹⁰

Because Scripture must be interpreted, and because Scripture cannot interpret itself by itself, it follows that some person or persons must interpret Scripture if Scripture is to function as an authority. Otherwise, irreconcilable hermeneutical disputes can only end in division, as each faction has no recourse but to separate. And these divisions are contrary to the will of Christ who prays in John 17 that all His followers would be one, so that the world would see that the Father sent the Son. These divisions are also contrary to the command of the Apostle Paul, who exhorts us that there be no divisions among us.¹¹ According to Mathison, the false assumption among advocates of solo scriptura is that the individual Christian can somehow bypass the interpretive process, resolving these hermeneutical disputes by a “simple appeal to Scripture.” But that does not resolve the dispute, as Mathison rightly notes, precisely because each disagreeing party is in actuality appealing to his own interpretation of Scripture. And hermeneutical disputes cannot be resolved so long as the disputing parties deny that hermeneutics is involved. So the necessity of interpretation leads us to the obvious question: “Whose interpretation should be given the final say?”

To this question Mathison responds forthrightly, “the Church.” And naturally, our dispute with Mathison on this point does not center upon his answer (“the Church”), so much as the referent he assigns to that term, and the basis for its being the referent of that term, as we shall discuss below. First, however, we explain why Mathison contends that solo scriptura is not only false, inasmuch as it fails to align with the Biblical pattern and example, but is also pernicious.

According to Mathison, when Christians do not follow the authoritative guidance of the Church in their interpretation of Scripture, not only do they fall into various kinds of errors, but Scripture itself, as he shows by various examples, necessarily ceases to function as their authority. In one example, he refers to Reformed theologian Robert Reymond’s call for “an abandonment of the Nicene Trinitarian concept in favor of a different Trinitarian concept,” referring to Reymond’s rejection of the Nicene Creed’s teaching that Christ is eternally begotten.¹² According to Mathison, this shows that for proponents of solo scriptura the Nicene Creed has no real authority.¹³

Mathison also refers to Edward Fudge, who defends annihilationism, as another example of someone operating according to solo scriptura. Fudge claims that Scripture “is the only unquestionable or binding source of doctrine on this or any subject.”¹⁴ The fact that annihilationism is heterodox does not deter him; he believes that his own interpretation of Scripture is correct on this matter, and that here the Church has been wrong. In addition to these examples, Mathison identifies Ed Stevens, who defends hyperpreterism, as another proponent of solo scriptura. Mathison quotes Stevens as writing:

Even if the creeds were to clearly and definitively stand against the preterist view (which they don’t), it would not be an overwhelming problem since they have no real authority anyway. They are no more authoritative than our best opinions today, but they are valued because of their antiquity. . . . We must not take the creeds any more seriously than we do the writings and opinions of men like Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, the Westminster Assembly, Campbell, Rushdoony, or C.S. Lewis.¹⁵

Referring to this quotation, Mathison writes:

Here we see the clear rejection of scripturally based structures of authority. The authority of those who rule in the Church is rejected by placing the decisions of an ecumenical council of ministers on the same level as the words of any individual. This is certainly the democratic way of doing things, and it is as American as apple pie, but it is not Christian. . . . If this doctrine of solo scriptura and all that it entails is true, then the Church has no more right or authority to declare Arianism a heresy than Cornelius Van Til would have to authoritatively declare classical apologetics a heresy. Orthodoxy and heresy would necessarily be an individualistic and subjective determination.¹⁶

The fundamental problem in each of these three examples, according to Mathison, is that the individual is failing to recognize the secondary authority of the Church and of the creeds. The result of making the individual the final interpretive authority, and not recognizing the interpretive authority of the Church, argues Mathison, is that the authority of Scripture is destroyed:

The adherents of solo scriptura dismiss all of this claiming that the reason and conscience of the individual believer is the supreme interpreter. Yet this results in nothing more than hermeneutical solipsism. It renders the universal and objective truth of Scripture virtually useless because instead of the Church proclaiming with one voice to the world what the Scripture teaches, every individual interprets Scripture as seems right in his own eyes. The unbelieving world is left hearing a cacophony of conflicting voices rather than the Word of the living God.¹⁷

Mathison’s point is that when individuals take Scripture out of its ecclesial context, and treat themselves as the ultimate or highest interpretive authorities, the practical authority of Scripture is effectively destroyed. Scripture can function as an objective authority only when interpreted in and by the Church.¹⁸

When each individual acts as his own ultimate interpretive authority, the result, argues Mathison, is a kind of de facto relativism. One person thinks a passage means one thing; another person claims that the same passage means something else. But without a divinely established interpretive authority to adjudicate the dispute, the practical result is that the meaning of Scripture is reduced to “what it means to me.” There is no one with interpretive authority to say, “That’s not what it means.” Rather, without interpretive authority the objector’s disagreement with another’s interpretation amounts to, “That’s not what it means to me.” To this the first person understandably replies, “I understand that that’s not what it means to you, but that’s what it means to me.” And this situation is a form of practical relativism. In this way, argues Mathison, solo scriptura “destroys” the authority of Scripture.¹⁹

Historical Problems with Solo Scriptura

According to Mathison, not only is there a hermeneutical problem with solo scriptura, there are also historical problems. The primary historical problem is that solo scriptura was not the position of the early Church or the medieval Church.²⁰ The early Christians, not only layman but even presbyters and bishops, did not resolve theological disputes by taking to themselves ultimate interpretive authority.²¹ The historical position, according to Mathison, is for a synod of bishops to address the matter with an authoritative decision. On this point Mathison quotes John Calvin, who wrote:

We indeed willingly concede, if any discussion arises over doctrine, that the best and surest remedy is for a synod of true bishops to be convened, where the doctrine at issue may be examined.²²

Mathison defends this position by pointing out that the Apostles provide an example of meeting in council (Acts 15:6-29) to resolve a question or dispute.

Another historical problem entailed by solo scriptura, according to Mathison, is that if the Church had no authority, then we would not have any certainty regarding the canon of Scripture.²³ According to Mathison, solo scriptura thus leads to a “fundamental self-contradiction” in the solo scriptura position.²⁴ The contradiction is that proponents of solo scriptura appeal to Scripture as their only authority, yet without the authority of the Church they would not know with certainty which books belong to the canon of Scripture. In this way, argues Mathison, supporters of solo scriptura could not adequately respond to a modern-day Marcion who challenged the canon of Scripture, because they could not appeal to any authority to establish or confirm the canon.²⁵

A third historical problem is the multiplication of schisms, which Mathison largely attributes to solo scriptura. He writes:

The Christian Church today is split into literally tens of thousands of denominations with hundreds of new divisions arising daily. Much of the responsibility for this divisiveness rests with the doctrine of solo scriptura. When each individual’s conscience becomes the final authority for that individual, differences of opinion will occur. When men feel strongly enough about their individual interpretations, they separate from those they believe to be in error. In the world today, we have millions of believers and churches convinced of thousands of mutually contradictory doctrines, and all of them claim to base their beliefs on the authority of Scripture alone.

Not only has solo scriptura contributed heavily to this division and sectarianism, it can offer no possible solution. Solo scriptura is the ecclesiastical equivalent of a nation with a constitution but no court of law to interpret that constitution. Both can lead to chaos. . . . But using Scripture alone, it cannot tell us what “Scripture” is or what it means. It simply cannot resolve differences of interpretation, and the result is more and more division and schism. The resolution of theological differences requires the possibility of authoritatively defining the propositional doctrinal content of Christianity, and it requires the possibility of an authoritative ecclesiastical “Supreme Court.” Since neither of those possibilities are allowed within the framework of solo scriptura, there can be no possibility of resolution.²⁶

As Catholics, we do not believe that Christ’s Church is split, because we believe that unity is one of the four essential marks of the Church specified by the Nicene Creed, and that since Christ cannot be divided, therefore Christ’s Body, the Church, cannot be divided. Any persistent schism therefore involves schism from the Church. ²⁷ But, we do agree with Mathison that non-Catholic Christians are split into thousands of denominations, and that these divisions are primarily the result of each individual treating himself as his own final interpretive authority.

A fourth historical problem resulting from solo scriptura, according to Mathison, is that it destroys the historic Christian faith by denying the ecclesial authority by which certain doctrines were definitively determined at particular times in the history of the Church to be orthodox and essential, and other doctrines definitively determined to be heretical. By rejecting the authority of the Church, solo scriptura reduces the authority of the ecumenical councils and creeds to that of the opinion of any individual Christian, and thus eliminates the possibility of an objective Christianity handed down to us through history.²⁸

In that respect, rejecting the authority of the Church, according to Mathison, has devastating consequences for Christianity, because it eliminates the creeds, and thereby eliminates the historic Christian faith as an objective reality.

If the ecumenical creeds have no real authority, then it cannot be of any major consequence if a person decides to reject some or all of the doctrines of these creeds-–including the Trinity and the deity of Christ. If the individual judges the Trinity to be an unbiblical doctrine, then for him it is false. No other authority exists to correct him outside of his own interpretation of Scripture. This is precisely why solo scriptura inevitably results in radical relativism and subjectivity. Each man decides for himself what the essential doctrines of Christianity are, each man creates his own creed from scratch, and concepts such as orthodoxy and heresy become completely obsolete. The concept of Christianity itself becomes obsolete because it no longer has any meaningful objective definition. Since solo scriptura has no means by which Scripture’s propositional doctrinal content may be authoritatively defined (such definition necessarily entails the unacceptable creation of an authoritative ecumenical creed), its propositional content can only be subjectively defined by each individual. One individual may consider the Trinity essential, another may consider it a pagan idea imported into Christianity. Without an authoritatively defined statement of Christianity’s propositional doctrinal content, neither individual can definitively and finally be declared wrong. Solo scriptura destroys this possibility, and thereby destroys the possibility of Christianity being a meaningful concept. Instead, by reducing Christianity to relativism and subjectivity, it reduces Christianity to irrationalism and ultimately nonsense.²⁹

Here again, Mathison is quite right. Denying the authority of the Church, by treating oneself as having greater interpretive authority than the Church, destroys the Christian faith for the very reasons Mathison so aptly explains. The content of the deposit of faith then becomes like a silver dollar hidden among a sea of silver dollars; there is no principled way of distinguishing it from the myriad of contending theological opinions. This is not the situation that Christ the Good Shepherd would have handed on to His sheep. But the problem here is not merely that the deposit of faith becomes murky and inscrutable. According to Mathison,

Solo scriptura results in the autonomy of the individual believer who becomes a law unto himself. Scripture is interpreted according to the conscience and reason of the individual. Everything is evaluated according to the final standard of the individual’s opinion of what is and is not scriptural. The individual, not Scripture, is the real final authority according to solo scriptura. This is rebellious autonomy, and it is a usurpation of the prerogatives of God.

Adherents of solo scriptura have not understood that “Scripture alone” doesn’t mean “me alone.” The Bible nowhere gives any hint of wanting every individual believer to decide for himself and by himself what is and is not the true meaning of Scripture.³⁰

By rejecting the interpretive authority of the Church, the individual makes himself autonomous. He might not think of himself as being autonomous or rebellious; he most likely thinks of himself as following God, by following [his own interpretation of] God’s Word as contained in Sacred Scripture. But by disregarding the divinely established interpretive authority of the Church, the individual usurps to himself an authority that Christ entrusted to the Church. This is why, according to Mathison, taking final interpretive authority to oneself makes the individual guilty of “rebellious autonomy.”³¹

Solo Scriptura is Unbiblical

Mathison argues that the solo scriptura position is unbiblical. He writes:

The Bible itself simply does not teach “solo” Scriptura. Christ established his church with a structure of authority and gives to his church those who are specially appointed to the ministry of the word (Acts 6:2-4). When disputes arose, the apostles did not instruct each individual believer to go home and decide by himself and for himself who was right. They met in a council (Acts 15:6-29).³²

Scripture itself indicates that the Scriptures are the possession of the Church and that the interpretation of the Scriptures belongs to the Church as a whole, as a community. In particular it has been entrusted to specially gifted men. … The fundamental point is that Christ established His Church with a structure of authority that is to be obeyed (Heb. 13:7). … The modern Evangelical doctrine of Scripture essentially destroys the real authority of ministers of the Word and the Church as a whole.³³

According to Mathison, Scripture itself teaches that Scripture belongs to the Church and is to be interpreted in and by the Church. Importantly, he is not here speaking of an invisible Church. He is saying that Scripture teaches that Christ founded a visible Church, with a visible authority structure composed of ordained men entrusted with the responsibility of expositing and interpreting the Scriptures. Scripture itself, according to Mathison, teaches that these men are to be obeyed.³⁴ Because solo scriptura denies the interpretive authority of the Church, claims Mathison, therefore solo scriptura is contrary to Scripture.

III. Mathison on Sola Scriptura, and How It Differs from Solo Scriptura

In contrast to the ‘solo scriptura‘ position, Mathison defends what he calls ‘sola scriptura,’ namely, the position that “Scripture [is] the sole source of revelation; that it [is] the final authoritative norm of doctrine and practice; that it [is] to be interpreted in and by the church, and that it [is] to be interpreted according to the regula fidei.”³⁵ Notice that for Mathison these four claims together constitute sola scriptura. Mathison is emphatic that sola scriptura is not the notion that Scripture is the only ecclesial authority. In this respect sola scriptura differs from solo scriptura. He writes:

It is important to notice that sola scriptura, properly understood, is not a claim that Scripture is the only authority altogether. … There are other real authorities which are subordinate and derivative in nature. Scripture, however, is the only inspired and inherently infallible norm, and therefore Scripture is the only final authoritative norm.³⁶

As mentioned above, he approvingly quotes Calvin proposing that doctrinal disputes be resolved by recourse to synods and councils.³⁷ And Mathison defends this position by pointing out that the Apostles provide an example of meeting in council (Acts 15:6-29) to resolve a question.

According to Mathison, Scripture must be interpreted in and by the Church:

Scripture does not exist in a vacuum. It was and is given to the Church within the doctrinal context of the apostolic gospel. Scripture alone is the only final standard, but it is a final standard that must be utilized, interpreted, and preached by the Church within its Christian context. If Scripture is not interpreted correctly within its proper context, it ceases to function properly as a standard.³⁸

It is therefore to the Church that we must turn for the true interpretation of the Scripture, for it is in the Church that the gospel is found. … Although individuals can and must read and study Scripture in order that their conscience may ultimately be bound by the Word of God, final ecclesiastical authority does not and cannot rest in the judgment of each individual member of the Church. … Individual private judgment, however, does not replace the corporate judgment of the covenant community. The creeds of the Church are the authoritative confessions of the communion of saints as the covenantal body of Christ. Excommunication is an authoritative judgment of the communion of saints as the covenantal body of Christ.³⁹

But sola scriptura does not mean only that Scripture must be interpreted in and by the Church. According to Mathison sola scriptura also means that Scripture is the final authoritative standard. He writes:

Scripture alone, therefore, can function as the “canon,” the rule, the final authoritative standard of truth against which all else is measured. Yes, it is the Church which does the measuring, and yes the rule of faith provides the basic parameters of measurement, but it is the Scripture and Scripture alone that is the standard norm.⁴⁰

An essential aspect of sola scriptura is that it affirms the infallibility of Scripture, and denies the infallibility of the Church. For this reason, according to Mathison, the Church, being fallible, is corrected by Scripture and subordinate to Scripture. He writes:

Because of the Church’s propensity to wander from the true path, she needs a standard of truth that remains constant and sure, and that standard cannot be herself. It can only be the inspired and infallible Scripture.⁴¹

For Mathison, then, sola scriptura ascribes the highest ecclesial authority to Scripture, and ascribes subordinate ecclesial authority to the Church and the creeds. The individual believer is to be subject both to the primary authority of Scripture and to the secondary authority of the Church and creeds. The primacy of the Scripture’s authority, according to Mathison, does not nullify the genuine secondary authority of the Church.⁴²

But this does raise a difficult question. If the Church has higher interpretive authority than does the individual, what is the individual to do when he or she disagrees with the Church’s decision regarding what Scripture teaches? In other words, what is the relationship between private judgment and the Church’s interpretive authority? Mathison answers this question by appealing to Francis Turretin.

As Turretin explains, although the corporate doctrinal judgment of the Church is not infallible and does not have an authority equal to that of Scripture, it does have true authority over those who are members of the visible communion of the Church. What then is the relationship between private judgment and this corporate judgment? What is an individual Christian to do if he believes the corporate judgment found in the creeds and confessions to be in error? Turretin explains,

“Hence if they think they observe anything in them worthy of correction, they ought to undertake nothing rashly or disorderly and unseasonably, so as to violently rend the body of their mother (which schismatics do), but to refer the difficulties they feel to their church and either to prefer her public opinion to their own private judgment or to secede from her communion, if the conscience cannot acquiesce in her judgment. Thus they cannot bind in the inner court of conscience, except inasmuch as they are found to agree with the word of God (which alone has the power to bind the conscience).”⁴³

According to Turretin, the individual Christian should submit to the Church’s teaching and interpretation, except when his conscience, ultimately informed by his own interpretation of Scripture, cannot accept what the Church says. Mathison adds,

There is a difference then between the external ecclesiastical court and the internal court of conscience. The inward court of the individual conscience cannot be bound by anything other than the Word of God, but the Church does have doctrinal authority in the external ecclesiastical court. This authority is given to preserve unity in the Church’s faith and to reject the errors of heretics.⁴⁴

Mathison maintains that the only authority that can bind the conscience is the Word of God. So when the Church teaches something that is incompatible with one’s conscience, as informed by one’s own interpretation of Scripture, one should reject the Church’s teaching and follow one’s own conscience. We can summarize Mathison’s explanation of the distinction between solo scriptura and sola scriptura as follows. Whereas solo scriptura rejects the interpretive authority of the Church and the derivative authority of the creeds, sola scriptura affirms the interpretive authority of the Church and the derivative authority of the creeds, except when they teach something contrary to one’s conscience, as informed by one’s own interpretation of Scripture.

IV. Why There Is No Principled Difference Between Sola Scriptura and Solo Scriptura

A. Direct and Indirect Ultimate Interpretive Authority

What makes the solo scriptura position problematic, according to Mathison, is not its high view of Scripture, but its presumption that the individual has higher interpretive authority than does the Church. Solo scriptura treats the individual as having the ultimate or final interpretive authority regarding whatever matters he or she considers to be theologically essential or important. That is precisely why solo scriptura leads to the situations Mathison describes in his book. Robert Reymond can reject one line of the Creed because he sees himself as having at least equal interpretive and magisterial (i.e. teaching) authority to the bishops who gathered at Nicea in AD 325 to formulate the Creed. If Reymond believed that those bishops had greater interpretive and magisterial authority than himself, he would treat the Creed as a corrective to his own interpretation and position, in whatever areas his interpretation and position were at odds with that of the Creed.

But there are two ways to make oneself one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority. One is a direct way and the other is an indirect way. The direct way is to subject all theological questions directly to the final verdict of one’s own interpretation of Scripture. That is the solo scriptura position. Because it is direct, the nature of the position is quite transparent; we can see clearly in such a case that the individual is acting as his own ultimate interpretive authority.

The indirect way of making oneself one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority is more complicated and subtle. In this case the individual, based upon his own interpretation of Scripture, either establishes or chooses an ecclesial community that conforms to his own interpretation in matters he considers to be essential or important. Then, he ‘submits’ to this institution so long as it continues to speak and act in accordance with his own interpretation of Scripture. If it deviates from his own interpretation of Scripture in matters he deems important, he repeats the process of either establishing or choosing an institution or congregation that conforms to his own interpretation in matters he considers to be essential or important.

In both the direct and indirect ways, the individual is acting as his own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority. But his doing so is more difficult to see in the indirect case because he appears to be submitting to the interpretive authority of a body of persons other than himself. Yet, because he has established or selected this body of persons on the basis of their conformity to his own interpretation of Scripture, and because he ‘submits’ to them only so long as they agree with his interpretation on matters he considers to be essential or important, therefore in actuality his ‘submission’ to this body is in fact ‘submission’ to himself. To submit to others only when one agrees with them, is to submit to oneself. But submission to oneself is an oxymoron, because it is indistinguishable from not submitting at all, from doing whatever one wants. Yet because this indirect way of being one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority maintains the appearance of being in submission to another body of persons, it allows those who practice it to believe falsely that they are genuinely submitting to another body of persons, and not acting as their own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority. Accumulating for themselves this body of persons to whom they ‘submit’ allows them to remain under a delusion that they are submitting to the Church.⁴⁵

Solo scriptura is the direct way of acting as one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority. But as we show below, the indirect way of acting as one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority is precisely the methodology entailed by sola scriptura. Here’s why. In Mathison’s account of sola scriptura, Scripture must be interpreted “in and by the church.” He even says that we must turn to the Church for the true interpretation of Scripture, “for it is in the Church that the gospel is found.”⁴⁶ Notice that Mathison claims that it is in the Church that the gospel is found.

But how does he determine what is the Church? Being Reformed, he defines ‘Church’ as wherever the gospel is found, because the early Protestants defined the marks of the Church as including “the gospel,” where the gospel was determined by their own private interpretation of Scripture. So he claims that is in the Church that the gospel is found, but he defines the Church in terms of the gospel. This is what we call a tautology. It is a form of circular reasoning that allow anyone to claim to be the Church and have the gospel. One can read the Bible and formulate one’s own understanding of the gospel, then make this “gospel” a necessary mark of the Church, and then say that it is in the Church that the gospel is found. Because one has defined the Church in terms of the gospel [as arrived at by one's own interpretation of Scripture], telling us that the gospel is found “in the Church” tells us nothing other than “people who share my own interpretation of Scripture about what is the gospel are referred to by me as ‘the Church.’” This kind of circular reasoning allows falsehood to remain hidden.

The Catholic position does not suffer from this circularity, because ‘Church’ is not defined in terms of “gospel,” but in terms of apostolic succession, involving an unbroken line of authorizations extending down from the Apostles. Just as Christ authorized and sent the Apostles to preach and teach in His Name, and govern His Church, so the Apostles, by the laying on of their hands, appointed bishops as their successors, and by this mystery handed on to them the divine authority to preach and teach and govern the Church. And these men also, in the same way authorized other men to succeed them to preach and teach the gospel and govern Christ’s Church. Only those having the succession from the Apostles are divinely authorized to preach and teach and govern Christ’s Church. For that reason, the Church is defined not by the gospel (as determined by one’s own interpretation of Scripture). Rather, the content of the gospel is specified by the Church, and the Church is located by the succession from the Apostles. This is why apostolicity is one of the four marks of the Church taught in the Creed: “we believe one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church.” But given Mathison’s account, what counts as ‘church’ is always and ultimately up to each individual to decide on the basis of his or her own determination of the gospel, on the basis of his or her own interpretation of Scripture. So on Mathison’s account, no one has any more authority than anyone else to say definitively what is the Church and where is the Church, and what is her doctrine and what is not her doctrine.

That can be seen in the very events of the Protestant Reformation. The first Protestants did not submit their interpretations of Scripture to the judgment of the Catholic Church in which they had each been baptized and raised. Rather, the first Protestants appealed to their own interpretation of Scripture to judge the Church to be apostate, and thus justify separating from her. They did this by redefining the marks of the Church. The first generation of Protestants, without any authorization from their bishops, appealed to their own interpretation of Scripture to determine three (or two) new “marks of the Church,” beyond the four marks given twelve hundred years earlier in the Nicene Creed. These new marks consisted of: (1) the preaching of the gospel (or ‘sound doctrine’), where what counts as ‘gospel’ and ‘sound doctrine’ was determined according to their own interpretation of Scripture, (2) the proper administration of the sacraments, where what counts as a sacrament and what is its proper administration were determined again by their own interpretation of Scripture, and (3) the right exercise of church discipline, again, as determined by their own interpretation of Scripture.⁴⁷ By these new marks derived from their own interpretation of Scripture, they determined that the Catholic Church governed by the successor of the Apostle Peter had become apostate, and thus that the Catholic bishops under whose authority they lived, had no ecclesial authority, and that they themselves [i.e. these first Protestants] were the continuation of the Church.

In this way they could seem to affirm devoutly the prohibition against spurning the authority of the Church, as Calvin did when he wrote:

However it may be, where the preaching of the gospel is reverently heard and the sacraments are not neglected, there for the time being no deceitful or ambiguous form of the church is seen; and no one is permitted to spurn its authority, flout its warnings, resist its counsels, or make light of its chastisements — much less to desert it and break its unity. For the Lord esteems the communion of his church so highly that he counts as a traitor and apostate from Christianity anyone who arrogantly leaves any Christian society, provided it cherishes the true meaning of Word and sacraments.⁴⁸

How did Calvin, who was baptized in the Catholic Church as an infant, and yet lived the last thirty or so years of his life in separation from the Catholic Church, avoid believing that he was spurning the authority of the Church? Simply by redefining the Church as “wherever the preaching of the gospel [as determined by Calvin's own interpretation of Scripture] is heard and the sacraments [as determined by Calvin's own interpretation of Scripture] are not neglected.”

The early Protestants appealed to their own interpretation of Scripture to make sola fide the sine qua non of the gospel, and appealed to their own interpretation of Scripture to make “the gospel” a new mark of the Church. In thus stipulating that sola fide was a now a mark of the Church, based on their own interpretation of Scripture and without any authorization from their bishops, the Reformers ‘avoided rebelling’ against their Catholic bishops simply by redefining ‘Church’ to match their own interpretation of Scripture, so that, by this redefinition of the ‘Church,’ their Catholic bishops were no longer even members of the Church. In doing so, these first Protestants placed their own interpretive authority above that of their bishops. For this reason, the assumption that final interpretive and teaching authority belongs to oneself is intrinsic to Protestantism, because to subordinate the individual’s interpretive and teaching authority to that of the Church would undermine the act by which the first Protestants separated from the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century, and thus undermine the very legitimacy of Protestantism as such.

Our point here is not to show which side was right and which side was wrong in the sixteenth century schism. Our point is to show that implicit within the claim by proponents of sola scriptura to be submitting to the Church, is always a prior judgment concerning which body of persons count as the Church, and a theological assumption about how that judgment is to be made. Mathison cannot say, “All Christians should submit to the Church’s determination of the marks of the Church,” because such a claim would beg the question, i.e. presume the very thing in question, by presuming the identity of the Church in determining the identity of the Church. At most he can say that all Christians should accept the three Protestant marks of the Church, on the ground that according to his [Mathison's] own interpretation of Scripture, these three are the marks of the Church. Mathison’s position does not allow the Church to have the definitive and authoritative interpretation and teaching of Scripture regarding the marks of the Church. Mathison’s position entails that the authoritative determination of the marks of the Church ultimately and perpetually rests with the individual.

No Middle Ground: Solo Scriptura or Apostolic Succession

This implication follows from Protestantism’s rejection of apostolic succession. Without apostolic succession, there is within Protestantism no group of persons already having divine authorization to provide the definitive decision regarding matters of doctrine and interpretation, including the marks of the Church. By granting a position in which each individual has the highest interpretive authority in determining the marks of the Church, Mathison leaves himself without a principled distinction between solo scriptura and sola scriptura, and thus his position is likewise open to the individualism and fragmentation that he rightly recognizes result from solo scriptura. Hence for this reason as well, sola scriptura reduces to solo scriptura.

The same point applies to determining which tradition is authoritative. Protestant theologian R. Scott Clark, in his book Covenant, Justification and Pastoral Ministry, claims that Christians should read Scripture through the eyes of the Reformed and Presbyterian standards, such as the Westminster Confession of Faith.⁴⁹ The only available basis by which he can argue for this is that the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) matches his own interpretation of Scripture, and that of those who share his interpretation. Clark has no a priori ecclesial authority to which all Christians should submit. Nor can the individual Christian use the WCF as the standard by which to evaluate the WCF. Nor can he use the WCF in order to evaluate the other Protestant confessions, without begging the question. Thus, if one denies apostolic succession, then in order to determine whether Scripture should be interpreted according to the doctrinal framework specified by the WCF, the individual Christian must evaluate the WCF by comparing it to his own interpretation of Scripture. For this reason, without apostolic succession, the secondary ‘authority’ of a tradition or ‘standard’ by which to interpret Scripture ultimately remains subordinate to the judgment of the individual, and thus retains only the illusory appearance of authority, not any actual authority.⁵⁰

For the proponent of sola scriptura, if his interpretation of Scripture changes concerning what doctrines or practices constitute ‘sound doctrine,’ or if the body of persons presently satisfying his determination of what counts as ‘Church’ makes a decision that is contrary to his own determination from Scripture of what is essential or important, then there is no reason for him to submit to them. By that very fact (i.e. change of this sort) they no longer satisfy his criteria for what is essential to the Church, just as the Catholic bishops were simply defined out of authority by the first Protestants. When that happens, the proponent of sola scriptura then establishes or chooses another body of persons that matches his current interpretation of Scripture, and ‘submits’ to them, until he and this new body of persons sufficiently diverge in their determination of what counts as ‘sound doctrine,’ proper administration of the sacraments, and right discipline. So the reason why there is no principled difference between solo scriptura and sola scriptura is that in both cases the individual is his own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority: solo scriptura in a direct way, sola scriptura in an indirect way.

We can see then that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura because given sola scriptura and the denial of apostolic succession, and thus given the equality in interpretive authority between the individual and the Magisterium, no Church council or promulgation of a dogma can bind the conscience of any individual. For any line in any creed or Church pronouncement, the individual may stand in judgment over it, just as the early Protestants stood in judgment of the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent (and other earlier ecumenical councils), based on their own interpretation of Scripture. As we saw above, Calvin seems to recognize the authority of Church councils, as when he wrote:

We indeed willingly concede, if any discussion arises over doctrine, that the best and surest remedy is for a synod of true bishops to be convened, where the doctrine at issue may be examined.⁵¹

But notice the term ‘true bishops.’ Without apostolic succession, what counts as a “true bishop” can only be “one who agrees with my interpretation of Scripture.” In other words, Calvin’s statement amounts to being willing to submit to a synod composed of bishops who agree with his own interpretation of Scripture. And there is no principled difference between this and solo scriptura; the former is solo scriptura masking itself from itself. ‘Submitting’ only to those with whom I agree, is merely a species of “submitting only when I agree,” which is itself an indirect form of “submitting only to me,” which is submitting only in semblance.

Calvin and the early Protestants rejected the decree of the Council of Trent regarding sola fide. They did so based on their prior determination, according to their own interpretation of Scripture, that sola fide was a mark of the Church. Because the Council of Trent denied justification by faith alone,⁵² the Council had not satisfied one of the Protestants’ own stipulated marks, and was therefore ipso facto not constituted of “true bishops,” and was ipso facto an invalid council.⁵³

Since apart from apostolic succession the determination of ‘the gospel’ and ‘sound doctrine’ rests ultimately and irrevocably on the individual’s own interpretation of Scripture in order to identify the Church, it follows that any particular line of any creed or Church decree becomes ‘authoritative’ only if the individual approves it as being sufficiently in agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture. If he judges it to be sufficiently contrary to his own interpretation of Scripture, and of sufficient import, then it ipso facto has no ‘authority’ over him. His disagreement with “the Church’s” interpretation of Scripture does not make his position heretical. It may very well be (according to his line of thought) that ‘the Church’ is heretical, and his own position is orthodox (and hence that he himself is the continuation of the actual Church, the rest being heretics). We may never know for sure this side of heaven. Thus ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ are relativized by the rejection of apostolic succession. Because sola scriptura rejects apostolic succession no less than does solo scriptura, and because the rejection of apostolic succession entails the relativization of heresy and orthodoxy, there is also for this reason no principled difference between solo scriptura and sola scriptura.

That is because given sola scriptura and a denial of apostolic succession, the individual has final interpretive and teaching authority in determining what is the ‘gospel’ and what is ‘sound doctrine,’ in order to determine who and what is the Church. If, however, apostolic succession is true, and the Church has final interpretive and teaching authority in determining what counts as the ‘gospel’ and ‘sound doctrine,’ then the first Protestants were not justified in separating from the Catholic Church. They could attempt to justify separating from the Catholic Church only by appealing to their own interpretation of Scripture regarding the marks, and thus only by rejecting apostolic succession and presuming that they themselves had equal or greater interpretive authority than did those Catholic bishops under whose authority they had been placed at their baptism. For this reason sola scriptura can never grant final interpretive authority to the Church, without refuting itself. So even though sola scriptura creates the appearance of submitting to Church authority, with regard to ultimate interpretive authority there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura. In both solo scriptura and sola scriptura, the individual is and remains his own final interpretive and teaching authority.

In sum, Mathison thinks he is defending a position that is fundamentally distinct from solo scriptura, but in fact it is in essence the same position, only hidden within a personally selected practice and a personally selected people such that its true essence is concealed. This can be seen in Mathison’s description of sola scriptura. On the one hand, he rejects the notion that the individual has final interpretive and teaching authority; according to Mathison the idea that each individual has final interpretive and teaching authority is precisely what is wrong with the solo scriptura position. On the other hand, Mathison grants that each individual may appeal to Scripture to correct the Church, disobey the Church and leave the Church, so long as he is following his conscience.⁵⁴ According to Mathison, the individual’s conscience is bound only by his own interpretation of Scripture. That notion reduces every other so-called ecclesial authority (e.g. creed, confession, magisterium) to mere advice. Here’s why. Without apostolic succession no one’s teaching and interpretation is divinely authorized, and therefore one’s conscience is not bound by any interpretive or teaching authority other than that of one’s self. And that is exactly the essence of solo scriptura. In order for the individual to stand in judgment of the interpretation of the Church, he must have equal or greater interpretive and teaching authority than does the Church. Otherwise, if the Church’s interpretation differed from that of the individual, the Church’s teaching and interpretation would serve as the standard to which the individual should make his own interpretation conform.⁵⁵

The Argument

1. According to solo scriptura, Scripture is the only ecclesial authority. [def]

2. If solo scriptura is true, then each individual is his own final interpretive authority concerning what he considers to be essential. [1]

3. According to sola scriptura, Scripture is the only infallible ecclesial authority. [def]

4. If sola scriptura entails that each individual is his own final interpretive authority concerning what he considers to be essential, then in this respect there is no principled difference between solo scriptura and sola scriptura.

5. If apostolic succession is false, then no one’s determination of the marks of the Church is any more authoritative than anyone else’s.

6. If no one’s determination of the marks of the Church is any more authoritative than anyone else’s, then each individual is his own final interpretive authority concerning what he considers to be essential.

7. If apostolic succession is false, then each individual is his own final interpretive authority concerning what he considers to be essential. [(5),(6)]

8. The doctrine of apostolic succession is false. [A]

9. If sola scriptura is true, then each individual is his own final interpretive authority concerning what he considers to be essential. [(7),(8)]

10. There is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura. [(4),(9)]

B. The Contradiction Internal to the Sola Scriptura Position

Mathison’s account of the sola scriptura position contains an internal contradiction. On the one hand, he claims that all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture:

All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture. The only real question is: whose interpretation? People with differing interpretations of Scripture cannot set a Bible on a table and ask it to resolve their differences. In order for the Scripture to function as an authority, it must be read and interpreted by someone.⁵⁶

On the other hand, he claims that Scripture is the final authority:

Of significant importance to the doctrine of sola scriptura is the insistence that Scripture is the one final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice.⁵⁷

Each of these newer concepts of tradition [Catholic and Evangelical] confuses the locus of final authority, ultimately placing it in either the mind of the Church or the mind of the individual. This always results in autonomy and rebellion against the authority of God and His Word.⁵⁸

But, if all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, then it follows necessarily that either someone’s interpretation of Scripture is the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice, or Scripture itself cannot be the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice. The latter option is not open to Mathison as a Protestant, because to deny that Scripture is the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice is to deny sola scriptura, the very foundation of Protestantism. But neither is the former option open to Mathison, because without apostolic succession, Protestantism has no sacramental basis for anyone’s interpretation being the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice. Mathison’s position thus creates a dilemma for himself that cannot be resolved without ceasing to be Protestant.

There is no middle position between the Church having final interpretive authority and the individual having final interpretive authority. Mathison recognizes that all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, and denies that the individual has final interpretive authority. But at the same time, as a Protestant, Mathison maintains that the individual can appeal to his or her own interpretation of Scripture to hold the Church accountable to Scripture, even to walk away from the Church (and thus treat himself as the continuation of the Church), otherwise Mathison would undermine the very basis for Protestants separating from the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century. So Mathison’s position essentially reduces to this: the Church has final interpretive authority, except when the Church’s interpretation disagrees with the individual’s interpretation. But that exception belies the charade, because “when I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” For this reason, in sola scriptura it is the individual who ultimately has and always retains final interpretive authority. Sola scriptura is a more sophisticated version of solo scriptura, but this added sophistication makes the position more deceptive, by allowing the individual to believe that he is not one of those me-and-my-Bible individualists.

C. The Delusion of Derivative Authority

Mathison claims that the creeds, the tradition, the ecumenical councils, and the fathers are authentic secondary authorities having derivative authority. Recognition of their genuine, though secondary authority, is one of the primary ways in which Mathison seeks to distinguish sola scriptura from solo scriptura. What does he mean by “secondary” and “derived”? He writes:

[T]he traditions, the fathers, and the Church are all inherently fallible standards. What this means is that these fallible traditions, these fallible fathers, and this fallible Church must be measured against the one infallible perfect standard.⁵⁹

And he writes that the Church’s authority:

consists in the fact that the Church has been entrusted with the Scriptures (Rom 3:2); in the fact that she is the proclaimer and defender of Scripture (1 Tim 3:15); and in the fact that she must make doctrinal judgments for the sake of the communion (Acts 15:6-35). These judgments usually find their public expression in the creeds and confessions of the Church. But these authoritative judgments are not to be confused with the final authority of Scripture. Their authority derives from and depends upon their conformity with the inherently authoritative Word of God.”⁶⁰

We showed above how Mathison argued that the proponents of solo scriptura do not recognize the secondary (or derived) authority of the Church and of the creeds. But here we want to show that Mathison’s own position is essentially equivalent to the denial of secondary authority. Mathison claims here that the authority of the creeds and other judgments of the Church “derives from and depends upon their conformity with the inherently authoritative Word of God.” But recall that according to Mathison, all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture.⁶¹ Therefore, the notion that the authority of the creeds and other judgments of the Church “derives from and depends upon their conformity with the inherently authoritative Word of God” entails that the authority of creeds and other judgments of the Church depends upon their sufficient conformity to the individual’s interpretation of Scripture. In other words, Mathison’s position entails that the creeds and other judgments of the Church are ‘authoritative’ only insofar as they agree with the individual’s interpretation of Scripture. But that conception of derivative authority is no different from that of Reymond, Fudge or Stevens, the very exemplars of solo scriptura that Mathison rejects.

The only relevant difference between Mathison’s position on the one hand, and that of Reymond, Fudge and Stevens on the other hand, is a merely accidental difference. According to Mathison’s interpretation of Scripture, the traditional positions of the Church on the eternal generation of the Son, annihilationism, and hyperpreterism, happen to be correct, meaning, they conform to Mathison’s own interpretation of Scripture. According to the Reymond, Fudge and Stevens’ interpretations of Scripture, respectively, the traditional positions of the Church are incorrect. Mathison himself rejects the teachings of the Council of Trent, because they do not conform to his interpretation of Scripture. So Mathison’s criticism’s of Reymond, Fudge and Stevens amount to “you are not conforming to my interpretation of Scripture.” And the proper response from Reymond, Fudge, and Stevens is, “So what? You have no more authority than do we, that we should conform our interpretations to yours. Moreover, you too pick and choose among the councils, according to your own interpretation of Scripture. So there is no principled difference between your practice and ours.”⁶²

Mathison addresses the heart of the issue when explaining how solo scriptura undermines ecclesial authority by treating the individual as having final interpretive authority. He writes:

Solo scriptura also undermines the legitimate ecclesiastical authority established by Christ. It negates the duty to submit to those who rule over you, because it removes the possibility of an authoritative teaching office in the Church. To place any kind of real hermeneutical authority in an elder or teacher undermines the doctrine of solo scriptura. Those adherents of solo scriptura who do have pastors and teachers to whom they look for leadership do so under the stipulation that the individual is to evaluate the leader’s teaching by Scripture first. What this means in practice is that the individual is to measure his teacher’s interpretation of Scripture against his own interpretation of Scripture. The playing field is leveled when neither the ecumenical creeds nor the Church has any more authority than the individual believer, but Christ did not establish a level playing field. He did not establish a democracy. He established a Church in which men and women are given different gifts, some of which involve a special gift of teaching and leading. These elders have responsibility for the flock and a certain authority over it. Scripture would not call us to submit to those who had no real authority over us (Heb 13:17; Acts 20:28).⁶³

Here Mathison is arguing that solo scriptura undermines legitimate ecclesial authority established by Christ. It does so by denying the “authoritative teaching office” in the Church, and the “hermeneutical authority” of those holding that office. How does it do that? Mathison is explicit: “the individual measures his teacher’s interpretation of Scripture against his own interpretation of Scripture.” For Mathison, God did not establish the Church as a democracy; rather, He gave specific gifts to men to teach and govern His Church.

The problem, however, is that the very basis for the existence of Protestantism as such, the very basis for the separating of Protestants from the Catholic Church, is this very act. The individual measured his teacher’s interpretation of Scripture against his own interpretation of Scripture, and in doing so performatively denied the authority of the teaching office of the Catholic Church. Mathison wants to affirm genuine ecclesial authority as a secondary authority to which individuals should submit, but his position is contravened in two ways. First, the existence of Protestantism as such is based on the legitimacy of the individual rejecting the established ecclesial authority on the basis of his own interpretation.⁶⁴ So Mathison is trying to propose a system incompatible with Protestantism’s historic foundation, and thus intrinsically incompatible with Protestantism as such.

Second, given Mathison’s denial of apostolic succession, he cannot make a principled appeal to any ecclesial authority as that to which every individual ought to submit. Nothing can give what it does not have. But Mathison’s foundational starting point does not include apostolic succession, and hence de facto it begins with each individual as his own highest interpretive and teaching authority. Therefore no qualitatively greater ecclesial authority than the teaching and interpretive authority derived from the “permission of those who sufficiently agree with me” is available to Mathison. Every secondary authority, given Mathison’s starting point, can be nothing more than a permission extended from the individual to the ‘secondary authority’ to function as an authority for the individual at that present time.

Mathison is right about the implications of denying creedal authority. He writes:

The modern Evangelical denial of creedal authority necessarily results in the impossibility of authoritatively and objectively defining the propositional content of Scripture. The very act of authoritatively defining the propositional doctrinal content of Scripture would be the creation of a creed — that which is deemed unacceptable within the framework of solo scriptura. This leaves the responsibility for defining Scripture’s doctrinal content to each individual. In other words, the modern Evangelical denial of genuine creedal authority reduces the doctrinal content of Christianity to mere subjectivism.⁶⁵

The modern Evangelical church must come to the realization that if the ecumenical creeds have no authority, then there are no essential or necessary doctrines of the Christian faith. There would be only subjective individual opinions of what the “essential truths” of the Christian faith are.⁶⁶

He is correct that solo scriptura undermines the possibility of authoritatively defining the propositional doctrinal content of Scripture. He is correct that undermining the authority of the creeds practically entails that “there are no essential or necessary doctrines of the Christian faith.” But Mathison’s position does exactly the same thing, because by denying apostolic succession, he undermines the possibility of a creed having any more authority than anyone’s subjective opinion. Apart from apostolic succession, the only ultimate basis for a creed’s ‘authority’ is (1) it agrees with one’s own interpretation of Scripture and/or (2) it was formulated by persons who sufficiently shared one’s own interpretation of Scripture. But both of those reasons reduce to “when I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me,” the very essence of the solo scriptura position Mathison rightly rejects.

How does Mathison attempt to defend his position from this sort of critique? He claims that the authority of the ecumenical creeds follows from the perspicuity of Scripture.

It is interesting to observe that the authority of these ecumenical creeds necessarily follows from one of the fundamental qualities of Scripture itself — its perspicuity. Scripture itself indicates it’s [sic] essential perspicuity or clarity on basic and essential matters.⁶⁷

If we confess the perspicuity of Scripture, then a confession of the ecumenical creeds inevitably follows. The ecumenical creeds are simply the written form of the confession of the faith of the universal Church. They are a confession of what the Church as a whole has read in the Scriptures.⁶⁸

[A] denial of this consensus of faith is not only a denial of the perspicuity of Scripture, it is in effect a denial of Scripture itself. Why? If the essential teachings of Scripture are clear (perspicuous); if the Holy Spirit has been promised to guide the Church into the knowledge of the truth of Scripture; if the entire Church for thousands of years confesses to being taught by the Spirit the same essential truths in Scripture, then it follows that those truths are what Scripture says.⁶⁹

This only compounds the problems with Mathison’s position. If the authority of the ecumenical creeds only followed from the perspicuity of Scripture, there would be no need for the creeds in the first place, since the creeds would have restated only what was already plainly explicit in Scripture. This would entail that all those who opposed the creeds were blind, deaf, and stupid. But history does not support that notion. The Arians, for example, were not unintelligent. They argued from the Scriptures that Christ was the first of God’s creation, a lesser deity, and the highest of all created things. The Macedonians and Nestorians and Sabellians, etc. all argued from Scripture for their respective heresies. Resolving these disputes was precisely the primary purpose of the ecumenical councils. So the purpose of the ecumenical councils shows that Scripture alone was not sufficient to resolve the theological disputes. And this shows that the ecumenical creeds are neither restatements of Scripture (which would simply leave the dispute unresolved) nor are they limited to statements simply and obviously deducible from Scripture by all persons of at least ordinary intelligence. The ecumenical creeds address doctrinal questions not clearly and explicitly stated in Scripture. Hence the authority of the ecumenical creeds cannot come from the perspicuity of Scripture. Mathison’s position is stuck between a rock and a hard place. He wants the creeds and the Church to have secondary authority so as to avoid solo scriptura, but his rejection of apostolic succession leaves any secondary authority with no possible basis except agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture.⁷⁰

His position also faces similar problem consisting of the following dilemma. He claims that it is “to the Church that we must turn for the true interpretation of the Scripture, for it is in the Church that the gospel is found.”⁷¹ But at the same time he claims that “Because of the Church’s propensity to wander from the true path, she needs a standard of truth that remains constant and sure, and that standard cannot be herself. It can only be the inspired and infallible Scripture.”⁷² So, since for Mathison all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, then when, as Mathison claims, the Church wanders from the true path, whose interpretation of Scripture will correct her? If it is the individual’s, then it is false that we must turn to the Church for the true interpretation of Scripture. The individual has no more reason to believe a priori that the Church’s present interpretation of Scripture is correct than he has to believe that the Church now stands in dire need of correction from his own lips on the basis of his own personal interpretation of Scripture. On the other hand, if it does not belong to the individual to correct the Church when she “wanders from the true path,” then it can belong to none other than the Church to correct herself when she wanders from the true path.” So the errant Church is then supposed to be corrected by her own erronious interpretation of Scripture. Not only does that seem implausible, if Protestants truly believed that to be the case, they would simply have remained in the Catholic Church, waiting for the ‘erring’ Church to be corrected back to the truth on the basis of her own erroneous interpretation of Scripture. But Protestants did not remain in the Catholic Church; and this indicates that Protestants did not and do not in fact believe that Scripture corrects the Church when she “wanders from the true path.” The problematic assumption in Mathison’s position entailing this dilemma is his notion that the Church “wanders from the true path,” something he has to hold in order to justify being a Protestant.⁷³

V. Objections and Replies

A. Tu Quoque: “The Catholic Position Does not Avoid Solo Scriptura“

One objection to our argument that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura is that the Catholic position likewise ultimately reduces to solo scriptura. This is so, according to the objection, because the individual who becomes Catholic must start in the same epistemic position as the person who becomes Protestant. In choosing to become Catholic, he has simply chosen the denomination that best conforms to his own interpretation of Scripture. He places himself under the authority of the Catholic bishops in the same way that a Lutheran places himself under the authority of a Lutheran pastor, that a Baptist places himself under the authority of a Baptist pastor, or that a Presbyterian places himself under a Presbyterian pastor. Hence if the person who becomes Protestant retains final interpretive authority, then so does the person who becomes Catholic.

The objection is understandable, but it can be made only by those who do not see the principled difference between the discovery of the Catholic Church, and joining a Protestant denomination or congregation. Of course a person during the process of becoming Catholic is not under the authority of the Church. At that stage, he or she is like the Protestant in that respect. But the Catholic finds something principally different, and properly finds it by way of qualitatively different criteria. The Protestant is seeking a group of persons who believe, teach and practice what his interpretation of Scripture indicates was the belief, teaching and practice of the Apostles. He retains his final interpretive authority so long as he remains Protestant. No Protestant denomination has the authority to bind his conscience, because [in his mind] the Church must always remains subject to Scripture, which really means that the Church must always remains subject to [his interpretation of] Scripture, or at least that he is not ultimately subject to anyone’s interpretation but his own.

The person becoming Catholic, by contrast, is seeking out the Church that Christ founded. He does this not by finding that group of persons who share his interpretation of Scripture. Rather, he locates in history those whom the Apostles appointed and authorized, observes what they say and do viz-a-viz the transmission of teaching and interpretive authority, traces that line of successive authorizations down through history to the present day to a living Magisterium, and then submits to what this present-day Magisterium is teaching. By finding the Magisterium, he finds something that has the divine authority to bind the conscience.

Here we should say something about what it means to bind the conscience. It is of the very nature of law to bind the conscience. Law does not coerce the will, but law binds the conscience precisely insofar as reason grasps it as the standard or rule to which our beliefs, words and actions ought to conform. God’s law, written on our hearts in the form of the natural law, informs the conscience of every man. Once one knows the law, then one knows acting against the law to be unlawful. Likewise, once one knows the Church’s magisterial authority, and her divinely revealed laws and dogmas concerning faith and morals, then one’s conscience is bound to believe and obey them. One knows that to disbelieve the Church’s dogmas is heresy and sinful, because one knows that what the Church has definitively determined, the Holy Spirit has ipso facto spoken. When the Church, with the authority she has received from Christ through the Apostles, definitively declares dogma, she ipso facto binds the conscience insofar as the hearer knows both the content of these dogmas and the divine authority by which they have been determined.

So for the person becoming Catholic, when he recognizes the authority of the Magisterium, he recognizes that his beliefs and interpretation of Scripture must conform to the authoritative teachings of the Church’s Magisterium. “When the Magisterium of the Church makes an infallible pronouncement that a teaching is found in Revelation,” he assents to it by an act of faith, believing this pronouncement to be the teaching of Christ, on account of the divine authority given to the Magisterium through apostolic succession to teach in Christ’s name and with His authority.⁷⁴ In this way, his faith in Christ is expressed as an act of faith in the infallible pronouncement of the Church’s Magisterium. In those teachings which are not infallible, he also, as an act of faith in Christ, gives religious submission of intellect and will, even while recognizing the fallibility of those teaching.⁷⁵

The Protestant, by contrast, in joining a Protestant community does not find the Magisterium. That is because he does not find something that can bind his conscience regarding the canon of Scripture, the interpretation of Scripture, and the identity of orthodoxy and heresy. This is why in his Protestant community he perpetually retains final interpretive authority, because no decision of that community has the authority to bind his conscience. This is why Mathison, drawing from Turretin, claims that “the individual conscience cannot be bound by anything other than the Word of God.”⁷⁶ And since, for Mathison, “All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture,”⁷⁷ it follows that the individual conscience cannot be bound by anything other than his own interpretation of Scripture.

Here we see precisely why the tu quoque fails against the Catholic. The person who becomes Catholic finds something that binds his conscience viz-a-viz the canon of Scripture and the interpretation of Scripture; he finds the Magisterium that the incarnate Christ established and authorized. By contrast, the person who becomes Protestant, finds nothing outside himself that binds his conscience viz-a-viz the canon of Scripture and the interpretation of Scripture. For this reason, until a person finds the Magisterium, he remains his own final interpretive authority, because he knows of nothing that can bind his conscience regarding the interpretation of Scripture. But when a person finds the Magisterium, and recognizes it for what it is, he immediately ceases to be his own final interpretive authority. He recognizes that his interpretation of Scripture ought to be conformed to the teaching and interpretation of the Magisterium, and that to reject the teaching of the Magisterium would be to reject Christ, just as Jesus said to the Apostles:

The one who listens to you listens to Me, and the one who rejects you rejects Me; and he who rejects Me rejects the One who sent Me. (Luke 10:16)

The Protestant epistemological stance, by contrast, is exemplified in the words of Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms:

Unless I am convicted by Scripture and plain reason — I do not accept the authority of popes and councils, for they have contradicted each other — my conscience is captive to the Word of God.⁷⁸

Luther’s statement captures the very essence of Protestant religious epistemology. All Protestants who followed Luther’s example took this very same stance, subjecting the Church’s teaching, councils, and interpretive tradition to the standard of their own interpretation of Scripture, picking and choosing from them as though they were mere advice. Since according to Mathison “all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture,” Luther’s claim that his conscience was “captive to the Word of God” means in actuality that his conscience was ultimately bound by his own interpretation of Scripture. That very claim, namely, that our conscience is bound ultimately by our own interpretation of Scripture, is contrary to the perpetual teaching of the Church, because that claim denies that Christ established a perpetual teaching authority in His Church, a magisterial authority through which the Holy Spirit works to determine definitively matters of faith and morals, and to which all Christians are to be subject. If the Church has the authority from Christ to give the definitive decision regarding some question of faith or morals, then she has the authority to bind the conscience ultimately regarding such matters. If the Church did not have the authority to bind the conscience, she could do nothing more than offer advice, because in that case no decision she made regarding faith or morals would be definitive.

The follow-up objection to our argument takes the form of a dilemma. The dilemma runs like this. Either the individual needs the guidance of an interpretive authority when interpreting Scripture, or not. If the individual needs the guidance of an interpretive authority when interpreting Scripture, then he will need the guidance of another interpretive authority when interpreting the first interpretive authority. And he will need the guidance of third interpretive authority when interpreting the second interpretive authority. That would lead to an infinite regress. But there cannot be an infinite regress, hence the individual does not need the guidance of an interpretive authority when interpreting Scripture.

The problem with this dilemma is that it ignores the qualitative ontological distinction between persons and books, and so it falsely assumes that if a book needs an authoritative interpreter in order to function as an ecclesial authority, so must a living person. A book contains a monologue with respect to the reader. An author can often anticipate the thoughts and questions that might arise in the mind of the reader. But a book cannot hear the reader’s questions here and now, and answer them. A living person, however, can do so. A living person can engage in genuine dialogue with the reader, whereas a book cannot. Fr. Kimel talks about that here when he quotes Chesterton as saying that though we can put a living person in the dock, we cannot put a book in the dock. In this respect, a person can do what a book cannot; a person can correct global misunderstandings and answer comprehensive interpretive questions. A book by its very nature has a limited intrinsic potency for interpretive self-clarification; a person, on the other hand, by his very nature has, in principle, an unlimited intrinsic potency with respect to interpretive self-clarification. This unlimited potency with respect to interpretive self-clarification ensures that the hermeneutical spiral may reach its end. A book cannot speak more about itself than it does at the moment at which it is completed. A person, by contrast, remains perpetually capable of clarifying further any of his previous speech-acts.

This objection can also take the following form. Even if the Church possesses final interpretive authority, yet because the individual must nevertheless interpret the Church’s dogmatic pronouncements, therefore, the individual must be the final interpretive authority of the Church’s dogmatic pronouncements. This objection conflates two senses of the term ‘final.’ ‘Final’ can mean the terminus of a movement or of a series of movements, as an airplane has a final destination, the terminus of a series of flights for the day. ‘Final’ can also mean the terminus in an order or hierarchy, as the Commander in Chief is for the military.⁷⁹ In a communication, the individual receiving that communication is, by definition, the terminus of the movement whereby knowledge is transmitted. He is, in that sense, the final interpreter. But he is not thereby the final interpretive authority in the sense of a terminus in an order or hierarchy. He may be the terminus of the motion of the communication, while remaining subordinate in the order of interpretive authority. The exercise of interpretive authority by the Magisterium, say, at an ecumenical council, does not prevent believers from interpreting Scripture or any other communication. Nor does it withhold from them the skill by which to interpret Sacred Scripture. On the contrary, the exercise of this teaching and interpretive authority provides a supernatural light by which the believer ought to interpret Scripture. We ignore or disregard that interpretive authority at our peril, because it is God-given authority, for our good.⁸⁰

A related objection takes the following form. Civil government leaders have genuine authority, yet they are neither infallible nor can they bind the conscience nor do they require some kind of analog to apostolic succession. Therefore neither infallibility nor the power to bind the conscience nor apostolic succession is necessary for genuine Magisterial authority in the Church. In response, it is true that civil government leaders have genuine civil authority, which they have received from God. And it is true that they are not infallible. But it is not true that they cannot bind the conscience. Civil laws bind the conscience in that we are obligated to obey them, so long as they do not conflict with a higher law, whether that be the natural law, or the law of God as revealed through the Church. Hence the nature of genuine civil authority does not show that the Magisterium cannot bind the conscience of the faithful.

In addition, the nature of the Church’s Magisterial authority is not rightly determined by determining what nature of authority is sufficient for civil government. Such a method would presuppose both that the Church is equivalent in nature to a civil society and that there is no existing ecclesial authority that provides the definitive answer to questions about the nature of the Church’s authority. Hence the fallibility of civil authority does not show that the Church’s Magisterial authority is always likewise fallible. Most importantly, Magisterial authority differs from civil authority in that the Magisterium of the Church provides the authoritative interpretation both of natural law and divine law supernaturally-revealed. For this reason, while the civil authority cannot bind the conscience with respect to natural and divine law, the Magisterium of the Church does bind the conscience with respect to natural and divine law. Those who know this can never, in good conscience, oppose the definitive teaching of the Magisterium in matters of faith and morals, by claiming that they must obey God rather than men. The definitive teaching of the Magisterium is the voice of God to the Catholic, just as conscience is the voice of God to the pagan. This is why the Catholic must seek to conform his conscience according to the definitive teaching of the Church in matters of faith and morals, because the Church’s Magisterium is a higher authority than his conscience (i.e. than reason alone).

Regarding whether civil authorities acquire their authority through some kind of analog to apostolic succession, the answer is both yes and no, though in different respects. The rightful ruler in a civil society is the one who has been selected according to the process specified by the law. A usurper, no matter how popular, is not the rightful ruler. In this respect, the way in which a civil authority acquires his civil authority is similar to the way a person holding ecclesial authority acquires that ecclesial authority, because an ecclesial authority rightly acquires such authority by a process already laid down in Church law and tradition. And we know that the civil authority has been given his authority by God’s providence, as Jesus indicates in John 19:11 in speaking to Pilate. And St. Paul teaches the same in Romans 13:1.

Magisterial authority in the Church, however, cannot be acquired only through providence. If there were no essential difference between these two authorities, the Church would be nothing more than a civil society, and this would contradict Christ’s statement, “My kingdom is not of this world.” (John 18:36). When Jesus says that His Kingdom is not of this world, He is not saying that His Kingdom is located in some other world; He is saying that His Kingdom, which is in this world, does not have its authority from the world, i.e. from the natural order. What makes the Church a supernatural society, and not merely a natural society, is precisely that the authority by which she is governed is a supernatural authority. That supernatural authority is Christ’s own authority. His authority is supernatural because He is God. And He gave His supernatural authority sacramentally to His Apostles, and they in turn handed it on to their successors.⁸¹ For this reason, without apostolic succession, the Church would be a natural society providentially governed by God, another nation among the nations. Only by apostolic succession is she a divine society that does not compete with natural societies, because grace builds on nature. In short, civil authorities acquire their natural civic authority by God’s providence through lawful processes. Since the Church is a supernatural society, ecclesial authorities cannot acquire their authority naturally under providential guidance. Ecclesial authority is not natural authority, but supernatural authority, and therefore requires succession from a supernatural source.

B. Sola Ecclesia: The Church Is Autonomous, a Law unto Itself, and Unaccountable

A second type of objection follows directly from the preceding paragraph. According to this objection, if the Church’s Magisterium has final interpretive authority, then the Church is placing itself above Scripture, making itself autonomous, and entirely unaccountable. Mathison himself makes this sort of objection against the Catholic Church. Recall that for Mathison the problem with solo scriptura is that it “results in the autonomy of the individual believer.”⁸² He claims that Catholic doctrine makes the Church similarly autonomous. He writes:

The fundamental problem with “solo” Scriptura is that it results in autonomy. It results in final authority being placed somewhere other than the Word of God. It shares this problem with the Roman Catholic doctrine. The only difference is that the Roman Catholic doctrine places final authority in the church while “solo” Scriptura places final authority in each individual believer. Every doctrine and practice is measured against a final standard, and that final standard is the individual’s personal judgment of what is and is not biblical.⁸³

One difficulty for Mathison is that if, as he argues, “the church” has greater interpretive authority than the individual, then Mathison cannot avoid the result that “the church” must likewise be ‘final’ in the sense he thinks is objectionable. In that case it follows that his own interpreters must also be subject to the charges of “autonomy” and to a Reformed version of “sola ecclesia.” Mathison’s objection to the Catholic Church’s position is that in relation to Scripture the Catholic Church is hermeneutically equivalent to a large subjective individual composed of many individuals — a collective version of the individual proponent of solo scriptura — and that the Catholic Church therefore falls victim to the same problem of individualism found in solo scriptura, except that it does so in a large scale, institutional way. So if he thinks all this follows against the Catholic Church because the Catholic Church (as opposed to Scripture) has, or makes itself out to have, final interpretive authority, then, if it follows that in his own sola scriptura position “the church” is also the final interpretive authority, then his position must also face the same problems that he attributes to the Catholic position.

Mathison clarifies this somewhat by claiming that what makes the Catholic Magisterium autonomous viz-a-viz Scripture is the notion that the Magisterium is infallible under certain conditions. He writes:

Finally, we must always be mindful that claims to infallibility by the Church or any member of the Church inevitably lead to autonomy on the part of the one or ones claiming such infallibility. Even such qualified infallibility as that which is claimed by Rome has led to virtual autonomy. The Roman church has become a law unto herself. Against what higher standard can an infallible Church be measured? None. The only standard against which Rome allows herself to be measured is Rome.⁸⁴

Mathison thinks that if the Church claims to be guided infallibly in her definitive formulations of dogma, this makes her a “law unto herself,” not subject to a higher standard. And that result, thinks Mathison, is precisely the mistake of solo scriptura; it makes final authority rest some place other than the Word of God.

Let’s consider this objection carefully. Mathison claims that “the only difference [between Catholic doctrine and the 'solo scriptura' position] is that the Roman Catholic doctrine places final authority in the Church while solo Scriptura places final authority in each individual believer.” Notice that he does not specify what he means by ‘final authority.’ The term can refer to two different types of authority. It can refer to the authority of the deposit of faith entrusted by Christ to the Apostles, or it can refer to teaching and interpretive authority with respect to that deposit of faith. Mathison seems to conflate the two types, or fail to distinguish between them, as though having final interpretive authority with respect to Scripture is to be equal in authority to the deposit of faith.

There is a difference, however, between the authority of the deposit of faith, and interpretive authority. We can see this difference already in Tertullian, who writes:

Our appeal [in debating with the heretics], therefore, must not be made to the Scriptures; nor must controversy be admitted on points in which victory will either be impossible, or uncertain, or not certain enough. For a resort to the Scriptures would but result in placing both parties on equal footing, whereas the natural order of procedure requires one question to be asked first, which is the only one now that should be discussed: “With whom lies that very faith to which the Scriptures belong? From what and through whom, and when, and to whom, has been handed down that rule by which men become Christians? For wherever it shall be manifest that the true Christian rule and faith shall be, there will likewise be the true Scriptures and expositions thereof, and all the Christian traditions.⁸⁵

Since this is the case, in order that the truth may be adjudged to belong to us, ‘as many as walk according to the rule,’ which the church has handed down from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, and Christ from God, the reason of our position is clear, when it determines that heretics ought not to be allowed to challenge an appeal to the Scriptures, since we, without the scriptures, prove that they have nothing to do with the Scriptures. For as they are heretics, they cannot be true Christians, because it is not from Christ that they get that which they pursue of their own mere choice, and from the pursuit incur and admit the name of heretics. Thus not being Christians, they have acquired no right to the Christian Scriptures; and it may be very fairly said to them, ‘Who are you?’”⁸⁶

Before debating the interpretation of Scripture, says Tertullian, we must first discover who has teaching and interpretive authority with respect to the deposit of faith. To do this, we locate those to whom the deposit of faith was entrusted, as handed down from the Apostles. Tertullian was writing about one hundred years after the death of the last Apostle. So the method he indicates for locating interpretive authority was not limited only to the generation after the Apostles. Tertullian indicates here a relation between interpretive authority and apostolic succession. In each generation, those persons having interpretive authority viz-a-viz the Scriptures are those to whom the deposit of faith was entrusted in the previous generation, all the way back to the Apostles themselves.

In this way Tertullian provides a clear example of the Catholic understanding of interpretive authority, and the basis for it in apostolic succession. Regarding the interpretive authority of the Church viz-a-viz the individual, the Council of Trent stated the following:

Furthermore, to check unbridled spirits, it decrees that no one relying on his own judgment shall, in matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, distorting the Holy Scriptures in accordance with his own conceptions, presume to interpret them contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, to whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has held and holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers.⁸⁷

And the First Vatican Council reaffirmed this, saying:

Now since the decree on the interpretation of Holy Scripture, profitably made by the Council of Trent, with the intention of constraining rash speculation, has been wrongly interpreted by some, we renew that decree and declare its meaning to be as follows: that in matters of faith and morals, belonging as they do to the establishing of Christian doctrine, that meaning of Holy Scripture must be held to be the true one, which Holy mother Church held and holds, since it is her right to judge of the true meaning and interpretation of Holy Scripture. In consequence, it is not permissible for anyone to interpret Holy Scripture in a sense contrary to this, or indeed against the unanimous consent of the fathers.⁸⁸

In the Catholic understanding, the individual’s own interpretation of Scripture does not have equal or greater authority than does that of the Magisterium. One of the primary tasks of the Magisterium is to give the authoritative interpretation of the deposit of faith.

The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ.⁸⁹

The pronouncements of the teaching and interpretative authority of the Church do not hold the same intrinsic authority as the deposit of faith, just as the Apostles were not equal in authority to Christ Himself. Christ has greater authority than did the Apostles, but that does not entail that when the Apostles were preaching and teaching they had no authority, or that they only had authority when what they were saying was divinely inspired. Having interpretive authority does not entail that the interpreter has the same or more authority than what is being interpreted. Jesus told them, “The one who listens to you listens to Me, and the one who rejects you rejects Me.” (Luke 10:16) When the Apostles testified that Jesus is the Christ, they did not take away from Christ’s authority; they spoke with His authority, by His authorization. But if interpretive authority were ipso facto equivalent in authority to that which it had been given the authority to interpret, then since the Apostles had the authority to speak in Christ’s name and interpret and explain what He had said, it would follow that the Apostles and Christ had equal authority. The Apostles and Christ, however, do not have equal authority. Therefore, interpretive authority is not ipso facto equivalent in authority to that which it has been given the authority to interpret. An authorized witness can give an authoritative testimony concerning an authority greater than himself; otherwise no one could have come to believe in the divinity of Jesus through the authority of the Apostles’ testimony. That is why, according to Catholic doctrine, the Magisterium “is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant.”

Yet this Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on to it. At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this devotedly, guards it with dedication and expounds it faithfully. All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn from this single deposit of faith.⁹⁰

Protestants sometimes mistakenly think that the Catholic position is sola ecclesia, but that is inaccurate. There is a three-fold arrangement of ecclesial authority consisting of Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture, and Magisterium, each according to its own mode:

It is clear therefore that, in the supremely wise arrangement of God, sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church are so connected and associated that one of them cannot stand without the others. Working together, each in its own way, under the action of the one Holy Spirit, they all contribute effectively to the salvation of souls.⁹¹

In Catholic theology Scripture is something known and properly understood only within the bosom of the Church, and only as explicated by the Magisterium of the Church. Of course this does not preclude private study of Scripture; that is encouraged.⁹² But in the Catholic Church Sacred Scripture is something properly known and understood through the Magisterium’s teaching authority guided by the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit operates through the Magisterium to cast a supernatural light upon Scripture, so that it may be understood according to the same Spirit by Whom it was inspired.

So, in sum, the authority of Scripture is the authority of the deposit of faith. The authority of the Magisterium, on the other hand, is interpretive authority with respect to the deposit of faith. These are two different types or modes of authority. They do not compete with each other, but complement each other, and are mutually dependent. The Magisterium cannot exist as an interpretive authority, without the sacred deposit of the Word of God. Similarly, the Sacred Scriptures cannot provide their own authentic and authoritative interpretation to the Church, and so require the Magisterium in order to fulfill their purpose in the Church.

Mathison indicates that it is not teaching and interpretive authority per se, that (in his view) entails Magisterial autonomy. It is primarily the doctrine of Magisterial infallibility.⁹³ There are at least two principled reasons why a Protestant might object to the doctrine that the Magisterium is infallible. First, one might believe that if any doctrinal pronouncements by the Magisterium are infallible, then such pronouncements are equivalent in authority to Scripture. Second, he might think that if any doctrinal pronouncements by the Magisterium are infallible, then there is no court of appeals for such doctrines.

Consider the first reason. If two statements are true, this does not entail that they are equally authoritative. Authority is not reducible to truth. The statement “I exist” is no less true than Christ’s statement, “I am the way, the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me.” (John 14:6) Both statements are equally true, but the latter has greater authority because it was spoken by God Himself. Since infallibility means protected from error, therefore it only means that the result is true. It does not, in itself, determine the degree of authority the statement has. Authority in this sense is that to which submission and obedience is due from those entrusted to it. Reducing authority to truth conceptually eliminates authority. That is because such a reduction would imply that we need only submit to authority when the authority speaks what we already believe, or can independently verify, to be the truth. Hence, the result would eliminate authority, because “When I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.”

So the true interpretation of Scripture is not authoritative because the interpretation is true, but this interpretation can be known to be true because it has been divinely authorized. An authoritative interpretation of Scripture is authoritative not because it is true (though it is true), but because of the authority given by Christ to the Magisterium to which is due submission of mind and will regarding the authentic interpretation of Scripture. For this reason the infallibility of a doctrinal pronouncement by the Magisterium does not make that doctrinal pronouncement as authoritative or more authoritative than Scripture itself.

The other objection to Magisterial infallibility is that it removes the possibility of a court of appeals for such doctrines. More specifically, given this doctrine of infallibility, the Scripture cannot be the “final court of appeal” if the Magisterium has already definitively and infallibly ruled on some matter of faith or morals, and there is no court of appeal beyond the Magisterium. In reply, recall that for Mathison,

All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture. The only real question is: whose interpretation?⁹⁴

There are a few things we can say here. First, if all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture, then Scripture alone cannot function as the “final court of appeals.” So Mathison’s requirement that Scripture be the final court of appeal is incompatible with his claim that all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretation of Scripture.

Second, if the Church’s definitive rulings are infallible, then there is no reason to challenge them by appealling to some higher authority. It makes no sense to appeal an infallible decision. So Mathison’s autonomy charge against the Catholic doctrine of Magisterial infallibility only applies if the Catholic doctrine of Magisterial infallibility is false. Hence in that respect Mathison’s charge begs the question (i.e. presumes precisely what is in question). Wishing to appeal an infallible ruling begs the question, by presuming that the infallible ruling is fallible. The problem in that case is not that the Magisterium has a charism of infallibility, but that the person requiring an additional court of appeals has not recognized that the Magisterium has this charism.

Third, when Mathison claims that the Church’s Magisterium needs to be accountable, he only pushes back the question. Accountable to whom? It cannot be Scripture itself, for the reason shown above, that Scripture needs to be interpreted. So it must be some other person or persons. Designate those to whom the Magisterium is accountable as x. Now, to whom are x accountable? Designate those to whom x are accountable as y. Now to whom are y accountable? We can keep asking this question. Either there is an infinite regress, or there is a final interpretive authority. But an infinite regress of accountability is absurd. So if there is to be accountability with respect to doctrinal and interpretive judgments, there must be a highest or final interpretive authority. Therefore the request for the Magisterium to be accountable to some other body is a denial that the Magisterium is the Magisterium, and a presumption that there is another Magisterium having final interpretive authority.

But the person who wants the Magisterium to be accountable to some other body, can only be satisfied if that body is either himself or those whom he approves. Otherwise his dissatisfaction with the lack of accountability would necessarily remain, for any body which has final interpretive authority. Hence the person who demands that the Magisterium be accountable to some other body is in actuality demanding that the Magisterium be accountable (directly or indirectly) to himself. And that is another way of showing that the demand is in essence an implicit arrogation to oneself of Magisterial authority. It is an expression of the maxim: “When I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.”⁹⁵

VI. Implications

The Objections to Solo are Objections to Sola

In this paper we have argued that apart from apostolic succession, there is no principled difference between solo scriptura and sola scriptura. If our argument is sound, it follows that the criticisms Mathison raises against solo scriptura apply no less to sola scriptura. If “hermeneutical chaos and anarchy” result from solo scriptura, then they likewise result from sola scriptura. If solo scriptura leads to the “multiplication of schisms,” so does sola scriptura. If solo scriptura entails that the creeds have no “real authority,” then sola scriptura likewise entails that the creeds have no real authority. If the necessary result of solo scriptura is a practical relativism concerning the content of Scripture, then this too is the necessary result of sola scriptura. If solo scriptura “destroys” the authority of Scripture “by making the meaning of Scripture dependent upon the judgment of each individual,” then so does sola scriptura. Given the soundness of our argument, it follows that the claim by various Catholics that sola scriptura is the source of Protestant fragmentation and division in which each person interprets Scripture as seems right in his own eyes, is not a criticism of a straw man, but is in fact quite accurate.

Concerning solo scriptura, Mathison writes,

By denying the authority of the corporate judgment of the Church, solo scriptura has exalted the individual judgment of the individual to the place of final authority. It is the individual who decides what Scripture means. It is the individual who judges between doctrines on the basis of his individual interpretation of Scripture. It is the individual who is sovereign.”⁹⁶

In light of our argument that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura, Mathison’s criticism of solo scriptura turns out to be a criticism of sola scriptura. So long as the individual retains final interpretive authority, it is the “the individual who is sovereign.” Yet as we have shown, in sola scriptura, the individual retains final interpretive authority. Hence it follows that in sola scriptura, it is the individual who is sovereign.

Solo Scriptura is the Fuller Manifestation and Outworking of Sola Scriptura

Moreover, our argument helps explain the rise over the last one hundred and fifty years of the explicit embrace of a solo scriptura approach within Protestantism. Philosophies and theologies more fully manifest their nature over time. If there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura, then we would expect the sola scriptura doctrine taught by the early Protestant to come to manifest its true nature over time as outright solo scriptura. Sola scriptura could temporarily conceal its true nature, as Protestantism lived on the inertial remnants of Catholic conceptions of sacramental authority. Sacramental magisterial authority is supernatural in origin, as we explained above, because the Church is a divine institution. The denial of sacramental magisterial authority closes a person off to the Church as supernatural, leaving only the possibility of democratic (bottom-up) man-made authority under providential guidance. As Protestants have come to understand more clearly the democratic nature of Protestant ecclesial authority, they have come to see that as Protestants, they themselves as individuals, hold final interpretive authority, and have come to live as such. This explains the widespread solo scriptura phenomenon within Protestantism that Mathison decries. Louis Bouyer concurs, saying:

The main difficulty Protestants have with the Catholic Church (and with the separated Eastern church as well) is on the subject of authority, and more particularly the teaching authority she claims. The opposition of those Protestants who are closest to the spirit of primitive Protestantism rests, as we have said, on the fear that whatever is conceded to the authority of the Church detracts correspondingly from the authority of the Word of God in the Bible. The opposition of those who adhere to doctrinal liberalism, however, while equally strong, has a different object, quite the reverse of the other. They object to the authority of the Church not for replacing another authority held to be divine and, as such, claiming man’s exclusive and undivided submission. They object to it simply because it is authority and therefore something inimical to the individual religious conscience.

This being the case, we may be tempted to believe that Protestantism, in the course of its development, has passed from one extreme to the other. That is to a certain extent, but not absolutely, true. The Protestantism which rejects the authority of the Church because it rejects all authority has come out of the Protestantism which rejected the authority of the Church because of the fear it wronged that other authority, held to be sovereign, of the Scriptures. If it was possible for the first to come from the second, it must somehow have been contained therein.⁹⁷

Bouyer presents two stances within Protestantism toward Magisterial authority. One of them, which he refers to as those closest to early Protestantism, fears that Magisterial authority detracts from the authority of Scripture, as though the two are the same sort of authority, and hence must be in competition with each other. Liberal Protestantism, by contrast, likewise objects to Magisterial authority, not for fear that it might detract from the authority of Scripture, but simply because it rejects authority. We might be tempted, claims Bouyer, to think that liberal Protestantism’s attitude toward authority is the opposite extreme of early Protestantism’s notion of authority. But according to Bouyer, that would be inaccurate. The liberal rejection of authority came out of the earlier Protestant conception of authority, precisely because it was somehow contained within it.

Recovering Apostolic Succession is the only way to avoid Solo

How then can Protestants avoid solo scriptura? Only by recovering apostolic succession. Solo scriptura logically follows the denial of apostolic succession. Either ecclesial authority has its basis in agreement or approval as determined by the individual’s own interpretation of Scripture, or ecclesial authority has its basis in Christ’s authorization and appointment. Wherever ecclesial authority has its basis in the individual’s agreement with that authority’s interpretation, there in essence is solo scriptura. And there in essence is the fulfillment of St. Paul’s prophecy:

For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but wanting to have their ears tickled, they will accumulate for themselves teachers in accordance to their own desires (2 Timothy 4:3.)

Only where ecclesial authority has its basis in Christ’s authorization and commission is the individual’s interpretation ultimately subject to that of the Church. Mathison’s positive intention to read and understand Scripture in the Church has genuine implications only if ‘Church’ is not defined as those who interpret Scripture like he does regarding the marks of the Church.⁹⁸ But authorization and appointment by the incarnate Christ can be found only in those having the succession of authorizations extending back through the Apostles to Christ Himself. Without apostolic succession, the individual has no less interpretive authority than does the Church. For this reason, only by recovering apostolic succession can Protestants overcome solo scriptura and all its destructive effects. May Christ the Good Shepherd bring us all into the one flock with one shepherd. (John 10:16).

By Bryan Cross and Neal Judisch

See the Catholic Encyclopedia entry ‘Protestantism.’ See also Philip Schaff, The Principle of Protestantism (Wipf & Stock, 2004). [↩]
Cf. Alister McGrath, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea (HarperOne, 2007). [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes,” pp. 25-29, 16 Modern Reformation Mar./Apr. 2007. Cf. The Shape of Sola Scriptura, pp. 237-253 (Canon Press, 2001) [hereinafter Shape]. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Shape, pp. 274-275. [↩]
In his letter of March 10, 2009, Pope Benedict XVI said something quite similar. He wrote:

Leading men and women to God, to the God who speaks in the Bible: this is the supreme and fundamental priority of the Church and of the Successor of Peter at the present time. A logical consequence of this is that we must have at heart the unity of all believers. Their disunity, their disagreement among themselves, calls into question the credibility of their talk of God. Hence the effort to promote a common witness by Christians to their faith – ecumenism – is part of the supreme priority.

Readers are also encouraged to examine the exposition of this theme in Pope John Paul II’s encyclical, Ut Unum Sint. [↩]
Shape, pp. 239-240. [↩]
Shape, p. 240. On the following page Mathison writes, “Unless one can escape the effects of sin, ignorance, and all previous learning, one cannot read the Scriptures without some bias and blind spots.” Here he is decrying what he describes as the “naïve belief in the ability to escape one’s own noetic and spiritual limitations” that undergirds the solo scriptura orientation. Shape, p. 241. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes,” pp. 25-29. Note that we, as well as Mathison, nevertheless accept that scriptura scripturae interpres (Scripture interprets Scripture), in the sense that the whole and each of the parts of Scripture function in such a way as to illuminate the meaning of one another. Dei Verbum, one of the documents of Vatican II, teaches:

Holy Scripture must be read and interpreted in the sacred spirit in which it was written, no less serious attention must be given to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture if the meaning of the sacred texts is to be correctly worked out. The living tradition of the whole Church must be taken into account along with the harmony which exists between elements of the faith. It is the task of exegetes to work according to these rules toward a better understanding and explanation of the meaning of Sacred Scripture, so that through preparatory study the judgment of the Church may mature. For all of what has been said about the way of interpreting Scripture is subject finally to the judgment of the Church, which carries out the divine commission and ministry of guarding and interpreting the word of God. Dei Verbum, 12.

[↩]
Shape, p. 246. We do not agree with Mathison that solo scriptura necessarily entails relativism. The person holding solo scriptura may believe firmly that his own interpretation is objectively true, and that everyone who disagrees with his interpretation is wrong. But we agree with Mathison that there is some truth to the connection between solo scriptura and relativism. That is because it is difficult in our present fluid culture to sustain the notion that anyone who disagrees with one’s own interpretation is wrong. The continual encounter with those of obvious intelligence and sincerity revering the very same book, and yet interpreting it differently from oneself, makes some form of relativism attractive without a principled basis for believing that one’s own interpretation is the authorized interpretation. So in this way, solo scriptura lends itself to a ‘practical relativism,’ which easily slides into an unqualified relativism. [↩]
1 Corinthians 1:10. Someone might object that divisions are good, since St. Paul says, “For there must also be factions among you, in order that those who are approved may have become evident among you.” (1 Cor. 11:19.) But St. Paul is not there praising division among Christians. He is teaching that division always entails schism from, not schism within. [↩]
Shape, p. 241. [↩]
Reymond, for his part, will respond that the Nicene Creed does have “real authority,” but that the authority it possesses is derivative and contingent upon its fidelity to Scripture; and since in his estimation it fails to conform to Scripture on this point of Trinitarian doctrine, he wishes to see it rectified “in light of the Biblical teaching.” The confluence between Mathison’s and Reymond’s orientations in this instance is quite striking. Striking, too, is the appearance that for Mathison the “real authority” of the Nicene Creed entails its irreformability: for Mathison does not criticize the theological or exegetical argumentation upon which Reymond relies to justify his repudiation of the “Nicene Trinitarian Concept,” but contents himself merely to point out Reymond’s departure from it, leaving us to conclude that his departure from the Nicene Creed is ipso facto a mistake. Yet if the “real authority” of Nicaea entails the irreformability of its Creed — as it certainly appears to here for Mathison, at least “in practice” — then it can be no argument against the “infallibility” of Nicaea or any other Council that the dogmatic decrees promulgated in them are likewise “irreformable.” Why, then, are we meant to believe that the irreformability of (infallible) Catholic dogma is objectionable, whereas the irreformability of the “real but subservient authority” of the Councils Protestants accept fails to infringe upon the ultimate authority of Scripture? [↩]
Quoted in Shape, p. 242. [↩]
Shape, p. 243. [↩]
Shape, pp. 243-244. [↩]
Shape, p. 246. [↩]
He writes:

The doctrine of solo scriptura, despite its claims to uniquely preserve the authority of the Word of God, destroys that authority by making the meaning of Scripture dependent upon the judgment of each individual. Rather than the Word of God being the one final court of appeal, the court of appeal becomes the multiplied minds of each believer. One is persuaded that Calvinism is more biblical. The other is persuaded that dispensationalism is more biblical. And by what standard does each decide? The standard is each individual’s opinion of what is biblical. The standard is necessarily individualistic, and therefore the standard is necessarily relativistic. Shape, pp. 246-247.

[↩]
Someone might claim that “the science of exegesis” will overcome this problem. But the evidence does not support that claim. Protestant theologians in many different traditions have been using exegetical methods to support their particular interpretations of Scripture for almost five hundred years. And yet there has been little to no convergence of these various traditions and denominations. Instead new theological positions and traditions have arisen, positions such as dispensationalism, Pentecostalism, open theism, federal vision, etc., each defending itself by the very exegetical methods that are supposed to bring and preserve all Christians in unity. The continued diversification and variegation within Protestantism indicates that exegesis is not capable of establishing or preserving unity among Christians who believe in the inspiration and authority of Scripture. Exegesis has shown itself to be used more within a tradition to support the theological position held by those in that tradition. So the appeal to exegesis only pushes back the question: Whose exegesis? Lutheran exegesis? Calvinist exegesis? Methodist, Anglican, Baptist, Pentecostal, (etc.)? And we have to ask ourselves how much more time would be necessary to falsify the claim that exegesis is capable of unifying all Christians. [↩]
Mathison writes, “It should go without saying that solo scriptura was not the doctrine of the early Church or of the medieval Church. However, most proponents of solo scriptura would not be bothered in the least by this fact because they are not concerned to maintain any continuity with the teaching of the early Church.” Shape, p. 247. [↩]
The first recorded use of the term ‘layman’ in the early Church Fathers is found in St. Clement’s epistle to the Church at Corinth, written around AD 96. [↩]
Quoted in “Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Shape, pp. 248-249. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Shape, pp. 250-251. [↩]
In 1 Corinthians 1:13 St. Paul asks, “Is Christ divided?” The obvious answer is “no.” And that answer must remain the same forever. [↩]
Mathison writes:

The doctrine of solo scriptura also reduces the essential doctrines of the Christian faith to no more than opinion by denying any real authority to the ecumenical creeds of the Church. We must note that if the ecumenical creeds are no more authoritative than the opinions of any individual Christian, as adherents of solo scriptura must say if they are to remain consistent, then the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian doctrine of Christ are no more authoritative than the doctrinal ideas of any opinionated Christian. The doctrine of the Trinity and deity of Christ become as open to debate as the doctrine of exclusive psalmody in worship.

It is extremely important to understand the importance of this point. If the adherents of solo scriptura are correct, then there are no real objective doctrinal boundaries within Christianity. Each individual Christian is responsible to search the Scripture (even though he can’t be told with any certainty what books constitute Scripture) and judge for himself and by himself what is and is not scriptural doctrine. In other words, each individual is responsible for establishing his or her own doctrinal boundaries-–his or her own creed. Shape, p. 249.

[↩]
Shape, p. 250. [↩]
Shape, p. 252. [↩]
Shape, p. 252. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes,” pp. 25-29. [↩]
Shape, p. 245. [↩]
Mathison’s claim here is very much in agreement with that of the Catholic Church. The Catholic understanding of the relation between Scripture and the Church treats Scripture as a treasure entrusted by Christ to the Church, properly known and understood only within the bosom of the Church as explicated by her divinely appointed shepherds. Catholics come to Scripture through the guidance of Holy mother Church. [↩]
Shape, p. 256. [↩]
Shape, p. 260. [↩]
“We indeed willingly concede, if any discussion arises over doctrine, that the best and surest remedy is for a synod of true bishops to be convened, where the doctrine at issue may be examined.” As quoted in “Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Shape, p. 259. [↩]
Shape, p. 270-271. [↩]
Shape, p. 262. [↩]
Shape, p. 264. [↩]
To assert that the Bible is the sole infallible authority, and that the Bible is the final and supreme norm, in no way rules out the necessity or reality of other secondary and penultimate authorities. The Church is one such subordinate authority recognized by the early Church and by the Reformers. The Church was established by Jesus Christ Himself and given authority by Him. Jesus gives the Church an authority of “binding and loosing” that is not given to every member of the Church as individuals. . . . It is only within the Church that we find Scripture interpreted rightly, and it is only within the Church that we find the gospel. Shape, pp. 267-268.

[↩]
Shape, p. 272. [↩]
Shape, p. 273. [↩]
Cf. 2 Timothy 4:3. [↩]
“It is therefore to the Church that we must turn for the true interpretation of the Scripture, for it is in the Church that the gospel is found.” Shape, p. 270. [↩]
Cf. the Confession of the English Congregation at Geneva (AD 1556), the French Confession of Faith (AD 1559), articles 26-28; the Scottish Confession of Faith (AD 1560), chapters 16 and 18, the Belgic Confession of Faith (1561), articles 27-29, and the Second Helvetic Confession (AD 1566), chapter 17. [↩]
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV.i.10 [hereinafter Institutes]. [↩]
Covenant, Justification and Pastoral Ministry, p. 12. [↩]
Once again: “When I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” [↩]
Institutes, as quoted by Mathison in “Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Cf. Session 6, Canon 9. [↩]
We see here again the relevance of the statement, “When I submit (only when I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” [↩]
Shape, pp. 272-273. [↩]
Kevin Vanhoozer writes:

While God’s word is infallible, human interpretations are not. God is in heaven; we are on earth. Situated between heaven and earth, we lack the knowledge of angels. What, then, are our options? (1) Hermeneutical relativism: embrace the interpreter within you and live as they did in the period of the Judges where everyone did what was right in their own eyes (so long as you don’t hurt anyone, presumably!); (2) take the road to Rome and the safety of numbers; (3) join an independent church, where right reading is a function of one’s local interpretive community. None of these options inspires confidence. I propose a fourth possibility: that we set out like pilgrims on the way indicated by our book; that we employ whatever hermeneutical tools available that help us to follow its sense; that we pray for the illumination of the Spirit and for the humility to acknowledge our missteps; and that we consult other pilgrims that have gone before us as well as Christians in other parts of today’s world. “Lost in Interpretation? Truth, Scripture, and Hermeneutics,” JETS 48/1 (March 2005) p. 92.

Vanhoozer’s option (1) is a description of solo scriptura. His option (2) is Catholicism. His option (3) is a description of sola scriptura, where “independent church” replaces denomination. His option (4) is not a fourth theoretical option, but a proposal to search for a way out of the hermeneutical mess. Of course we agree that (1) and (3) are false, for reasons we have explained in this article. And we believe that Vanhoozer’s option (4) leads inevitably to option (2). [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes,” pp. 25-29. [↩]
Shape, p. 260. [↩]
Shape, p. 276. [↩]
Shape, p. 261. [↩]
Shape, p. 270. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
John Calvin similarly says:

In this way, we willingly embrace and reverence as holy the early councils, such as those of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus I, Chalcedon, and the like, which were concerned with refuting errors – in so far as they relate to the teachings of faith. For they contain nothing but the pure and genuine exposition of Scripture, which the holy fathers applied with spiritual prudence to crush the enemies of religion who had then arisen. Institutes, IV.9.8.

The reason Calvin accepts the first four ecumenical councils, but not the following councils, is because the first four, but not the later ones, sufficiently agree with his interpretation of Scripture. This shows again the same problem described above: “when I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” In other words, Calvin does not in fact recognize the authority of the first four councils. Rather, he merely ascribes authority to them on the ground that these four councils agree with his own interpretation. [↩]
Shape, pp. 251-252. [↩]
In June of 1520 Pope Leo issued the papal bull titled Exsurge Domine in which he warned Luther that he faced excommunication from the Church unless he recanted 41 sentences contained in his writings. Luther responded by publicly burning a copy of this Church document in December of that year. As a result, on January 3, 1521, he was excommunicated. In the Spring of that year, Luther appeared before the Diet of Worms. He was asked by Johann Eck, an official of the Archbishop of Trier, whether he rejected any part of his writings. At first he said, “If I am shown my error, I will be the first to throw my books into the fire.” Eck replied, “Martin, …Your plea to be heard from the Scripture is the one always made by heretics. You do nothing be renew the errors of Wyclif and Hus. . . . Martin, how can you assume that you are the only one to understand the sense of Scripture? Would you put your judgment above that of so many famous men and claim that you know more than they all? You have no right to call into question the most holy orthodox faith, instituted by Christ the perfect lawgiver, proclaimed throughout the world by the apostles, sealed by the red blood of the martyrs, confirmed by the sacred councils, defined by the Church in which all our fathers believed until death and gave to us as an inheritance, and which now we are forbidden by the pope and the emperor to [debate] lest there be no end of debate. I ask you, Martin — . . . do you or do you not repudiate your books and the errors which they contain?” Luther replied, ” . . . Unless I am convicted by Scripture and plain reason — I do not accept the authority of popes and councils, for they have contradicted each other — my conscience is captive to the Word of God.” Roland Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther, pp. 143-144 (Mentor, 1950). [↩]
Shape, p. 278. [↩]
Shape, p. 278. [↩]
Shape, p. 279. [↩]
Shape, p. 279. [↩]
Shape, p. 280. [↩]
This same problem faces Kevin Vanhoozer’s attempt to distinguish between magisterial authority and ministerial authority. See his The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Westminster John Knox, 2005). [↩]
Shape, p. 270. [↩]
Shape, p. 264. [↩]
See our previous article, “Ecclesial Deism.” [↩]
Donum Veritatis, 23. [↩]
Among the principal duties of bishops the preaching of the Gospel occupies an eminent place. For bishops are preachers of the faith, who lead new disciples to Christ, and they are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach to the people committed to them the faith they must believe and put into practice, and by the light of the Holy Spirit illustrate that faith. They bring forth from the treasury of Revelation new things and old, making it bear fruit and vigilantly warding off any errors that threaten their flock. Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra. Lumen Gentium, 25.

When the Magisterium, not intending to act “definitively”, teaches a doctrine to aid a better understanding of Revelation and make explicit its contents, or to recall how some teaching is in conformity with the truths of faith, or finally to guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths, the response called for is that of the religious submission of will and intellect. Donum Veritatis, 23.

[↩]
Shape, p. 273. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther, pp. 143-144. [↩]
Of course the Commander in Chief is under the authority of God, but here we are speaking of ‘final’ only in a certain respect, i.e., within the human society. [↩]
Hebrews 13:17. [↩]
Christ did this when He instituted the Eucharist, and when He breathed on them and gave them the authority to forgive sins. Cf. Luke 22:19 and John 20:22-23. [↩]
Shape, p. 239. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
Shape, p. 264. [↩]
Tertullian, On Prescription Against the Heretics, ch. 19. [↩]
Ibid., 37. [↩]
Council of Trent, Session IV. [↩]
First Vatican Council, Session 3, ch. 2, paras. 8-9. [↩]
Dei Verbum, 10. [↩]
Dei Verbum, 10. [↩]
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 95. [↩]
Cindy Wooden, “Pope encourages Christians to read Bible,” Catholic News Service (Nov. 14, 2007). [↩]
See Lumen Gentium, 25. [↩]
“Solo Scriptura: The Difference a Vowel Makes.” [↩]
This does not mean that an infallible doctrine cannot be further developed (i.e. unpacked, unfolded, unveiled, etc.) Anything taught by the Magisterium can be further developed. This is how the Nicene Creed went from the form it had in AD 325 to the form it acquired in AD 381. But development never contradicts what has already been given. If it could, then over the last 2000 years, nothing at all would have been definitively established; the Arians might still turn out to have been right. And in that case, there would have been no point in holding any councils. [↩]
Shape, p. 276. [↩]
The Word, Church and Sacraments: In Protestantism and Catholicism, pp. 37-38 (Ignatius Press, 2004). [↩]
See Scott Hahn’s article titled “The Authority of Mystery: The Biblical Theology of Benedict XVI” in 2 Letter & Spirit, pp. 97-149 (2006). [↩]

Tags: Sola Scriptura

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Jeremy Tate November 4th, 2009 12:41 pm :
Dear Bryan,

Excellent article. Some of my closest reformed friends have taken up Mattison’s argument which you describe in rejecting solo scriptura in favor of sola scriptura. I think you are right in pointing out that ultimately there is no difference between the two. What I had not seen before reading your article was how somebody indirectly makes themselves their own interpretive authority.
Here’s what I found interesting in light of a class I recently dropped at RTS (partially over this issue). I think my Professor might have realized the strength of the Catholic argument on this huge point, so he was very careful to say that the issue is not interpretation, but rather, making things up which are nowhere even hinted at in Scripture (he then discussed the Assumption of Mary, Immaculate Conception, ect…ironically all doctrines which were formally defined long after the Reformation – so even if they were wrong I’m not sure how they would justify the reformation). Have you seen this approach, which my Professor took before? How would you respond to it?
Bill Cobbett November 4th, 2009 2:32 pm :
Jeremy,

Isn’t the Catholic critique of sola scriptura just as powerful as the case made above against Mattison’s argument? The Catholic position does not abide by sola scriptura therefore your professor has still begged the question. He operates from a sola scriptura paradigm (which cannot be found in Scripture) and then hammers the Catholics for not operating from sola scriptura. But sola scriptura is the novelty, and therefore doesn’t it have to be justified appropriately before one can reasonably appeal to that principle to critique that which has always existed?

Best,
Bill
JJS November 4th, 2009 6:52 pm :
Our point is to show that implicit within the claim by proponents of sola scriptura to be submitting to the Church, is always a prior judgment concerning which body of persons count as the Church, and a theological assumption about how that judgment is to be made.

I know this has come up before and will do so again, but how is it that the Catholic is not doing the exact same thing (albeit in a different way)? Bryan, you have made a “prior judgment concerning which body of persons count as the church,” haven’t you? Your own interpretation of history and Scripture tells you that it is apostolic succession that locates the church, while Mathison’s tells him it’s the gospel that locates it. But in both cases, private judgment is being followed in order to locate where exactly Christ’s church is.
Tim A. Troutman November 4th, 2009 8:34 pm :
JJS > Section V above deals with that argument. Also Dr. Liccione on “Bad Arguments Against the Magisterium Part 2″ would be good supplemental reading.
Bryan Cross November 4th, 2009 9:12 pm :
Hello Jeremy,

I’m glad you appreciated our article. You asked me how I would respond. I would call into question his working assumption that if a doctrine is not explicitly stated in Scripture, then Christians do not need to believe it. I might write a post up on the subject of Scripture and Tradition, but in the mean time, I recommend listening to the first lecture in this lecture series by Prof. Feingold. Then I would recommend reading Newman’s An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, if you have not already done so. The fact of development should lead us to be very cautious about inferring from apparent early silence about a doctrine to the conclusion that the doctrine is a heretical accretion.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
JJS November 4th, 2009 9:47 pm :
Tim,

You’re right, I posted my comment before I had finished the article (and I am doing it again right now, only now I’m closer to the end).

The Protestant is seeking a group of persons who believe, teach and practice what his interpretation of Scripture indicates was the belief, teaching and practice of the Apostles….

The person becoming Catholic, by contrast, is seeking out the Church that Christ founded. He does this not by finding that group of persons who share his interpretation of Scripture. Rather, he locates in history those whom the Apostles appointed and authorized, observes what they say and do viz-a-viz the transmission of teaching and interpretive authority, traces that line of successive authorizations down through history to the present day to a living Magisterium, and then submits to what this present-day Magisterium is teaching.

I still don’t see the difference. The Catholic convert studies the Scripture and the fathers and concludes that the church Christ founded looks like what the Catholic Catechism says it is, while the Protestant does the same and concludes the church looks like what the Heidelberg Catechism says it is.

It sounds like the position being advocated is that as long as one uses his private judgment to come to the right position, it’s OK. If you step outside your tradition for a moment and consider this, can you see how it looks to the rest of us?
Jared Brattoli November 4th, 2009 10:33 pm :
Very well thought out and structured article. I love it. Just what I’ve been waiting for.
Andrew McCallum November 4th, 2009 11:13 pm :
Bryan,

There are a number of ways to address your points. One of them is to point out that we don’t believe that apostolic succession is false. Now if you are just assuming the RCC understanding of apostolic succession that’s a different story. But if we assume Rome’s understanding of apostolic succession then we don’t need to talk about sola scriptura at all, do we? If the only thing that matters concerning ecclesiastic validity is for there to be literal succession from the bishops of the 1st century to now then Rome is right about everything, end of story. In short to assume the RCC definition of apostolic succession is to define away Protestantism.

But let me give you another way of looking at the issue. At the origins of Christianity we find writings of men who assumed the infallibility of the Scriptures. We have talked about Clement on a number of occasions here. He speaks with great authority by pounding home verse after verse from the Bible. He assuredly believed what the Apostles and Prophets had before him that the Scriptures were the infallible Word of God because they were inspired and thus these could be used as an ultimate standard. The question before us is then whether or not the ECF’s believed that there was anything else that rose to the level of the Scriptures. If they did not,then we are left with Scripture alone (unless you want to suggest another possibility?). If they did, then they did not believe in Scripture alone, they believed in Scripture plus this something else. But note this – if they did believe that only Scripture alone could provide this ultimate authority, this fact does not undermine the Church’s ability to rule or act authoritatively. The Church could still act as a Church whether shew was using either a standard of 1) only Scripture or 2) Scripture + whatever tradition might be around at the time.

Now of course as a Protestant my position is that the Scriptures are superior to the words of the bishops (as Augustine held), but I think we have been through that before. The point I want to really bring home is that the Church would not have fallen apart if she had always viewed tradition as a secondary authority to the Scriptures. Play this thought game for me, Bryan. Assume for the moment that Clement and his contemporaries believed that only Scripture could be the final bar of authority. Now given this belief of the Early Church, what would have stopped the Church from acting authoritatively as that authority was laid out by Christ and the Apostles?
David Pell November 4th, 2009 11:40 pm :
The point I want to really bring home is that the Church would not have fallen apart if she had always viewed tradition as a secondary authority to the Scriptures.

The history of Protestantism until now shows this statement to be patently false.
Teri November 4th, 2009 11:43 pm :
Bryan and Neil,

Excellent article! Of course, I will have to read it several times to absorb it completely. Professor Feingold is an amazing gift to the Church. As a Jewish Convert to the Catholic Church, his insights are phenomenal. I believe you suggested his lecture series, Bryan. All of his lectures give new meaning to our common faith.

May Our Lord bless your work and give you His peace,
Teri
Bryan Cross November 4th, 2009 11:49 pm :
Andrew,

The comment box is intended for use only by those who have read the article. The article is long, I understand, but if you wish to comment, please read the article first.

Also, comments should stay on-topic, that means, directly interacting with the argument in this article. Comments that don’t interact with the article, but strike off on a different topic, will not be approved.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Sean November 5th, 2009 12:06 am :
Andrew,

Its not as if the Catholic definition of apostolic succession was just invented yesterday and we are backing into something here. This is creedal Christianity.

“For if the lineal succession of bishops is to be taken into account, with how much more certainty and benefit to the Church do we reckon back till we reach Peter himself, to whom, as bearing in a figure the whole Church, the Lord said: ‘Upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it !’ The successor of Peter was Linus, and his successors in unbroken continuity were these: — Clement, Anacletus, Evaristus, Alexander, Sixtus, Telesphorus, Iginus, Anicetus, Pius, Soter, Eleutherius, Victor, Zephirinus, Calixtus, Urbanus, Pontianus, Antherus, Fabianus, Cornelius, Lucius, Stephanus, Xystus, Dionysius, Felix, Eutychianus, Gaius, Marcellinus, Marcellus, Eusebius, Miltiades, Sylvester, Marcus, Julius, Liberius, Damasus, and Siricius, whose successor is the present Bishop Anastasius. In this order of succession no Donatist bishop is found. But, reversing the natural course of things, the Donatists sent to Rome from Africa an ordained bishop, who, putting himself at the head of a few Africans in the great metropolis, gave some notoriety to the name of “mountain men,” or Cutzupits, by which they were known.”
Augustine, To Generosus, Epistle 53:2 (A.D. 400)

Augustine, here, describes what Apostolic Succession means. Its pretty clear which definition is a later invention intended to back into a presupposition.

“In like manner as if there take place an ordination of clergy in order to form a congregation of people, although the congregation of people follow not, yet there remains in the ordained persons the Sacrament of Ordination; and if, for any fault, any be removed from his office, he will not be without the Sacrament of the Lord once for all set upon him, albeit continuing unto condemnation.”
Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, 24:32 (A.D. 401).

The second part of your comment is an attempt to pit scripture against the church. This is not the Catholic position.

Scripture must be interpreted by the Church. Bryan’s paper addresses the question of how one defines church and specifically addresses Mathison’s error in not identifying the church by apostolic succession.
Bryan Cross November 5th, 2009 12:16 am :
Jason,

Both the person becoming Protestant, and the person becoming Catholic, are using their own judgment. That’s not where the difference is located. And you are correct that the Catholic convert might study Scripture and the Fathers. And the Protestant convert might study Scripture and the Fathers. That too is not where the difference is located. The difference is that while the person becoming Protestant bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture (not on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church), the person becoming Catholic bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
mateo November 5th, 2009 1:49 am :
Congratulations to Bryan Cross and Neal Judisch for a great article.

So long as the individual retains final interpretive authority, it is the “the individual who is sovereign. … As Protestants have come to understand more clearly the democratic nature of Protestant ecclesial authority, they have come to see that as Protestants, they themselves as individuals, hold final interpretive authority, and have come to live as such.

To me, the “democratic nature of Protestant eccelesial authority” and the belief that it is “the individual who is sovereign” is reflected most glaringly in the Protestant practice of church shopping. The practice of church shopping indicates two things, that the individual believes that he has the right to church shop until he finds a church that agrees with his own private interpretation of scriptures, and that the Protestant churches have the right organize themselves via democratic principles. I am astounded that so many “bible believers” can practice church shopping without being bothered by the practice. Where in the Bible did the Old Testament prophets teach synagogue shopping or the Apostles teach church shopping?

Even worse than church shopping is the idea that a bible believer has the authority to found a new church that teaches novel doctrines. The new non-denominational church in town spun off from the Vineyard Church that spun off from the Calvary Chapel Church, that spun off from the … Sheesh! Do Protestants really have the freedom to go church shopping and found new sects that teach novel doctrines? The answer to that question depends on the answer that one gives to “the Question of Interpretive Authority.”

Mathison grants that each individual may appeal to Scripture to correct the Church, disobey the Church and leave the Church, so long as he is following his conscience.

I find it surprising that this particular Protestant doctrine doesn’t have a name by which it is commonly known, such as the Doctrine of the Primacy of Conscience, or the Doctrine of the Primacy of the Believer. The closest thing that I can think of that expresses this doctrine is what some Protestant sects call “Bible Freedom”.

Without apostolic succession, there is within Protestantism no group of persons already having divine authorization to provide the definitive decision regarding matters of doctrine and interpretation …

The Jehovah Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints are sects that take issue with their Protestant brethren over the doctrine of “Bible Freedom”. Both Jehovah Witnesses and Mormons teach that the believer must submit to the men that hold the authority of a teaching office within their respective churches:

Hence, besides individually possessing God’s Word, we need a theocratic organization. Yes, besides having God’s spirit of illumination, a Christian needs Jehovah’s theocratic organization in order to understand the Bible. (Watchtower; June 15, 1951; p. 375)

As members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, we are blessed to be led by living prophets—inspired men called to speak for the Lord, as did Moses, Isaiah, Peter, Paul, Nephi, Mormon, and other prophets of the scriptures. We sustain the President of the Church as prophet, seer, and revelator—the only person on the earth who receives revelation to guide the entire Church. Prophets – The Church of the Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints

The Jehovah Witnesses and the Mormons may claim that certain men are vested with the authority of a teaching office within their respective churches – what they can’t claim is that doctrine that their churches officially teach has always been the same. A church hierarchy that can change the doctrine of the church cannot also be a source of infallible truth.

… “when I submit (so long as I agree), the one to whom I submit is me.” For this reason, in sola scriptura it is the individual who ultimately has and always retains final interpretive authority.

… that our conscience is bound ultimately by our own interpretation of Scripture, is contrary to the perpetual teaching of the Church, because that claim denies that Christ established a perpetual teaching authority in His Church …the Catholic must seek to conform his conscience according to the definitive teaching of the Church in matters of faith and morals, because the Church’s Magisterium is a higher authority than his conscience (i.e. than reason alone).

The Catholic Church has never taught a doctrine of the Primacy of Conscience, but has, instead, taught the doctrine of the Primacy of Peter. Who among those that adhere to the doctrine of the Primacy of Conscience believe that all men and women are born with perfectly formed consciences? The man born with a conscience that is perfectly formed does not need scripture to form it, and the man that does not have a perfectly formed conscience could not depend on his conscience to infallibly guide him in his interpretation of scriptures.

If the authority of the ecumenical creeds only followed from the perspicuity of Scripture, there would be no need for the creeds in the first place, since the creeds would have restated only what was already plainly explicit in Scripture. This would entail that all those who opposed the creeds were blind, deaf, and stupid …

Very good point. The creeds are summaries of the doctrines believed by the Church. I always wonder how Protestants can seriously claim to believe in the perspicuity of scriptures and then reconcile that belief with the reality that outside of their particular Protestant sect there are thousands upon thousands of Protestant sects that that teaching contradictory church doctrine.

Do most Protestants think that the Protestants belonging to the other sects that preach contradictory doctrine are “blind, deaf, and stupid”? I doubt it, since most Protestants also believe that there is nothing wrong with church shopping. What sane person would look for the truth in a church that is comprised of the blind, deaf and stupid? Nor do I believe that Protestants think that the other Protestants that preach contradictory doctrine are doing so because they actually know the truth and are maliciously teaching heresy. I suppose one way to reconcile these two beliefs is to become hostile the concept of doctrine, which is a stance that is not uncommon among the members of Protestant “bible churches”.

I also find it hard to accept Mathison’s thesis that Protestants are oblivious to the “the hermeneutical chaos and anarchy that exists within the Protestant church” for the reason that he gives: “Most Protestants do not seem to have taken this question seriously enough if they have considered it at all.”

I believe that most Protestants are, in fact, not oblivious to the reality that there are thousands of other Protestant sects that teach contradictory church doctrine. But what, exactly, is the source of the “hermeneutical chaos and anarchy” within Protestantism if it is not a misplaced belief in sola sciptura, not a misplaced belief in the perspicuity of scriptures, not a belief that Protestants that disagree with them are “blind, deaf, and stupid”, and not a belief that other Protestants know the truth and are maliciously spreading heresy? From whence does the scandal of Protestant division spring?

Mathison is most certainly correct, the scandal of Protestant division is a scandal to the unbelieving world that hinders the spread of the gospel: “If we proclaim to the unbelieving world that we have the one true and final revelation from God, why should they listen to us if we cannot agree about what that revelation actually says?”

May Christ the Good Shepherd bring us all into the one flock with one shepherd. (John 10:16).

Amen!
JJS November 5th, 2009 3:40 am :
Bryan,

The difference is that while the person becoming Protestant bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture (not on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church), the person becoming Catholic bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church.

I understand that, but is it not true that the Catholic’s “basing his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church” itself a result of that Catholic’s own private determination of whose judgment is most trustworthy?

In other words, this is how it sounds to someone who doesn’t share your assumptions: “The problem with Protestantism is not its use of private judgment (since all decisions involve this). Rather the problem with Protestantism is that it understands church authority as being derivative rather than rooted in an infallible Magisterium. How Protestant of those Protestants!”

Your claim seems self-serving. You admit that before you became a Catholic, you were not under the Church’s authority. But then somehow, through lots of study I’m sure, you came to believe (before coming under the jurisdiction of Rome) that the best way to locate the church Jesus founded was to consult the successors of the apostles (whom you somehow, through lots of study I’m sure, came to believe were the God-ordained and infallible leaders of the church for endless generations).

Forgive me for being overly dense, but I still fail to see how this is different from that for which you fault us Protestants. What is the difference between using my decision-making power to conclude that the Bible is the only infallible authority, and using my decision-making power to conclude that it isn’t?
Devin Rose November 5th, 2009 8:45 am :
Thank you for this excellent article. I found it really helpful. I have some questions about the answers to the objections part which I hope to ask if I get some time later, but I had an insight I wanted to share which I hope is relevant to this part:

“The objection is understandable, but it can be made only by those who do not see the principled difference between the discovery of the Catholic Church, and joining a Protestant denomination or congregation….But the Catholic finds something principally different, and properly finds it by way of qualitatively different criteria.”

For myself, a convert from Evangelical Protestantism to Catholicism, the word “discovery” exactly describes my experience, and I would draw an analogy of this experience to when I found Christ a year or so before becoming Catholic. When I “discovered” Christ as an atheist, all of a sudden my entire life’s paradigm shifted: I realized that there was One who created me and loved me and that I wanted to love Him in return. It was no longer a question of following what I had previously thought to be true but to re-orient myself to the One who could not lie. I wanted to know who Jesus was, what he taught, his truth and then live that truth by his grace.

This is not a perfect analogy, but as a Protestant when I continued looking ever deeper for Christ’s truth in the Faith and in morals, I read the Bible daily, prayed all the time, had Bible studies, listened to pastors preach at church and on tapes: I was always trying to discern whether one interpretation of the Scriptures or system of interpreting them made more sense than others so that I could have an accurate understanding of God’s truth which is found in them. I only got so far before realizing that, unless God has divinely protected “some Church” from error could I ever hope to have a correct Faith and not believe and follow falsehoods. No Protestant Community I had heard of even claimed to have this fullness of the truth. It seems that the Mormons claimed it and the Catholics and Orthodox did. The Mormons were not credible in my eyes.

So I began researching into the history of the Faith. How credible was the Catholic Church’s claim to being the Church Christ founded and protected from error? I don’t want to go too far off topic here, but I “discovered” the Catholic Church was this Church and knew that I could trust her as I would trust Christ because Jesus preserved his Bride from error. This discovery was a paradigm shift from Protestantism, where it was very much “do you best to find the denomination and local church that seems to most closely match what I currently believed to be the right interpretation of the Bible.”

I hope that this is not off-topic. Thanks and God bless!
Bryan Cross November 5th, 2009 10:08 am :
Jason,

I’ll respond to your comments paragraph by paragraph, if you don’t mind.

I understand that, but is it not true that the Catholic’s “basing his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church” itself a result of that Catholic’s own private determination of whose judgment is most trustworthy?

In the case of the person becoming Catholic, the judgment regarding who is most trustworthy follows from the discovery of a living divinely authorized teaching office having the divine authority to bind the conscience. In the case of the person becoming Protestant, the judgment regarding who is most trustworthy does not follow from the discovery of this divinely authorized teaching office; it follows from one’s interpretation of Scripture, to determine who is teaching most closely in accordance with one’s interpretation.

In other words, this is how it sounds to someone who doesn’t share your assumptions: “The problem with Protestantism is not its use of private judgment (since all decisions involve this). Rather the problem with Protestantism is that it understands church authority as being derivative rather than rooted in an infallible Magisterium. How Protestant of those Protestants!”

The problem with understanding church authority as being derivative (rather than being based on apostolic succession) is not that it is Protestant. That would just be putting a label on the practice, not pointing to an actual problem. The problem is that there is a contradiction internal to the sola scriptura position. It claims to be different in a principled way from solo scriptura, but because it understands church authority as being derivative, there is ultimately [as we showed in the article] no principled difference between solo scriptura and sola scriptura.

Your claim seems self-serving. You admit that before you became a Catholic, you were not under the Church’s authority. But then somehow, through lots of study I’m sure, you came to believe (before coming under the jurisdiction of Rome) that the best way to locate the church Jesus founded was to consult the successors of the apostles (whom you somehow, through lots of study I’m sure, came to believe were the God-ordained and infallible leaders of the church for endless generations).

Correct.

Forgive me for being overly dense, but I still fail to see how this is different from that for which you fault us Protestants. What is the difference between using my decision-making power to conclude that the Bible is the only infallible authority, and using my decision-making power to conclude that it isn’t?

The difference is not in the initial use of one’s decision-making power. The difference lies in whether or not one discovers the living teaching authority appointed and authorized by the incarnate Christ. Because the Protestant convert does not discover this, he retains ultimate interpretive authority (and hence this creates the contradiction in his claim to reject solo scriptura). But the Catholic convert does discover this, and so does not retain ultimate interpretive authority. This is why, as we argued in the article, the only way to avoid solo scriptura is by discovering apostolic succession.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Tim Troutman November 5th, 2009 10:19 am :
What is the difference between using my decision-making power to conclude that the Bible is the only infallible authority, and using my decision-making power to conclude that it isn’t?

There is no difference in the process, but in the result. What is the difference in me concluding that Jesus is the Messiah and that He isn’t? Well, nothing (in the process) and everything (in result).

There is a qualitative difference in what happens when you submit to the Catholic Church and when you join a denomination just as there is a qualitative difference when you submit to Christ and when you submit to the President of the United States.

This is exemplified when we start talking about the Church being infallible. That’s scares the hell out of men because it means that we have to obey her even if we think we know Scripture better than her.
K. Doran November 5th, 2009 10:21 am :
Hi JJS,

You asked: “What is the difference between using my decision-making power to conclude that the Bible is the only infallible authority, and using my decision-making power to conclude that it isn’t?”

I see one difference (there are many others) in our use of private judgment as the following. If you read the bible carefully, and concluded that your denomination’s belief about (say) Matthew 16 was sufficiently likely to be wrong, and your denomination refused to change it’s interpretation and tried to make you agree publicly that it’s interpretation was at least concurrently acceptable, you would leave your denomination for another one. And your denomination couldn’t really complain, because they have never claimed to have an infallible interpretation of Matthew 16 or of any other bible verse.

But if I use my private judgment to conclude that the Catholic church is likely wrong about Matthew 16 based on non-magisterial data, I won’t leave the Catholic Church. Because I include the magisterial data as of sufficient weight to override my own best interpretations of scripture. Thus, when Augustine developed different views of the verses in Matthew over time, he didn’t feel so sure of these new views that he could either leave the Catholic Church or demand that the Church’s various traditional interpretations of these verses needed to change. Rather, he required of himself and others to stay in the Catholic Church, and recognized that his new interpretation should not ipso facto replace the traditional ones in Church teaching.

Thus, we simply don’t use our private judgment to church shop in the same way that protestants do. We of course use private judgment to: (a) determine that apostolic succession is necessary for the true church, and (b) identify the church with the best claims to apostolic succession. But once we apply our private judgment to (a) and (b), we turn off the private judgment and accept magisterially-taught doctrines whether we have sufficient non-magisterial proof or not.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but you would not accept a protestant doctrine without a plain proof from scripture, and if your best private interpretation of scripture changed with sufficient certainty, then you would not accept any magisterial teaching as capable of overturning that certainty? In other words, you wouldn’t do what we do: accept magisterial teachings whether or not we think the non-magisterial evidence points against them?

Sincerely,

K. Doran

p.s. I have always found the non-magisterial evidence to be quite consistent with Catholic magisterial teaching. But to the extent that I don’t initially see the evidence perfectly in line, I still accept the magisterial teaching. The correlation between evidence and teaching doesn’t eviscerate the obedience.
Jared Brattoli November 5th, 2009 11:57 am :
Very Good point by K. Doran! :)

I would like to add that when it comes to using our private interpretation (which is unavoidable for everyone), as K. Doran points out, the Catholic spirit is to withhold final judgement from ourselves and leave it for those given the responsibility and authority to make those final judgements, and that the spirit and mind of the church collectively, while being ordered properly, is the true spirit and mind of Christ. By holding final judgement to ourselves, we withhold from ourselves the promise Christ made that he will send the Holy Spirit to lead the Church into all truth. There must be some kind of final, infallable judgement on doctrine if the Scriptures and Apostolic tradition will have any meaning or use to us, to the effect that it will unite us as one body. Since final judgement is not to be assumed by any individual who so chooses, then it must be assumed by someone, or else we have the effects of solo scriptura, which are contrary to the will of Christ. Whatever the final judgement is it must be infallable, or else we inevitably have the effects of solo scriptura, which are contrary to the will of Christ. If the final judgement on doctrine is to be infallable, that infallable body must be easily identified and recognized, or else we have the effects of solo scriptura, etc. Apostolic succession is that thing which is easily identified and recognized–it is the one thing that is perspicious. It is as easy as using our private judgement to determine the color of the sky–every one uses there own private judgement, but the color of the sky is so perspicious and apparent that those who use their private judgement to recognize it need not be blamed for using private judgement, while those who would deny that the sky is blue can be blamed for using private judgement, for they oppose what is so perspicuous and apparent. This isn’t the best analogy, but it is the quickest analogy my limited mind can think of at the moment. No protestant denomination can say they have authorization to make such final judgements, because no member of any protestant denomination has been given (i.e. ordained) authority to do so by a prior valid authority, and this is easily recognizable. If authority is to be derived, it cannot be derived privately; it cannot be privately assumed without order (this is protestantism).

One may object that Apostolic succesion is not easily identified and recognized, but I would only point out that at the very least we can easily identify and recognize what/who does not have that necessary kind of authority, i.e. protestantism.

For the first 1500 years of the Church’s existence it has held reletively few divisions, and there is no reason the true Chruch of Christ cannot be recognized today by those seperated from her, despite our private scruples with her doctrine.
Andrew Preslar November 5th, 2009 2:31 pm :
Matt Yonke has made some brief and lucid comments about the relationship of authority and private judgment in the act of conversion. See Podcast #8, beginning around the 30:00 minute mark.
Keith Mathison November 5th, 2009 2:34 pm :
Hi Bryan,

I just ran across this critique of my book. I’ve only had time to skim it so far, but I do plan to read it carefully. I appreciate you taking the time to try present my argument fairly, even while disagreeing with it. That doesn’t always happen in such discussions. Do you mind if I interact with your paper here in the comments section of the site?

I don’t have anything substantive to say in response to the paper itself yet since I haven’t read it all the way through, but in the meantime, may I ask about something you wrote in response to Jason in comment #13? You wrote:

“Both the person becoming Protestant, and the person becoming Catholic, are using their own judgment. That’s not where the difference is located. And you are correct that the Catholic convert might study Scripture and the Fathers. And the Protestant convert might study Scripture and the Fathers. That too is not where the difference is located. The difference is that while the person becoming Protestant bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on agreement with his own interpretation of Scripture (not on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church), the person becoming Catholic bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church.”

This looks to me like you are saying:

The person becoming Protestant determines the nature and location of the Church by examining Scripture and/or history.

The person becoming Catholic determines the nature and location of the Church by asking the Roman magisterium (those having succession).

To those of us who aren’t Roman Catholic, it seems that to ask Rome if Rome is the Church begs the question since the very point to be determined is whether Rome is the Church.

Even if this were not the case, by what criteria would the person determine that the best way of determining the nature and location of the church is to ask the Roman magisterium? Does he ask the Roman magisterium if asking the Roman magisterium is the best way, or does he determine (discover) that the Roman magisterium is the best way to determine the location and nature of the church by examining Scripture and history?

I’m not sure whether your response gets to the heart of Jason’s question since the person in question will have to base his evaluation of the magisterium’s claims either on some other criterion or combination of criteria (Scripture, history, reason, etc.) or else make a fideistic leap of faith and accept the magisterium’s claims because they are the magisterium’s claims.

I look forward to going through your paper and hope you don’t mind my following up on it here.

Keith
Bryan Cross November 5th, 2009 3:23 pm :
Hello Keith,

I’m glad you commented here, and yes, you’re welcome to comment here about the article. I tried to look up your email address yesterday, to send you a heads-up on our article, but I couldn’t find your email address through the Ligonier site. So, I’m glad you came across our article.

In regard to your question, you put it this way:

The person becoming Protestant determines the nature and location of the Church by examining Scripture and/or history.

The person becoming Catholic determines the nature and location of the Church by asking the Roman magisterium (those having succession).

To those of us who aren’t Roman Catholic, it seems that to ask Rome if Rome is the Church begs the question since the very point to be determined is whether Rome is the Church.

If I had been making an argument, and my premise was “The Catholic Church claims to be the Church Christ founded”, and then concluded, “Therefore, the Catholic Church is the Church Christ founded” that would be question-begging. In other words, if I was here (in this thread) arguing that we should all be Catholics and not Protestants, and using as my reason “that Rome says so”, I would indeed be begging the question. But, in my comments (in the combox here) I haven’t been arguing that the Catholic Church is the true Church that Christ founded (even though I believe that it is). Rather I have been pointing out that there is principled epistemic difference between the person who becomes Catholic, and the person who becomes Protestant. The person becoming Catholic discovers (from his study of all these things) that Christ instituted apostolic succession. The Protestant does not. That discovery changes the epistemic condition of the Catholic viz-a-viz the Protestant, regarding the retention of ultimate interpretive authority by the individual. And so my point has been that the Catholic is not subject to the tu quoque objection in response to our argument that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura with respect to the holder of ultimate interpretive authority.

Even if this were not the case, by what criteria would the person determine that the best way of determining the nature and location of the church is to ask the Roman magisterium? Does he ask the Roman magisterium if asking the Roman magisterium is the best way, or does he determine (discover) that the Roman magisterium is the best way to determine the location and nature of the church by examining Scripture and history?

This will involve an investigation into early Church history, to determine whether the early Church practiced apostolic succession, and how the early Church understand the role of Peter and his successors. If such things are found, then we can either believe that those were corruptions or, that they were manifestations of the Spirit-protected unfolding of the deposit of faith entrusted by the Apostles to the Church.

I’m not sure whether your response gets to the heart of Jason’s question since the person in question will have to base his evaluation of the magisterium’s claims either on some other criterion or combination of criteria (Scripture, history, reason, etc.) or else make a fideistic leap of faith and accept the magisterium’s claims because they are the magisterium’s claims.

It would most definitely not be the latter, i.e. the fideistic option. But, the false dilemma is that we have to choose between being governed ultimately by our own interpretation of Scripture and leaping blindly into the dark. The other possibility is that we can, through an investigation of early Church history, discover the Church’s understanding and practice of apostolic succession, and all its implications. Once we discover that magisterial authority, and trace the lines of succession, then that changes our epistemic position viz-a-viz the interpretation of Scripture.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
JJS November 5th, 2009 4:20 pm :
Bryan et al,

Thanks for your responses. So am I right in understanding you to be saying that there is no difference between the Catholic’s and Protestant’s process of arriving at their respective destinations, but once we’ve each landed, THEN the difference kicks in (the Protestant retains, while the Catholic surrenders, ultimate interpretive authority)?

Because if so, my question now becomes, “If the Catholic’s ‘discovery’ that he is supposed to listen to the Magisterium is no less a result of his private study than the Protestant’s discovery that, as messy as it may be, Scripture is our only infallible authority, then how exactly does this furnish the Catholic with bragging rights against the Protestant?”

I mean, if the initial discovery was made through private judgment, and then (and only then) is private judgment set aside, that seems problematic, not unlike the guy who favors free markets, but only after the government gives everyone a house and farm, with six acres and ten cows to begin to make their living.
Chris Donato November 5th, 2009 4:37 pm :
So then, Bryan, if one does indeed investigate early Church history and comes to different conclusions than what you’ve come to, then that person is somehow epistemically deficient? What other options are there (to view the other’s Protestant or Orthodox or [fill in the blank] choice) for the one who consciously chooses to become Roman Catholic? You’ve “arrived,” in a manner of speaking.

Well, good for you.
Tim A. Troutman November 5th, 2009 5:05 pm :
JJS, if I may step in. My response to you earlier may have muddied the waters a bit. Bryan is answering you from a different angle so I don’t want the two angles to add confusion.

When we say “private judgment” it has a negative overtone, but on the other hand, “reason” has a positive overtone. What is the difference? In most practical applications – there is none. Did I submit to the authority of the Catholic Church by reason (private judgment)? Yes I did. How about the young man who grew up Pentecostal, searched the Scriptures and studied great theologians and came to the conclusion that conservative Presbyterianism most faithfully represented biblical truth? He also used reason (private judgment). In this specific respect, there is no difference (in that we both used reason to decide which was best).

But what evidence did we evaluate? Was it the same? Some of it was, but not all of it. We both used Scriptures, reason, theologians, (possibly) Church fathers. But the Catholic also uses the evidence of material succession to determine the true Church. So at least on that point we differ.

Additionally, my submission to the Catholic Church involves an act of faith that her teaching authority is divinely protected from error. The young man selecting the Presbyterian church makes no such act of faith. He believes that she is capable of teaching error and when she does, then he will leave.

So there is a difference in the ‘selection’ process, but not one that excludes reason or private judgment from either side. As far as using reason to make a decision, we are both in the same boat.

Compare it to a man who wanted to discover the teaching authority of America and judged by reason that a particular group of the constitution party was the rightful government of America because they most faithfully reflected the founding fathers’ intentions for the government (in his judgment). Another man decides that Obama, the legislators, and duly elected judges were the rightful authorities. Was there a principled difference in the way these two men chose their authority? Is there any principled difference in their selections? They both used private judgment yes, but one used his private judgment correctly and the other used it incorrectly. The former may say to the latter “Well you also used private judgment to submit to your government.” He would be right that they both used private judgment, but wrong about thinking they were in the same boat. The latter’s position does not reduce to solo-constitutiono because he evaluated a tangible, objective, piece of evidence that is not contingent upon his private interpretation of the constitution. The former’s position is reducible to solo-constitutiono because it is entirely based on his private interpretation.
Faramir November 5th, 2009 5:07 pm :
I am currently in RCIA in part because I started asking questions about sola scriptura. One of my family members, who is a Protestant minister, gave me a copy of Mathison’s book and it was definitely a challenge to the arguments against sola scriptura I had been considering. I had assumed that sola scriptura = solo scriptura and was intrigued by Mathison’s difference – I wondered if this might be a way to answer my worries without having to go “all the way” to Rome.

Everything sounded fine with Mathison’s argument that Scripture should be interpreted by the Church using the regula fidei, but my question then became, “Where is the Church?” I was really hoping Mathison would give some set of objective criteria by which I could determine what is the true Church with the authority to interpret the Scripture. I was hoping to read, “The true Church is the church that teaches doctrines x, y, and z” or even “The true Church is the Presbyterian Church in America”. That would give me something solid and objective to investigate. Instead Mathison identifies the Church in a very vague and subjective way, and I recall it being very disappointing and anti-climactic when I read it.

I enjoyed this article very much because it clearly articulates the vague feeling of uneasiness that I had with Mathison’s argument. It states and develops as a logical argument what I felt as sort of a vague feeling of not quite being convinced. As much as I wanted it to be correct and to give me a “way out”, his vague identification of the Church left me disappointed. I also suspected that Mathison’s definition of sola scriptura was attempting to walk a fine line between solo scriptura on the one hand and full-fledged church authority on the other, and I wasn’t fully convinced that his position avoided falling into one side or the other.

I’m very glad that Dr. Mathison is interacting in the comments on this site and look forward to following the dialogue.

Bryan, I notice that this article did not deal with the sections of Mathison’s book dealing with church history and the allegations of erroneous and contradictory pronouncements that Mathison rasises. Nor do you interact with his distinction of Tradition 0/I/II/III. These may be topics for future articles, but I am your curious what your thoughts are regarding Mathison’s claim that the Catholic Church has shifted from Tradition I (sola scriptura) to Tradition II (scripture + tradition) and Tradition III (magisterium).
Tim Troutman November 5th, 2009 5:28 pm :
Chris – JJS is not arguing that the Catholic Church is not, in fact, in material succession from the apostles. He’s arguing that (or asking why not) the Catholic Church is in the same epistemic boat. Bryan showed him why this is not the case.

Person a: “Whoever I privately decide is the heir to the throne of England is the true heir.”
Person b: “Whoever is the first to touch the throne after the king dies is the true heir.”

They are not in the same epistemic boat. Person b’s criteria does not rely on private judgment like person a’s does. Person b is wrong, but he is not in the same boat as person a. The issue immediately at hand is not whether or not the Catholic Church actually has material apostolic succession nor whether material apostolic succession is a valid indication of the true Church, but whether or not we are in the same epistemic boat as Protestants. We have sufficiently shown that we are not.
JJS November 5th, 2009 5:35 pm :
Tim,

Compare it to a man who wanted to discover the teaching authority of America and judged by reason that a particular group of the constitution party was the rightful government of America because they most faithfully reflected the founding fathers’ intentions for the government (in his judgment). Another man decides that Obama, the legislators, and duly elected judges were the rightful authorities. Was there a principled difference in the way these two men chose their authority? Is there any principled difference in their selections? They both used private judgment yes, but one used his private judgment correctly and the other used it incorrectly.

Well, sure, but what if the whole issue at stake centered around whether the way we choose leaders itself is legitimate or not? And furthermore, what if some Americans believed that the whole legitimacy and authority of our government rested in the passing on of some invisible gift to the president, and NOT in merely electing someone? And what’s more, what if our country were really, really old (like 2000 years), and our entire existence hinged upon there never being a break in that link (a claim that millions of us thought was fanciful and romantic)?

You see, that’s my problem with Bryan’s language of “discovery” on the part of the Catholic of the Magisterium, it seems to assume that it is true, and that I have just failed to discover it.

Returning to your illustration, any American today would (and should) be laughed at for denying that the government we really have is the legitimate one. But in the case of the church, you have millions of people who question whether or not Rome was ever intended to be (by God) or thought to be (by the early fathers) what she claims to be today. And it’s not just Protestants, either.

So like I said before, THE main issue, namely apostolic succession, is precisely the issue that the Catholic must embrace as a result of his private judgment. And that’s why I don’t see why you claim bragging rights.
Chris Donato November 5th, 2009 5:58 pm :
I don’t get it.

You are, Tim, not unlike the rest of us, born into this fragmented world—which includes, obviously, deeply divided religious institutions. And, like the rest of us, you are forced to choose which you’d like to belong to. This is your heretical imperative. You cannot escape it. We are in epistemic communion. And I am the fellow touching your shoulder. Take your head out of the sand.
rfwhite November 5th, 2009 6:06 pm :
Bryan, glad to see you finished this piece. I look forward to reading it.
Bryan Cross November 5th, 2009 6:08 pm :
Jason,

So am I right in understanding you to be saying that there is no difference between the Catholic’s and Protestant’s process of arriving at their respective destinations, but once we’ve each landed, THEN the difference kicks in (the Protestant retains, while the Catholic surrenders, ultimate interpretive authority)?

No, that’s not what I’m saying. If the process were absolutely identical, the destination would be identical. The process is the same in one respect, but differs in another respect. The process is the same in this respect: both persons use their own power of reason, and hence their private judgment, in the investigation of the data available to them. If the convert to Protestantism encounters evidence of apostolic succession in the early Church Fathers, he discounts it as an accretion, primarily because he doesn’t see it in Scripture. When the convert to Catholicism encounters evidence of apostolic succession, he treats it as evidence of what the Apostles handed down to the early bishops. So at that point, the respective processes diverge. I’m generalizing a bit, to make the point, but the Protestant is using his assumption that if it is not taught clearly in Scripture, it isn’t part of the deposit of faith, and therefore when it is found in early Church history it must be an accretion. His presupposition regarding that form of sola scriptura forces him to adopt a stance of ecclesial deism when he encounters patristic data supporting apostolic succession. The convert to Catholicism is not bringing that assumption to the investigation. He doesn’t assume that apostolic succession in the Fathers is an accretion.

Because if so, my question now becomes, “If the Catholic’s ‘discovery’ that he is supposed to listen to the Magisterium is no less a result of his private study than the Protestant’s discovery that, as messy as it may be, Scripture is our only infallible authority, then how exactly does this furnish the Catholic with bragging rights against the Protestant?” I mean, if the initial discovery was made through private judgment, and then (and only then) is private judgment set aside, that seems problematic, not unlike the guy who favors free markets, but only after the government gives everyone a house and farm, with six acres and ten cows to begin to make their living.

We necessarily make use of private judgment in the discovery of divine authority. But once we discover that divine authority, we subordinate our own judgments to it. That’s true for Protestants and Catholics alike. The fundamental point of difference between Catholics and Protestants is that the Catholic believes he has found living divine authority in those having the succession from the Apostles, and a Sacred Tradition from the Apostles and a written form of the Word of God as the Bible, while the Protestant would not claim to have found the first two, but only the latter.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Andrew Preslar November 5th, 2009 6:21 pm :
I think that Neal and Bryan’s paper demonstrates one of the important differences between (1) being Catholic and being Protestant. Some of the discussion here is pointing to the differences between (2) becoming Catholic or remaining Protestant, or between (3) an unchurched person choosing between the Catholic Church and one among the various Protestant denominations.

Everyone seems to appreciate the difference between (1) and the other two. I suggest that there is an important difference between (2) and (3). I tried to write out what that might be, but it got all long and autobiographical, so I’ll save it for later. The second dilemma involves a much greater degree of continuity, pre- and post- conversion, and this includes the general and “irreformable” relation of all forms of Protestantism to Catholicism, than does (3).
JJS November 5th, 2009 6:23 pm :
Bryan,

Thanks for the interaction, it is helpful.

We necessarily make use of private judgment in the discovery of divine authority. But once we discover that divine authority, we subordinate our own judgments to it. That’s true for Protestants and Catholics alike. The fundamental point of difference between Catholics and Protestants is that the Catholic believes he has found living divine authority in those having the succession from the Apostles, and a Sacred Tradition from the Apostles and a written form of the Word of God as the Bible, while the Protestant would not claim to have found the first two, but only the latter.

But all that says is that the fundamental difference between a Catholic and a Protestant is that the former believes Catholic theology, while the latter doesn’t. I mean, if we’re both using our deliberative faculties, but you come to believe in the Magisterium and I do not, then I still fail to see why you get to slap yourself on the back.

If we both went to Baskin Robbins and surveyed their 31 flavors, and I chose vanilla (hey, I’m Presbyterian, remember?) and you chose Rocky Road (no hidden meaning there), we can debate the merits (ahem) of our respective choices, but I don’t see how either of us is more a company man while the latter is maverick.

Now of course, if you vow from that moment on to eat Rocky Road forever, even if they tinker with the recipe in a way that makes you a bit uncomfortable, and I make no such vow, THEN you can say that you’re a more submissive guy and I’m more of a rogue.

Now swinging back to the point under discussion, I completely agree with you that you are more submitted to your church than I am to mine. But it’s not like we both “discovered the Church’s divine authority” but I alone rejected it. No, you believe you discovered it by means of your own personal study, while my own personal study yielded a different conclusion. So the difference between you (a Catholic) and me (a Protestant) is that you adhere to Catholic theology, while I do not. And likewise, the difference between me (a Presbyterian) and James White (a Baptist) is that I adhere to Presbyterian theology while he does not.

Yes, James White and I each reached our conclusions through private judgment, but so did you.
Taylor Marshall November 5th, 2009 6:24 pm :
Great article. I hope this one makes the rounds.

One of the frustrating things about this so-called distinction between sola scriptura and solo scriptura is that “solo scriptura” is an impossibility in Latin? Does Mathison have a way of justifying the ungrammatical rendering of “solo scriptura”?

How can SOLO scriptura have any grammatical meaning?

This seems akin to other mistakes that I see here and there by well-meaning Calvinists writing wanna-be Latin such as “sola Christus” or “post tenebrus lux”.
Bryan Cross November 5th, 2009 6:24 pm :
Chris,

I don’t think the “you’ve arrived; good for you” sort of thing is helpful for resolving the disagreement. We [both sides] cannot pretend that we don’t think we have discovered something that the other side doesn’t see or get. Protestants generally think they’ve discovered that we’re justified by faith alone, and that Catholics for some reason don’t see the truth of what they [Protestants] see. So, let’s just be open with each other and move past the offense of the other person claiming to know something (or have something) that we don’t. The more helpful/constructive response to what I’ve said in these combox comments, in my opinion, is to dig into the evidence together — in this case the evidence regarding apostolic succession. “Here, Bryan, is why I think you are wrong about the Fathers on apostolic succession.” etc. Perhaps it can’t be done in a combox. Maybe we need another article just dealing with patristic evidence related to apostolic succession, where we can sort through that evidence carefully. But I think that’s the more constructive way to move forward, and I hope you agree on that point.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Matthew Anderson November 5th, 2009 6:30 pm :
Bryan and Neal,

Once one has submitted to the Roman Catholic Church, let’s say, and been sacramentally received, are there any significant epistemological or hermeneutical difficulties left for the individual within that tradition? If so, what might they be? For example, are there any significant interpretive decisions that need to be made about church teachings? Or, is everything absolutely clear? I can’t imagine the answer to that question is yes (but it could be), but I think it might be interesting to explore some of the epistemological and hermeneutical questions that remain for the intellectually sensitive Roman Catholic even after there has been a formal submission to the church.

Matthew Anderson
JJS November 5th, 2009 6:45 pm :
Taylor,

Latinus Calvinisticum es superiorum ad Latinus Catholicus. Implorum, no continua braggadorium, it’s very unbecomingum.

See? Latin’s easy, a piecem tortam.
Tim A. Troutman November 5th, 2009 6:46 pm :
Chris, do any two positions on any subject vary in epistemology? The scientist and the witch doctor evaluate the cause of a man’s illness. The scientist relies on private judgment to decide whether or not to trust the scientific method and likewise, the witch doctor relies on his private judgment to decide whether or not to trust the ‘spirits’ and the omens. Are they in the same epistemological boat just because they’re both born into a world with a lot of unknowns and rely on private judgment? This is skepticism.

It is possible, even with private judgment involved, for two positions to be on uneven epistemological ground.
Tim A. Troutman November 5th, 2009 6:55 pm :
JJS,

But all that says is that the fundamental difference between a Catholic and a Protestant is that the former believes Catholic theology, while the latter doesn’t.

See #38 – we might claim that the fundamental difference between the scientist and the witch doctor is that the former uses the scientific method without begging the question. The scientific method is both what makes him a scientist and what proves that he is more objective than the witch doctor. The Catholic method for determining the Church is both what makes a man a Catholic and what makes the Catholic choice more objective than the Protestant choice.

The Catholic method may be wrong. And we may be wrong in our estimation of it. But that’s not what we’re talking about yet. We’re just refuting the “tu quoque” idea. It seems to be the only objection raised so far.

Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we were able to convince you that there was an epistemological difference but you decided, even still – the Catholics either A) Can’t prove they have material succession or B) Material Succession is not proof of authority at all or more likely C) All of the above. Even given that, you would still be left in the same boat – sola scriptura is reducible to solo scriptura unless you or someone else has an unmentioned objection.
K. Doran November 5th, 2009 8:24 pm :
Hey Chris,

I’m glad you’re posting again! It would be a lot of fun to look at the evidence for apostolic succession and petrine ministry together. Send me an email if you’re interested!

sincerely,

K. Doran
Chris Donato November 5th, 2009 8:30 pm :
Bryan (#36) — of course not, but neither are some of the implications of what you’ve written (to resolving disagreement). Regarding the way forward, you’re not going to find much disagreement from me about apostolic succession, at least in principle. It’s how that principle has developed via Roma that’s the rub.

Also, I hope you and others realize my tone is light when I take jabs. I know I’m a smart ass, but I don’t intend to be a jerk.

Finally, Tim (#39): You’ve hit it on the head — This is skepticism. Welcome to the real world.
Matt Yonke November 5th, 2009 9:14 pm :
I think there’s an approach to this from a slightly different angle that might help to clarify the “distinction without difference” problem a lot of our Protestant readers seem to have.

That approach would start with the understanding of the Church as the Body of Christ. When the Body of Christ was on earth incarnate and fully present, how did He demand allegiance and how was that allegiance given? Jesus told people, give up everything and come follow me. He didn’t lay out a ten point plan, He didn’t tell the disciples what was going on and ask if they could think about it, see if it jived with their worldview and come back tomorrow to tell Him if they could get on board. He required them to believe a lot of weird stuff and follow Him.

It seems to me that the Protestant approach to accepting the Christian faith and choosing a Church is akin to a prospective disciple who said to Jesus, “Alright, give me a list of propositions, I’ll see if they check out with my understanding of Scripture and get back to you.”

The response of the Catholic is to realize that the Mystical Body of Christ on earth, the Catholic Church, has the words of eternal life, so we drop our nets and follow.

Now, we certainly try to make sense out of some of the baffling things Jesus said, but we don’t follow because the propositions check out.

Put another way, we don’t follow a list of propositions, we follow a source of propositions. The Church to us is not the ecclesial body most in line with the truth as we understand it, but the body that gives us the truth that we accept because we trust the source.

I would also submit that the way we Catholics got to believing this truth was not a simple measuring of Catholic doctrine against reason and Scripture. There is a deeper act of faith involved that makes it truly different than the Protestant embracing one system of doctrine or another. Particularly because the Protestant could switch systems of doctrine tomorrow without undergoing a radical change to the basis of his faith.

A way to sum this up might be to look at the reason C.S. Lewis eventually gave for not becoming Catholic before he got to Heaven ;) That was, not that he didn’t believe anything the Catholic Church taught now, but that he couldn’t commit himself to believing what the Catholic Church might teach tomorrow.
Jonathan Brumley November 5th, 2009 11:36 pm :
Hi Bryan,

Thank you for another thought provoking article.

You said:

“Maybe we need another article just dealing with patristic evidence related to apostolic succession, where we can sort through that evidence carefully.”

I am looking forward to that article. I am very skeptical that divine authority was somehow passed down 2000 years through a succession of men who ordained each other – possibly sometimes for ill reasons. I would like to see what evidence you have that God has protected the Church in this way.
Tom Brown November 6th, 2009 2:11 am :
Dear Pastor Stellman,

With the risk that further discussion of the “distinction without a difference” problem detracts from Neal’s and Bryan’s primary arguments in mind, I will take a stab:

“But all that says is that the fundamental difference between a Catholic and a Protestant is that the former believes Catholic theology, while the latter doesn’t.”

This misses Bryan’s point about discerning (with private judgment, yes, of course) divine revelation and divine authority. The Catholic is not Catholic because he “believes Catholic theology.” The Catholic is Catholic because he believes it is the visible Church vested with the authority of Christ and graced with divine revelation and preserved from error. He believes Catholic theology because he is Catholic.

“I mean, if we’re both using our deliberative faculties, but you come to believe in the Magisterium and I do not, then I still fail to see why you get to slap yourself on the back.”

I think we try hard on Called to Communion to avoid back-slapping. In a discussion of the body of divine revelation and the location of divine authority, this site exists to discuss/debate/wrestle with our reaching different conclusions following the efforts of our respective deliberative faculties. With [all of] our prayers, and God’s grace, this is not a lost cause. But I hope you can see the difference Bryan has been making between reaching the conclusion that Catholic theology is right, and reaching the conclusion that Catholic authority is authoritative.

Peace in Christ,
Tom
Bryan Cross November 6th, 2009 2:45 am :
Jason,

I wrote:

The fundamental point of difference between Catholics and Protestants is that the Catholic believes he has found living divine authority in those having the succession from the Apostles, and a Sacred Tradition from the Apostles and a written form of the Word of God as the Bible, while the Protestant would not claim to have found the first two, but only the latter.

You replied:

But all that says is that the fundamental difference between a Catholic and a Protestant is that the former believes Catholic theology, while the latter doesn’t.

No, that’s not all it says. Your redescription of what I said reductively eliminates some of the relevant content of what I said. I’m not simply saying that the Protestant believes Protestant theology, and the Catholic believes Catholic theology. The person becoming Catholic does not just come to believe a theology; he discovers a living divinely-appointed authority, and that discovery then shapes his theology. The person becoming Protestant does not discover such a thing, and so remains his own ultimate interpretive authority in shaping his theology. This difference has nothing to do with back-slapping; it is simply the reason why the Catholic is not subject to the tu quoque objection, in response to our argument that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura with respect to the holder of ultimate interpretive authority.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
JJS November 6th, 2009 4:02 am :
Tom,

You can just call me “Jason.”

The Catholic is not Catholic because he “believes Catholic theology.” The Catholic is Catholic because he believes it is the visible Church vested with the authority of Christ and graced with divine revelation and preserved from error. He believes Catholic theology because he is Catholic.

I think I need to just give up, because we’ve been talking about this for over a year and I still can’t see your point.

You say that “The Catholic is Catholic [not because he believes Catholic theology, but] because he believes it is the visible Church vested with the authority of Christ and graced with divine revelation and preserved from error.” But isn’t the belief that “the visible Church is vested with the authority of Christ and graced with divine revelation and preserved from error” itself Catholic theology? Isn’t that the WHOLE ISSUE that we disagree on?

So when you say that “the Catholic believes Catholic theology because he is a Catholic,” I scratch my head in bewilderment. As Bryan has repeatedly said, the convert to Rome doesn’t surrender private interpretive judgment until he has joined the church, but uses it in order to “discover a living divinely-appointed authority, and that discovery then shapes his theology.” So at the most crucial stage in the game, namely, when you are reading the Scriptures and the fathers about apostolic succession and weighing all the evidence against the Protestantism that you are now beginning to doubt, you are admittedly not yet submitted to Rome, but are still in the deliberative, investigative stage. Now regardless of which road you take (to Rome or Geneva), the decision you make is NOT made out of deference to a Magisterium, since you’re not yet convinced of its authority. Sure, once you are, you bow to it. But first you must make that determination, that “discovery.” So my question is, what constitutes it a “discovery” (which is good) rather than a something you reject? It can’t be the case that you come to believe that the Magisterium is the Magisterium because it says it is (else I’ve got a bridge to sell you). And it has already been stated that it’s not a leap into the dark. So the only other option that I can see is that you came to believe that the Magisterium demands your submission because you weighed the evidence and found it satisfactory and in accord with your private interpretation of the facts as you understand them.

So putting aside the differences between us once we’ve chosen our road (since I’ve admitted that you’re way more submitted to your church than I am to mine), I see no difference between the way we each come to make our respective decisions.

Please tell me what I’m missing, because it seems that you are every bit as subject to the tu quoque objection as we are.
Keith Mathison November 6th, 2009 8:32 am :
I’m still working my way through the main article, but had to comment on one thing in the comments thread:

Taylor,

You wrote (#35): “One of the frustrating things about this so-called distinction between sola scriptura and solo scriptura is that “solo scriptura” is an impossibility in Latin? Does Mathison have a way of justifying the ungrammatical rendering of “solo scriptura”? How can SOLO scriptura have any grammatical meaning? This seems akin to other mistakes that I see here and there by well-meaning Calvinists writing wanna-be Latin such as “sola Christus” or “post tenebrus lux”.

Three quick points:

1. I didn’t come up with this term. Doug Jones coined it.
2. Jones knows (and I know) that it’s not grammatically correct. It was a tongue in cheek idea he had.
3. At least it’s not as dull as Heiko Oberman’s terms – Tradition I, Tradition II, and Tradition III. :-)

Back to the paper…

Keith
Bryan Cross November 6th, 2009 9:52 am :
Jason,

The tu quoque we address in our article is not “You too used private judgment to come to your position”. That’s not the point in question, because no one denies it. The tu quoque is “You too retain ultimate interpretive authority.” That’s the objection, I think, that in our article we have shown to be false.

You might have in mind another tu quoque, namely, “you too are an ecclesial consumerist.” That’s the impression I’m getting from your following statement:

So the only other option that I can see is that you came to believe that the Magisterium demands your submission because you weighed the evidence and found it satisfactory and in accord with your private interpretation of the facts as you understand them.

If that’s the tu quoque you have in mind, then perhaps that explains why we’re talking past each other.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Trevor Britton November 6th, 2009 10:00 am :
Hi, this is my first post here. I have really enjoyed reading the articles here at Called to Communion.

I have been reading the tu quoque discussion and been trying to make sure I understand it clearly. It seems to me that the important point is what type of decision is being made after the investigation, not how it is made. Both sides use their reason, etc., but the person who becomes Catholic discovers an authority and so submits to it. The person who decides on a specific protestant tradition discovers a tradition that agrees with or convinces them of its doctrine (not its authority). Tu toque would apply if the person becoming Catholic was also discovering a tradition and only being convinced of its doctrinal correctness and not its authority. Is that the correct distinction?
Matthew Anderson November 6th, 2009 10:10 am :
Jason,

I’m actually an evangelical Anglican, but my sense is that a Catholic could respond to you by saying that the process by which we come to our decisions between Catholicism or Protestantism is much the same, but the end result is different. So, yes, both sides weigh evidence, consider arguments, make individual judgements, etc., but the Catholic position entails additional epistemological security once the decision has been made to become Catholic. I think I would grant that.

But, I would add that claims to epistemological security are not a guarantee of truth. The Church of Latter Day Saints and many other institutions and religious traditions through the ages have offered a greater sense of epistemological security to their followers, and we all know this doesn’t mean that what they teach is true. As far as I can tell, the Roman Catholic tradition does offer a greater measure of epistemological security than the Protestant tradition, but that doesn’t guarantee it to be true. Obvious, but I wanted to point it out.

Knowledgeable Protestants or Orthodox Christians find that whatever epistemological security is offered through the papacy and Catholic magisterium, and however appealing it may be, it is on offer at too high a cost. I might say that to take refuge in this security would be theologically speaking a “Pyhrric victory,” in that it would require me to accept doctrines that appear clearly unbiblical (e.g. the perpetual sinlessness of Mary), doctrines that feel theologically dangerous (e.g. eucharistic adoration of the transubstantiated host), or doctrines that appear to contradict historical facts (e.g. the infallibility and exclusive supremacy of the Pope). Of course, my Catholic friends assure me that all of these kinds of questions can be answered. But I’ve too often found that what is driving the answers they provide is not objective historical research or cogent theological explanation, but the very thing under discussion: the desire for increased epistemological security.

Perhaps one day God will grant me to see the truth they claim to have found. Or perhaps one day I will more fully supplement my theology with the aspects of catholic ecclesiology found in Orthodoxy or even Anglo-Catholicism. In the meantime, I’ve found the safest place to rest is what I believe is the most certain and non-negotiable core of the Christian tradition, the holy Scriptures. If they fail the church, no amount of ecclesiological scaffolding can save her, in my view.

Lord have mercy.
Sean November 6th, 2009 10:33 am :
Tu toque would apply if the person becoming Catholic was also discovering a tradition and only being convinced of its doctrinal correctness and not its authority. Is that the correct distinction?

That is a good distinction. Its been discussed before that somebody becoming Catholic because they agree with Catholic doctrines X, Y and Z but do not submit to the authority of the Church would be becoming Catholic for the wrong reasons.
K. Doran November 6th, 2009 10:51 am :
Hi Matthew,

You said: “doctrines that appear to contradict historical facts (e.g. the infallibility and exclusive supremacy of the Pope). Of course, my Catholic friends assure me that all of these kinds of questions can be answered. But I’ve too often found that what is driving the answers they provide is not objective historical research or cogent theological explanation, but the very thing under discussion: the desire for increased epistemological security.”

I think one thing that can help you here is to realize that the most important first step in analyzing historical data relating to a particular doctrine (such as the petrine ministry) is to look at the general relationship in the data. There will always be outliers from this general relationship because of many reasons: the insufficiency of language, the indeterminacy of intentions, large gaps in the historical record, corruptions in the historical record, etc. When the data is particularly solid (as it is for some of the counter-examples against Mormon beliefs, as I understand it) then it is good to place considerable weight on supposed contradictions of a doctrine. But when the data that makes up a supposed contradiction of the petrine doctrines is sparse, ambiguous, and interpretable in many different ways, then a reasonable person will interpret that data in light of the general relationship found in all of the data. To rely on outliers for your historical defense of doctrine is to court falsehood.

A great example is non-papal anglo-catholic historians arguing in favor of (and indeed, perhaps basing their entire early defense of) their ecclesiology by relying on Cyprian’s theologically-incorrect temper tantrum in favor of re-baptism of those baptized by heretics. This episode is an outlier relative to the pattern of other writers from the first 350 years of Christianity, and furthermore to interpret Cyprian’s actions here without reference to his pro-papal comments elsewhere makes it even more of an outlier. Thus, it makes more sense to interpret his actions in light of his own pro-papal comments elsewhere, and in light of the general tilt of the other papal data of the first 350 years. When one does, it is certainly no contradiction of the Catholic claim that there was some form of petrine ministry in the early Church. We are certainly not obliged by the limited data to interpret the Cyprianic evidence in a manner that contradicts the Catholic claim. There is indeed so little data that the data isn’t capable of obliging us to interpret it one way or another! This makes me unsympathetic to the claim that outliers such as Cyprian’s temper tantrum can only be surmounted by ignoring the “clear” evidence that they provide against papal claims. They don’t provide clear evidence for or against any doctrine at all — to the extent that they provide any evidence, it is through interpreting them in light of the other data, which makes them weak evidence in favor of Catholic claims, not strong evidence against them.

Do you see what I am getting at? You said: “Lord have mercy.” You sound sad and dejected about the prospects of more certainty.

But maybe one way He will have mercy on you is for you to see that the supposed contradictions of the petrine ministry in early Christianity have been advanced without reference to the usual requirements of data analysis: careful recognition of the general relationship, humility towards the epistemic usefulness of outliers, humility towards areas of the data where the observations are sparse and hence the models that can be rejected are few, etc. If any of this is helpful, just send me an email and we can talk about the things that make you feel that the Catholic Church is an impossibility for you: KBDh02@yahoo.com

Sincerely,

K. Doran

p.s Sorry CTCers for not directing people back more closely to the topic at hand. I will do my best to let the discussion continue without my interruptions now!
Bryan Cross November 6th, 2009 10:55 am :
Matthew,

Welcome to Called to Communion.

As far as I can tell, the Roman Catholic tradition does offer a greater measure of epistemological security than the Protestant tradition, but that doesn’t guarantee it to be true.

If there is no guarantee of truth, then there is no “epistemological security.” You also wrote:

I might say that to take refuge in this security would be theologically speaking a “Pyhrric victory,” in that it would require me to accept doctrines that appear clearly unbiblical (e.g. the perpetual sinlessness of Mary), doctrines that feel theologically dangerous (e.g. eucharistic adoration of the transubstantiated host), or doctrines that appear to contradict historical facts (e.g. the infallibility and exclusive supremacy of the Pope). Of course, my Catholic friends assure me that all of these kinds of questions can be answered. But I’ve too often found that what is driving the answers they provide is not objective historical research or cogent theological explanation, but the very thing under discussion: the desire for increased epistemological security.

Your claim here amounts to one long ad hominem. I have addressed that in more detail here. As for whether those uniquely Catholic doctrines are “unbiblical,” we’ll have to save that for another thread, because it would take us down multiple rabbit trails to address them here. But, we will be discussing each of these subjects, in due time.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
David November 6th, 2009 11:13 am :
Taylor,

We could all try nuda scriptura!

Dr. Mathison, glad you’re in the mix here; Bryan, thanks for the article – you had mentioned a few months ago hat this was forthcoming and I am grateful for your work on the subject.

It seems to me that lurking beneath the surface of the assertions against (a properly understood)sola scriptura is a form of the Augustinian Totus Christus – from which some might derive a doctrine of ecclesial infallibility (which for the ultramontanists becomes in the long run Papal infallibility), the attributes the Head being transferred to the Body, or at least to the ‘successors’ of the Apostles founding the Body. The ‘proposed discovery’ of an ‘authority’ suggests in fact an ‘infallible’ authority on these issues. But does Christ promise an infallible Church? Or is it more a case of a fallible Church given grace to recognize the words of the Apostles in written form as infallible and thus possessing the authority to be the regulators of what is claimed to be ‘traditioned’ to us from the apostles?

It is the notion of apostolic succession and the nature of infallible authority supposedly passed to these successors to the Apostles which is the central issue. Answer that question in one or the other, and everything else tends to line up for debate in a different context (i.e., between RCC and EO on various spheres and nature of apostolic succession, Marian Dogmas, etc).

Perhaps we might wish to consider the idea of a fallible community capable of infallible pronouncements. Simply because any mom can make an infallible statement regarding her child does not mean the mom is infallible on all matters concerning her child – or her husband. One might say that Mom made an infallible judgment on what constitutes Scripture – a judgment ratified by Council but made in practice by all the Church – and that this infallible reception of infallible and inspired words recognizes these words as the ultimate and infallible authoritative standard to resolve disputes as they arise for it is the sole source of infallible revelation. This does not do away with ‘lower courts’, and it places Scripture within Tradition as opposed to it coming alongside Tradition, pitting one against the other. It would also guard against the imposition of Dogmas not found in Scripture (and I note dogmas as opposed to traditions, various pietistic practices and beliefs, etc).

Now obviously this gets into the question of which Council affirms what and when, and one suspects that this discussion will go on for some time…but it is a good discussion.
Teri November 6th, 2009 11:14 am :
From a female prospective – believing that my Bridegroom, who says He is The KING of Kings and LORD of Lords, would leave me with a book of His instructions but no one to explain them to me correctly is absurd. That is not love, much less agape love.

A Kingdom presupposes a King and He did not abdicate His throne, nor did He leave His Bride unprotected until His promised return. How cruel of a Bridegroom who would have His beloved Bride searching door to door for someone to explain truthfully His words to prepare her for His return.

Maybe I’m being a simple minded and terribly “female romantic”, but if my King did not leave anyone to look out for me until His return, then He doesn’t love me. If He told me that the gates of Hell would not prevail against His Church, which is His Bride, then I have faith in HIM for all things.

In the peace of Christ,
Teri
Matthew Anderson November 6th, 2009 11:43 am :
Bryan,

To be fair, my paragraph that you cite above does not amount to one long ad hominem. If I grant there is an ad hominem in the paragraph, it is the second part of it. I will take your thoughts seriously about that, but the first part of the paragraph involves my conviction that each of those three doctrines is significantly problematic for different reasons, and this can be clearly distinguished from ad hominem argumentation. And I can say that I’ve not been convinced by the Catholic responses that I’ve heard to these matters and others like them.

By the way, do you feel it is necessary to argue that all Catholic doctrines are in any significant sense “biblical”? Wouldn’t it be a legitimate Catholic approach simply to say that not all doctrines of the Catholic Church are found in Scripture? I’m not saying that every Catholic has to take that approach, but wouldn’t it be acceptable to hold that position?

Matthew
T Ciatoris November 6th, 2009 11:50 am :
Dear Bryan,

I wonder if I might try slightly recasting Matthew’s argument (“As far as I can tell, the Roman Catholic tradition does offer a greater measure of epistemological security than the Protestant tradition, but that doesn’t guarantee it to be true”). When he refers to “epistemological security”, I take him to mean “subjective certainty or epistemological confidence.” If I’m right about this, then he is making the same point as you made at Principium Unitatis: certainty and truth are not the same thing, so a reduction of desire for truth to desire for certainty is not a legitimate move to make. (Thanks for the link, by the way. I’d had the same fundamental objection to McKnight’s article.) As you say, the status of the doctrines Matthew finds untenable should be addressed elsewhere. But his point is a good one, IF the Catholic’s alleged desire for truth is in fact a desire for certainty. A person who finds doctrines X, Y, and Z untenable (for whatever reason) should not acquiesce to them out of a mere desire for certainty that he believes can be fulfilled through the Magisterium. If, however, submission to the Magisterium comes about through a search for TRUTH and not merely because it seems to offer more subjective certitude than anything else on the market, then he MUST accept doctrines X, Y, and Z.

To return to more central points in the article, I’d like to echo the pleas of several comments for a clarification from those who wish to disagree with Bryan and Neal’s article. First, the article claims that there is no principled difference between *sola scriptura* and *solo scriptura*, and I’ve yet to see anybody challenge that. Would anybody like to? Second, the arguments about the tu quoque objection have proceeded as though the objection addressed by Bryan and Neal had been, “You Catholics also are inescapably bound to private judgment.” I don’t think that’s the point. Of course Catholics are bound to private judgment (though the content of a Catholic’s private judgment vis-a-vis the relationship between Scripture, Tradition, Church, and one’s personal reasoning on a given doctrine will differ from the content of a Protestant’s personal judgment about these). But, unless I’m mistaken, Bryan and Neal simply rebut the objection, “There is no principled difference between Catholic epistemology and solo scriptura.” I haven’t seen anybody challenge that directly.

in Christ,

TC
Matthew Anderson November 6th, 2009 11:54 am :
K. Doran,

Thanks for your comments. If I agreed that the evidence against the *Roman Catholic* doctrine of the papacy is as insignificant as you say, then of course it would be insignificant. My reading of early church literature has not led me to such a conclusion. But, I would be interested in hearing more of your thoughts about it, and will email you.

Matthew
Chris Donato November 6th, 2009 1:06 pm :
Not wanting to bog down this great article and its thread with sidetrails (in anticipation of Keith’s engagement), I’ve attempted to say something relevant with respect to epistemological certainty (security) over here.

Thanks.
Neal Judisch November 6th, 2009 1:18 pm :
Hello, all.

It’s gratifying to see the discussion this article has sparked. I’m unfortunately pretty busy just now and likely won’t being playing any very large role in this thread, but I wanted to respond to some of the remarks that have been lodged so far, especially those that have been voiced by more than one participant.

It seems the main issue so far has centered on the question whether there is parity between Catholics and Protestants along one or more of the points at which Bryan and I have criticized Protestantism. One form of the question concerns whether Catholics and Protestants as such are in the same ‘epistemic situation’, whether they’re (to use Chris’ memorable phrase) in ‘epistemic communion’. Another form takes up the question whether Catholic converts, in coming to accept the claims of the Catholic Church on the basis of their own reasoning, studies, or whatever (as of course they must), have done pretty much the same thing that any Protestant who’s moved from (say) mainline evangelicalism into a confessionally Reformed communion has done. And if so, it’s a nice and pressing question whether this implies that an affirmative answer to the first question should be given, i.e. that the current (post-conversional) ‘epistemic situations’ of Catholic and Protestant are equivalent.

Take the second one first. To put my cards on the table, I must say that this rejoinder is exactly the one I’d use (and, in fact, did for a time use) if I were a Protestant. Sounds pretty good, pretty damning. I don’t (no longer do) find it very persuasive, but I still find myself dissatisfied by my attempts to articulate why precisely I don’t think parity holds here. But maybe someone here can help me get clearer about this. So let me try to do it indirectly, less by argument and more by way of hopefully suggestive analogy.

Suppose you’re a presuppositionalist, and are extolling the superiority of what we can call ‘the Christian worldview’ over alternative, non-Christian worldviews. And suppose that among the reasons you find the Christian one superior and much more epistemically satisfying is that you’re not (as a presuppositionalist Christian) in the unenviable position of having to think ‘autonomously’, having to be an epistemic egoist, etc., but are now able to think in some sense “according to” the Scriptures. You’re now under an epistemic authority (a legitimate one) whereas before you weren’t. And you’re no longer saddled with systems of thought (‘worldviews’) that contain internal contradictions or evidently irresolvable tensions, and which inevitably rely upon bits and pieces of the Christian worldview that have to be borrowed from it so as to prop up the internally unstable non-Christian ones.

We can imagine a critic of presuppositionalism arguing like this.

Compare the ‘epistemic situations’ of two persons, Bertie and Clive. Both of them are atheists, but they decide to make a study of Scripture, historical theology, etc., and both of them (let’s add) make a reasonably thorough study of folks like Schaffer and Van Til and Bahnsen and Frame and whoever else you’d like to name. At the end of the process Bertie remains unconvinced and doesn’t convert. Clive, however, is impressed by the extent to which his previous ‘worldview’ has coming crashing down about his ears, aghast at the previously unseen or unacknowledged tensions and contradictions within his system, and has decided that Christianity does in fact deliver a uniquely coherent and satisfying worldview against which the gates of hell won’t prevail. The Spirit does His work, Clive is baptized, and spends the better part of his life as a committed and (let’s add) confessionally Reformed/presuppositionalist Christian.

But here’s what the critic says. “It’s clear that Bertie and Clive are in the same ‘epistemic situation’ still, because Clive had to use his ‘autonomous’ reason in an effort to figure out whether he should accept Christianity, and he had to do this to the same extent that Bertie did. Bertie comes down on one side of the question, Clive the other. But that hardly implies that there is any difference between Bertie and Clive’s current ‘epistemic situations’, for despite their differences in judgment they both necessarily deployed their autonomous reasoning capacities in the act of judgment itself. So the claim that Clive is now under an epistemic authority and Bertie is not is not defensible. Clive and Bertie are autonomous thinkers to the same degree, and if Clive protests to the contrary he’d better get his head out of the sand.”

I’ll leave the presuppositionalists (or others) to explain why the critic’s criticism misfires. My guess is that it misfires because it fails to understand that Clive, but not Bertie, hasn’t simply come to a conclusion that has left him constitutionally unaffected (epistemically speaking), but has actually undergone something like an ‘epistemic restructuring’ or ‘reconfirguring’ (in some sense), which entails a significant change in his doxastic practices. But however that may be, the point is that the presuppositionalist’s dissatisfaction with this analysis of Clive’s epistemic situation (vis-à-vis Bertie’s) is, I think, the Catholic’s dissatisfaction with the analysis that his epistemic situation is no different from that of sola (or solo) proponents. Not so, I think.

Let’s extend (just quickly) the presuppositionalist analogy.

It’s worth noting that the article we’ve written is taken up primarily with a presentation of Mathison’s fine refutation of solo scriptura, and an explanation as to why we agree that solo is not biblical, historically and practically problematic, etc. This constitutes (should I even say it in this context?) ‘common ground’ between us and Reformed folks like Mathison. What concerns us is that Mathison’s position (which was the position I previously held) looks to contain a number of internal tensions and conflicts, which are difficult satisfactorily to resolve given the confessional tools at his disposal and the constraints imposed on his theorizing by the pertinent Reformed commitments he must uphold. We find instead that sola scriptura evidently stepwise-reduces to solo scriptura, and that the problems with solo may be directed with apparently equal force against sola. We find that a good number of the arguments aimed at distinguishing solo from sola, and which aim at justifying the conclusion that Catholicism amounts to its own version of solo scriptura (‘sola ecclesia’), either do not work or contain suppressed premises that, after some consideration, we find ourselves unable to discover. We notice that a number of these tensions disappear if we drop sola scriptura in either of its permutations and adopt a position that would justifiably allow us to treat external interpretive authority as de facto irreformable and infallible, rather than insisting that they really aren’t either of these things, but either (a) going ahead and treating them as if they were, or (b) refusing so to treat them, and finding ourselves stuck (de facto) with solo scriptura. (The adopted position in question treats the authority as irreformable and infallible de jure.) We notice, in other words, that a pretty nice presuppositionalist-style case can be made against sola scriptura, and can lead a person to consider afresh the Catholic alternative.

(Before anyone says it: no, the ‘alternative’ isn’t “tension-free,” and no, not everything becomes automatically clear and so forth, not in my experience at any rate.)

Last remark before I have to go away. It might be worthwhile to consider the notion of authority more closely, specifically as it relates to the question of individual autonomy, the conditions under which it is justified, and what’s entailed by submission to an authority. Has anyone read Joseph Raz’s influential book, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford 1986)? It’s a ‘modern classic’ in political philosophy, and it contains a defense of the authority of the state which is supposed to reconcile political authority with individual autonomy under the strictures imposed by a modern liberal perspective. (This entails among other things that state authority derives, bottom up, from the authority of the autonomous [consenting] self, because the authority of self-over-self is really [according to modern liberalism] the only non-derivative authority. Both Catholics and Reformed will reject that presupposition, but there’s lots of other stuff he says that doesn’t rest upon it.)

Bypassing questions about the conditions under which the individual is justified in submitting to authority, there are a couple of features of authoritative directives that are worth thinking about. The first is ‘content-independence’. And what this condition says is roughly that an authoritative directive is one that gives the subject a reason to follow the directive, which is such that there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason. In other words, within certain limits, the authority’s authority doesn’t depend on the content of the directives issued by the authority, and that the subject has reason (second-order reasons) to obey the directive irrespective of its content. (This is necessary but not sufficient for a directive to be authoritative, because things like threats, advice of experts, etc. may also satisfy this condition at times, but ‘experts’ are not ipso facto authorities.) The second interesting thesis for our purposes is the ‘preemption thesis’. What this one says, roughly, is that the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is reason for its performance that replaces (preempts, trumps) whatever other reasons the subject may have to perform it. It does not simply add another, additional reason to the set of reasons subjects may already possess to do something, but (as it were) ‘replaces’ those reasons in the sense that it becomes the reason for which the submitting subject acts.

It’s interesting to apply these to questions about religious and epistemic authority. I won’t try to do this here since I don’t have the time, but here’s some fodder for discussion anyway: one might think that the Catholic’s epistemic situation entails that what the Church tells him to believe or do ‘preempts’ his other reasons for believing and doing those things. And it might be that the Catholic’s epistemic situation entails that what the Church tells him to believe or do provides him with reason to believe and do these things irrespective of the content of the directives or dogmas promulgated by the Catholic Church. And it may be that these things do not hold in the case of the Protestant’s epistemic situation. From this latter perspective, to the extent the Church (denomination, communion) has (apostolic) authority, it is because (and only because) of the content of the Church’s directives and dogmas – in particular, it’s exclusively about whether the Church’s teachings and decrees faithfully reflect those of the apostles’ (e.g.). Moreover, it might be that the Church couldn’t give reasons to believe or do something in a preemptive way, on Protestantism, since the Protestant’s submission to authority is going to depend at least in part upon whether he agrees that the authority in question deserves to be considered ‘the Church’, a question that cannot be answered without reference to the individual’s (Biblical-)interpretive stance. (Note well: this isn’t to say that a Protestant cannot accept something “just because” the WCF says so; I think he can. But in this case it will likely be because, in so many other and perhaps more central areas, the WCF says things he finds to be uniquely in conformity with Scripture. In this case, plausibly, the WCF and the divines who wrote it are being viewed as legitimate and trustworthy experts; but expertise isn’t the same as authority in the sense defined, as noted above.) We may then want to try to tighten up our discussion of authority by considering conditions/theses along these lines, and then move to a comparative analysis of religious and epistemic authority from the Protestant and Catholic perspectives.

Again, just some fodder for discussion. Thanks for letting me think aloud a bit. I’ll return at some point to see what you’ve made of all this, but (again) I can’t promise a lot of prolonged interaction just now.

Much love and so forth,

Neal
Bryan Cross November 6th, 2009 2:26 pm :
Matthew,

What I find methodologically unhelpful [with respect to ecumenical efforts] is the mere assertion [without substantiation] that Catholic doctrines are “unbiblical,” and then the dismissal of arguments explaining in what way these doctrines are biblical, as merely a rationalization aimed at obtaining “epistemological security.” That methodology, in my opinion, is not charitable. It assumes that one’s interlocutor loves something else [i.e certainty] more than he or she loves truth.

And I can say that I’ve not been convinced by the Catholic responses that I’ve heard to these matters and others like them.

What we need to be doing [in ecumenical dialogue] is not substituting self-referring statements for presentations of arguments, evidence, objections, etc. Many people found Jesus’ claims unconvincing. But their remaining unconvinced by Jesus’ statements tells us nothing (positively or negatively) about whether what Jesus said was true. The focus of ecumenical dialogue, if it is to advance, must be on that which is external to us, i.e. the truth of claims, the cogency of arguments, the coherence of positions, etc., not on our own internal state.

By the way, do you feel it is necessary to argue that all Catholic doctrines are in any significant sense “biblical”? Wouldn’t it be a legitimate Catholic approach simply to say that not all doctrines of the Catholic Church are found in Scripture? I’m not saying that every Catholic has to take that approach, but wouldn’t it be acceptable to hold that position?

First, just to be clear, my decisions and positions are not primarily the result of feelings, nor do I think they should be. Advancing in ecumenical dialogue would be impossible if we each followed our feelings, because rational discourse requires the use of reason. Second, there is an ambiguity in the term ‘unbiblical,’ for which reason, in my opinion, the term should be avoided. The term can mean “not stated in the Bible” or it can mean “contrary to what is stated in the Bible.” If we wish to mean only that some doctrine is not stated in Scripture (or not stated clearly in Scripture), then we should use the term ‘extra-biblical.’ Otherwise, we’re implying by connotation that the other person is contradicting Scripture. You are correct that a Catholic may believe that some Catholic doctrines are not taught explicitly in Scripture.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
JJS November 6th, 2009 2:50 pm :
Tu toque [sic] would apply if the person becoming Catholic was also discovering a tradition and only being convinced of its doctrinal correctness and not its authority. Is that the correct distinction?

Yes, I think that is a correct distinction, but what I can’t get past is the fact that what makes Catholic authority actually authoritative is a set of ecclesiological tenets, and if one does not share them, he will look at the so-called authority of the Magisterium and reject it. In other words, without a proper doctrine of the church, one cannot even recognize the Magisterium’s authority in the first place.

And as I’ve been saying all along, if the initial “swallowing of the red [Catholic] pill” is due to the same kind of deliberative and investigative process as the “swallowing of the blue [Protestant] one,” then what’s the big deal? I mean, what if I joined a cult of people who believe their leader is not the vicar of Jesus, but Jesus himself, and I vow allegiance to him and will not refuse a single command he gives me? Could I not then look at Catholics and Protestants as being kind of the same, since they both are only partially submissive to their respective leaders?
Tim A. Troutman November 6th, 2009 3:20 pm :
Jason,

what I can’t get past is the fact that what makes Catholic authority actually authoritative is a set of ecclesiological tenets, and if one does not share them, he will look at the so-called authority of the Magisterium and reject it.

And if one is an atheist, he will reject Christ’s authority because his world view does not allow for divine authority at all (much less in a man). So the atheist has to adopt a Christian world view before he can accept Christ’s authority. A Protestant must accept a Catholic ecclesiology before he can submit to the Church. It’s just the nature of the game.
Jared Brattoli November 6th, 2009 5:26 pm :
Maybe this aspect can add to the discussion…Would spiritual orientation/direction influence which epistemology a person carries? A strong part of me feels that the distinction over epistemologies is not enough because, for me, it wasn’t merely my intellectual recognition of the Catholic epistemology which made me discover the Catholic Church as being what she says she is.

Consider…

In order to discover which kind of ecclesiology is necessary for the Church, it is first necessary to discover the nature of authority which Christ invested into his Church before he went away for a little while. But, before it is even possible to fully comprehend the nature of that authority, one must truly and intimately comprehend the nature of the spirit of Christ–that is, what is the character of the servent of God within the body of Christ and community of the kingdom God, who participates in the building of that kingdom for the glory of God. In other words, before one can understand the nature of the authority of the Church, one must first understand what it is to submit as a servent to authority as Christ did–not merely intillectually, but spiritually and existentially. Besides the clear epistemic difference between the Catholic and Protestant positions, a deeper issue lies close at hand, and that is the spiritual virtue which accompanies the different empistemology of the Catholic and Protestant. In my own experience, and the experiences of many Catholic converts, the most significant aspect of our conversions was not so much the epistemology by which we arrived at our private conclusions, as important as that is, but primarily the virtue of Christ which we have grown to understand and experience as we moved along in our persuit of Christ and our knowldge of Him–which helped us grasp that empistemology. For my own part, I found the Catholic Church more favorable and necessary for my continuing spiritual developement because as I was growing more intimate with Christ I began to see why such and such teachings were necessary, not only for my spiritual health, but the health of the whole Church. My mindset evolved from a centerdness on my own spiritual welfare to that of the body, and only then did I discover that I was not an individual in relationship to Christ, but a small part of something much larger than myself–a very small part. I for the first time entered out of myself and into Christ, at least in a deeper way. And since that time I have learned that Christ is experienced and known in the Catholic Church in ways that are for the most part near impossible in any other communal context, i.e. Protestantism–I, at least, was not able to find it there; it was way off radar. As I entered the Catholic communion I was for the first time submitting to Christ in the most complete way(at least more complete than it was previously), and the peace and joy which accompanied that decision assured me that I was. I went from being my own authority as an individaul existing among other individuals in what was so called “church”, to a servant devoutly submitted to the authority of Christ which I could only truly find within the bosom of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.

I think there is more which can be said concerning this particular point, but I think I have explained myslef decently.

In Christ,
Jared B
Nathan November 6th, 2009 7:54 pm :
Jason,

Is there a principled difference between rejecting the apostolic message (and consequently Christ himself) on the basis of (an interpretation of) scripture and a rejection of apostolic succession on the same basis? In other words, what’s the difference between my arguing against Paul or Peter vs. arguing against Timothy, Titus, Linus, Ignatius, et. al.?
Tom Brown November 6th, 2009 9:07 pm :
Dear Jason (the honorfic was always meant with respect, by the way),

I think Matthew’s response generally aligned with what I want to communicate. Please don’t give up, and thank you for this discussion. I benefit, and I think it helps ‘place’ where a helpful Reformed-Catholic discussion should occur.

I admit that I was using “Catholic theology” in a narrow sense—not in the fullest sense of the “study of God.” Could you take my comments above with “Catholic theology” meaning something like: “non-ecclesial doctrines”? So the Catholic believes Catholic Trinitarian doctrine, or understands the descendit clause in a Catholic way, in accordance with the ecclesial authority he [privately] concluded to be governing him.

I think I agree with you about the hypothetical inquirer using private judgment to weigh evidence [Scripture, the Fathers, history] and reaching a conclusion. He does not choose Catholicism out of deferrence to the Magesterium, for the reason you implied. I think your articulation seems fine, that this person, after weighing the evidence, “found [Catholic authority] satisfactory and in accord with [his] private interpretation of the facts as [he] understand[s] them.”

The difference is this: the Catholic decides [via private judgment] which authority governs him [choosing magisterium, tradition, and text], and then accedes to non-ecclesial teachings on faith and morals in submission to that authority; the Protestant decides [via private judgment] which authority governs him [choosing text over magisterium], and then decides [via private judgment] which beliefs of faith and morals are true, and then decides [via private judgment] which denomination is most in line with his own conclusions.

I would profit from hearing from you what (if anything) is disagreeable about this perspective. I don’t think you give up that much, or maybe even anything, by this formula. And if we could agree here, we would know how to proceed with the discussion about our disagreements: we would discuss the evidence and rationale yielding conclusions of governing authority.

(I hope this moves the ball down the field. If I lost a down and gained no yardage, I regret it.)

Peace in Christ,
Tom
JJS November 7th, 2009 3:59 am :
Nathan,

Is there a principled difference between rejecting the apostolic message (and consequently Christ himself) on the basis of (an interpretation of) scripture and a rejection of apostolic succession on the same basis? In other words, what’s the difference between my arguing against Paul or Peter vs. arguing against Timothy, Titus, Linus, Ignatius, et. al.?

Well, I can’t imagine a scenario in which a Protestant would “reject the apostolic message (and consequently Christ himself)” on the basis of Scripture. That just doesn’t compute. Now on your clarifying question, I would want to as you whether Linus or Ignatius ever claimed to speak under the inspiration of the Spirit. As far as I know, Catholics make a “principled,” qualitative distinction between inspired Scripture and non-inspired writings. So to answer your question, a Protestant would never knowingly disobey Scripture, but if he felt that someone’s extra-biblical teaching (which we all admit is non-inspired) was contrary to Scripture, he could not in good conscience obey it. And as far as I know, Rome teaches that one’s conscience should not be violated. So speaking for myself, I could not bow down to a statue or speak of Mary as co-Mediatrix without sinning in the process.
JJS November 7th, 2009 4:09 am :
Tom,

The difference is this: the Catholic decides [via private judgment] which authority governs him [choosing magisterium, tradition, and text], and then accedes to non-ecclesial teachings on faith and morals in submission to that authority; the Protestant decides [via private judgment] which authority governs him [choosing text over magisterium], and then decides [via private judgment] which beliefs of faith and morals are true, and then decides [via private judgment] which denomination is most in line with his own conclusions.

I would profit from hearing from you what (if anything) is disagreeable about this perspective.

Yeah, I don’t see any problem with this. I would want to stress, however, that a Reformed and confessional Protestant minister like myself does not take something like “going rogue” lightly. They used to say back in the ‘30s that the difference between fundamentalists and Reformed folks was that the former left their mainline denominations rejoicing, while the latter left weeping.

So no, I don’t disagree in general with Bryan’s points on the tensions within our position (as taught by Mathison). What was said about governments can be said about our ecclesiology: “Presbyterianism is the worst kind of church government out there, except for all the other kinds.”

My only point in all of this has been that you guys lose all bragging rights (for lack of a better term) when you concede that at the most crucial moment—deciding that Rome’s Magisterial authority is in fact Christ’s authority—you are relying on private judgment every bit as much as I was when I finally embraced TULIP.
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 6:12 am :
Given the various critiques of sola scriptura offered here at CTC, it would be helpful for someone to outline a Catholic perspective on the authority of Scripture in relation to tradition as well as the nature of tradition itself. Is tradition an actual parallel stream of information flowing from the apostles? Is it simply the right interpretation of Scripture? What is it, where does one find it, and how does one defines its parameters? What should a Catholic expect Scripture supply to the Catholic faith? What should a Catholic expect tradition to supply? Should a Catholic necessarily expect a doctrine to be evidenced in Scripture or tradition, or is it appropriate to believe a doctrine that isn’t clearly found in either? Are there a variety of perspectives on these questions, and if so, does that really matter?

I know those are several questions, each requiring extensive discussion. However, given the focus on the sufficiency/insufficiency of Scripture here, I think it will be important at some point to provide some answers to such questions.
Devin Rose November 7th, 2009 9:35 am :
Jason (and I think Matthew A. from up above),

I don’t know if anyone on CTC responded about the statement that “we Catholics could still be wrong/not guaranteed to have discovered the truth,” but I don’t see why we as Catholics cannot concede this point. Yes, I think I have found the fullness of the truth in the Catholic Church, but I could certainly be wrong. (If the CTC guys need to correct me here, I’m all ears.)

Jason wrote that “My only point in all of this has been that you guys lose all bragging rights (for lack of a better term) when you concede that at the most crucial moment—deciding that Rome’s Magisterial authority is in fact Christ’s authority—you are relying on private judgment every bit as much as I was when I finally embraced TULIP.”

I agree that we lose all bragging rights, and I know you used that phrase loosely, for the simple truth that we never had any bragging rights. If we as Catholics have found what is in actuality the fullness of the truth, then it is not because of our own greatness and brilliance, though certainly effort on our part was involved in seeking God’s truth, but instead by God’s grace that we have discovered it. If we have actually discovered something false because the Catholic Church’s claims are not true, then we failed in some way to listen to our Lord who was surely not wanting us to fall into error. This seems obvious to me, but perhaps it seems like we are claiming that we are better because we discovered the Catholic Church.

We can only brag on God who has been merciful and gracious to us.
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 10:40 am :
Jason, (re: #63)

but what I can’t get past is the fact that what makes Catholic authority actually authoritative is a set of ecclesiological tenets,

What makes the successors of the Apostles actually authoritative is their having received this authority from the Apostle; no set of tenets makes the successors of the Apostles actually authoritative. I’m distinguishing between having authority, and recognizing that a person has authority. Even what allows a person to recognize the authority of the successors of the Apostles is not a “set of tenets,” but evidence in the Fathers that these successors were given authority by the Apostles, and that they understood themselves as having received such authority from the Apostles, and as handing down such authority to those succeeding them. That’s not a “set of tenets;” that’s evidence discoverable within the record of history.

and if one does not share them, he will look at the so-called authority of the Magisterium and reject it. In other words, without a proper doctrine of the church, one cannot even recognize the Magisterium’s authority in the first place.

The situation here is not some form of presuppositionalism, where we get out of it only what we bring to it. That’s the worry I hear you raising, if I’m understanding you correctly. The evidence of Church history shows that apostolic succession was the practice of the early Church, wherever the Church spread throughout the world. But if one brings ecclesial deism to the study of Church history, then everything one finds in the early Church Fathers will be subject to doubt (as to its orthodoxy) until verified by one’s own interpretation of Scripture, including this practice of apostolic succession. In that respect, ecclesial deism is a kind of hermeneutic of suspicion that strips away the evidential value of the teaching and practice of the Church Fathers, except, by arbitrary exemption, the authority of Scripture itself. And if the only thing a person believes he can truly trust is Scripture, and he doesn’t find apostolic succession in Scripture, then necessarily he will remain his own ultimate interpretive authority, and hence become or remain Protestant. But if he does not bring ecclesial deism to the evidence, then when he reads St. Ignatius of Antioch, for example, he’s going to see that he had better be figuring out where is the bishop to whom he needs to be subject, and what the bishops are teaching regarding Christ and the gospel.

The Protestant approach is to locate the Church by figuring out the gospel from Scripture, and then finding those who hold this gospel. The Catholic approach is to locate the gospel by finding the Church, and then listening to what she says is the gospel. There is a principled difference right there.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 10:51 am :
Faramir (re: #27),

Welcome to CTC. In our article we didn’t deal with the question of Tradition, because we didn’t need to do so in order to make our argument. We have some beliefs about this issue, and about Mathison’s treatment of it, but addressing them here would take us off-topic. Look for this topic in a future post/article.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 11:13 am :
Jason, (re: #29)

You see, that’s my problem with Bryan’s language of “discovery” on the part of the Catholic of the Magisterium, it seems to assume that it is true, and that I have just failed to discover it.

But that’s exactly what the Catholic is claiming, namely, that he has discovered something (i.e. apostolic succession) that the Protestant (as Protestant) has not discovered. That shouldn’t be any more offensive than a scientist announcing he has discovered a new species of bird. Having a “problem” with the very language of discovery would presuppose that it is impossible for anyone to discover something you haven’t yet discovered. I don’t think you want to put yourself in that kind of epistemic position. (When my wife says, “What was that noise?” and I say, “I didn’t hear anything.” she rightly responds, “Just because you didn’t hear anything doesn’t mean I didn’t hear something.” Sometimes I’ll just bite the bullet, to get a rise out of her: “No, if I didn’t hear it, there was no sound.”)

So like I said before, THE main issue, namely apostolic succession, is precisely the issue that the Catholic must embrace as a result of his private judgment. And that’s why I don’t see why you claim bragging rights.

No one is claiming bragging rights. Claiming to have discovered the Church Christ founded does not translate into ‘bragging rights.” When Andrew went and got Peter, and said, “We have found the Messiah” (John 1:41), Peter didn’t say “I have a problem with your language of discovery; you used your private judgment, so you don’t get bragging rights.” Instead, they both went to Jesus. So here also, I think that if one party claims to have discovered something, the right response is, “Ok, show me, or let’s look at it together.” As I said earlier, it seems to me that what is needed, given the discussion here, is another thread(s) focusing on the patristic evidence regarding apostolic succession.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 11:31 am :
One thing I’ve noticed in the original paper and the various posts is that the Catholic position (represented here by Bryan and others) is more often emphasizing the concept of apostolic succession (which is not a exclusively Roman Catholic doctrine) rather than other more distinctive Catholic ecclesiological beliefs (i.e. the Papacy). Why is this? Am I imagining this? But, my understanding is that when the Catholic position is reduced to its essentials, even apostolic succession is inadequate outside of the claims of the papacy.

Are the various Catholic posters here granting that apostolic succession is valid and ecclesiologically adequate outside of the papacy? Or, is this a two-step argument where first one is supposed to accept apostolic succession, and then find that only the papacy can really guarantee this as well?
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 12:50 pm :
Matthew (re: #75),

Yes, apostolic succession is “valid” apart from the papacy. That is, from a Catholic point of view, apostolic authority can be (and is) handed down from those bishops (not presently in communion with the Pope) to those whom they ordain as successors. This is why, from the Catholic point of view, apostolic succession is retained in the Orthodox Churches, for example. And this is why ordinations among the Donatists in the fourth century were valid. But Protestants in the 16th century explicitly denied and departed from the practice of apostolic succession. This is precisely why, from a Catholic point of view, you see the difference in approach in questions 4 and 5 of the Responsa ad quaestiones. As for whether apostolic succession is “ecclesiologically adequate” outside the papacy, in order to answer that question we’d need to know exactly what you mean by “ecclesiologically adequate.” Can there be a valid Eucharist if there is apostolic succession but not full communion with the Pope? Yes. But apostolic succession apart from full communion with the universal Church, nevertheless deprives a particular Church of the fullness of communion and life of the universal Church, as explained in Communionis notio. To separate from the Church Christ founded is, in some respect, to cut oneself off from the Holy Spirit who is the soul of the Church, and from its ongoing life and growth.

Since our article is directed toward a conversation with Protestants, among whom apostolic succession is rejected, there is no need in this article (in order to make our argument) to include an argument for the necessity of full communion with the successor of St. Peter.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 1:30 pm :
Bryan,

Thanks for your response. I am aware that the Catholic church recognizes the validity of Eastern Orthodox orders. This in itself poses several interesting questions, but those aside…

Of course, your paper is in dialogue with Protestantism, but is also about questions of theological epistemology more broadly. You’ve framed the discussion primarily as if it is between apostolic succession and sola scriptura, and I guess I’m not convinced that is an adequate representation of the Roman Catholic position. It feels to me that this particular formulation obfuscates what is actually the central claim of Roman Catholic theological epistemology, the papacy.
Tom Brown November 7th, 2009 1:42 pm :
Dear Jason,

Yeah, I don’t see any problem with this. I would want to stress, however, that a Reformed and confessional Protestant minister like myself does not take something like “going rogue” lightly.

Our having reached some common understanding on this matter is wonderful news to me. And you are right to make that qualification: when the Protestant uses private judgment, his judgment gives due weight to the consensus of those around him and those that preceded him, gives due weight to the cost of schism, etc.

My only point in all of this has been that you guys lose all bragging rights (for lack of a better term) when you concede that at the most crucial moment—deciding that Rome’s Magisterial authority is in fact Christ’s authority—you are relying on private judgment every bit as much as I was when I finally embraced TULIP.

I agree that the Catholic has no bragging rights for having done other than used private judgment to conclude that the Catholic Church has been vested with Christ’s authority. I hope I haven’t bragged. He should, however, be able to love and admire this facet which he holds to be true, just as we can all love and admire Scripture for its divine inspiration and perfection.

All this marvelous agreement to say that the point of discussion between us should be whether the Catholic or Reformed claim of spiritual authority is true.

Peace in Christ,
Tom
Randy November 7th, 2009 1:47 pm :
Great article.

“All appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture”. This is a stunning admission. I found this to be the biggest hurdle in becoming Catholic. Once I thought through the implications of this Sola Scriptura was dead.

I did want to object to the dismissal of a community of like-minded people. I do think people benefit greatly from interpreting scripture as a community. I know I have. Even as Catholics we are called to do that. I know such a community is not going to question your entire exegetical framework. But they can correct a lot of errors.

I can see your point but it seems made to strong. Such a community is not useless. It is, I think, in a different philosophical category that we are talking about. It is more along the line of best practices rather than core principles. Something like always reading scripture in context. A good thing to do but it does not really belong in this conversation.

Maybe it is a subtle distinction but I don’t really believe there is no difference between what he calls Sola and Solo. Sola is better and evangelicals know it. But it does not have a better foundation. It does more to make up for it’s flaws. Still it does not do enough. This is proved because there are different truths arrived at.
Tim A. Troutman November 7th, 2009 2:00 pm :
Matthew, do you agree that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura? If not, why not?

The papacy is a separate issue. If you think that the papacy is involved in the fact that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura, then please explain how.
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 2:02 pm :
Matthew,

We call this the “stinking fish fallacy”, where the objector says, “I smell a stinking fish here,” but does not explain what it is, or how it refutes the argument. So the objector discredits the argument by suggestion, without refuting the argument. To avoid that sophistic fallacy, the one raising the objection to the argument must identity the error, and show how the error makes the argument unsound. In other words, show that because of the [alleged] error, either the conclusion does not follow from the premises, or one of the premises is not true.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Tim A. Troutman November 7th, 2009 2:04 pm :
Matthew – Also, to see where the Catholic Church is coming from on the issue of Scripture and its relation to Sacred Tradition, see Dei Verbum.
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 3:46 pm :
Well, I think did explain what I though the “stinking fish” is, but generally it is that broad appeals to “apostolic succession” or even a “magisterium” do not get to the heart of Roman Catholic theological epistemology. And so this makes, in my view, the comparison between sola scriptura and “apostolic succession” somewhat misleading. The evidence for this can be found in the First Vatican Council, but the fact is, that according to Roman Catholicism, even a council of bishops in apostolic succession will need to have papal approval for its decrees. So, what validates epistemologically the doctrines of the Roman Catholic church is not apostolic succession broadly defined, nor even an ecumenical council, but papal approval. Do you disagree with that?
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 4:19 pm :
Do I believe that there is no principled difference between sola scriptura and solo scriptura? I think in principle I could agree to that.

Let me suggest a few qualifications, however.

1) Most importantly, I’m not convinced that sola/solo scriptura is unviable.

2) Even if in principle they are the same, in practice they can be different. Sola scriptura would presumably be drawing on the wisdom and experience of the church in its interpretation, whereas solo scriptura may be completely ignorant and indifferent to the practice of the church. So, even if in principle they are identical, I think the difference in practice could be consequential.

3) I think there may be aspects of Protestant theological epistemology for which are affirmed but difficult to comprehensively account for. Take the canon of Scripture, for example, a favorite for Roman Catholics in this discussion. People who have read this history of this process know that early church father were appealing to certain aspects of the NT as scripture long before a council or Pope gave any official canonical list. The process by which the church discovered these books is not exactly clear, but involves a lengthy process of deliberation. I think a Protestant could hold to the conclusions that were arrived at on the NT, for example, even though the precise method by which this was decided is unclear.
Tim A. Troutman November 7th, 2009 5:00 pm :
Matthew –

1) Most importantly, I’m not convinced that sola/solo scriptura is unviable.

Solo Scriptura is unviable for the reasons that Mathison gave (see the first part of this article). If you disagree with Mathison then why?

2) Even if in principle they are the same, in practice they can be different.

I agree that there is a practical difference between Reformed and many other denominations on the subject of Church authority. The point of this article isn’t to try and paint the Reformed as if there is no difference whatsoever between their approach to ecclesial authority and the ‘me & Jesus’ evangelical. But this article does show that without a principle of distinction between solo and sola, their position amounts to the same thing. As you said above, it might still be a viable position, but we agree with Mathison that it is not.

3. We’ll talk about the canon in our next major article. Please try to keep the discussion as focused as possible. There are a *lot* of issues to discuss, but right now, we’re talking about whether or not there is a distinction between sola and solo scriptura and if not, whether or not solo scriptura is a viable option for a Christian.
Matthew Anderson November 7th, 2009 6:14 pm :
Tim,

I will be interested to see Mathison’s own reaction to the article. But I do think I disagree that solo/sola scriptura is as *necessarily* bleak as he seems to paint it. For example, it appears that he paints solo/sola scriptura as producing hermeneutical chaos, endless division and schism, etc. The fact that the Protestant tradition is suffering from this, may not mean that it *has* to. It might mean that there has been sinful and ignorant disregard for the unity of the church that needs to be repented of. It might mean that many old shibboleths need to be laid down, and a more simple “catholic” core of Christianity is affirmed. That is the direction I would like to see the Protestant tradition move in. But, my point is that there could be other causes for the divisions in Protestantism than solo/sola scriptura, and there could be fresh solutions to some of these issues as well. That is not a full answer to your question, but it gives you an idea.

Briefly on the question of whether sola scriptura is historical or ancient, I would argue that there were competing, mixed theological epistemologies in the early church. Anyone who thinks that these men were arguing like modern evangelicals is going to get a shock. But so will anyone who thinks they were arguing like modern Roman Catholic apologists. I think a case can be made from the early church writings that Scripture was functionally the supreme authority in the church.
Bryan Cross November 7th, 2009 8:14 pm :
Matthew, (re: #83)

Papal authority is based on apostolic succession, in this case from the Apostle Peter, in that See in which he handed down the keys. So there is no way to understand papal authority apart from apostolic succession. The reason why there is no need to go into the details of papal authority in order to make the argument we made in this article, is that the Orthodox could make the very same argument we presented in this article. So if the Orthodox could make the very same argument, then the argument doesn’t depend on papal authority.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Matt Yonke November 7th, 2009 8:51 pm :
Matthew A.,

In #86 you allege that there is a case to be made that the ECF’s regarded Scripture as the supreme authority in the Church.

You could certainly find quite a number of quotes from the ECF’s that speak in glowing terms, and rightfully so. But I’d refer you to my article on Hermeneutics and the Authority of Scripture.

In that article, I compare several of those quotes from the ECF’s with quotes using equally high language to express faith in doctrines that are not explicitly taught in Sacred Scripture.

Whatever the view of the ECF’s was on the authority of Scripture, it was certainly not the Westminster Confession of Faith’s view that Christian doctrine must be taught explicitly or follow from good and necessary consequence from Sacred Scriptures.

Good job, by the way, keeping up with such a multitude of interlocutors ;)
Paige Britton November 7th, 2009 11:58 pm :
Bryan,
Thank you for this article – you are informative and challenging as always!

Here is a small question, for either you or Tim, which I ask out of genuine curiosity. Tim wrote in #64,
“And if one is an atheist, he will reject Christ’s authority because his world view does not allow for divine authority at all (much less in a man). So the atheist has to adopt a Christian world view before he can accept Christ’s authority. A Protestant must accept a Catholic ecclesiology before he can submit to the Church. It’s just the nature of the game.”

…You know that no Reformed person would award “bragging rights” to the converted atheist over his atheist friends who have not embraced Christ’s authority, because we’d understand that his conversion means that the Holy Spirit has overcome the noetic effects of sin, an epistemic change that the former atheist had no control over. On the other hand, a Protestant might be tempted to boast when she moves from a non-denominational church into the PCA, because she has done the reasoning and weighing and has decided that Presbyterians have the right stuff. There’d be no assumption of a divine overcoming of the noetic effects of evangelicalism there.

What’s the Catholic p.o.v. re. entering the Catholic fold from the Protestant camp? Is it truly considered a matter of reasoned choice? Or is it more akin to conversion – does the Spirit need to overcome the noetic effects of Protestantism? Just following the above discussion, this almost seems like what needs to happen.

Thanks!
pb
Tim A. Troutman November 8th, 2009 1:58 am :
Paige, An act of faith in the Church (submission) is an act of faith in Christ. In that regard, I’d affirm that grace from the Holy Spirit is necessary to become Catholic.

But I really don’t like the term “bragging rights” in any capacity within this discussion. No Catholic should ever think for a second that he has earned any right to brag about personal achievements. Coming into the Church, for some, is a largely intellectual journey where they have weighed and wrestled with various propositions. Yet for others that I meet, it is something far less intellectual. Some of the people I know who have become Catholic are dumb as bricks to be honest with you. It isn’t about intelligence as if all the smart people become Catholic and all the dumb ones stay Protestant. But even if that were the case, it wouldn’t grant us bragging rights.
JJS November 8th, 2009 4:27 am :
Tim,

I will cop to introducing the term “bragging rights,” for which I apologize if you take it as my misconstruing you or your attitude. The reason I used it was that the underlying position of the featured article seems to be that Protestants are individualists while Catholics are not. My point in saying that I am denying you bragging rights is simply that we both, at the most critical point in our respective investigations, use the exact same private judgment to come to our conclusions. But I never intended to imply that you guys are bragging. Hope that clears things up a bit.

Cheers….
Richard November 8th, 2009 8:46 am :
I’m looking forward to reading this article.
Tim A. Troutman November 8th, 2009 12:50 pm :
Jason, no worries. I hadn’t mentioned the phrase before now because I got where you were coming from. It keeps getting re-used and I just wanted to make sure no one was getting the wrong idea.

Also, to reiterate, the problem with the Protestant position isn’t that they use reason. We readily admit to using reason also. I’ve tried to show a few examples demonstrating that two positions, both using reason, can be an uneven epistemic ground. I.e. one is more objective and can be known more certainly than the other because it is based on something more objective. I haven’t seen any response to my analogies or arguments. I think I have rubbed Donato the wrong way and maybe you too.

Let me just explain that I’m not comparing Protestants to witch doctors, I’m just showing that it is conceivable that two positions, both relying on reason, could have varying levels of subjectivity involved. The mere fact that both positions start with a man’s reason does not automatically put the two positions in the same epistemic boat which is what you’re claiming in response to this article.

So if you grant that it is possible for any two positions to differ in regards to objectivity, then we would turn our focus to the question of whether the Catholic position (identifying the Church based on private judgment of historical material apostolic succession) is more objective than the Protestant position (identifying the Church based on private judgment of Scripture).
Richard November 8th, 2009 1:05 pm :
Dear Keith,

Having read the article I find it making points that I have seen but been unable to articulate clearly for a few months now. May I ask that in your response you interact with Bryan’s point regarding who decides whether the Church’s reading of the text is correct rather than simply dealing with the epistemic argument he articulates to deal with potential objections? The reason I ask is that my solution to the problem of “Whose interpretation is authoritative?” has been to move in a more liberal Protestant direction rather than a Catholic one. It strikes me that, asuming Bryan has articulated your position correctly, your position argues that I should submit to the teaching of a Church that may make mistakes in how it interprets the biblical text and that I really have no way of determining which Church is the correct one because as soon as I test what each Church teaches against Scripture I am interpreting Scripture instead of accepting the Church’s interpretation of it and still I am not sure which Church’s interpretation I should be accepting (Presbyterian, Reformed, Anglican, Orthodox, Catholic…). There may well be problems with Bryan’s proposed solution but pointing those problems out doesn’t demonstrate the validity of your position and I think this is one of the issues we face today – if Bryan’s statement of the problem is correct then to my mind either we accept the Catholic solution or we slide into a radical skepticism about a real meaning in the text.

I hope that makes sense. :-)
K. Doran November 8th, 2009 5:12 pm :
Dear Richard,

You said: “if Bryan’s statement of the problem is correct then to my mind either we accept the Catholic solution or we slide into a radical skepticism about a real meaning in the text. I hope that makes sense.”

It made sense to John Henry Newman :-) It makes sense to me too.

Sincerely,

K. Doran
Nicholas T. Batzig November 8th, 2009 5:35 pm :
Bryan,

In a typical Roman Catholic fashion you fall back on apostolic succession in the comment sections of this post. I would be interested in knowing who the apostolic successor of Peter from the time of his death until Gregory? Even your own ecclesiatical community cannot answer that question, leaving a five century hole in your system. Furthermore, where was the center of Rome and who was the Pope during the Avignon period? Did the Pope have the authority, as the apostolic successor of Peter, or did the counsel that chose which of the three Popes would be Pope? Furthermore, have you read what Ireneaus meant by “apostolic succession?” Seems to me that this would be important since your entire argument hinges on the veracity of it. Did Irenaues mention the church of Rome in his exposition? The absence of support for Roman Catholic adaptation of such dogma actually makes Rome look like a usurper. How could you believe that you have unity in dogma in Rome when transubstantiation was not even formulated or articulated until Radbertus Paschasius in the 9th Century. It was not official Roman Catholic dogma until the Fourth Lateran Counsel. In fact, prior to this counsel variations of explanation of the significance of the Eucharist were held and tolerated in the church of Rome. What about Limbo. It is dogma for so many centuries and then all of a sudden the Pope waves his magic wand and it disappears. Explain that one to your readers. How could Jesus say, “Not one jot or tittle will pass away,” but the Pope can add or remove them at will?

How can you be so arrogant as to attack Protestantism when you system is a fraudulent version of ecclesiastical unity. It is, in reality, a deceitful institution of equivocation and human authority. The Reformers understood the abuses and have marked them sufficiently in their writings, but, as is true for so many in this world, it is far easier to adhere to human religion than to Christ.
herbert November 8th, 2009 6:14 pm :
It seems that much of this conversation has been focused upon that which precedes one’s submission to the Church. As the article reasons, once a person recognizes/discovers the Authority of the Magisterium, she is then subsequently bound to allow the Church to play a definitive role in the binding of her conscience.

I am seeing a problem, though. It seems that in this case, continual “rediscovery” of the Magisterium’s authority is necessary in the faith life of the believer in order for this argument to stand. The believer, even after submitting to the Magisterium, can always dissociate himself from the Catholic Church- and believe herself to be thoroughly justified in doing so. In that case, rather than her “discovery” having opened her eyes to Catholic authority, the opposite takes place. She “discovers” as Luther did, that she isn’t bound after all…
Bryan Cross November 8th, 2009 9:37 pm :
Nicholas,

Welcome to CTC. You ask a lot of questions, many of which seem to be rhetorical questions, though perhaps you are asking them sincerely. Although I would be glad to answer your questions, this combox is for discussion of the article above; it is not a Catholic-Protestant free-for-all. Also, let me suggest that you first read the “Posting Guidelines” under the ‘About’ tab above. If you’re not familiar with CTC, we believe strongly that ecumenical dialogue cannot be productive unless conducted very carefully and charitably, and in a focused way. Throwing everything but the kitchen sink at each other, is not productive; it wouldn’t persuade anyone or get us one step closer to agreement. So, we have to discipline ourselves, restrain ourselves, and just roll up our sleeves and consider together the points that separate us, one at a time. And this combox is devoted exclusively to the argument we raised in the article above. So, feel free to raise objections here to the article, but in this combox we’re not going into the subjects of “transubstantiation”, Limbo, etc.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Tom Brown November 8th, 2009 9:41 pm :
Dear Herbert,

A Catholic does not spend each moment or each day trying to determine if she still believes that the Catholic Church has authority, any more than a Protestant would spend time trying to determine if he still believes that the Bible has authority. Why do you believe that a process of “continual ‘rediscovery’” must be occurring?

The Catholic can always dissociate herself from the Catholic Church, but she would only believe she were justified in doing so if she concluded that the Catholic Church has no authority over her (as she had once believed). She cannot believe both that the Catholic Church has authority over her in matters of faith and morals, and that the Catholic Church is wrong in a matter of faith or morals. So she cannot rationally leave over, say, a dispute on the Trinity or indulgences, but only over a dispute regarding the Church’s own authority claims.

Peace in Christ,
Tom
Bryan Cross November 8th, 2009 9:46 pm :
Herbert,

At the end of Matt’s comment #43, he wrote:

A way to sum this up might be to look at the reason C.S. Lewis eventually gave for not becoming Catholic before he got to Heaven ;) That was, not that he didn’t believe anything the Catholic Church taught now, but that he couldn’t commit himself to believing what the Catholic Church might teach tomorrow.

Lewis understood what it would mean. Once the Apostles discovered Christ’s authority, they did not need to “rediscover” Christ’s authority; they simply needed to remember it. Likewise, once a person discovers that the successors of the Apostles have authority from Christ to govern the Church and preach and teach in His Name (i.e. as His authorized representatives), then so long as one remembers this, one cannot “dissociate” from them without violating one’s conscience.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Paige Britton November 8th, 2009 10:34 pm :
Thanks, Tim, for your reply in #90.
For the record, I used “bragging rights” in a tongue-in-cheek way (as I think Jason does, too), so as to distinguish the monergistic work of the Holy Spirit from either the synergistic work of our cooperation, or the monergistic work of our solitary action. (If I said all that, see, I’d sound like an egghead. :)
herbert November 9th, 2009 8:03 am :
Bryan and Tom- Thanks to both of you for your replies. And though Bryan may recall me… Tom, for the record, I joined the Catholic Church on Easter Vigil 2008. So I speak as a Catholic in full communion. So, though I am bound by Church teaching, and can’t imagine this changing, I am curious about this idea of “discovery” of the Magisterium. I certainly experienced such a discovery. I can still remember when my sponsor suggested that Christ actually founded the Roman Catholic Church. For me this was a “discovery” indeed. However, I know that people don’t make decisions based solely upon principle. So what I’m trying to get at is this:

1. It seems to me that just as a “born-again evangelical” may commit apostasy on any day of the week, and NOT feel as though he’s violated his conscience in doing so (depending on the change that’s taken place in his perspective, i.e. he’s become agnostic, he’s become Mormon, etc.), similarly, why might a Catholic not come to believe that his having understood the Catholic Church as retaining Divine Authority was based upon flawed thinking?

2. And I don’t quite understand Lewis’s argument. Why wouldn’t this same reasoning apply to his identification with the C of E? Was he implying that when it came to submission to church authority, he could just “take it or leave it”? Like so many others who SEEM to hold the Church in high regard, did his thinking boil down to solo Scriptura, as well?

thanks.
Nicholas T. Batzig November 9th, 2009 8:42 am :
Bryan,

I certainly should have read the guidelines. Sorry about that!

Since you say at the outset of the post, “a return to apostolic succession is the only way to avoid the untoward consequences to which both solo scriptura and sola scriptura lead,” would it be fair for me to ask the first series of related questions concerning the nature and origin of the doctrine of apostolic succession? If so, can you answer the first? Who were the apostolic successors of Peter from Peter until Gregory?
retro satana November 9th, 2009 8:48 am :
I’d love for one of you guys to read Erik Wait’s Presuppositional Defense of Sola Scriptura, which is a direct response to “Not By Scripture Alone” by Sungenis. Perhaps, you could even do a review on the website, refuting it as necessary. Here’s the link: http://www.erikwait.com/index.cgi?location_id=2&subject_id=6.
Blessings!
Tim Troutman November 9th, 2009 9:47 am :
Nicholas, Irenaeus lists the successors of Peter from Peter until his day (the second century). Church historian Eusebius continues tracking them until the fourth century. If you want a complete list check out the Liber Pontificalis (or any Catholic Bible will have them).
Keith Mathison November 9th, 2009 10:14 am :
I asked earlier if it would be okay to respond to this article in the comment box. I’m not sure now that this will work. I think that what I will try to do is write a single response, post it somewhere (perhaps at Ligonier’s website), send you the link, and let you respond in whatever way you deem best. If you post a new article in response, then I can jump in the comments to carry on the discussion if necessary. Sound okay?

I’ve made it up to Section IV.B of the paper, so I’m making progress. I do want to ask one more follow up question, which may be answered in the section of the paper I haven’t reached yet. But I want to make sure I have this clear, so that in my response, I don’t end up shadow boxing.

If I follow what has been said in response to the concerns of several folks here, you grant that you as well as we use our private judgment and reason to determine which communion we should submit to through the study of Scripture, church history, the Fathers, etc. Correct, so far?

The epistemic difference, then, according to you, would be that since you’ve discovered apostolic succession, you are submitting to a church with final interpretive authority, but we are only submitting to a church with derivative authority, which then means that we retain the right to disagree with (or leave) that church if it teaches or does something contrary to our individual interpretation of Scripture – which itself is practically solo scriptura? Am I understanding you correctly?

There are two phases, then, in your understanding: the determination phase and the submission phase. Is that right?

It seems to me that the issue of infallibility is an important factor in the discussion (in addition to the obvious importance of clarifying what we mean by “church”). If Communion A claims some type of infallibility and Communion B does not, then one will be placed in a different condition depending on which communion he or she submits to. If someone submits to Communion A and truly believes the claims of Communion A, then that will make some type of difference. Correct?

A major question, then becomes how to adjudicate between the claims of Communion A and B (not to mention C,D, and F and so forth), and does the way we do this imply solo scriptura? What I found, and still find a bit confusing, Bryan, is your comment in post 13, where you said: “the person becoming Catholic bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church.”

In order to base your determination on “what those having the succession from the Apostles” say, you have to know who “those having succession from the Apostles” are. How do you already know this in the determination phase – prior to submission? This is where the argument appears circular to me.

Perhaps, I can illustrate it in this way:

You based your determination of the nature and location of the church on what those having the succession from the Apostles say, and submitted to Rome.

Frank Schaeffer based his determination of the nature and location of the church on what those having the succession from the Apostles say, and submitted to the Orthodox Church.

Which one of you submitted to the one true church Christ established, and what criteria do you use to determine the answer to that question?

I’m hoping your answer to this will help me get a clearer understanding of exactly what you see as the epistemic difference submission to Rome makes.

Thanks again.

Keith

P.S. Richard, I did see post #94 and will attempt to answer the question in my response.
retro satana November 9th, 2009 10:49 am :
Bryan Cross,
I was skimming through your exchange with user “JJS”, and I admit I understand where he is coming from. I have a question based on something you said. if you’ve already answered it, forgive me. I might have missed a few posts.

If the difference with a Roman using private judgment prior to converting is that he judged where the Church was, and then faithfully submitted to her teaching, how did he judge which Church was the true church? He cannot use Scripture, because according to your view, apart from the Magisterium we cannot know which books are inspired. At this point, the Christian scriptures may or may not be reliable, so he cannot appeal to them to find the true church. If he cannot appeal to the Scriptures, then how does he know there is such a thing as a “church”, let alone a “true” one? If he has to search, study, etc to determine the Magisterium is the ultimate authority, then whatever he appeals to will be the ultimate authority, not the Magisterium. How exactly does one judge the Magisterium to be the one true church, without running into a self-defeating, circular mess?
Thanks, be blessed!
Paige Britton November 9th, 2009 11:25 am :
I notice that Bryan & Neal’s article, as well as much of this discussion, seems to be considering only two interpretive options: 1) the infallible and authorized interpretation of the Magisterium, and 2) the absolute interpretive uncertainty presented by solo/sola Scriptura (i.e., it’s all individualized, so there is no ultimate interpretive authority to appeal to).

I don’t know from what perspective Keith Mathison is writing, so I don’t know if he addresses this idea, but there is a third option that Reformed people work with – the idea that we may know sufficiently, but not exhaustively, the meaning of the biblical texts, especially through study & discussions with others. This still leaves unanswered the claims about apostolic succession, and it will not satisfy those who hope for absolute interpretive certainty. But it is for many of us a livable epistemic condition. Was this not mentioned because Mathison’s own premise is that “sola Scriptura” is a means of interpretive certainty?
Tim A. Troutman November 9th, 2009 12:28 pm :
Retro – I get where you’re coming from and where JJS is coming from. The tu quoque argument is reasonable and demands a good answer. I feel like I’ve given a good answer for it (as has Bryan) above but I haven’t had any response to what I’ve written. The issue is not the use of private judgment (reason) but whether or not the individual’s reason is used correctly and whether it is based on something objective. As I’ve shown in examples above, two people may both use private reason and yet not be in the same epistemic boat. If we deny that, then it seems to me that we are left with skepticism.

Paige – I’m not sure I’m getting your precise objection. Can you be more specific about what argument you disagree with from the article? It seems like you’re dismissing the conclusions of the article wholesale but without a specified reason. Maybe I’m missing it. Can you be more specific?
mateo November 9th, 2009 3:31 pm :
Tom Brown:

… the Protestant decides [via private judgment] which authority governs him [choosing text over magisterium], and then decides [via private judgment] which beliefs of faith and morals are true, and then decides [via private judgment] which denomination is most in line with his own conclusions.

Which is exactly what a Protestant does when he goes church shopping. But the market that the Protestant shops in contains thousands upon thousands of Protestant denominations that teach anything and everything because of sola scriptura / solo scriptura.

Is there any real submission to a higher temporal authority if I believe that I can church shop until I find a church that agrees with me? The main article argues that doing that is really a subtle form of delusion:

The indirect way of making oneself one’s own ultimate interpretive and magisterial authority is more complicated and subtle. In this case the individual, based upon his own interpretation of Scripture, either establishes or chooses an ecclesial community that conforms to his own interpretation in matters he considers to be essential or important. Then, he ’submits’ to this institution so long as it continues to speak and act in accordance with his own interpretation of Scripture. … Accumulating for themselves this body of persons to whom they ’submit’ allows them to remain under a delusion that they are submitting to the Church.

As long as one believes he has the right to church shop, he will always be making himself the ultimate arbiter of scriptural truth.

Either ecclesial authority has its basis in agreement or approval as determined by the individual’s own interpretation of Scripture, or ecclesial authority has its basis in Christ’s authorization and appointment.

Nathan: And as far as I know, Rome teaches that one’s conscience should not be violated.

The Catholic Church does indeed teach that one must follow one’s conscience. But the Catholic Church does not teach a doctrine of the Primacy of Conscience – that is the foundational Protestant doctrine that makes the individual the ultimate arbiter of scriptural truths.

From a Catholic point of view, since the Catholic Church cannot teach error in matters of faith or morals, the person that states that his conscience disagrees with the moral teaching of the Catholic Church is merely making a statement that his conscience in need of formation. See Catechism of the Catholic Church §1776 – 1802 .

Matthew Anderson: You’ve framed the discussion primarily as if it is between apostolic succession and sola scriptura, and I guess I’m not convinced that is an adequate representation of the Roman Catholic position. It feels to me that this particular formulation obfuscates what is actually the central claim of Roman Catholic theological epistemology, the papacy.

When it comes to the question of the ultimate temporal authority, the Catholic Church teaches a doctrine of the Primacy of Peter, and not a doctrine of the Primacy of Conscience. When the Eastern Orthodox speak about the ultimate temporal authority in matters of dogma, they claim that the dogmas promulgated by valid Ecumenical Councils speak as the ultimate temporal authority for the Church … BUT … the dogmas promulgated by an Ecumenical Councils are not valid unless they are “approved” by the “whole church”. The EO, with their novel “whole church approval” doctrine, are actually claiming an implicit doctrine of the Primacy of the Laity, since the laity are supposedly the final and ultimate temporal authority that “approves” the dogmas solemnly defined and promulgated by the Bishops at an Ecumenical Council.

I don’t think that anyone here is trying to obfuscate the doctrine of Petrine Primacy. Since both Catholics and Orthodox recognize that there have been Ecumenical Councils that are not recognized as valid, there must be some way of making that determination. The different ways that Protestants, Orthodox and Catholics determine the validity of Ecumenical Councils is a topic for another thread, which would, of course, would involve the doctrine of the Petrine Primacy.

One issue that this article addresses is whether the dogmas defined at an Ecumenical Council are binding on Christians, or are they merely opinions of men that I can ignore, because I am the ultimate temporal authority in determining matters of faith and morals.

Mathew, how do you respond to the members of Protestant sects that deny the dogmas of the Trinity defined by the Ecumenical Councils? The Unitarians, Oneness Pentecostals, Church of God Abrahamic Faith, Jehovah Witnesses, etc. all believe they are being “scriptural” when they deny the Trinity.
Bryan Cross November 9th, 2009 8:01 pm :
Keith,

If you post a new article in response, then I can jump in the comments to carry on the discussion if necessary. Sound okay?

That’s fine with me.

If I follow what has been said in response to the concerns of several folks here, you grant that you as well as we use our private judgment and reason to determine which communion we should submit to through the study of Scripture, church history, the Fathers, etc. Correct, so far?

Yes.

The epistemic difference, then, according to you, would be that since you’ve discovered apostolic succession, you are submitting to a church with final interpretive authority, but we are only submitting to a church with derivative authority, which then means that we retain the right to disagree with (or leave) that church if it teaches or does something contrary to our individual interpretation of Scripture – which itself is practically solo scriptura? Am I understanding you correctly?

Yes.

There are two phases, then, in your understanding: the determination phase and the submission phase. Is that right?

There is a searching phase, a discovery, and then submission (or resistance).

If Communion A claims some type of infallibility and Communion B does not, then one will be placed in a different condition depending on which communion he or she submits to. If someone submits to Communion A and truly believes the claims of Communion A, then that will make some type of difference. Correct?

Correct.

A major question, then becomes how to adjudicate between the claims of Communion A and B (not to mention C,D, and F and so forth), and does the way we do this imply solo scriptura? What I found, and still find a bit confusing, Bryan, is your comment in post 13, where you said: “the person becoming Catholic bases his determination of the nature and location of the Church fundamentally on what those having the succession from the Apostles say is the nature and location of the Church.”

In order to base your determination on “what those having the succession from the Apostles” say, you have to know who “those having succession from the Apostles” are. How do you already know this in the determination phase – prior to submission? This is where the argument appears circular to me.

One can find who those having the succession are, without already being in submission. We can do this by reading St. Clement, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus, and Eusebius. In other words, you don’t need to start the inquiry phase by determining *immediately* who presently holds authority from the Apostles. Rather, we can start this by going back to the Apostles, and then moving forward through the timeline, continually tracing the passing on of Church authority through St. Clement and through the other bishops down to the Council of Nicea and so on. Every time there is a schism, we have to determine which is the Church, and which is the “schism from” the Church, and then we keep tracing forward this handing on of authority, until we reach the present day.

You based your determination of the nature and location of the church on what those having the succession from the Apostles say, and submitted to Rome.

Frank Schaeffer based his determination of the nature and location of the church on what those having the succession from the Apostles say, and submitted to the Orthodox Church.

Which one of you submitted to the one true church Christ established, and what criteria do you use to determine the answer to that question?

Frank submitted to a bishop who has apostolic succession, but is presently in schism from the Church Christ founded. The criterion we use is the principle of unity of the first thousand years of the Church, before the Greek schism. (I briefly discussed here the notion of schism.) We find in the Fathers that the successor of St. Peter holds this role, as the one to whom Christ gave the keys, and made to be the rock upon which He would build the Church. I could write a couple articles just on that subject alone, so it won’t fit into a combox. If you’re interested, read Studies on the Early Papacy, by Chapman, Documents Illustrating Papal Authority: AD 96 – 454, by Giles, and The Early Papacy: To the Synod of Chalcedon in 451, by Fortescue. We will be covering this subject in the future, Lord willing. Our purpose in the present article, is much more focused, simply to show that without apostolic succession, there is no principled difference between sola and solo.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
retro satana November 9th, 2009 9:01 pm :
Troutman (and Bryan, too),
thanks for the response. I completely agree that we can both use private reason (what else could we use? – whether it is logically sound or not), and not be in the same epistemic boat. But the reason we’re not in the same boat is because our fundamental presupposition is different. I presuppose scripture, you presuppose the Magisterium. My question is, how does a non-catholic go about changing his presupposition to the Magisterium w/o first having to presuppose Scripture? I presuppose the claims of Scripture because of Scripture, I believe Jesus is Lord because of Scripture. But where can the non-catholic start to find the true Church?

According to Rome, our epistemology is faulty and unreasonable outside of her walls, because we’re not trusting in the true church. So, any appeal I make to Scripture, to history, to Christ, to anything, is ultimately uncertain, since I’m using my own private criteria rather than Rome’s. Therefore, how can any conclusion I make (i.e. “Rome is true Church”, or “apostolic succession is real,”) be certain? If I start with a false premise, the conclusions will also be false, inconsistent, or uncertain. It sounds like you’re saying: “The protestant presupposes Scripture by his own private judgment and concludes that Scripture is the ultimate source for truth. The Roman presupposes scripture by his own private judgment and concludes that the Magisterium is the ultimate source for truth, thus proving his presupposition of scripture to be false.” But if the latter is true, then the Roman had no real reason to presuppose Scripture, therefore not giving him any certainty that his conclusions FROM Scripture are true. This is where the RC logic gets confusing. It would make more sense if you were being circular: “I presuppose the Magisterium because of the Magisterium.” But I haven’t heard you guys affirm this. You presuppose the Magisterium, by appealing to Scripture and supposed “facts” of history. Scripture or history then become the ultimate authorities, not the Magisterium. But by what standard can I even trust history? When I read RC, EO, or Reformed literature I get 3 different views of history. I wasn’t there. How can I possibly know exactly what happened and what went down for certain? Whose history do I trust and by what criteria?

When it comes to epistemological ultimate authority, you have to have ONE final authority, not multiple. It seems to me the only choices are Sola Scriptura, Sola Ecclesia or Sola Historia. You deny the first two, so I’m just trying to figure out how this works out. Thanks for your time!
Grace and Peace!
Paige Britton November 9th, 2009 9:02 pm :
Hey, Tim (re. #109),
Thanks for trying to understand. I am not casting judgment on the arguments in the article at all. I was merely pointing out that there seem to be two interpretive options under discussion, leaving the impression that there are only two interpretive options or expectations among Christians:

a) the Catholic view, in which the Magisterium provides infallible authoritative interpretation;
and b) the Protestant view as described by Mathison, which devolves into a nonsensical mess because there is no infallible earthly authority to appeal to for interpretation.

The first, if it is true, would be livable. The second would be unlivable, and Richard’s post (#94) characterizes how crazy-making it would be never to be able to adjudicate between competing interpretations, because there is no ultimate infallible interpretive authority to appeal to.

In light of this observation, I have an informational question. I have not read Mathison’s book, so I am curious to find out this: Does he present his positive argument for “sola Scriptura” as a way for people to achieve certainty about interpretations, as the Magisterium offers Catholic believers interpretive certainty? In other words, does Mathison lead one to EXPECT interpretive certainty, as the Magisterium’s claims lead one to EXPECT interpretive certainty?

Or does he speak more reticently about what Protestants may expect with regards to certainty? The “third interpretive option” that I did not see mentioned in the article is the understanding that Reformed folks work with, that we may expect to know “sufficiently but not exhaustively,” which is a phrase from the Westminster Confession. This is not the absolute knowledge of Magisterial certainty, but it is also not the quicksand of absolute uncertainty. (I won’t try to unpack what is more or less “certain” in this view — I’m just mentioning that it exists.)

The reason I bring this up is simply that it has been found by many thoughtful people to be a livable perspective, and is a real third option to Magisterial certainty and crazy-making Protestant uncertainty about interpretations. Whether it is RIGHT or not is not my point — I am just wondering whether Mathison goes here, and it was overlooked — or whether he really does make claims about expecting interpretive certainty that leave one groping for an authority behind them; in which case my “third option” would be extraneous to a response to his book.

Does this make sense? I’m just trying to find out something I don’t know yet, not dismissing anybody’s arguments.

pax!
pb
David November 9th, 2009 11:46 pm :
Bryan,

With reference to your responses to Keith Mathison, you seem to suggest that the crucial issue is not even Apostolic succession per se, but the Universal Fatherhood of the Bishop of Rome. Right? In other words, without affirming not simply primacy of honor but primacy of rule by the Roman Pontiff, the Orthodox Churches cannot be anything but in schism with the one true Church? Right? Have you read Meyerndorff’s work on Roman Primacy?

David
Tim A. Troutman November 10th, 2009 12:10 am :
Retro:

You said:

I presuppose scripture, you presuppose the Magisterium.

But this rests on another presupposition, namely that all viewpoints start with a presupposition (i.e. presuppositionalism). I don’t believe that, but that is a long discussion and we can’t do that here. The short of it is that I do not presuppose the magisterium.

So, any appeal I make to Scripture, to history, to Christ, to anything, is ultimately uncertain, since I’m using my own private criteria rather than Rome’s.

Rome doesn’t think of you that way regardless of what you may have heard from some apologists.

When I read RC, EO, or Reformed literature I get 3 different views of history. I wasn’t there. How can I possibly know exactly what happened and what went down for certain? Whose history do I trust and by what criteria?

This is a difficulty not unique to Christianity. Talk to a southerner and to a yankee and you’ll get a different view of the Civil War. We have to approach history as objectively as we can; it’s not always easy to sort through the mess and psychology of conflicts of interest among historians.

As for Church history, if there is a visible Church, the best one to ask about her history would be herself. She knows it better than anyone else. There’s a multiplicity of ways to approach the question(s) facing the Christian. What is the history of the Church? Ask the visible Church. Is there a visible Church? History tells us that there is. :-) Sometimes it’s just easier to wear a WWJD bracelet and listen to contemporary music on the radio. I know its messy but we Christians dont have anyone but ourselves to blame for it!

When it comes to epistemological ultimate authority, you have to have ONE final authority, not multiple. It seems to me the only choices are Sola Scriptura, Sola Ecclesia or Sola Historia. You deny the first two, so I’m just trying to figure out how this works out. Thanks for your time!

I can see where you’re coming from. There is definitely a sense in which all things terminate (or begin) somewhere. A thing cannot ultimately spring from multiple sources. But taking this truth to an extreme would be like taking “act precedes potency” to the extreme. Act ultimately does precede potency – but practically, as we interact with the world we see that a thing must be potential before it can be actualized. Enough with the philosophy – most of which I barely understand. So here’s the deal… before my wife kills me for taking too long on this blog. If it is true that we must have one and absolutely one source for epistemological certainty, then if we choose sola scriptura, that excludes God Himself from being our source of certainty. So do we trust the Scripture as the final authority even above God? Of course that doesn’t make sense. Eck.. gotta go. Wanted to write more but wife is impatient. Hope you can follow out my train of thought. Otherwise I’ll be back tomorrow to help clean it up.
Nathan November 10th, 2009 12:32 am :
Tim (115), I think it would be fair to characterize what you’re saying about ultimate causes in terms of incarnation. If Christ himself is the first apostle (Hebrews 3:1), and his message was spread by his chosen apostles before any authoritative New Testament writings existed, authority must be rooted in incarnation and apostleship, and only secondarily in scripture, which always points to the source, namely the incarnate Word. At any rate, this is the direction my thinking is being pushed of late.
Bryan Cross November 10th, 2009 1:15 am :
David,

It is not so much primacy of honor or universal jurisdiction that is crucial to see, but the charism of truth and the principle of unity — that See with which one must be in full communion in order not to be in schism from Christ’s Church. I’d be glad to discuss Meyendorff’s book, but that would take us away from the argument in our article. We’re going to address the primacy of Peter in a future article. Our argument in this present article does not depend on universal papal jurisdiction. Our argument is only that without apostolic succession there is no principled difference between sola and solo, because without apostolic succession each individual retains ultimate interpretive authority.

If you asked anyone in the first eight hundred years of the Church, “Where is the Catholic Church?” everyone knew the answer. It wasn’t a difficult question. It has become a difficult question today because we’ve forgotten to ask the question, and forgotten the criteria by which those in the first millennium knew the answer to the question: one, holy, catholic and apostolic. Only the Catholic Church today bears all four marks. The Orthodox Churches are not hierarchically one. Nor are they catholic; they are each national and ethnic. When they separate from each other, that is not a schism from the universal Church that Christ founded, because none of them is the principle of unity of the Church. None of them is by divine establishment the necessary continuation of the Church whenever there is schism. That is why when one of them separates from the others, there is no principled answer to the question: “Which one is the continuation of the Church?” That principled basis for measuring schism can be found only in the unique authority and unitive role of St. Peter, on account of the keys of the Kingdom, which Christ give particularly to him.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Andrew McCallum November 10th, 2009 1:24 am :
One can find who those having the succession are, without already being in submission. We can do this by reading St. Clement, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus, and Eusebius. In other words, you don’t need to start the inquiry phase by determining *immediately* who presently holds authority from the Apostles. Rather, we can start this by going back to the Apostles, and then moving forward through the timeline, continually tracing the passing on of Church authority through St. Clement and through the other bishops down to the Council of Nicea and so on.

OK Bryan, so you are saying that all we have to do is look to the material succession of the current bishops and this will tell us where the true Church is. Correct? So there should be no debate about whether the bishops of the Renaissance/Reformation or during the present era were and are faithful to the teachings of Clement, Ignatius, etc. Any such discussion is of no value because formal succession has already decided the matter. Is that correct?
retro satana November 10th, 2009 9:04 am :
Tim,
I understand you weren’t able to continue your post, I’m married as well. :) But I hope you can return and help me out a little bit more. Of course, I don’t want to stray too much from the topic at hand, but I’d love for you to briefly explain how/why you deny presuppositionalism. My mind starts jumping to conclusions as to what you believe about our epistemological foundations (blank slate?) but I’d rather wait to hear your explanation before making an assumption. Also, does Rome have an official position on this?

If Rome doesn’t think my appeal to Scripture apart from her authority is arbitrary and uncertain, then why do so many apologists and lay-persons harp on us for not having a standard to decide what the Canon should be? We just like to cherry-pick which books line up with our private interpretations, remember? :) All joking aside, if Rome is indeed the True Church, and her claims of infallibly interpreting the deposit of faith is true, how is it NOT an arbitrary/uncertain position for protestants to put faith in ANY piece of scripture?

I know the issue of history is not unique to church history, but you may have missed my point. Certainty of historical data is limited, apart from divine revelation (whether in Scripture or any other form of revelation). A good historian will try to report all accounts of an event, all viewpoints, and be as objective as possible, but we know that there is always room for error. Two people can see/experience the same event and walk away with two totally different accounts of it. What if a historian reports his interpretation of an event rather than the “cold hard facts”? There are always very limited amounts of certainty when reading the books of history. So, telling a non-Catholic to find the true church by studying history doesn’t help him much. I could easily see someone getting overwhelmed by the amount of data he must process and weigh against each other that he simply becomes skeptical about the whole thing, or just jumps into one he prefers most, having blind faith that his pick is right!

It should be stressed that we all presuppose the existence of the Triune God. We all believe that whatever source(s) of revelation we adhere to come from him, as the F has given the S ALL authority, even scriptural authority and papal authority. That’s a given, so it shouldn’t even be an issue. What we mean when we’re talking about Sola Scriptura vs. Magisterium is what source of revelation is the ultimate authority for our objective use on earth in this current stage of redemptive history.
Tim Troutman November 10th, 2009 10:30 am :
Nathan – thanks for helping tie that together!

Retro – so a follow up with a little help from Nathan. If we can demand a singular source for epistemic certainty by posing a dilemma between Scripture and the Church, then why not between the Scripture and Jesus? Which is your ultimate source, the Bible or Jesus? Clearly that’s a false dichotomy. It is possible that the dichotomy between the Bible and Tradition is also false.

Suppose for a minute that the two actually agree. Sometimes it is hard to convince someone that they do because there are apparent contradictions. But it is hard to convince an atheist that the Scriptures do not contradict themselves. I say all this to establish the possibility that Tradition and Scriptures are, together, the Word of God and both infallible. That is certainly a logical possibility.

How do we determine whether it’s true? Well, one way of making decisions like this is to eliminate alternatives. This article demonstrates why the most convincing alternative (sola scriptura) is reducible to solo scriptura and per Mathison’s own arguments above, it is not a viable option for Christians.
Keith Mathison November 10th, 2009 11:28 am :
One more follow-up. In the original paper you wrote:

“So for the person becoming Catholic, when he recognizes the authority of the Magisterium, he recognizes that his beliefs and interpretation of Scripture must conform to the authoritative teachings of the Church’s Magisterium. “When the Magisterium of the Church makes an infallible pronouncement that a teaching is found in Revelation,” he assents to it by an act of faith, believing this pronouncement to be the teaching of Christ, on account of the divine authority given to the Magisterium through apostolic succession to teach in Christ’s name and with His authority.74 In this way, his faith in Christ is expressed as an act of faith in the infallible pronouncement of the Church’s Magisterium. In those teachings which are not infallible, he also, as an act of faith in Christ, gives religious submission of intellect and will, even while recognizing the fallibility of those teaching.”

I want to make sure I clearly understand the final sentence. From your Roman Catholic perspective:

1. Does the insertion of the category “teachings which are not infallible” under the purview of a Magisterium whose pronouncements are, in your words, “the teaching of Christ” have any effects on the question at hand regarding the epistemological advantage provided by Roman Catholicism?

2. From your perspective, why is it that you are able to submit truly to “teachings which are not infallible” but Protestants are not able to submit truly to teachings which are not infallible?

3. Does the Magisterium teach you infallibly or fallibly which of her teachings are infallible and which are not infallible?

Thanks,

Keith
Tim A. Troutman November 10th, 2009 12:01 pm :
Paige – #113

I think that the tu quoque objection has thrown this conversation off course a bit. The issue is not about absolute certainty as if the Catholic position claims that it puts us in a sort of absolute certainty about all things faith related whereas Protestants are just fumbling around hopelessly in the dark because of their dependence on private interpretation. That’s not what we mean at all.

In fact, what we see in some Protestant branches, such as the Reformed, is an incredible fidelity to the gospel of Christ especially where moral teachings are concerned. There doesn’t seem to be a lack of certainty on what the Scripture teaches.

But what we’re concerned with is whether or not there is a principled difference between sola and solo scriptura. As the article shows, if Mathison is right, and all appeals to scripture are really appeals to one’s private interpretation, and if Calvin and the WCF are right that the Church is defined by those who rightly preach the Scriptures, then an appeal to Church authority is an appeal Scripture and thus to one’s private interpretation thereof and thus to solo scriptura. There is no principled difference between sola and solo scriptura. But if Church is not defined by one’s private interpretation of Scripture, but instead is defined by those whom Christ authorized as Church and their successors by material apostolic succession, then we have an objective touch point that does not rely on private interpretation. This position is not reducible to solo scriptura.

Now again this does not mean that Catholics are absolutely certain about faith whereas Protestants are in the dark. Does this make sense?
Bryan Cross November 10th, 2009 12:17 pm :
Keith,

1. Does the insertion of the category “teachings which are not infallible” under the purview of a Magisterium whose pronouncements are, in your words, “the teaching of Christ” have any effects on the question at hand regarding the epistemological advantage provided by Roman Catholicism?

No it does not. Notice the three-fold categorization in the Profession of Faith:

With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgement or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed.

I also firmly accept and hold each and everything definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals.

Moreover, I adhere with religious submission of will and intellect to the teachings which either the Roman pontiff or the College of Bishops enunciate when they exercise their authentic Magisterium, even if they do not intend to proclaim these teachings by a definitive act.

That third category of Magisterial teachings are not taught infallibly. That doesn’t mean, of course, that they are false. It means that they are not guaranteed to be protected from error by the Holy Spirit. But they could all be true. These [in this third category] we [Catholics] are required to adhere to with “religious submission of mind and intellect” on account of the authority by which they are given. The ground of their authority is not “agreement with my own interpretation of Scripture”; rather, the ground of their authority is apostolic succession, had by those in communion with the one to whom Christ gave the keys, and upon whom He promised to build His Church.

2. From your perspective, why is it that you are able to submit truly to “teachings which are not infallible” but Protestants are not able to submit truly to teachings which are not infallible?

Because of the difference in the ground of the authority. The ground of Protestant ecclesial authority is not apostolic succession, but is ultimately agreement with one’s own interpretation of Scripture, as we explained in the article. This is why no Protestant pastor has the authority to bind the conscience. The ground of Catholic ecclesial authority, by contrast, is apostolic succession; and this authority can bind the conscience.

3. Does the Magisterium teach you infallibly or fallibly which of her teachings are infallible and which are not infallible?

The criteria by which to distinguish fallible from infallible Magisterial teaching, were given infallibly in the first Vatican Council (Session 4, Chapter 4).

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan
Tim A. Troutman November 10th, 2009 12:30 pm :
Retro:

I’d love for you to briefly explain how/why you deny presuppositionalism. My mind starts jumping to conclusions as to what you believe about our epistemological foundations (blank slate?) but I’d rather wait to hear your explanation before making an assumption. Also, does Rome have an official position on this?

As far as I know, Rome does not have an official position on this, but I could be wrong. I’m going to email you a reply about this one so we don’t get off on a rabbit trail.. This one could be long!

If Rome doesn’t think my appeal to Scripture apart from her authority is arbitrary and uncertain, then why do so many apologists and lay-persons harp on us for not having a standard to decide what the Canon should be?

Our next lead article will be out in a few weeks and will be on the issue of the canon. I think it will be helpful to get into this more deeply at that point. Briefly, the problem is with a lack of consistency in epistemology. It is inconsistent to trust the Scriptures with absolutely certainty but only trust the Church, who gave us those scriptures, conditionally (upon our interpretation of the Scriptures she gave us.) If the Church is incapable of acting infallibly, then the canon cannot be infallible. I can think of a lot of objections to all this, but can only say for now that we will address those when we address the canon and then a few articles later with Church infallibility.

So, telling a non-Catholic to find the true church by studying history doesn’t help him much.

I gotcha. It’s not always black and white. Depending on the historical source, you get a different understanding of what really happened. I can appreciate that. It’s a process for us all.
JJS November 10th, 2009 1:44 pm :
Tim,

Sorry for vanishing for a couple days, I’ve traveled to Annapolis.

Also, to reiterate, the problem with the Protestant position isn’t that they use reason. We readily admit to using reason also. I’ve tried to show a few examples demonstrating that two positions, both using reason, can be an uneven epistemic ground. I.e. one is more objective and can be known more certainly than the other because it is based on something more objective. I haven’t seen any response to my analogies or arguments. I think I have rubbed Donato the wrong way and maybe you too.

OK, I understand that your position is that, reason aside, the basis for your view is more objective than the basis for mine. Let’s take this a step further, then: As you may remember from when you were a PCA guy, the insistence that there has been an unbroken succession of bishops from the apostles to the college of bishops today (and from Peter to BXVI) sounds to non-Catholics like a fairy tale. If I wanted to “objectively” investigate such a claim, I wouldn’t even know where to start. A Catholic author will insist on it while a Protestant one will deny it.

So how is apostolic succession more sure footing than rolling up my sleeves and studying Scripture? Now if I granted it, I would agree it’s way more objective, but I’m asking how I can objectively know if it’s even true in the first place.
Andrew McCallum November 10th, 2009 2:23 pm :
Tim Troutman from #93:

So if you grant that it is possible for any two positions to differ in regards to objectivity, then we would turn our focus to the question of whether the Catholic position (identifying the Church based on private judgment of historical material apostolic succession) is more objective than the Protestant position (identifying the Church based on private judgment of Scripture).

Tim,

It seems to me that “historical material apostolic succession” is absolutely objective and something that we Protestants can’t possibly argue with. Yes, the current RCC bishops can trace their line to those bishops of the 1st century. But how does “private judgment” play a part here? You are not judging anything, are you? You are just noting that current bishops can trace their lines to previous generations of bishops. Is it maybe more accurate to say that Church tradition is what you are assessing and that and your private interpretation of Church tradition is that material succession is the all abiding principle by which the validity of the Church should be identified?

Protestants and Catholics recognize/discover material succession, but it seems that the Catholic makes more of this discovery than does the Protestant. Perhaps to the Catholic mind there is a necessary logical connection between material succession and faithful material succession? For some reason that is unclear to us, it is inconceivable to the Catholic mind that there could be un-faithful material succession.
Tim A. Troutman November 10th, 2009 2:57 pm :
Jason,

As you may remember from when you were a PCA guy, the insistence that there has been an unbroken succession of bishops from the apostles to the college of bishops today (and from Peter to BXVI) sounds to non-Catholics like a fairy tale.

Yes I distinctly remember the first time I heard of Apostolic Succession, especially regarding the See of St. Peter. I thought it was, in a word, retarded. But it’s hard for me to identify with you exactly and that’s because I didn’t so much reject AS on account of me believing that there was a break somewhere, but because I just didn’t think it mattered if there was or wasn’t.

You bring up a completely legitimate question though; it was one that I had not considered be

Solo Scriptura, Sola Scriptura, and the Question of Interpretive Authority

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