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1. Richard Flatley April 25th, 2011 6:48 pm :

   This Work from Thomas Aquinas on Assurance, is so well placed into todays discussions, with non-Catholics. I have always enjoyed reading Thomas Aquinas. He does a great job on explaining the for and against each question using reason and explaining Divine Revelation of God. Thank You God for using your servant Thomas for your work.

2. Nathan December 2nd, 2011 10:01 am :

   Andrew,

   Your post on Thomas is fascinating, to say the least. Some of the topics covered in it (i.e. “assurance is better grounded upon the objective criteria of the sacraments (he focuses upon Baptism) than upon the subjective criterion of one’s own faith”) bring to mind this fabulous presentation from Phillip Cary (an Anglican):

   http://www.scribd.com/doc/2269563/Sola-Fide-Luther-and-Calvin-by-Phillip-Cary

   That said, I must confess that Thomas is quite hard to understand for me, as his thought-categories are often quite foreign to mine. As if Aristotle was not difficult enough to comprehend! I know we don’t remain children (childish) in one sense, but we are always to remain child-like (hence the title of my blog and this latest post complements of First Things (of all places! : ) ) : http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/to-train-children-we-must-become-children-with-them/ )

   I tend to think that even if Thomas was largely on the right track here (interestingly, one of the greatest of the Lutheran theologians, John Gerhard, really did like St. Thomas – it would be interesting if he uses Thomas’ views on confidence of salvation vs. Rome in his magnum opus, which argued *only from RC sources* that the Lutheran church was the true Church [to my knowledge, people from Rome never really responded to this, like they had with Chemnitz’s magnum opus, the Examen of Trent, before ]), Trent sounds a much different note on this topic of the confidence of faith (even if “If any one saith, that justifying faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine mercy which remits sins for Christ’s sake… let him be anathema” is true, why not clarify that it is not true insofar as we are talking about the forgiveness, life, and salvation that is freely given in confession and absolution for those broken souls who seek it and the revitalization if offers?) Again, I realize that all of the statements of Trent need to be taken together, but it seems to me that the treatment of Luther himself is evidence that Thomas’view, if it is what you say it was, was not the view of the Roman curia by the early 16th century. The reason for this, I suspect, is that the legalisms and complicated intricacies of the Roman penitential system had clouded the perhaps better thinking of Thomas. That said, the RPS (for short) largely had its grounding in Thomistic thought, which of course, was a fusion of Scripture and Aristotle (can I get you to at least admit that this *could* lead to problems? : ) )

   Do “We can enjoy certainty of eternal life” and “one cannot know with “indubitable knowledge” that he is either in a state of grace” go together? Well, of course Lutherans insist that as we grow in our Christian life, faith only continues to live in repentance as regards God’s laws. And of course, we would reject the “sinful presumption” that Thomas rejected (but do Trent, Bellarmine, etc. have the same definition of “sinful presumption”? I have real doubts here: it seems “antinomian” now has come to mean “anyone who does not submit to the Roman curia”!). In any case we would deny the second phrase just for the reasons Thomas cites: because even in the midst of our doubts, we know that children simply take people at their words (even if we can’t not reflect on our faith as adults, we know we ought to be like children, and it is Satan, who, using our intellect, tempts us not to – for more on this see the posts below, particularly the second one).

   Maybe there is more compatibility here than I realized, but I hope you will understand that, given that I feel that Rome has been less than forthcoming in many ways (i.e. the failure to deal honestly with the importance of the different definitions of terms in the Joint Declaration on Justification: yes, the Lutherans involved are culpable to for this) I really have my doubts. If you have time, I wonder if you might be willing to look at and respond to these two posts (not at my blog) as it relates to what you have written here:

   http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/forgiveness-free-and-true-the-crux-of-the-reformation-the-essence-of-the-christian-life/

   http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2009/07/31/babies-in-church-part-v-the-arrogance-of-the-infant-a/ (part b, which would not be as important is here: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2009/07/31/babies-in-church-part-v-the-arrogance-of-the-infant-b/ )

3. Andrew Preslar December 2nd, 2011 11:42 am :

   Nathan,

   Thanks for reading the post. I will check out the links you provided. I do think that on some points, assurance being one of them, Catholics and Lutherans are closer together than is sometimes supposed. For more along this line, I recommend the book by Fr. Stephen Pfurtner, Luther and Aquinas on Salvation.

   In its teaching on assurance, Trent had in mind the assurance of faith (apart from a special revelation), not the assurance of hope (which is the subject of this post). Furthermore, the Council did not rule out the possibility of arriving at some kind of certainty that one is in a state of grace. Catholics can take great comfort in the promise of the Gospel, being assured that it is indeed “well with my soul.” That has a lot to do with taking God at his word, both in the hearing of scripture (e.g., “he who believes in me has eternal life”; “there is therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus”) and in the reception of the sacraments (“I baptize you in the Name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit”; “I absolve you of your sins…”; “this is my Body, which is given for you”; etc.) The difference between this sort of confidence, and the certainty of faith, is that the latter rests upon a proposition as having been divinely revealed, whereas the former is more of an inductive certainty, based upon a variety of factors (both objective and subjective) other than what has been explicitly revealed.

   One of the reasons that St. Thomas, and his philosophical guide, Aristotle, seemed strange and difficult to me was the unfamiliar and at times off-putting emphasis on the virtues (and the opposing vices) in their description of the good life (i.e., authentic happiness). However, once I began to pay more attention to similar language throughout Scripture, especially in the New Testament, those treatises began to click a bit more. The crux that brought it all together, the Gospel and the virtues, faith and obedience, was the Catholic doctrine of grace. (See Sean Patrick’s article, Sola Gratia, for a comparison of the Catholic doctrine of grace with the Protestant Reformed doctrine.)

4. Nathan December 2nd, 2011 12:46 pm :

   I thought the assurance of hope comes from and is based on faith, so how can you have one without the other?

   “Furthermore, the Council did not rule out the possibility of arriving at some kind of certainty that one is in a state of grace.”

   Right, by special revelation. :) Seriously, your evidence?

   “The difference between this sort of confidence, and the certainty of faith, is that the latter rests upon a proposition as having been divinely revealed, whereas the former is more of an inductive certainty, based upon a variety of factors (both objective and subjective) other than what has been explicitly revealed.”

   I’ll be interested in your response to my links.

5. Nathan December 2nd, 2011 1:13 pm :

   Andrew,

   Interestingly, the White Horse Inn recently had a show related to this: http://www.whitehorseinn.org/blog/2011/11/27/whi-1077-repentance-personal-transformation/

   Of course, I am Lutheran, but they make some good points, especially as regards how the doctrine of penance (in RC and some strains of Protestantism) causes us to look inward again as regards the issue of confidence of peace with God.

   +Nathan

6. Andrew Preslar December 2nd, 2011 1:48 pm :

   Nathan,

   One cannot have hope, in St. Thomas’s sense, without faith. Hope is based upon faith, but not reducible to faith. Faith accepts the Gospel as divine truth, and hope receives that truth as good news “for me.”

   Chapter XII of Session VI (Trent) refers to the possibility of “absolute certainty” of predestination to life, which knowledge can only come by special revelation. In my last comment, I had primarily in mind assurance of being in a state of grace, though I did not mean to rule out assurance of predestination. The evidence from Trent for a kind of “moral certainty” or comforting assurance other than the absolute certainty of faith lies in the phrases and adjectives that qualify the noun “certainty,” both in Chapter XII and in the Canons that touch upon the matter of assurance (emphasis added):

   Canon 13.
   If anyone says that in order to obtain the remission of sins it is necessary for every man to believe with certainty and without any hesitation arising from his own weakness and indisposition that his sins are forgiven him, let him be anathema.

   Canon 14.
   If anyone says that man is absolved from his sins and justified because he firmly believes that he is absolved and justified, or that no one is truly justified except him who believes himself justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are effected, let him be anathema.

   Canon 15.
   If anyone says that a man who is born again and justified is bound ex fide to believe that he is certainly in the number of the predestined, let him be anathema.

   Canon 16.
   If anyone says that he will for certain, with an absolute and infallible certainty, have that great gift of perseverance even to the end, unless he shall have learned this by a special revelation, let him be anathema.

   Among other things, this is to say that our faith is not in faith (Canons 13 and 14), and that the status of one’s own soul and eternal destiny are not among the articles of faith (Canons 15 and 16), to which pertain “absolute and infallible certainty.” The qualifying language (which I emphasized), furthermore, would be entirely gratuitous if the Church denied that, apart from special revelation, Christians could enjoy some form of certainty, and corresponding assurance, about their spiritual condition and eternal destiny.

   Concerning the last bit of your comment, where you quoted me: Taylor Marshall fleshes this out a bit in his post Signs of Predestination — A Catholic Discusses Election. Tom Brown also raises a relevant point in Conditional or Unconditional Assurance. Their focus is on the “conditional,” “internal,” or “subjective” aspects of assurance, which complements the “objective” aspect discussed in Neal Judisch’s post on assurance and St. Thomas’s analysis of the virtue of hope.

   (Sorry to bombard you with links. Its just that there are many aspects to this topic, and I wanted anyone following this thread to be aware of some of the related discussions that have taken place here. Pip pip. I’m faring forth for the rest of today. I’ll pick up tomorrow, when hopefully I’ll have chance to read some of your material. Onward.)

7. Nathan December 2nd, 2011 2:58 pm :

   Andrew,

   I may not be able to get to this for a while. But we are discussing on a two-year old post, so I think that will be OK. : )

   +Nathan

8. Nathan December 4th, 2011 1:33 pm :

   Andrew,

   All of the following I wrote before reading the Neal Judisch essay:

   First things first. You wrote:

   “It is true that Aquinas teaches, in language echoed by Trent, that one cannot know with “indubitable knowledge” that he is either in a state of grace or among those predestined to glory.”

   Let’s not worry about a person having “indubitable knowledge” that they are “among those predestined to glory”. Some Lutherans did think this, but in our Confessions we learn that any double predestination that Luther some people assert that he must have held is rejected and that Christians can indeed lose their faith, or fall away from God (like Thomas). We certainly should have the filial fear (or fear of losing God’s friendship) that he speaks of. So we are a different animal than the reformed. Let us only deal with the idea that one can, in the present, know that they are at that time in a stable relationship with God (i.e at peace with Him). Such that, if they were to drop dead at that moment, they would die in a state of grace and obtain the blessed eternal life that is in His Presence.

   Now, in your last comment you said:

   “Among other things, this is to say that our faith is not in faith (Canons 13 and 14), and that the status of one’s own soul and eternal destiny are not among the articles of faith (Canons 15 and 16), to which pertain “absolute and infallible certainty.”….

   I think we agree with these. From my viewpoint, these anathemas do not “hit” the Lutherans.

   You go on to say:

   “..The qualifying language (which I emphasized), furthermore, would be entirely gratuitous if the Church denied that, apart from special revelation, Christians could enjoy some form of certainty, and corresponding assurance, about their spiritual condition and eternal destiny.”

   Yes, as you pointed out, one can have a “moral certainty”. My beef is with all the distinctions Roman Catholics make among the kinds of certainty. Where are the specifics definitions for what these kinds of certainties are, how they play out on the ground, and what is the underlying reasons (presuppositions) for these definitions?

   I don’t doubt for a minute that these distinctions can be useful in this or that situation, but when Jesus says that we won’t enter the Kingdom of Heaven unless we become like a child, I suggest that He is giving us a clue that such philosophical thinking should not cloud the more basic issue. Can a person falsely be confident that they are in a state of grace? Of course. That does not mean that all persons have a false confidence. If I say I have confidence – what I would be willing to call “indubitable knowledge” – that I am in a very strong and healthy and stable relationship with my wife, you can either disbelieve me or take my word for it. If you believe me, you are putting your trust in my judgment of the situation. Is this something I can know? Of course it is – even as other marriages around us drop like flies/go to hell. The situation is analogous with God. Well, there is no reason that things like “indubitable knowledge” and confidence/certitude/ psychological certainty need be opposed. The question is what constitutes warrant for certainty in one’s personal relationships, period. And here, as I said earlier, I think you are on the right track in recognizing that Luther said that we should not look inward, but put our trust in the rock-solid promises of God applied to us.

   Some questions about your initial essay:

   Thomas says that an objection to the certainty of *hope* is that “there can be no certainty about that which may fail, but notes that certainty is found not only in discovering the essence of things (I think this is what he means), but also by participation (note he also says that another objection is that “hope resides in the will” and “certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect”, and I am not sure in any case I would fully agree with him here – it’s hard for me to know where he gets this or what he really means by it…).

   Can you explain in different words his answer to the first objection? It seems to me that Thomas is saying that one can have the certainty of hope if one participates in the whole teleological structure that God has established: bringing things to certain completion as He has planned to do. In other words, it is in one’s continual participation in this process by which one has hope. Is this correct?

   I think this is what you are saying when you say the following about Thomas’ view:

   “In hope, we enjoy the assurance that we will receive all the help necessary to attain final salvation. Thus, hope does not only look to the end to be obtained (final salvation/eternal happiness), in which case it would be indistinguishable from fortitude, but also to the divine help by which we are enabled to obtain that end.”

   I think we would definitely say something similar – although we would talk about the importance of retaining a living faith that continues to look outward to Christ’s objective Promises (which one can’t really do apart from the presence of true repentance). We would look at a passage like the end of Romans 8 as being written precisely to encourage believers in this kind of hope.

   In reply to Objection 2 Thomas says: “Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God’s omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God’s omnipotence and mercy”

   And here, I suspect that Trent means that one is certain, by faith, of God’s omnipotence and mercy, but not necessarily in one’s own case, period. But is seems you are saying there is actually a legitimate debate among interpreters of Thomas regarding what he means here… In my simple reading of what you have provided here, it seems clear that he is talking precisely about certain individuals being certain of God’s mercy [and omnipotence] ***in their case****. Of course, you say, “Hope is based upon faith, but not reducible to faith. Faith accepts the Gospel as divine truth, and hope receives that truth as good news “for me.”

   You see, we would call that faith itself. We would say that faith, which is basically trust, knowledge and assent (with infants it would be almost all trust, with the other things developing as the spiritual life grows), is that which receives the truth as good news “for me”. Hope might be the confidence that we not only have faith now, but that God will give us all we need to persevere, because all is rooted in the work of Christ that He has shared with us in the seed of our baptism. As you say: ““Hope, according to Aquinas, proceeds from faith in the mercy and omnipotence of God, who wills all men to be saved. (ST, II-II, q. 18, a. 4.)”

   Also, I assume here it is safe to say that in RC theology, faith is more about what the intellect knows, and assents to (it is not that trust is not an element of faith here, but…). In our view, faith, in order to be real faith, needs to have trust as a component, and needs to be trusting the right thing (so the faith James talks about, which the devils share, is not really true faith) – and faith is living and active – where there is smoke (faith) there is fire (love and good works).

   In reply to Objection 3 he says: “That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency in God’s power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.”

   What does he mean when he talks about hope placing its trust in God’s power or mercy? Is it not the person who trusts God’s mercy? Or, if we are going to talk about these things that occur in persons apart from the persons, do we not still say that *faith* places its trust in God’s power and mercy (for me), before hope does? Is not our hope based on our faith, or trust in God’s mercy? (maybe this is what he is saying?)

   St. Thomas:

   “Since, however, the death of Christ is, so to say, the universal cause of human salvation, and since a universal cause must be applied singly to each of its effects, it was necessary to show men some remedies through which the benefit of Christ’s death could somehow be conjoined to them. It is of this sort, of course, that the sacraments of the Church are said to be. (Summa contra Gentiles 4:56, 1, trans. Charles J. O’Neil [Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1957].)”

   Right. And this is why, for example, when a pastor pronounces absolution – and we really trust His words – we can have certainty of salvation at that moment. It is not “special revelation” in the same way the Scriptures are, but it is a revelation that is personally applied to us, and is to be believed/trusted in. This, as best as I can tell, was one of the main reasons that Luther was excommunicated. This arrogant monk had a confidence in God’s mercy – and God’s desire to spread His mercy – in a way that undermined the goals and desires of the RC church in his day.

   To touch on the other concerns in your essay, Luther did not presume that one could obtain pardon without repentance. He also would have never said that a person who was not sanctified would be saved. His concern was pastoral: that persons who had a deep knowledge of their sin (i.e. like the wicked in Romans 4:5) would not trust in themselves or their own merits God had put in them before His seat, but would look outside of themselves to the merits of Christ and His mercy, given in His Means of Grace. Again, Luther would have never said that the justified man (reconciled with God and having the future Promise of glory) is not cleansed from sin by the Holy Spirit (and also saved to do good works, which are certainly necessary for the Christian). He simply wanted to focus person’s eyes on the mercy of God to cover their sinfulness and all the sins they knew they had commited before God (and regretted). Is this the sin against the Holy Spirit, which Scripture seems to say is attributing the good works of God to Satan? Evidently not, because you conclude: “Faith that gives rise to the assurance of hope is focused upon God, not upon the subject who has faith. God as revealed in Christ Jesus is the object of saving faith” and “The love of God poured out in our hearts (i.e. sanctifying grace) is not the proper object of hope”

   But again, I am by no means convinced that Trent would agree with you.

   We will persevere in sins though – although this is not what we want. The Christian is the one who knows their sin, confesses it, and longs to be rid of it. We do not “continue to sin” in this way (per I John). We also know that we will not be rid of it until we die or Christ returns (per I John). Our whole life is one of repentance. If you search for “Transformation Failure” and “theology like a child” you will pull up my post that deals with the struggle here.

   +Nathan

9. Nathan December 4th, 2011 1:34 pm :

   Andrew,

   Here’s that post I mentioned in my last paragraph: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2009/12/23/transformation-failure-3/

10. Nathan December 4th, 2011 1:36 pm :

    Andrew,

    After I had read Dr. Judisch’s *first paragraph*, I quickly wrote down the following (as I thought that I knew where he was going):

    “ the author says, “By ‘strict certainty’ I mean a kind of epistemic certainty implying the impossibility of being wrong given the internal evidence before you – given, that is, the evidence accessible to your consciousness and/or instrospective awareness – and not necessarily a form of certainty which deals in psychological feelings of confidence or certitude.)”. I don’t doubt for a minute that these distinctions can be useful in this or that situation, but when Jesus says that we won’t enter the Kingdom of Heaven unless we become like a child, I suggest that He is giving us a clue that such philosophical thinking should not cloud the more basic issue. Can a person falsely be confident that they are in a state of grace. Of course. That does not mean that all persons have a false confidence. If I say I have confidence – what I would be willing to call a “strict certainty” (when Dr. Judisch says “Everybody seemed to agree, at least at various points in their reflections, that you might not have (do not have?) strict certainty regarding… whether you are currently justified (or “saved”)” I fundamentally disagree with him – ) -that I am in a very strong and healthy and stable relationship with my wife, you can either disbelieve me or take my word for it. If you believe me, you are putting your trust in my judgment of the situation. Is this something I can know? Of course it is – even as other marriages around us drop like flies/go to hell. The situation is analogous with God. Well, there is no reason that “strict certainty” and confidence/certitude/ psychological certainty need be opposed. The question is what constitutes warrant for certainty in one’s personal relationships, period. I would be interested in knowing what Dr. Judisch considers to be things that we can have “strict certainty” about.

    BUT then I read on to see him say:

    “It’s possible that a person who is justified at a time is able to have strict certainty that he is justified at that time, without its being the case that he can have strict certainty that he is among the elect.”

    !!!

    …and many other amazing statements in support of Luther and his views! Remarkable. I have *never* seen such an endorsement of Luther’s views on these issues from a Roman Catholic.

    That said, at the end of my last post to you, I noted the following:

    “Luther did not presume that one could obtain pardon without repentance. He also would have never said that a person who was not sanctified would be saved. His concern was pastoral: that persons who had a deep knowledge of their sin (i.e. like the wicked in Romans 4:5) would not trust in themselves or their own merits God had put in them before His seat, but would look outside of themselves to the merits of Christ and His mercy, given in His Means of Grace. Again, Luther would have never said that the justified man (reconciled with God and having the future Promise of glory) is not cleansed from sin by the Holy Spirit (and also saved to do good works, which are certainly necessary for the Christian). He simply wanted to focus person’s eyes on the mercy of God to cover their sinfulness and all the sins they knew they had commited before God (and regretted). Is this the sin against the Holy Spirit, which Scripture seems to say is attributing the good works of God to Satan? Evidently not, because you conclude: “Faith that gives rise to the assurance of hope is focused upon God, not upon the subject who has faith. God as revealed in Christ Jesus is the object of saving faith” and “The love of God poured out in our hearts (i.e. sanctifying grace) is not the proper object of hope”

    But again, I am by no means convinced that Trent would agree with you.”

    Even if, as Dr. Judisch notes, Alister McGrath says the following:

    “Trent’s point seems to be that the reformers seemed to be making human confidence or boldness the grounds for justification, so that justification rested upon a fallible human conviction, rather than on the grace of God. The reformers, however, saw themselves as stressing that justification rested upon the promises of God; a failure to believe boldly in such promises was tantamount to calling the reliability of God into question.”

    …I maintain that this is very likely not the case. I think this is what a lot of people *want* to be true (this reminds me of many of the things that find man, Al Kimmel [the Pontificator] would write about n his blog many years ago), but that it really is not. Luther had made it very clear in his writings that what he and the Lutherans were talking about was alien righteousness and even alien faith. It seems to me that this is precisely what got him condemned, over and over. If Luther did in fact agree with Thomas, Trent did not.

    I’d rather this not be the case, but I’m quite confident that it is. I think it would take some very, very solid evidence to convince me otherwise. Though not as confident as I am that I am in a state of grace via the external Promise of God alone. : )

    Best regards,

    Nathan Rinne

11. Andrew Preslar December 4th, 2011 9:32 pm :

    Nathan,

    Thanks for the responses. I’ll try to read and reply later this week.

    (By the way, though I first posted this more than two years ago, it has recently been much revised, so to tie up some loose ends. The current version reflects a bit of the thinking that I have done on this subject over the past two years. The main thesis is the same, but the details are, I hope, better understood and expressed. Again, I look forward to interacting with your comments and reading the material to which you have referred.)

    Andrew

12. Andrew Preslar December 5th, 2011 1:47 pm :

    Nathan,

    I read the material on your blog and listened to the White Horse Inn podcast. Let me just say that we have many of the same concerns, though perhaps significantly different (not completely different) ways of addressing those concerns. Here are some replies to your comment #8:

    You wrote:

    Yes, as you pointed out, one can have a “moral certainty”. My beef is with all the distinctions Roman Catholics make among the kinds of certainty. Where are the specifics definitions for what these kinds of certainties are, how they play out on the ground, and what is the underlying reasons (presuppositions) for these definitions?

    Certainty is a subjective condition relative to a variety of factors. Perhaps some examples will convey my meaning, and at least by implication address the several aspects of your question:

    1. I am certain that God is love, and that God loves me. These certainties are based upon what I know (through reason and revelation) about the nature of God and the operations of God (the second certainty is what gives rise to the certainty of hope, regarding God’s provision for my own salvation).

    2.I am certain that he who has begun a good work in me (at Baptism) will bring it to completion on the Day of Judgment. This is the certainty of hope.

    3. I am certain that the law of non-contradiction is true, because it is impossible to deny it without invoking it. It is rationally inescapable.

    4. I am certain that Adam and Eve are historical persons, because this has been revealed by God in Sacred Scripture, as interpreted by the Catholic Church (this interpretation being evinced by the unanimous consent of the Fathers and the explicit teaching of Pope Pius XII).

    5. I am certain that the country of Canada lies immediately to the north of the contiguous United States. This certainty is the result of overwhelming and virtually undisputed testimony. (Granted, the idea of Canada does sometimes seem far-fetched to us Americans, but only a real kook would deny that that country actually exists!)

    6. I am certain that my brother does not intend to murder me. This certainty is founded upon long, personal experience, including knowledge of his character.

    7. I am also certain that the dispatcher in Pittsburgh, whom I call each evening when I have finished work, does not intend to murder me. This certainty is pretty much founded on a “no reason to think such a thing” basis.

    The different kinds or classifications of certainty (however many they might be; e.g., knowledge, faith, hope, moral certainty, presumption, delusion) correspond to the different things of which one is certain, together with the conditions under which certainty obtains, and perhaps the differing significance and subjective “feel” of each instance of certainty (although the latter can vary somewhat from person to person and time to time). My confidence in God regarding salvation is an instance of the certainty or assurance of hope. My confidence in my brother is an example of what I mean by “moral certainty”; that is, although in the realm of logically possibility his intentions could be otherwise, and though God has not revealed my brother’s intentions to me, I am certain that he means me no mortal harm.

    This same kind of certainty, moral certainty, to be distinguished from the certainty of the rationally inescapable, the certainty of faith, and the certainty of hope, can legitimately be enjoyed by Catholics with respect to being in a state of grace, at least in the sense that Trent seems not to disallow such moral certainty of grace, as indicated in comment #6. Of course, being morally certain of being in a state of grace is not a necessary condition of actually being in a state of grace.

    I can have doubts about myself, and still trust in God for deliverance from sin and sustenance in a state of grace, so long as I make faithful use of the means of grace, especially going to Confession and Mass. For me, one usual result of this religious activity, especially right after a double dose of the sacraments–Reconciliation and Communion–is a kind of confidence, a moral certainty if you will, of being in a state of grace. Among the conditions or presuppositions underlying this sacramental certainty are a constant reliance on the mercy of God (“Lord, I am not worthy that you should come under my roof, but only say the word and my soul shall be healed”), the intention to obey his will, and a right understanding of the difference between mortal and venial sin.

    It looks like your comments immediately following the above question track pretty well with my idea of moral certainty. The reason for making these distinctions is that the distinctions are there in reality. Not to see or not to acknowledge them could be a kind of ignorance and/or carelessness. Good philosophy is a remedy for such ills.

    Of course, since “moral certainty” is not a logically inescapable kind of certainty, there could be cases in which one should be morally certain of something but is not. This might be due to incredulity, or scrupulosity, or some other contingent factor. Conversely, the credulous or presumptuous person might hope for or be morally certain of something that he should not be certain about. Some have argued that Martin Luther fit into both categories: the first as a Catholic, the second as a Protestant. I don’t know enough about Luther to opine on that.

    Regarding the relation of faith and hope, I think that Protestants tend to include the latter in the definition of the former, while Catholic theology distinguishes these virtues by definition, and relates them psychologically. Such distinguishing and relating is the hallmark of St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica. You ask me to clarify or restate Thomas’s reasoning on the nature of hope and its relation to faith, and the relation of each to the faculties of intellect and will. For now, I will refer you to Thomas himself, in Question 17 of the section on hope, particularly Articles 6–8. That might help.

    You wrote:

    But again, I am by no means convinced that Trent would agree with you.

    Well, I encourage you to read again the concluding quote from Trent, in the post. This seems to perfectly cohere with what St. Thomas says about the virtue of hope as related to faith and charity, focused upon God in Christ Jesus, for salvation.

13. Andrew Preslar December 5th, 2011 2:15 pm :

    Nathan,

    A quick note on your comment #10:

    You wrote:

    BUT then I read on to see [Neal Judisch] say:

    “It’s possible that a person who is justified at a time is able to have strict certainty that he is justified at that time, without its being the case that he can have strict certainty that he is among the elect.”

    !!!

    …and many other amazing statements in support of Luther and his views! Remarkable. I have *never* seen such an endorsement of Luther’s views on these issues from a Roman Catholic.

    Neal can speak for himself on this, but my perception is that he was not intending to affirm the Lutheran view of strict certainty of justification. Rather, he was affirming that it is logically consistent to be strictly certain of justification while not being strictly certain of being among the elect, granted the thesis that the two categories–(1) those who have been justified at some point in time, and (2) those who have been elected to final salvation/perseverance–are not coextensive.

14. Nathan December 5th, 2011 4:11 pm :

    Andrew,

    Thanks for doing this. It might be a while before I can write again (but then again, I said that before… : ) ).

    I’m guessing a week or so.

    +Nathan

15. Nathan December 6th, 2011 10:12 am :

    Andrew,

    I have not read everything you wrote above yet, but I did notice this:

    “Neal can speak for himself on this, but my perception is that he was not intending to affirm the Lutheran view of strict certainty of justification. Rather, he was affirming that it is logically consistent to be strictly certain of justification while not being strictly certain of being among the elect, granted the thesis that the two categories–(1) those who have been justified at some point in time, and (2) those who have been elected to final salvation/perseverance–are not coextensive.”

    I hope you understand my frustration in talking with RCs about this issue. It is precisely things like this inability to be clear that make this discussion so difficult. Maybe he should go clarify his post as well (by the way, I think it might be better to re-issue the post as a 2nd, [or 3rd] edition, so people can compare how what you thought in the past has changed)

    I’m hoping after I read your other comments I don’t feel the same way.

    +Nathan

16. Andrew Preslar December 6th, 2011 2:25 pm :

    Nathan,

    Sorry that you’re frustrated. The details of the doctrinal matters that separate Christians can be complicated. But in these discussions, it is necessary to move beyond popular generalization, especially to avoid caricature of positions other than one’s own. Also, it is necessary to be patient, in order to understand the theological framework that gives context to the various views of particular doctrines. Of course, there is a sense in which everyone who has faith apprehends the whole of the faith, simply and implicitly. This is a blessed truth, but the fact remains that those who have faith, in this sense, are not completely united in the faith. There are schisms among Christians. Figuring out why this is the case, trying to understand one another, and fostering the hope that these wounds can be healed in this life, so that the world might believe in Jesus, can involve some frustration. But I think that pursuit of the goal is worth that price.

    Of course, it is good to express oneself as clearly as possible. I think that the distinction that Neal is drawing is quite clear. In fact, it is one that a Lutheran should be very comfortable with; i.e., the difference between strict certainty of justification right now, and strict certainty of being among the elect. After all, you guys, like Catholics, affirm that not every person who is at some point justified will finally be saved. As for my own post, I would rather modify one version than post multiple versions side by side. And I know that I am not always as clear as I could be in expressing my views. Sorry about that. Part of the function of a comment box is to give folks the opportunity to ask for clarification of claims and arguments, so to foster mutual understanding. If anything that I have written remains unclear to you, a cause of frustration, just point it out and I’ll do my best to clarify, as I am sure you would do for me.

    Andrew

17. Nathan December 13th, 2011 10:38 am :

    Andrew,

    Not sure when I will have time to respond again (the Thomas thing you linked me to will take a while). I’ve got some questions though.

    Do you know if the understandings of certitude found here (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03539b.htm) have their roots in St. Thomas? If so, can you help me locate this in his writings? If not, do you know about the time this way of distinguishing certitude arose?

    Thanks for your patience.

    +Nathan

18. Andrew Preslar December 13th, 2011 12:56 pm :

    Nathan,

    St. Thomas, as a student and expositor of Aristotle, was familiar with the distinction between science and opinion, and with the kinds of certitude that pertain to the respective sciences, but I do not know if he distinguished between the kinds of certitude mentioned in the Catholic Encyclopedia article. As a Christian, he was of course familiar with the certitude of faith, which is again distinct from science. (For Thomas, following Aristotle, “science” is a strictly defined knowledge. This should not be confused with the modern sense of the term “science.”)

    So far as I can tell, St. Thomas would correlate “metaphysical certitude” with science, and “physical certitude” and “moral certitude” with opinion, since he defines opinion broadly as pertaining to that which could be otherwise (i.e., the contingent).

    What seems to be the case is that the article, without going against the basic distinctions enunciated by Aristotle and St. Thomas, discerns two “epistemic conditions” between science (strictly speaking) and opinion, namely, physical and moral certitude. Although these pertain to that which is contingent, they are in a certain sense immune to misgiving or doubt. Aristotle and Thomas pointed out the simple distinction between what is absolutely immune from doubt and what is not thus immune. The article discerns a further distinction, i.e., that which is practically immune from doubt, and thus builds upon the work of these great philosophers.

    Thomas discusses these matters in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (see especially ch. 44, “Science Compared with Other Modes of Knowing”).

    Update: You also asked when this sort of distinction, between metaphysical, physical, and moral certitude, is first found in philosophy. I did not mean to overlook that question. Others can give a more informed and therefore specific answer. In general, a lot of modern philosophy, Descartes being the fountainhead, focuses on the inward experience of the subject as a starting point for inquiry. This approach has its drawbacks, some of them serious, but with it has come an emphasis on epistemology unlike anything found in previous periods. Thus, philosophers in general, even those who think that modern philosophy gets off on the wrong foot, have paid close attention to variations in certitude, as denoting states of mind. One can see the fruits of this inward turn in Christian thinkers ranging from Blessed John Henry Cardinal Newman (e.g., Grammar of Assent) to American analytic philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga (e.g., Warranted Christian Belief).

19. Nathan December 15th, 2011 10:24 am :

    Andrew,

    Hopefully, I will have another response soon.

    In the meantime, I am wondering if you could clarify something for me:

    “…As a Christian, he was of course familiar with the certitude of faith, which is again distinct from science. (For Thomas, following Aristotle, “science” is a strictly defined knowledge. This should not be confused with the modern sense of the term “science.”)

    So far as I can tell, St. Thomas would correlate “metaphysical certitude” with science, and “physical certitude” and “moral certitude” with opinion, since he defines opinion broadly as pertaining to that which could be otherwise (i.e., the contingent).”

    The certitude of faith, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia article, it says “It should be noted, too, that in the common opinion of theologians there is a greater certitude in divine faith than in any human science.” In other words, we can be even more certain about what the [Roman Catholic] Church teaches than any human science, including “metaphysical certitude”, correct?

    Thanks again!

    +Nathan

20. Andrew Preslar December 15th, 2011 11:35 am :

    Nathan,

    You asked:

    In other words, we can be even more certain about what the [Roman Catholic] Church teaches than any human science, including “metaphysical certitude”, correct?

    Yes, that is correct.

    This is why: The object of divine faith is nothing other than God himself. We believe in God by means of divine revelation, which in the fullest sense is God himself, the Word made flesh, who in turn sends the Holy Spirit of God, who testifies through the prophets and apostles. Because the Church is the mystical Body of Christ, whose animating principle, or soul, as it were, is the Holy Spirit, we believe the Church with the full assent of faith, just as we confess in the Nicene Creed, even though the Church is not the object of faith (the Holy Trinity is). The Church is the custodian of divine revelation, the “place” where we meet God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Therefore, we believe in God through believing the Church, and this includes the faithful reception of that which has been divinely revealed as made explicit by a doctrinal definition of the Church. If such a definition could be contrary to divine revelation, then the mystical Body of Christ with its animating principle, the Holy Spirit, would be a kingdom divided against itself. But a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand. The Church, however, cannot fall. So the Church, when expounding the meaning of divine revelation through a doctrinal definition intended to be binding upon all the faithful, cannot contradict the actual meaning of divine revelation. Nothing is more certain than the word of God, because God is truth itself. This is the basis of the certitude of faith, as well as the reason that this certitude surpasses even metaphysical certitude (the CE article reflects St. Thomas’s teaching on this matter). The certitude of faith encompasses “what the [Roman Catholic] Church teaches” because of the Church’s unique relation to divine revelation, as just described.

21. Nathan December 15th, 2011 12:13 pm :

    Andrew,

    Thanks again for your comments. A couple quick points/questions

    “We believe in God by means of divine revelation, which in the fullest sense is God himself, the Word made flesh, who in turn sends the Holy Spirit of God, who testifies through the prophets and apostles.”

    Yes, I would simply add that when we trust God’s Word, we can see the visible manifestation of God in Christ for what it really is. Right hearing is critical here, because this is how we see God in Jesus in the concrete.

    “we believe the Church with the full assent of faith, just as we confess in the Nicene Creed, even though the Church is not the object of faith (the Holy Trinity is).”

    I do believe that “The Church is the custodian of divine revelation” and that we trust the Church (we go different places from here though…how this plays out on the ground). That said, of course Augustine says you are not reading Nicea correctly here.

    “If such a definition could be contrary to divine revelation, then the mystical Body of Christ with its animating principle, the Holy Spirit, would be a kingdom divided against itself. But a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand.”

    I see where you are going here, I think. What would you say about Paul talking about how there must be divisions to see who has God’s approval? How do you read that?

    “The Church, however, cannot fall.”

    Agreed. And it is visible. How big does it need to be do you think? : )

22. Andrew Preslar December 15th, 2011 3:37 pm :

    Nathan,

    I wouldn’t want to oppose St. Augustine’s understanding of that article of the Nicene Creed. However, you didn’t specify where the opposition lies, so I cannot respond to your claim about the correct reading.

    In any case, my gloss on the Creed was more of an inference than an interpretation; i.e., given that we “believe in one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church,” and given the nature of that church, it is unconscionable to reject the teaching of the church, when she declares and defines something as belonging to the deposit of faith.

    In 1 Corinthians 11, St. Paul is addressing factions within a local church, not a supposed division of the universal Church.

    The visible Church that Christ founded needs to be large enough to merit the adjective “catholic,” which is how the Fathers referred to that one Body spread throughout the known world, as distinct from schisms and the proliferating sects. In addition, the visible Church that Christ founded needs to be old enough to be traced back to Christ, obviously.

23. Nathan December 16th, 2011 9:18 am :

    Andrew,

    I may be able to make time to track down the Augustine quotation. As I recall, it is very clear though: he explicitly says the Creed is not to be understood in the way you put it.

    I remember reading it here: http://www.amazon.com/Church-Theological-Commonplaces-Numbered/dp/0758618670 Gerhard is usually very careful with his quotations.

    Your take on I Corinthians 11 I find to be interesting. We would say that this can certainly be extrapolated.

    +Nathan

24. Nathan December 19th, 2011 9:28 am :

    Andrew

    “we have many of the same concerns, though perhaps significantly different (not completely different) ways of addressing those concerns”

    I am interested in what overlap I have found by talking with you.

    First of all, in the article I recently read at Brian Cross’ suggestion (New Advent on “certitude” which we have discussed here) two kinds of certainty were addressed, objective and subjective (also called “certitude”). I think both of these need to be addressed here, since this has to do in part with God’s objective promises made to an individual – things that have been explicitly revealed to that person by means of God’s messenger. In general, when those in the Apostolic ministry speak of revealed truth that applies to all, they are to be believed. And in general, when those in the Apostolic ministry *reveal* that God has forgiven *this or that person* – which brings “peace with God” (Romans 5:1) – they are to be believed. Before this is about the subjective this is about things that are objective.

    First, I will comment on some of your kinds of certainty:

    *I am certain that God is love, and that God loves me. These certainties are based upon what I know (through reason and revelation) about the nature of God and the operations of God (the second certainty is what gives rise to the certainty of hope, regarding God’s provision for my own salvation).

    Yes, I understand and share.

    *I am certain that he who has begun a good work in me (at Baptism) will bring it to completion on the Day of Judgment. This is the certainty of hope.

    Yes. Are you saying you know you are currently saved (i.e. in a stable relationship with God, i.e. a state of grace) or, are you only saying that you know that if you have faith and love – and continue to follow in His paths – that you can have *a* moral certainty that you will be saved?

    *I am certain that the law of non-contradiction is true, because it is impossible to deny it without invoking it. It is rationally inescapable.

    Yes. It makes no sense to say it is raining and not raining in the same place at the same time.

    *I am certain that my brother does not intend to murder me. This certainty is founded upon long, personal experience, including knowledge of his character.

    OK. I believe you.

    “My confidence in my brother is an example of what I mean by “moral certainty”; that is, although in the realm of logically possibility his intentions could be otherwise, and though God has not revealed my brother’s intentions to me, I am certain that he means me no mortal harm.”

    Here may be where we disagree. Although you may think that it is in the realm of logical possibility that your brother may intend to kill you, would you agree that it is possible to know a person well enough that such “logical possibilities” cease to become logical? If not, why not? Just because every person who might have such confidence might not prove to be right? In addition, your example of certainty within the realm of relationships here is pretty weak, as mine dealt more with confidence in the stability and strength of a marriage relationship, i.e. a desire to continually love and forgive the other, not just a lack of a desire and intention to kill them.

    You go on to say:

    “This same kind of certainty, moral certainty, to be distinguished from the certainty of the rationally inescapable, the certainty of faith, and the certainty of hope, can legitimately be enjoyed by Catholics with respect to being in a state of grace, at least in the sense that Trent seems not to disallow such moral certainty of grace, as indicated in comment #6. Of course, being morally certain of being in a state of grace is not a necessary condition of actually being in a state of grace.”

    “Amen” to the last sentence. Still, your first sentence: distinguished in what sense? Obviously in the sense that while a person who is certain of being in a state of grace may not be, a person who is certain about the teachings of the Catholic Church cannot be wrong (in your view). But how else is this moral certainty really to be distinguished from the certainty of faith and certainty of hope? Any other ways?

    The quote from Trent you have been using says:

    Now, they [the adults] are disposed to that justice when, aroused and aided by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are moved freely toward God, believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised, especially that the sinner is justified by God by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves from the fear of divine justice, by which they are salutarily aroused, to consider the mercy of God, are raised to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ’s sake; and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice, and on that account are moved against sin by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by that repentance that must be performed before baptism; finally, when they resolve to receive baptism, to begin a new life and to keep the commandments of God. (The Council of Trent, Session VI, Chapter 6.)

    I will admit this sounds alright. But then again, in other places the content of this statement seems to be expanded on in ways that are less than helpful.

    For example:

    For even as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, even so each one, when he regards himself, and his own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and apprehension touching his own grace; seeing that no one can know with a certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God.

    “no one can know with a certainty of faith…that he has obtained the grace of God.” Here we would say that whatever the pastor looses is loosed as if God Himself had done it. This is not a revelation from God applied personally?

    Again, if Bellarmine said this: “The doctrine that in the present life men cannot attain to an assurance of faith regarding their righteousness, with the exception of a few whom God deems worthy to have this fact revealed to them by a special revelation – this doctrine is a current opinion among nearly all theologians,” and if Cajetan said to Luther that “one could never be certain that one’s contrition was sufficient to effect the forgiveness one hoped to receive” (Hendrix, Papacy and Rome) it seems to me that I can have no certainty that Rome meant Trent to be taken in the way you are reading it – or, given the lack of clarification from on high – they are doing this now.

    “I can have doubts about myself, and still trust in God for deliverance from sin and sustenance in a state of grace, so long as I make faithful use of the means of grace, especially going to Confession and Mass. For me, one usual result of this religious activity, especially right after a double dose of the sacraments–Reconciliation and Communion–is a kind of confidence, a moral certainty if you will, of being in a state of grace. Among the conditions or presuppositions underlying this sacramental certainty are a constant reliance on the mercy of God (“Lord, I am not worthy that you should come under my roof, but only say the word and my soul shall be healed”), the intention to obey his will, and a right understanding of the difference between mortal and venial sin.”

    We have a different understanding of the nature of sin than you (and this influences what we say may or may not be mortal sin), but as regards certainty, it seems you pretty much have a Lutheran view – my question now is, or course, how your view of confession and absolution differed from the one of Luther that Cajetan, the Pope, and Trent condemned (I know you don’t think you know enough about Luther here…). It sounds like you would not say you *know* you have eternal life or “peace with God”, like John or Paul says – do you think this is a difference? My position would be that you can know and may know – but that the teachings of the RC church on this issue at the very least cause confusion on this issue and at worst mitigate the certainty that you are meant to really have here. I know a little bit about philosophy, and I’m not so sure that what is happening here with Rome is always “good philosophy”.

    A pastor I know said the following: “”assurance and certainty about salvation and election are not abstract philosophical truths that can be considered apart from faith and the gospel. If and as long as there is genuine faith in the gospel, there is blessed assurance. May that assurance abide with us always.”

    Those are the kinds of words I consistently need. I want to still talk – I am sorry if you feel like I am being unfair to you, but I hope my concerns seem reasonable and make sense.

    “Regarding the relation of faith and hope, I think that Protestants tend to include the latter in the definition of the former, while Catholic theology distinguishes these virtues by definition, and relates them psychologically…. For now, I will refer you to Thomas himself, in Question 17 of the section on hope, particularly Articles 6–8. That might help.”

    Helpful. Thank you. For now, let me point out that we Lutherans also distinguish faith and hope.

    In sum, here is where I am right now with all this: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/knowledge-first-and-foremost-baby-king-david-vs-adult-st-thomas/

    +Nathan

25. Ray Stamper December 19th, 2011 2:46 pm :

    Andrew,

    I am spending some time working through the “certainty” issue w/regard to the faith & reason “epistemic joint”. Nathan asked you:

    “In other words, we can be even more certain about what the [Roman Catholic] Church teaches than any human science, including “metaphysical certitude”, correct?”

    In #20, you responded in the affirmative, and followed that affirmation with an explanation. I agree with everything you wrote in that explanation, but I remain a little hesitant (at least from one angle) about the notion that Catholic dogma is known with greater certainty than truths known through metaphysical demonstration. The crucial portion of your explanation (at least from my perspective) is the following:

    “The Church is the custodian of divine revelation, the “place” where we meet God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Therefore, we believe in God through believing the Church, and this includes the faithful reception of that which has been divinely revealed as made explicit by a doctrinal definition of the Church.”

    I agree that whatever is revealed by God is more certain than that which can be known via metaphysical demonstration; for God, by nature, cannot error; whereas, we – even in a metaphysical demonstration – might (especially as one approaches the most abstract domains of that science). So in that respect, yes; in so far as the teachings of the Catholic Church are known to be authorized by God, those teachings surpass metaphysical demonstration with regard to certitude.

    However, God’s revelation passes into the public domain via some proximate instrumentality, such that we can only be certain that a given teaching is from God (and, therefore, more certain than truths known via metaphysical demonstration) to the degree that we are certain that the proximate instrument, through which we received that teaching was (or is), in fact, an instrument used by God. But this forces us, ISTM, to focus in on the central role played by the motives of credibilty (MOC), in establishing the fact of the Catholic Church as the instrument through which God’s revelation is definitively promulgated.

    Now, let me set aside both the “motives of faith” (i.e., influence of grace on the will, leading one to desire the goods set forth in the proclamation of divine revelation), as well as the infusion of supernatural faith wherein grace elevates the intellect to see or apprehend the MOC with a clarity and connectivity that produces supernatural certainty regarding the Church’s claim to be the “custodian of divine revelation”. With these set aside, we are left with natural reason and its native resources. Within this resource set, I am not sure I would affirm that the demonstrative or persuasive power of the MOC issue in the same level of certainty as attaches to metaphysical demonstration.

    I am not saying (lest I find myself in opposition to Vatican I) that no certainty attaches to the MOC. I think the MOC are certain in such a way that one is culpable for rejecting the conclusion to which they lead (asuming one has rightly understood the MOC); for culpability, ISTM, can attach to rejection of truths which are known on grounds less certain than metaphysical demonstration. Folks are convicted in human courts so long as the evidence affirms a guilt-proposition beyond a “reasonable doubt” – a criterion hardly rising to the clarity of metaphysical demonstration.

    Where, exactly, the type of certainty affirmed for the MOC by Vatican I falls along the spectrum of certainty (say from moral certainty to metaphysical certainty) I am not yet clear about. Still, the historical nature of the MOC seems to introduce elements for consideration which make me doubtful that the conclusions will produce a certainty as sharp and vivid to natural reason as those arrived at by metaphysical demonstration. Of course, the game changes if we introduce the effects of actual or sanctifying grace, supernatural faith, etc. into the mix. But I am thinking about the question within the ambit of natural reason alone (the way one might explain the epistemic situation to a pagan while awaiting and praying for the Holy Spirit’s active influence upon his mind and will).

    Anyhow, I know this question has been kicked around a few times here at C2C, but I wonder what your thoughts are on these concerns I raise w/regard to the comparison of human certainty regarding the MOC (and indirectly Catholic dogma) with human certainty in metaphysics.

    Pax Christi,

    -Ray

26. Andrew Preslar December 20th, 2011 2:25 pm :

    Ray,

    You wrote:

    I agree that whatever is revealed by God is more certain than that which can be known via metaphysical demonstration; for God, by nature, cannot error; whereas, we – even in a metaphysical demonstration – might (especially as one approaches the most abstract domains of that science). So in that respect, yes; in so far as the teachings of the Catholic Church are known to be authorized by God, those teachings surpass metaphysical demonstration with regard to certitude.

    That is pretty much my understanding–though I cannot put a fine point on it. For Aquinas, scientific knowledge, like faith but unlike opinion, excludes doubt, so in that sense they are equally certain:

    It does not seem possible for a person simultaneously to have scientific knowledge and opinion about the same thing, for opinion includes a fear that the other part [of the contradiction] is true, and scientific knowledge excludes such fear…. (De veritate, 14. 9. ad 6.)

    Regarding the motives of credibility and certitude, Lamentibili Sane (1907) seems to be more relevant than Vatican I (the Council focused upon the extreme of rationalism, and therefore emphasized the distinctiveness of faith, as resting upon divine revelation, cf. Session III.). LS, for example, condemned the following propositions:

    24. The exegete who constructs premises from which it follows that dogmas are historically false or doubtful is not to be reproved as long as he does not directly deny the dogmas themselves.

    25. The assent of faith ultimately rests on a mass of probabilities.

    In might be interesting to note, in connection with proposition 25 (condemned) in LS, that in 1864, in his famous Apologia, Newman gave the following account of the broad contours of his intellectual journey from Anglicanism to Catholicism:

    In the first chapter of this narrative I spoke of certitude as the consequence, divinely intended and enjoined upon us, of the accumulative force of certain given reasons which, taken one by one, were only probabilities. Let it be recollected that I am historically relating my state of mind, at the period of my life which I am surveying. I am not speaking theologically, nor have I any intention of going into controversy, or of defending myself; but speaking historically of what I held in 1843-4, I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, and that these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of course in subject matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind, a cumulative, a transcendent probability but still probability; inasmuch as He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities;—He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do, and carries us on, if our will does but co-operate with His, {200} to a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions. And thus I came to see clearly, and to have a satisfaction in seeing, that, in being led on into the Church of Rome, I was not proceeding on any secondary or isolated grounds of reason, or by controversial points in detail, but was protected and justified, even in the use of those secondary or particular arguments, by a great and broad principle. But, let it be observed, that I am stating a matter of fact, not defending it; and if any Catholic says in consequence that I have been converted in a wrong way, I cannot help that now. (Apologia pro vita sua, Chapter 4, Part 2, par. 6.)

    At first blush, Newman seems to affirm what would later be condemned (in 1907). And by his own account, Newman would be fine with that, and simply admit that in fact the certitude of faith does not rest on a “mass of probabilities,” even though, taking each argument in itself, he failed to see them as more than probable. And that pretty much sums up my predicament, unless there is some way to distinguish between Newman’s sense of “probability” and the sense in which that term is used in LS. For the motives of credibility surely include historical arguments, and historical arguments (e.g., for the authenticity of the Gospels, the historicity of the Resurrection, the establishment of the Church, the Apostolic Succession, etc.) by the nature of the case (pertaining to the contingent) do not yield metaphysical certitude. Of course, as I have been arguing in previous comments, there is a kind of certainty distinct from both the certainty of scientific knowledge and the certainty of faith, and this would be moral certainty.

    There might be several ways of reconciling LS 25 with Newman’s account, especially since Newman would surely deny that the assent of faith “ultimately” rests on a “mass of probabilities.” For example, perhaps there is a relevant distinction between a collection of probable arguments that taken together cannot (or ought not) render one morally certain of the motives of credibility (this would be what is condemned by LS) and a collection of probable arguments that taken together do (or should) render one morally certain of the motives of credibility (this would be the sense affirmed by Newman). This distinction allows us to affirm LS, while denying that the motives of credibility (at least, those involving historical inquiry) are indubitable by way of demonstrative argument, and therefore not probable arguments. Of course, as Newman himself admitted, his analysis in the Apologia could be theologically incorrect. But because it tracks pretty well with my own interior process in evaluating Catholic claims (while still a Protestant), and also with the points you raise in your comment, I am interested to know if there is a sense in which Newman is theologically correct, despite the seeming conflict with LS.

    Andrew

    [By way of clarification, for readers who may not be familiar with some of the foregoing terminology:

    CatholicCulture.org provides the following definition of the "motives of credibility":

    The rational grounds for accepting divine revelation in general, or of the divine establishment of the Catholic Church in particular. These grounds are also called the preambles of faith. They include the evidence from reason that God exists; that what he reveals is believable because he is all-wise and true; and that he did actually make a revelation because he performed and continues to perform verifiable miracles testifying to his having spoken.

    "Moral certainty" (e.g., regarding the motives of credibility) is not the same thing as the certainty of faith, which believes divine revelation on the basis of authority, not argument (demonstrative or otherwise). However, since there are motives of credibility of which we can be morally certain, the assent of faith is not a leap into the dark; it is, rather, a step into the light (as one of my apologetics professors used to say). Faith goes beyond, not against, reason.]

27. Nathaniel Cunningham December 20th, 2011 3:54 pm :

    Andrew, thanks for your post and comments. Ray, thanks for your recent question.
    I, too, am musing on these questions, and it took me awhile to dig up a recent, related question by a commenter named Eric and response from Bryan Cross. It seems appropriate to link it here, from Comments 76 – 77 in the Wilson vs. Hitchens thread.
    –Nathaniel

28. Ray Stamper December 20th, 2011 4:54 pm :

    Andrew,

    Fascinating. I have been thinking about that very quote by Newman in his “Apologia”. You wrote:

    Perhaps there is a relevant distinction between a collection of probable arguments that taken together cannot (or ought not) render one morally certain of the motives of credibility (this would be what is condemned by LS) and a collection of probable arguments that taken together do (or should) render one morally certain of the motives of credibility (this would be the sense affirmed by Newman). This distinction allows us to affirm LS, while denying that the motives of credibility (at least, those involving historical inquiry) yield metaphysical certitude.

    Startling how close this comes to the position I have been moving towards. Let me elaborate a bit on your proposed distinction.

    First, a few words about “certainty”. Certainty seems to be a subjective concept. Conclusions, based on evidence are not more or less certain, they are true or false. Certainty, or lack thereof, resides in the intellect on account of its grasp, or not, of the nature/truth of the evidence (premises), and their interrelations as concluding to truth or falsity. This is why mathematical and metaphysical certitude are generally more free from the subjective experience of doubt; because the truth of the premises (through greater degree of abstraction) and the interrelation of these premises (through first principles) are more immediately clear to the intellect.

    Moreover, freedom from the subjective experience of doubt can been understood along a moving scale from less doubt (or practically zero) at the level of first principles, mathematics and metaphysics; to some minimal doubt at the level of other scientia (because grasp of the premises in other sciences involve lower levels of abstraction, and the interrelations are more complex; and therefore, the conclusions more tenuous relative to math and metaphysics – though still relatively certain due to the employment of a tested method). Next, moral certainty would entail a more significant subjective experience of doubt; however, given knowledge of moral principles, knowledge of aggregate circumstances would yield a certainty sufficient for moral action. A sufficient certainty, such that, given the principles and the known circumstances, one would be morally culpable for not acting in a particular way. Finally, there would be opinion, least certain of all, for its conclusions are un-vetted by exposure to any strict methodology or set of known principles.

    Given something along those lines with reference to the spectrum of subjective certainty in relation to various kinds of knowledge, the first question I have is whether Catholic dogma requires us to hold that any sort of subjective certainty (even moral certainty) necessarily attends to the motives of credibility prescinding entirely from the assistance or grace. In other words, I am not clear that Catholic dogma holds that the motives of credibility, assessed strictly within the resources of natural reason, necessarily bring about some level of certitude. Consider the following from Dei Filius:

    Nevertheless, in order that the submission of our faith should be in accordance with reason, it was God’s will that there should be linked to the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit external indications of his revelation, that is to say divine acts, and first and foremost miracles and prophecies, which clearly demonstrating as they do the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of revelation and are suited to the understanding of all.

    And again,

    So that we could fulfill our duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering unwaveringly in it, God, through his only begotten Son, founded the Church, and he endowed his institution with clear notes to the end that she might be recognized by all as the guardian and teacher of the revealed word. To the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, which have been divinely ordained to make for the manifest credibility of the Christian faith. What is more, the Church herself by reason of her astonishing propagation, her outstanding holiness and her inexhaustible fertility in every kind of goodness, by her Catholic unity and her unconquerable stability, is a kind of great and perpetual motive of credibility and an incontrovertible evidence of her own divine mission. So it comes about that, like a standard lifted up for the nations she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and likewise assures her sons and daughters that the faith they profess rests on the firmest of foundations. To this witness is added the effective help of power from on high. For, the kind Lord stirs up those who go astray and helps them by his grace so that they may come to the knowledge of the truth; and also confirms by his grace those whom he has translated into his admirable light, so that they may persevere in this light, not abandoning them unless he is first abandoned.

    It seems as though, DF is indicating that the subjective experience of certainty regarding the claims of the Catholic Church is a function of both objective, non-probabilistic motives of credibility plus the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit. If that is so, then Newman’s position is not problematic in the least, as I will explain shortly.

    Could we not divide the question into two parts: Firstly, what does Catholic dogma require regarding the subjective state of persons in relation to the MOC – the question of certainty? Secondly, what does Catholic Dogma requires regarding the objective, non-probabilistic nature of the MOC as concluding to the fact of the Catholic Church as God’s instrument for the definitive promulgation of divine revelation? Whether or not someone is, subjectively, more or less certain of a conclusion has no bearing on whether or not the conclusion is true or false in reality. Further, whether or not the MOC as relating to the divine authority of the Church are “probable” or not, can be taken in two sense: subjectively according to the internal disposition of the subject and objectively according to the state of reality. It seems to me that Lamentibili Sane (LS) must be referring to the objective sense. Here is why. Firstly, the Church cannot control the subjective disposition of any person. If a person thinks that the MOC are only probably true, rather than certainly true, there is nothing the Church can do about that; for the term “probable”, in that sense merely say something about the person’s internal attitude. Secondly, LS must be saying something like this:

    “The assent of faith does not rest on a mass of evidence that is probably true, rather it rests on a mass of evidence that is true, simpliciter.”

    The term “probably” here, seems very much directed at the state of the evidence (MOC) and its conclusion as considered distinct from subjective considerations (i.e. the one potentially making an “assent of faith” based on the MOC). So it seems to me that the MOC may be held as objectively non-probable, and true; leading (not probably) but truly to the conclusion that the Catholic Church is the guardian of divine revelation. Yet, without holding that everyone who assess them with the resources of natural reason alone, inevitably comes to see that conclusion with certainty. Think of Sherlock Holmes and Watson. A vast set of complex circumstances, evidences, and interrelations exist, which, when known and seen according to their objective aspect, lead certainly (inevitably) to one conclusion – whodunit. Holmes, “sees” all the circumstances, evidences and their interrelations clearly, so that he knows with certainty that one, and only one, culprit can have been responsible for the crime. Watson, however, scratching his head, and ostensibly considering the same circumstances, evidences and interrelations cannot reach Holmes’ conclusion. The difference? Holmes sees with a clearer light. His powers of deduction are sharper and better developed.

    Now the key to this analogy is that the circumstances and evidences considered objectively, outside of their subjective assessment by any one person (one might almost say – considered ontologically), entail one, non-probabilistic truth. This affirmation – on the objective side of the question – would suffice to meet the demands of LS.

    Nevertheless, on the subjective side of the equation, the subjective experience of certainty will only attach to the MOC (and their conclusion), if the subject is granted an elevated power of “sight”, which is just what the gift of faith is in its relation to the intellect. It is the “light of faith”, a supernatural “seeing” which illumines the evidence, and “connects the dots” so to speak in such a way that one “sees” the truth. This can (and often is) accompanied by the effects of the gift of supernatural faith on the will, which is to impress upon the will the “Motives of Faith” (MOF), whereby the will desires (wants to believe) the supernatural goods which the doctrine of the Church presents to it. Now, given that the MOC objectively entail the truth of the Church’s claims (LS), it will certainly be the case that prior to the gift of faith, different men of differing moral and intellectual powers and experience will find themselves viewing the claims of the Church as more or less probable (more or less certain) subjectively. And on my reading, this would pose no conflict with LS. Further, if Catholic dogma does not hold that the MOC yields subjective certainty without the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit (supernatural faith); then there is no need to worry over the subjective certainty of persons not yet influenced by the gift of faith with reference to the MOC. This solution would enable us to better understand Newman in a way consistent with Catholic dogma. Early Newman (initial Newman?), possessed of a powerful natural intellect, as he first surveyed the MOC, came to this:

    I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, and that these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of course in subject matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind, a cumulative, a transcendent probability but still probability

    Not that the MOC lead to mere “probable” conclusions in themselves (LS); but that Newman, according to his natural powers of intellect could only hold them subjectively as most probable. Actual grace was leading him along, giving him peeks and glimpses of the truth, but he had not yet received the gift of faith with grants that certitude which Catholic dogma affirms attaches to the MOC for the Christian. But later Newman, after cooperating with actual grace, ultimately experiences something beyond probabilities:

    He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities;—He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do [actual operative grace – not yet certainty], and carries us on, if our will does but co-operate with His [actual co-operative grace – not yet certainty], to a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions [supernatural faith and its attendant certitude]. And thus I came to see clearly, and to have a satisfaction in seeing, that, in being led on into the Church of Rome, I was not proceeding on any secondary or isolated grounds of reason, or by controversial points in detail, but was protected and justified, even in the use of those secondary or particular arguments, by a great and broad principle.

    So, in short, my proposal is this. The MOC are not probabilistic, objectively. Considered apart from subjective assessment – as they stand in the real world – they lead truly to the conclusion that the Church is the guardian of divine revelation (sic LS). However, considered subjectively, certitude only attaches to the internal disposition of the subject toward these MOC and their conclusion after the subject is infused with the gift of supernatural faith. Hence, faith is not fideism, or contrary to reason, because the MOC, when seen in the proper light, and as they stand objectively, conclude to the claims of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, supernatural faith is that proper light which enables the subject to see what is objectively there with a clarity rising to certitude. In this way, grace elevates nature, rather than destroying it. Without that gift, the MOC will seem more or less probable to human beings according to their intellectual and moral powers, opportunities and dispositions. This solution would fail if Catholic dogma demands that the MOC entail certitude, absent the gift of faith. But I do not see – as yet – that it does.

    Pax Christi,

    Ray

29. Ray Stamper December 21st, 2011 9:43 am :

    Nathaniel,

    In Eric’s comment he writes:

    “I mean, if the papacy, for example, denied the divinity of Christ tomorrow, and did so while speaking ex cathedra, the evidentiary state would be different. We might then change our position or not. If we changed our position, how did the certainty of faith phrase ever apply?”

    It seems to me that such a situation (assuming it were unavoidable clear that the pope WAS speaking ex cathedra) would undermine the Church’s claims for herself and show that the “certainty of faith” was at the least, mis-placed. So the Catholic Church really does put herself “out there” so to speak. If we find, in the entire history of the Church, one undeniable example of where the Magisterium has taught doctrine X as irreformable with the force of infallibility, and then later, with the same irreformable and infallible force, taught non-X; then the Catholic Church’s claim for herself as the divine agent for the definitive promulgation of divine revelation falls apart.

    However, I think for many people, that bold (actually incredible precipice) turns out to be one of the greatest MOC for the Church; because in 2000 years there are only a handful of dogmas and historical events which even qualify as a possible candidates for such a contradiction, and when one carefully explores these, one finds that these too are free from contradiction. Given the history of merely natural societies and institutions, we might expect to find countless irresolvable contradictions during a 2000 year course. Luther knew what he was doing when asserting that “popes and councils can and do err”. If that claim can be substantiated with regard to irreformable dogma, the Reformation gains a footing (but the grounds of orthodoxy also become hopelessly subjectivized). Yet, Luther’s claim cannot be substantiated – he was wrong.

    I would also point out that the same siutation applies for Christianity more generally. If someone were to find a 1st century tomb with a corpse and artifacts clearly identifying the tomb’s occupant as Jesus of Nazareth (maybe even some scrolls about how the disciples secretly stowed the body away and started the rumor regarding His resurrection), I think that would undermine the claims of Christian theism generally. There is a sense in which the entire Judeo-Christian tradition puts itself “out there”, precisely because it so clearly grounds its claims in the historical record open to public investigation. But again, that is why the Judeo-Christian tradition has such a strong intellectual appeal over against other more esoteric or shorter lived, or non-falsifiable religious claims.

    Finally, I wonder what you think about my proposal in #28 as a solution to Eric’s second concern.

    Pax Christi!

    Ray

30. Andrew Preslar December 21st, 2011 1:09 pm :

    Ray,

    You introduce some important distinctions, and I agree with many of your points. I would only add that it seems to me that a kind of certitude (moral certitude) regarding the motives of credibility does not depend upon the gift of faith, but perhaps may require, as you put it towards the beginning of your comment, the assistance of grace, which of course all men receive. On reflection, I tend to agree that LS refers to the objective state of the evidence. The result of that evidence as brought to bear upon an individual subject varies from subject to subject, for a variety of reasons, as you indicate in your comments on Newman. That is a different way of reconciling Newman with LS than the way that I proposed, as you pick out the objective/subjective dimensions of evidence/probability.

    One of my concerns throughout, even apart from the discussion of certitude of being in a state of grace (to which I will return in another comment), is that Protestants who are considering the claims of the Catholic Church, or more generally people who are considering the claims of the Christian faith, do not get tripped up on some particular point of inquiry, concluding that one is justified in doubting rather than believing, in cases where an argument for an essential point of the faith, or arguments for several points, each considered in isolation, only seems more or less probable. I am not convinced that Newman’s certitude regarding the motives of credibility depends on the gift of faith. Rather I think (and at least I can appeal to my own experience here) that this certitude is a moral certainty (distinct from faith) that results from “accumulated probabilities” (in the subjective sense), that with the assistance of grace leads to the assent of faith, which is a divine gift that also involves an act of the human will.

31. Andrew Preslar December 21st, 2011 2:35 pm :

    Nathan,

    You raise several points in your comment. I hope that you don’t mind if I respond bit by bit, putting your comments in block quotes.

    I think both of these need to be addressed here, since this has to do in part with God’s objective promises made to an individual – things that have been explicitly revealed to that person by means of God’s messenger. In general, when those in the Apostolic ministry speak of revealed truth that applies to all, they are to be believed. And in general, when those in the Apostolic ministry *reveal* that God has forgiven *this or that person* – which brings “peace with God” (Romans 5:1) – they are to be believed. Before this is about the subjective this is about things that are objective.

    I agree with this statement. It needs to be born in mind, however, that salvation (in one or more of its many aspects) is tied to a condition, e.g., be baptized and your sins will be forgiven; believe and you will be justified; persevere to the end and you will be saved. There are a few places in Scripture where an individual is specifically named as having fulfilled these conditions. Otherwise, groups are addressed more generally. Of course, as we have seen in Neal’s Lutheran-friendly post referred to earlier in this thread, baptism is an objective marker of Christian identity, of belonging to the people of God. But we both agree that not all the baptized remain in a state of grace, so certitude that one is in this state does not normally depend upon baptism alone.

    Are you saying you know you are currently saved (i.e. in a stable relationship with God, i.e. a state of grace) or, are you only saying that you know that if you have faith and love – and continue to follow in His paths – that you can have *a* moral certainty that you will be saved?

    Both. Consistent with Catholic principles, one may without presumption, though not without filial fear, enjoy a moral certitude that he is in a state of grace, and that he will be finally saved. (2 Timothy 1:12)

    Here may be where we disagree. Although you may think that it is in the realm of logical possibility that your brother may intend to kill you, would you agree that it is possible to know a person well enough that such “logical possibilities” cease to become logical? If not, why not? Just because every person who might have such confidence might not prove to be right? In addition, your example of certainty within the realm of relationships here is pretty weak, as mine dealt more with confidence in the stability and strength of a marriage relationship, i.e. a desire to continually love and forgive the other, not just a lack of a desire and intention to kill them.

    I think that here we actually agree. I am using logical possibility in the broad sense as pertaining to a contingent fact; i.e., though my family and I do in fact enjoy a loving relationship, we are not necessarily in a loving relationship. Our human nature, especially as wounded by sin, is such that we could hate one another, although in fact we love one another. My example does not depend on the relative strength of absence of hate versus presence of love. It depends upon the category of “personal relationships” as pertaining to certitude. Substitute “a desire to continually love and forgive the other” for “does not intend mortal harm” and my point remains the same.

    But how else is this moral certainty really to be distinguished from the certainty of faith and certainty of hope? Any other ways?

    The certainty of faith pertains to that which has been revealed by God. The certainty of hope corresponds to the mercy and omnipotence of God as related to his will for the salvation of all persons, including myself. Moral certainty pertains to matters that have not been revealed, and are not rationally inescapable or proved by demonstrative argument, but for which I have sufficient reason to be confident. As we have seen, this confidence can pertain to personal relationships, both human to human relationships (e.g., loving and being loved) and human to divine relationships (e.g., being in a state of grace).

    “no one can know with a certainty of faith…that he has obtained the grace of God.” Here we would say that whatever the pastor looses is loosed as if God Himself had done it. This is not a revelation from God applied personally?

    Again, if Bellarmine said this: “The doctrine that in the present life men cannot attain to an assurance of faith regarding their righteousness, with the exception of a few whom God deems worthy to have this fact revealed to them by a special revelation – this doctrine is a current opinion among nearly all theologians,” and if Cajetan said to Luther that “one could never be certain that one’s contrition was sufficient to effect the forgiveness one hoped to receive” (Hendrix, Papacy and Rome) it seems to me that I can have no certainty that Rome meant Trent to be taken in the way you are reading it – or, given the lack of clarification from on high – they are doing this now.

    These quotations have to do with the certainty of faith. I am discussing the certainty of hope and moral certitude. Therefore there is no contradiction between these statements and the way that I am reading Aquinas and Trent.

    A pastor I know said the following: “”assurance and certainty about salvation and election are not abstract philosophical truths that can be considered apart from faith and the gospel. If and as long as there is genuine faith in the gospel, there is blessed assurance. May that assurance abide with us always.”

    I completely agree with the first statement. The second statement seems to imply that assurance is of the essence of saving faith. But I thought that we had already agreed that this is not true, since in your last comment you responded with an “Amen” to this sentence (quoting an earlier comment of mine): “Of course, being morally certain of being in a state of grace is not a necessary condition of actually being in a state of grace.” But this implies that blessed assurance is not a necessary condition or component of having genuine faith in the gospel. I agree that we can enjoy blessed assurance, but would add that due to both sin and human frailties there may be, even for one who has faith, times of doubt and fear, though in no case should one ever despair of salvation.

    (I have not had the chance to read your blog post yet. I look forward to reading it. In case we don’t have a chance to pick back up before the 25th, allow me to now wish you a very happy, merry Christmas.)

    Andrew

32. Nathan December 21st, 2011 2:56 pm :

    Andrew,

    Just caught your last sentences there for now. I will hold off until you are finished responding.

    Merry Christmas to you (and all) as well.

    +Nathan

33. Andrew Preslar December 21st, 2011 4:30 pm :

    Nathan,

    I read your post, and I agree with much of that last quote from Luther. For the rest, it seems that you are drawing a false dichotomy between faith in divine revelation–simply taking God at his word–and the kind of understanding that can come from careful reasoning. You claim that the distinctions made by Catholics regarding kinds of certitude seem wrongheaded to you, without giving us any reason to think that they are in fact wrongheaded. Again, you seem to think that there is some sort of incompatibility between careful thinking and simply believing. But you have given us no reason to think that you are right about this; in fact, if you did give us such a reason, you would be undermining your own position!

    As things stand, I think that you are already somewhat inconsistent. Notice that throughout this exchange, you have been using reason, and I presume that you have been careful, in order to understand and critique my views, as well as to set forth your own views. So reason is not the problem. The misuse of reason is the problem, as when one makes bad arguments, or supposes that reason can dispense with faith, or that only really smart people can rightly apprehend divine revelation.

    We both agree that bad arguments are to be avoided, and that faith is necessary for salvation, and that even a little child can believe the Gospel. Furthermore, as a Catholic, I believe that the habit of faith is infused into babies at Baptism, such that the promises “he who believes in me has everlasting life” and “…now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from law, although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe” apply to infants who cannot even understand those words, much less reason discursively about the truths of revelation and the human sciences.

    Concerning assurance, you wrote:

    In RC theology a person may have a “moral certainty” that they are in a state of grace – but this can only be determined by evaluating of one’s own [moral] character and conduct – not by clinging to the external Promise alone (of course after calling what God calls sin “sin”– ie. that thing and those particular things which separate us from Him).

    The first part of this statement is simply not true, as anyone can see from reading my post and subsequent comments. The announcement and promise of the Gospel in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, the reception of Baptism, the pronouncement of absolution in sacramental Confession, receiving Communion, and continual reliance upon God’s mercy are all factors in assurance of salvation (as a moral certainty). Catholic assurance therefore depends upon a variety of external things. It is manifestly not determined only by evaluating one’s own moral character and conduct.

    The second part of your statement, with the parenthetical material, raises a dilemma: If you are clinging to the external promise alone for assurance, then why bother considering sin, i.e., that in us (not external to us) which separates us from God? I think that at the end of the day we both want to depend upon the external Promise and to take seriously the fact that sin separates us from God, which seems to imply that the external Promise, though essential for assurance of salvation, is not alone sufficient for assurance of salvation. We both agree that the popular adage (based on a kind of Calvinism), “once saved always saved” is simply not true. So we both need to take into account how personal sin can affect one’s relationship with God, as well as the implications of this for assurance.

34. Nathan December 22nd, 2011 8:40 am :

    Andrew,

    Thank you. Probably after Christmas.

    +Nathan

35. Nathan January 3rd, 2012 9:29 am :

    Andrew,

    First of all, I rejoice in the things we seem to agree about.

    I asked:

    “Are you saying you know you are currently saved (i.e. in a stable relationship with God, i.e. a state of grace) or, are you only saying that you know that if you have faith and love – and continue to follow in His paths – that you can have *a* moral certainty that you will be saved?”

    You said:

    “Both. Consistent with Catholic principles, one may without presumption, though not without filial fear, enjoy a moral certitude that he is in a state of grace, and that he will be finally saved. (2 Timothy 1:12)”

    Wow! I have never heard another RC say things this clearly- even though you did not use the word “knowledge” in your reply, I think I should assume this. And why do you think you are justified in saying this? I think this gives a clue:

    “Moral certainty pertains to matters that have not been revealed, and are not rationally inescapable or proved by demonstrative argument, but for which I have sufficient reason to be confident. As we have seen, this confidence can pertain to personal relationships, both human to human relationships (e.g., loving and being loved) and human to divine relationships (e.g., being in a state of grace).”

    I understand what you are saying here. Still, it seems strange, that strictly speaking, we cannot call this knowledge. Judging from the Catholic Encyclopedia article on “certitude”, this would also seem to be the matter about even the most general statements about what has occurred in the past. With the categories inherited from Aristotle here (of which, I will admit, seem to be quite justifiable on the face of it), things such as these are relegated to the category of “opinion”. I would think the reason this seems wrong to me (“wrongheaded”, I said in my post) would be clear. Just because I cannot prove something to be rationally inescapable to another person by means of a demonstrative argument – does this mean that I, at least, cannot be said to know (i.e. to have knowledge) something? To say the least, this seems to go counter to all of our regular human experience I think (there really are historical events that we can be sure of – we might have less confidence of this if we are a North Korean, but nevertheless….) Here, the personal element of inter-human trust seems thrust out of the equation, and the only knowledge is that which everyone can and should share and be convinced of…. But even here, we run into issues I think: who is to determine when the label “contingency” obtains and when it does not? (all of this should give you more of a sense about why “the distinctions made by Catholics regarding kinds of certitude seem wrongheaded to [me]” – you talk about the “kind of understanding that can come from careful reasoning”, but I carefully reason about ( : ) ) and go on to talk about the sure knowledge we can have that comes in part as a result of trust which is indeed warranted – i.e. many do indeed prove themselves to be trustworthy, and further, many of these are careful observers of the world and its evidences, even if they do not always have explicit methodologies, by which they justify their knowledge… indeed using reason itself is not the problem….)

    I had said:

    “I think both of these need to be addressed here, since this has to do in part with God’s objective promises made to an individual – things that have been explicitly revealed to that person by means of God’s messenger. In general, when those in the Apostolic ministry speak of revealed truth that applies to all, they are to be believed. And in general, when those in the Apostolic ministry *reveal* that God has forgiven *this or that person* – which brings “peace with God” (Romans 5:1) – they are to be believed. Before this is about the subjective this is about things that are objective.”

    You replied:

    “I agree with this statement. It needs to be born in mind, however, that salvation (in one or more of its many aspects) is tied to a condition, e.g., be baptized and your sins will be forgiven; believe and you will be justified; persevere to the end and you will be saved. There are a few places in Scripture where an individual is specifically named as having fulfilled these conditions. Otherwise, groups are addressed more generally. Of course, as we have seen in Neal’s Lutheran-friendly post referred to earlier in this thread, baptism is an objective marker of Christian identity, of belonging to the people of God. But we both agree that not all the baptized remain in a state of grace, so certitude that one is in this state does not normally depend upon baptism alone.”

    Although faith, baptism and perseverance are necessary for salvation (repentance to), they are not always – nor should they be – presented as conditions. If I say: “if you believe in Jesus Christ you will be saved”, I can say that in a “you-need-to-do-this” kind-of-way, or I can say it to comfort someone who does believe, i.e. to assure them. Often in the New Testament, statements such as this are used in this latter sense. All of this relates to the purpose of absolution as well: to assure the believer and to strengthen faith, even as it also really offers forgiveness of sins. “Certitude that one is in this state [of grace] does not normally depend upon baptism alone”, but it would not be bad if it did (assuming the person was remembering their baptism in the fullness of what it means). See below for more.

    I had quoted a pastor friend:

    “assurance and certainty about salvation and election are not abstract philosophical truths that can be considered apart from faith and the gospel. If and as long as there is genuine faith in the gospel, there is blessed assurance. May that assurance abide with us always.”

    You said:

    “I completely agree with the first statement. The second statement seems to imply that assurance is of the essence of saving faith. But I thought that we had already agreed that this is not true, since in your last comment you responded with an “Amen” to this sentence (quoting an earlier comment of mine): “Of course, being morally certain of being in a state of grace is not a necessary condition of actually being in a state of grace.” But this implies that blessed assurance is not a necessary condition or component of having genuine faith in the gospel. I agree that we can enjoy blessed assurance, but would add that due to both sin and human frailties there may be, even for one who has faith, times of doubt and fear, though in no case should one ever despair of salvation”

    It is true that “Of course, being morally certain of being in a state of grace is not a necessary condition of actually being in a state of grace”, but this is not to say that such moral certainty is not desirable or is not to be encouraged in the Christian. Because of the persistence of sin within us, human frailties, doubt and fear – it is appropriate to call these things what they are and to flee to the solid word of the One who absolves and gives peace. Since this is not about a person’s own righteousness, but the forgiveness and righteousness of another, it is completely appropriate and even necessary for pastors to urge their troubled flock to set their eyes on Jesus, and the forgiveness, life, and salvation He brings. We need to keep in mind that before faith is reflective (i.e. faith thinking about itself and what it obtains), it simply is. The faith of a child is not of the reflective type. See this post: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2009/07/31/babies-in-church-part-v-the-arrogance-of-the-infant-a/ , which should help.

    I had said:

    “Again, if Bellarmine said this: “The doctrine that in the present life men cannot attain to an assurance of faith regarding their righteousness, with the exception of a few whom God deems worthy to have this fact revealed to them by a special revelation – this doctrine is a current opinion among nearly all theologians,” and if Cajetan said to Luther that “one could never be certain that one’s contrition was sufficient to effect the forgiveness one hoped to receive” (Hendrix, Papacy and Rome) it seems to me that I can have no certainty that Rome meant Trent to be taken in the way you are reading it – or, given the lack of clarification from on high – they are doing this now.”

    And you responded: “These quotations have to do with the certainty of faith. I am discussing the certainty of hope and moral certitude. Therefore there is no contradiction between these statements and the way that I am reading Aquinas and Trent.”

    Here is where I feel our conversation goes nowhere. I can see how the Bellarmine quote might have to do with the certainty of faith. That said, I am not sure why you feel justified in being so confident about the Cardinal Cajetan quote. If you read my most recent posts (see http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/the-roman-penitential-system-and-the-emergence-of-reformation-doctrine-part-i-of-ii/ and http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/the-roman-penitential-system-and-the-emergence-of-reformation-doctrine-part-ii-of-ii/ ) detailing (I hope you will find it fair) the Roman Penitential system (or RPS), it becomes hard to believe – almost impossible in fact – that Cajetan’s words could mean anything else! Assuming that Hendrix has accurately reflected his position, it seems to me rather inescapable that he is talking about a concrete person’s concrete ability to have concrete confidence that the concrete words of absolution can be applied to one’s self – and that the negative position he takes makes complete sense in light of Roman penitential teachings and practices.

    I concluded in my post: “In RC theology a person may have a “moral certainty” that they are in a state of grace – but this can only be determined by evaluating of one’s own [moral] character and conduct – not by clinging to the external Promise alone (of course after calling what God calls sin “sin”– ie. that thing and those particular things which separate us from Him).”

    You replied:

    “The first part of this statement is simply not true, as anyone can see from reading my post and subsequent comments. The announcement and promise of the Gospel in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, the reception of Baptism, the pronouncement of absolution in sacramental Confession, receiving Communion, and continual reliance upon God’s mercy are all factors in assurance of salvation (as a moral certainty). Catholic assurance therefore depends upon a variety of external things. It is manifestly not determined only by evaluating one’s own moral character and conduct….”

    Andrew, even if you do think that the first part of my statement is not true, can you at least admit that what I wrote above is not another seemingly legitimate interpretation (that it seems clear Cajetan held to)? I have talked about this discussion much before in other contexts, and many other RCs – some who seem to be capable apologists – have not taken your view, but one that seems more akin to the one Cajetan seemed to clearly express. Also, you say that “Catholic assurance….. does not depend only by evaluating one’s own moral character and conduct”, but I highlight that *only* – this shows that it is dependent on this to some extent, and I think that this can have disastrous consequences for those who take God’s Laws – and the Roman Church’s penitential practices – most seriously (this is not to deny that I John does not offer the Christian assurance based on their works, namely, their love – it does, but when it comes to terrified consciences, the passages in I John that point people to God being bigger than our doubts and the primacy of His love over ours need to be emphasized). Again, please read my posts above for the details of the RPS in Luther’s day.

    Then you said:

    “The second part of your statement, with the parenthetical material, raises a dilemma: If you are clinging to the external promise alone for assurance, then why bother considering sin, i.e., that in us (not external to us) which separates us from God? I think that at the end of the day we both want to depend upon the external Promise and to take seriously the fact that sin separates us from God, which seems to imply that the external Promise, though essential for assurance of salvation, is not alone sufficient for assurance of salvation. We both agree that the popular adage (based on a kind of Calvinism), “once saved always saved” is simply not true. So we both need to take into account how personal sin can affect one’s relationship with God, as well as the implications of this for assurance.”

    As regards your first couple sentences above, I can see why you would think this. I should have left that part about considering sin out of there. In fact, this is, strictly speaking, not necessary. The point is that if I, as a Lutheran, express confidence that I am saved, some may wonder whether or not my confidence is really false presumption – and that an underlying antinomianism lurks. At this point, I explain that it is not, and talking about “calling what God calls sin ‘sin’ and calling what God calls gift ‘gift’” is one ways of demonstrating this: by way of offering a good “confession” (in the sense that I confess I believe to be sin what God calls sin, meaning I want to flee from this relationship-destroying thing and desire forgiveness for it and its manifestations in my life). So, the external Promise is sufficient for the assurance of salvation, but when we are made to doubt that it is, this is one way of calming those doubts and answering those who would insist that we can’t rest in the fact that repentance and faith are fully gifts from God that are received by hearing His word (Romans 10, Isaiah 55). Again, all of these questions are related not to direct faith, which clings to the Promise in confidence in real time (see the post above about arrogant infants again), but “reflective faith” which we realize will always produce doubt due to the sin within us (here is another example of working through this doubt – I believe I linked you to this earlier: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2009/12/23/transformation-failure-3/).

    +Nathan

36. Nathan January 3rd, 2012 9:39 am :

    Andrew (and Ray),

    Thanks for a most interesting discussion. You guys, with your desire to talk about truth, certainty, and evidence, are my kinds of fellows. The kinds of things you are talking about I resonate with a lot (I have read widely in evidential and presuppositional apologetics – less reading of RC folks like Peter Kreeft)

    The thing is, I see the desire to seek and understand these things – from the Christian perspective – as being bridled by the relational certainties created in baptism and nurtured in the Church. I do not deny that they do not have their use though in evangelism. As John 16 makes clear, the Holy Spirit, in His love, is always looking to convict not only the Church, but the world of sin, that they may see Christ. Therefore, when Ray says things like “In other words, I am not clear that Catholic dogma holds that the motives of credibility, assessed strictly within the resources of natural reason, necessarily bring about some level of certitude”, we would certainly say that unaided natural reason is an oxymoron. Just as the “laws of nature” should not be understood as things exist apart from the persistent activity of the Creator in His creation, likewise, conviction of sin (whether for false thoughts, words, or deeds) only occurs because of the work of the Holy Spirit. We would also agree that “miracles and prophecies… are the most certain signs of revelation and are suited to the understanding of all”, but would point specifically to these things in the Bible as they give witness to the promised Messiah, the focal point of the Church.

    Further, while Ray wants to talk like this:

    “Certainty, or lack thereof, resides in the intellect on account of its grasp, or not, of the nature/truth of the evidence (premises), and their interrelations as concluding to truth or falsity.”

    We would disagree with the focus on the intellect here (while certainly agreeing about the distinction between certainty and certitude). We must get straight what knowledge is, fundamentally (as I said before: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/knowledge-first-and-foremost-baby-king-david-vs-adult-st-thomas/ )

    It is fascinating to me how much our different ecclesiastical views relate to these points.

    Ray said: “However, God’s revelation passes into the public domain via some proximate instrumentality, such that we can only be certain that a given teaching is from God (and, therefore, more certain than truths known via metaphysical demonstration) to the degree that we are certain that the proximate instrument, through which we received that teaching was (or is), in fact, an instrument used by God. But this forces us, ISTM, to focus in on the central role played by the motives of credibilty (MOC*** – see below), in establishing the fact of the Catholic Church as the instrument through which God’s revelation is definitively promulgated.” (bold mine)

    I want to note that from the Lutheran perspective, the only real difference here would be that God uses all men as His instruments, even when they rebel against Him. Even legitimately ordained pastors of God, in bodies that are truly Church can, of course, resist the work that He gives them to do, in which case, they are used by Him for other purposes, though not necessarily that which they were meant to accomplish. In other words, even if it can be established that a particular church body is a chosen instrument of God (this has to do more with the “eyes of faith” though then it does what our eyes can see: clinging to the Gospel we hear purely proclaimed and the sacraments rightly administered – blind human sight, on the other hand, leads not to Jerusalem, but to Babylon – “catholicity” does not in any sense mean big and outwardly conspicuous, but universal, in that there are *at the very least* faithful believers and groups of believers spread throughout the world who agree with one another in the doctrines that brings life and salvation, even if it means they are hidden in caves, deserts and prisons), and hence meant to definitively promulgate His Word, persons in this body can resist this charge (living falsely AND teaching falsely), and the direction of this particular body be sabotaged. That said, the Church as a whole is indefectible, and God will always at the very least retain a remnant (the Church, of course, is determined not by counting sheep, but by listening to the Shepherd).

    On the one hand, we have statements like this from the RC church (in Dei Filius):

    “To the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, which have been divinely ordained to make for the manifest credibility of the Christian faith. What is more, the Church herself by reason of her astonishing propagation, her outstanding holiness and her inexhaustible fertility in every kind of goodness, by her Catholic unity and her unconquerable stability, is a kind of great and perpetual motive of credibility and an incontrovertible evidence of her own divine mission. So it comes about that, like a standard lifted up for the nations she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and likewise assures her sons and daughters that the faith they profess rests on the firmest of foundations.”

    On the other hand, John Gerhard, one of our great theologians, said the following: “In the same way, in the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church, these same two states may be observed. One is of emptying or humiliation, when the force of persecutions, the cleverness of heretics, or the large number of growing scandals oppress the church. The other is of exaltation or glorification, when the church enjoys the peaceful administration of its holy things, when it shines with the splendor of an uncorrupted ministry, when it gleams publicly with the quiet exercise of pure divine worship. In this state the church is visible, manifest, and glorious; in the other it is invisible, hidden, and shameful….“Even though the church can be reduced to such scarcity that it is not glorious and visible in its external splendor in the way the Papists claim, yet one cannot infer from this that the church is not visible, speaking absolutely and simply, because even if those few confessors are not known publicly to the entire world, they still can be known to one another, and even if they are not visible actually, still they are visible potentially. Just as the sun does not cease being visible even if it is not actually seen at times when clouds cover it – since its radiance later shines with very brilliant splendor – so the church does not cease being visible even if the true confessors are hidden in caves and secret places, because they will again come into public when the madness of their persecutors cools and the darkness of heresy has ended” (On the Church, 146, 185).

    In other words, though the Church in council in Acts 15 did not fail, it could have failed due to sin, as the Church in the Old Testament so often did, leaving only a very small remnant. When does any “church body” cease to become truly Church? The position of the Confessional Lutheran Church, it seems to me (here I channel Gerhard, one of the great teachers of our Church) is that we have, by faith, certitude that we are truly Church (no matter how small the remnant) – and we know with certitude that many are not – but as regards who is a true visible Church on earth there is much that we cannot really definitively determine and pronounce on. Although we might be persuaded that some in these bodies are believers, we cannot commune with them – even though they seem much closer than others to what we believe (for example, the Christological doctrines and the sacraments as means of grace and channels of God’s Real Presence in a special way). See my second response with RC apologist Dave Armstrong for more about pertinent issues related to this, like, does God always preserve a Church that is conspicuous without error (see section on indefectibility[IV] and infallibility [V] here: http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/11/01/round-2-with-rc-apologist-dave-armstrong-the-unattractive-body-of-christ/) or how should we think about essential and non-essential doctrines (see section VII there).

    + Nathan

    *** NOTE: Andrew clarified re: the MOC:

    “For the motives of credibility surely include historical arguments, and historical arguments (e.g., for the authenticity of the Gospels, the historicity of the Resurrection, the establishment of the Church, the Apostolic Succession, etc.) by the nature of the case (pertaining to the contingent) do not yield metaphysical certitude.”

    And

    “CatholicCulture.org provides the following definition of the “motives of credibility”:

    The rational grounds for accepting divine revelation in general, or of the divine establishment of the Catholic Church in particular. These grounds are also called the preambles of faith. They include the evidence from reason that God exists; that what he reveals is believable because he is all-wise and true; and that he did actually make a revelation because he performed and continues to perform verifiable miracles testifying to his having spoken.

    “Moral certainty” (e.g., regarding the motives of credibility) is not the same thing as the certainty of faith, which believes divine revelation on the basis of authority, not argument (demonstrative or otherwise). However, since there are motives of credibility of which we can be morally certain, the assent of faith is not a leap into the dark; it is, rather, a step into the light (as one of my apologetics professors used to say). Faith goes beyond, not against, reason.”

37. Nathan January 3rd, 2012 9:40 am :

    Men,

    Please know that though I wish it were not so, it will be at least one week before I can comment again. Must limit self!

    Blessings in Christ,
    Nathan

38. Andrew Preslar January 3rd, 2012 1:34 pm :

    Nathan,

    Take your time. I have not had the chance to read your comments, and it might be a while before I can read, digest, and respond. (I am working on the “digest” part. My nature is to be hasty–may God help me.) In any event, it is best not to rush these things.

    Peace,

    Andrew

39. Andrew Preslar February 6th, 2012 12:21 pm :

    Nathan,

    re #35:

    Contemporary philosophers are usually content to count as “knowledge” what Aristotle and St. Thomas would have classified as “opinion.” But so long as we define the thing the same way, as having the same causes and accompanied by the same degree of certitude, then I don’t think that it is necessary to dispute over which word is more apt.

    I did not see a quote from Cardinal Cajetan in the posts to which you linked, so I cannot evaluate your claim that his understanding of the sacrament of penance is incompatible with the certainty of hope.

    You wrote:

    If I say: “if you believe in Jesus Christ you will be saved”, I can say that in a “you-need-to-do-this” kind-of-way, or I can say it to comfort someone who does believe, i.e. to assure them.

    I agree that this is a comforting statement. But in any case, it remains a conditional statement: if/then. Since there is no proposition in divine revelation stating “Andrew has saving faith,” then the certainty that I have fulfilled the condition cannot be the certainty of faith (i.e., faith that I have faith), since faith corresponds to what God has revealed. (Its worth remembering, at this point, that the certainty of hope, according to St. Thomas, does not depend upon knowing whether one has personally fulfilled the condition of any such conditional statement.)

    re #36: My recent post, A Response to Scott Clark and Robert Godfrey on “The Lure of Rome,” addresses, in a general way, some of your comments about the nature of the Church.

40. Nathan February 6th, 2012 7:32 pm :

    Andrew,

    It is not specifically a quote, but a secondary source. It is found here:

    http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/forgiveness-free-and-true-the-crux-of-the-reformation-the-essence-of-the-christian-life/

    “Luther had asserted that Christians approaching the sacrament of penance should not trust in their own contrition but in the words of Christ spoken by the priest in the absolution. If they believed in these words, then they could be certain of forgiveness, because these words were absolutely reliable, whereas the sufficiency of their contrition was never certain. In reply, Cajetan upheld the prevailing theological opinion: although it was true that contrition was never perfect, its presence still made one worthy to receive the grace conferred by the sacrament. Still, one could never be certain that one’s contrition was sufficient to effect the forgiveness one hoped to receive. To hold the contrary, said Cajetan, was to teach a new and erroneous doctrine and to “build a new church…”

    So again,

    “If you read my most recent posts (see http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/the-roman-penitential-system-and-the-emergence-of-reformation-doctrine-part-i-of-ii/ and http://infanttheology.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/the-roman-penitential-system-and-the-emergence-of-reformation-doctrine-part-ii-of-ii/ ) detailing (I hope you will find it fair) the Roman Penitential system (or RPS), it becomes hard to believe – almost impossible in fact – that Cajetan’s words could mean anything else! Assuming that Hendrix has accurately reflected his position, it seems to me rather inescapable that he is talking about a concrete person’s concrete ability to have concrete confidence that the concrete words of absolution can be applied to one’s self – and that the negative position he takes makes complete sense in light of Roman penitential teachings and practices. ”

    We say that you can know that you have eternal life, with I John 5:12. The Catholic Church, it seems to me, in effect says “know” doesn’t really mean “know”.

    I admit that an examination of Cajetan’s work may be revealing. But I see no reason to doubt Hendrix’s analysis. I guess I need good reasons to doubt what he says at the very least.

    +Nathan

41. Nathan February 6th, 2012 7:35 pm :

    Andrew,

    It doesn’t need to be phrased as a conditional statement. If saying “Jesus says if you believe in Him you can have forgiveness of sins and have eternal life” does not bring comfort to a person, but makes them think it is up to them to produce their own faith or make their faith sufficiently strong, it is basically synonymous to say “Jesus forgives you all your sins”. And if they sigh in relief, have they not believed?

    +Nathan

42. Nathan February 6th, 2012 7:38 pm :

    sorry – Hendrix is the guy who made the statement about what Cajetan told Luther….Scott Hendrix: Luther and the Papacy, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1981, p. 62

43. Andrew Preslar February 7th, 2012 2:49 am :

    Nathan,

    Your secondary source refers to faith (“if they believed these words”), so in context Cajetan should probably be interpreted as referring to the certainty of faith. One should of course believe the Catholic doctrine of the sacrament, but he should not believe that he is, by his verbal confession together with the pronouncement of absolution, absolved of sins for which he is not sorry and which he intends to keep committing, for this would be contrary to the Catholic doctrine, which states that the benefits of this sacrament are related to certain conditions of a subjective nature, namely, that the sinner be sorry for his sins and that he be resolved to sin no more, as well as the objective parts of the sacrament: verbal confession of sin, pronouncement of absolution, and doing the prescribed penance.

    But the fact that there is a conditional aspect to the sacrament is perfectly consistent with its being a source of comfort and assurance, just as the conditional nature of the proposition, “If you believe in Christ, then you will have eternal life,” is perfectly consistent with its being a source of comfort and assurance. But, once again, the assurance of faith pertains to divine revelation, and divine revelation does not included any proposition to the effect that you or I or most anyone else has met the condition for eternal life. This does not leave us without assurance of personal salvation, however, since there are also the assurance of hope and moral certitude, both of which are distinct from the certainty of faith.

    We have been over this ground in some detail already. So, I find it deeply disappointing when you write:

    We say that you can know that you have eternal life, with I John 5:12. The Catholic Church, it seems to me, in effect says “know” doesn’t really mean “know”.

    I addressed the matter of arguing over words in my last comment, where I indicated the sense in which Catholics can maintain that assurance is a kind of knowledge (as the term is commonly used in modern parlance). If you want to mount a substantive argument to the effect that the Catholic Church denies that we can know that we have eternal life, then you will have to, for starters, define the term “know” as used in that proposition. Scare quotes do not constitute a definition, nor does saying what “seems” to you to be the case indicate anything at all about what is actually the case as regards Catholicism and assurance of salvation.

    The Catholic Church maintains that we can enjoy assurance of salvation, in the forms of the certainty of hope and moral certitude. We have spent some time discussing the differences between these kinds of certainty, the certainty of faith, and the certainty of what Aristotle and St. Thomas referred to as scientia, which is translated “knowledge.” I cannot recall you ever claiming that assurance of eternal life amounts to knowledge in the sense of scientia, nor do I recall you ever claiming that everyone who repents and believes knows, by special revelation, that they have saving faith. So, I cannot yet see any disagreement between us regarding the sense in which a person can know that he has eternal life.

    In your next comment, you wrote:

    It doesn’t need to be phrased as a conditional statement.

    I am not talking about how things “need to be phrased,” because I am not disputing with you over words. My interest is in what things are in reality. However you phrase it, the offer of eternal life is conditional. I agree that we can know that we have met that condition, both in the sacrament of penance (contrition) and in the hearing of the Word (faith). But I deny that this knowledge is either the certainty of faith or scientia, in which there is no possibility of the contrary. This knowledge is more like the knowledge that we have in regard to personal relationships–which is also something that we have already discussed at some length. If there is something in that discussion that remains unclear to you, please let me know. Until then, you should know that Catholics can know that we have eternal life, and that we have been absolved of our sins in the sacrament of reconciliation.

    The Council of Trent, Session XIV, Chapter 3, teaches the following concerning the effects of the sacrament of penance:

    But that which is signified and produced by this sacrament is, so far as its force and efficacy are concerned, reconciliation with God, which sometimes, in persons who are pious and who receive this sacrament with devotion, is wont to be followed by peace and serenity of conscience with an exceedingly great consolation of spirit.

    I can testify to such effects in my own life, on several occasions when I have received this wonderful sacrament.

44. Nathan February 7th, 2012 9:30 am :

    Andrew,

    Thanks for commenting again. I hope to get back to you early next week.

    Best regards,
    Nathan

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