Aquinas on Faith & Reason
Dei Filius
Catechism of the Catholic Church
Outlines of Moral Theology
Faith and Certitude
The Assurance of Things Hope For: A Theology of Christian Faith
Outlines of Dogmatic Theology Vol. 1
Fundamental Theology
Faith: Sermon’s Preached at a Men’s Retreat
Theological Virtues Vol. 1 Faith
The Theology of Faith
Fides et Ratio
A Manual of Catholic Theology based on Scheeben’s Dogmatik Vol. 1
Faith and Revealed Truth
A Manual of Dogmatic Theology
Faith and Doubt
The Grammar of Assent
The Grounds of Faith

^I have begun reading this last one. The title of the first chapter is “Revelation: Definite and Certain.” Sounds promising, eh?

Thanks for your comments. You wrote:

That being said, I do think it is very clear that not only does the Church teach that we can have certainty of the fact of Revelation prior to the assent of faith, we MUST have that certainty prior to the assent of faith.

As I said, one of the first things you will need to do before the discussion can be very useful is become very clear on what the term certainty means. Defining terms and all that (which is why I discussed the spectrum of subjective certainty). I hope we can agree that the very notion of certainty applies not to things as the exist in reality, but the subjective state of persons according to the degree in which they have confidence (i.e. certainty) that their thoughts adequately correspond to reality. I am sure you will agree that *certainty* taken in this way is not necessarily a simple notion (mathematical certainty, metaphysical certainty, scientific certainty, moral certainty, etc.). So when one finds the term “certain” or “certainty” utilized within Magisterial documents, ISTM that one needs to recognize the elasticity of that term in itself.

Secondly, I look forward to whatever quotes you might offer to help clarify the discussion. However, I would caution that in an area as nuanced as this, it might be best to restrict quotations to formal Magisterial documents, rather than the Catholic Encyclopedia or various manuals of theology, regardless of how – generally – sound such sources might be. For myself, I have yet to find any Magisterial textual evidence for the proposition that

“we MUST have that certainty prior to the assent of faith” [emphasis mine]

But I am happy to stand corrected. As another example of the notion I am getting at, consider the earlier quote you provided from Pope Innocent XI, wherein he condemns the following proposition:

“The supernatural assent of Faith necessary for salvation is compatible with merely probable knowledge of Revelation, nay even with doubt whether God has spoken.”

Note how it is only the supernatural assent of faith which is incompatible with “merely probable knowledge”. This leaves open the possibility that absent the supernatural gift of faith, natural reason may indeed be left with probable knowledge (perhaps highly probable or even morally compelling knowledge – yet probable, nonetheless). Moreover, as I said before, the subjective state of certainty which obtains in this or that person’s intellect, with regard to the MOC for the claims of the Catholic Church; in no way undermines the objective state of the evidence as concluding to the truth of the Catholic claims, such that If one could apprehend all the relevant facts at once, as God does, the premises and the logic would and could only result in this one conclusion.

But men differ widely, and for a variety of reasons, with regard to the degree in which they can see, in a unified and integrated way, the truth and interrelations of the various MOC. The most common difference pertains to the degree in which a person is asking the right questions to begin with. That is why so many converts here at CTC and elsewhere describe the common scenario wherein for much of their life, it never occurred to them to even explore the Catholic claims. Then, some event or question forced them to ask this or that fundamental question which they had heretofore never considered. More often than not, this sets off a train of exploration in which the questions asked get better and sharper so that the answers sought and obtained begin to coalesce into a clearer and clearer conviction that the Church might just be what she claims to be. Subjectively then, certainty regarding the claims of the Catholic Church moves from downright denial (or ignorance) through various stages of (often frightening) insight and growing conviction, until the force of probability weighs heavily on the intellect in preparation for the gift of grace which elevates and enables the convert to make the supernatural assent of faith – to commit his entire self to Christ and His Church. That’s the sort of progression which I am suggesting can be reconciled with the official Magisterial teaching of the Church.

Pax Christi,

Brian writes: That being said, I do think it is very clear that not only does the Church teach that we can have certainty of the fact of Revelation prior to the assent of faith, we MUST have that certainty prior to the assent of faith.

The supernatural gift of faith is one of the seven sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit. One receives the seven sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit by receiving the Sacrament of Baptism. So if the sanctifying gift of faith is received through the grace of Baptism, what kind of faith must a catechumen have before receiving the Sacrament of Baptism?

Catechism of the Catholic Church

Faith and Baptism

1253 Baptism is the sacrament of faith. But faith needs the community of believers. It is only within the faith of the Church that each of the faithful can believe. The faith required for Baptism is not a perfect and mature faith, but a beginning that is called to develop. The catechumen or the godparent is asked: “What do you ask of God’s Church?” The response is: “Faith!”

Can a man, apart from grace, develop a faith that may not be “not perfect and mature”, but is sufficient to lead him seek out the Sacrament of Baptism? I believe that to say that is possible is to embrace the heresy of semi-Pelagianism. Hence the teaching of the Catholic Church that actual grace, in the form of operating and cooperating grace, is given to catechumens before they seek the sanctifying grace that bestows upon them the seven sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit.

A catechumen makes this confession of faith before he receives the Sacrament of Baptism:

I believe and profess all that the holy Catholic Church believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God.

That profession of faith can only be made with a faith that is not perfect or mature, since one is in absolute need of the sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit to have perfect and mature faith.

Brian writes: … we can have certainty of the fact of Revelation prior to the assent of faith …

A Catechumen can believe with a faith that is neither perfect nor mature in what God has revealed. That said, I believe that moral certainty in God’s revelation comes through the reception of the sanctifying gifts of faith and knowledge. Perhaps that is wrong though, maybe the faith of the catechumen qualifies as moral certainty in what God has supernaturally revealed.

Ray Stamper writes: … supernatural faith is that proper light which enables the subject to see what is objectively there with a clarity rising to certitude. In this way, grace elevates nature, rather than destroying it.

I agree. I think that the question here is whether or not one have moral certainty apart from the sanctifying gifts of faith and knowledge. What do you think about this?

Those are some interesting distinctions. I will have to re-read all that I have on the subject and see if those distinctions help provide a more correct understanding of the Church’s teaching. That being said, I do think it is very clear that not only does the Church teach that we can have certainty of the fact of Revelation prior to the assent of faith, we MUST have that certainty prior to the assent of faith. We must give everything of ourselves in trust to God, there can be no room for doubt, no holding back. Certainty is necessary for faith. At least, that is my tentative understanding.

Later tonight, I’ll post some quotations that I think might help.

There is, here, the difficult question of priority – but priority is not always temporal priority. On the day I decided to become a Catholic, I prayed – quite literally – “Lord, I’ll never dot every ‘i’ and cross every ‘t’ – but I know enough now that if I knew I were going to die tonight, I would want to see a priest first. If You don’t stop me, I’m going to become a Catholic.”

I had moral certainty – and I think that if anyone had tried to argue me out of my conviction, I would have shown that I had certitude as well. That certitude came from the motiva credibilitatis but was something higher than them.

Don’t know what Pope Innocent would say to me :-)

jj

I didn’t use the word “free,” I just said that, for example, it does not require faith to believe that 2+2=4. I don’t believe that the Catholic Church could be requiring a knowledge of that kind as a motive of credibility. It would be a self defeating requirement it seems to me. i.e. the requirement would be: in order to have faith in X you must have a relation to X such that precludes the possibility of faith. So whatever the Church means, she can’t mean that. Unless I’m off my rocker.

I think what the Church must be saying has to do with moral certainty rather than something like a mathematical certainty. e.g. the defense attorney may explain to us that we cannot prove that Joe intended to kill Bob when he pointed the gun at his head and pulled the trigger. (Stay with me) Some people have survived gun shots to the head and Joe knew that. But you and I know with a kind of moral certainty that Joe is guilty of murder. Perhaps it’s that kind of moral certainty, not the kind where we know 1+1=2, that the Church requires of us as motives of credibility. Just speculating.

Ray’s reply is much better than mine. Read his. :-)

I agree that our terms have to be defined, but I was hoping you guys could help with that! Notice, I am not using those terms – the Church is!

Why would the assent of faith would no longer be free? I have had this discussion before, and I still do not understand why having this prior knowledge takes away our freedom. Though we may have certainty of the divine origin of Christianity, we still face the decision as to whether or not we will accept the gift of faith, whether we will trust in God and believe in what we cannot see.

From “A Manual of Catholic Theology”:

“The certitude of the fact of Revelation must be in excluding all feared keeping with the firmness required by Faith. Hence all theologians teach that the demonstration of this fact from visible signs, such as prophecies and miracles, must be so evident as to generate a certitude excluding all doubt and
fear of error a certitude sufficient to place a reasonable man under the obligation of adhering to it. This, however, does not mean that the evidence must be of the most perfect kind, so as to render denial absolutely impossible. The proofs of the fact of Revelation may admit of unreasonable dissent,
as is manifest by daily experience.” (126)

^Here, it says denial is possible, but only unreasonable denial.

I am deeply interested in this subject as well. I wrote a detailed comment that attempts to develop a solution to your question a while back, but I cannot find it, or I would just link to it. Instead I will repost what I wrote there. Feel free to interact!

First, a few words about “certainty”. Certainty seems to be a subjective concept. Conclusions, based on evidence are not more or less certain, they are true or false. Certainty, or lack thereof, resides in the intellect on account of its grasp, or not, of the nature/truth of the evidence (premises), and their interrelations as concluding to truth or falsity. This is why mathematical and metaphysical certitude are generally more free from the subjective experience of doubt; because the truth of the premises (through greater degree of abstraction) and the interrelation of these premises (through first principles) are more immediately clear to the intellect.

Moreover, freedom from the subjective experience of doubt can been understood along a moving scale from less doubt (or practically zero) at the level of first principles, mathematics and metaphysics; to some minimal doubt at the level of other scientia (because grasp of the premises in other sciences involve lower levels of abstraction, and the interrelations are more complex; and therefore, the conclusions more tenuous relative to math and metaphysics – though still relatively certain due to the employment of a tested method). Next, moral certainty would entail a more significant subjective experience of doubt; however, given knowledge of moral principles, knowledge of aggregate circumstances would yield a certainty sufficient for moral action. A sufficient certainty, such that, given the principles and the known circumstances, one would be morally culpable for not acting in a particular way. Finally, there would be opinion, least certain of all, for its conclusions are un-vetted by exposure to any strict methodology or set of known principles.

Given something along those lines with reference to the spectrum of subjective certainty in relation to various kinds of knowledge, the first question I have is whether Catholic dogma requires us to hold that any sort of subjective certainty (even moral certainty) necessarily attends to the motives of credibility prescinding entirely from the assistance or grace. In other words, I am not clear that Catholic dogma holds that the motives of credibility, assessed strictly within the resources of natural reason, necessarily bring about some level of certitude. Consider the following from Dei Filius:

Nevertheless, in order that the submission of our faith should be in accordance with reason, it was God’s will that there should be linked to the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit external indications of his revelation, that is to say divine acts, and first and foremost miracles and prophecies, which clearly demonstrating as they do the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of revelation and are suited to the understanding of all.

And again,

So that we could fulfill our duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering unwaveringly in it, God, through his only begotten Son, founded the Church, and he endowed his institution with clear notes to the end that she might be recognized by all as the guardian and teacher of the revealed word. To the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvelous, which have been divinely ordained to make for the manifest credibility of the Christian faith. What is more, the Church herself by reason of her astonishing propagation, her outstanding holiness and her inexhaustible fertility in every kind of goodness, by her Catholic unity and her unconquerable stability, is a kind of great and perpetual motive of credibility and an incontrovertible evidence of her own divine mission. So it comes about that, like a standard lifted up for the nations she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and likewise assures her sons and daughters that the faith they profess rests on the firmest of foundations. To this witness is added the effective help of power from on high. For, the kind Lord stirs up those who go astray and helps them by his grace so that they may come to the knowledge of the truth; and also confirms by his grace those whom he has translated into his admirable light, so that they may persevere in this light, not abandoning them unless he is first abandoned.

It seems as though, DF is indicating that the subjective experience of certainty regarding the claims of the Catholic Church is a function of both objective, non-probabilistic motives of credibility plus the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit. If that is so, then Newman’s position is not problematic in the least, as I will explain shortly.

Could we not divide the question into two parts: Firstly, what does Catholic dogma require regarding the subjective state of persons in relation to the MOC – the question of subjective certainty? Secondly, what does Catholic Dogma requires regarding the objective, non-probabilistic nature of the MOC as concluding to the fact of the Catholic Church as God’s instrument for the definitive promulgation of divine revelation? Whether or not someone is, subjectively, more or less certain of a conclusion has no bearing on whether or not the conclusion is true or false in reality. Further, whether or not the MOC as relating to the divine authority of the Church are “probable” or not, can be taken in two sense: subjectively according to the internal disposition of the subject and objectively according to the state of reality. It seems to me that Lamentibili Sane (LS) where Pius X condemns the following proposition:

25. The assent of faith ultimately rests on a mass of probabilities .

must be referring to the objective sense. Here is why. Firstly, the Church cannot control the subjective disposition of any person. If a person thinks that the MOC are only probably true, rather than certainly true, there is nothing the Church can do about that; for the term “probable”, in that sense merely say something about the person’s internal attitude. Secondly, LS must be saying something like this:

“The assent of faith does not rest on a mass of evidence that is probably true, rather it rests on a mass of evidence that is true, simpliciter.”

The term “probably” here, seems very much directed at the state of the evidence (MOC) and its conclusion as considered distinct from subjective considerations (i.e. the one potentially making an “assent of faith” based on the MOC). So it seems to me that the MOC may be held as objectively non-probable, and true; leading (not probably) but truly to the conclusion that the Catholic Church is the guardian of divine revelation. Yet, without holding that everyone who assess them with the resources of natural reason alone, inevitably comes to see that conclusion with certainty. Think of Sherlock Holmes and Watson. A vast set of complex circumstances, evidences, and interrelations exist, which, when known and seen according to their objective aspect, lead certainly (inevitably) to one conclusion – whodunit. Holmes, “sees” all the circumstances, evidences and their interrelations clearly, so that he knows with certainty that one, and only one, culprit can have been responsible for the crime. Watson, however, scratching his head, and ostensibly considering the same circumstances, evidences and interrelations cannot reach Holmes’ conclusion. The difference? Holmes sees with a clearer light. His powers of deduction are sharper and better developed.

Now the key to this analogy is that the circumstances and evidences considered objectively, outside of their subjective assessment by any one person (one might almost say – considered ontologically), entail one, non-probabilistic truth. This affirmation – on the objective side of the question – would suffice to meet the demands of LS.

Nevertheless, on the subjective side of the equation, the subjective experience of certainty will only attach to the MOC (and their conclusion), if the subject is granted an elevated power of “sight”, which is just what the gift of faith is in its relation to the intellect. It is the “light of faith”, a supernatural “seeing” which illumines the evidence, and “connects the dots” so to speak in such a way that one “sees” the truth. This can (and often is) accompanied by the effects of the gift of supernatural faith on the will, which is to impress upon the will the “Motives of Faith” (MOF), whereby the will desires (wants to believe) the supernatural goods which the doctrine of the Church presents to it. Now, given that the MOC objectively entail the truth of the Church’s claims (LS), it will certainly be the case that prior to the gift of faith, different men of differing moral and intellectual powers and experience will find themselves viewing the claims of the Church as more or less probable (more or less certain) subjectively. And on my reading, this would pose no conflict with LS. Further, if Catholic dogma does not hold that the MOC yields subjective certainty without the internal assistance of the Holy Spirit (supernatural faith); then there is no need to worry over the subjective certainty of persons not yet influenced by the gift of faith with reference to the MOC. This solution would enable us to better understand Newman in a way consistent with Catholic dogma. Early Newman (initial Newman?), possessed of a powerful natural intellect, as he first surveyed the MOC, came to this:

I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, and that these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of course in subject matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind, a cumulative, a transcendent probability but still probability

Not that the MOC lead to mere “probable” conclusions in themselves (LS); but that Newman, according to his natural powers of intellect could only hold them subjectively as most probable. Actual grace was leading him along, giving him peeks and glimpses of the truth, but he had not yet received the gift of faith with grants that certitude which Catholic dogma affirms attaches to the MOC for the Christian. But later Newman, after cooperating with actual grace, ultimately experiences something beyond probabilities:

He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities;—He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do [actual operative grace – not yet certainty], and carries us on, if our will does but co-operate with His [actual co-operative grace – not yet certainty], to a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions [supernatural faith and its attendant certitude]. And thus I came to see clearly, and to have a satisfaction in seeing, that, in being led on into the Church of Rome, I was not proceeding on any secondary or isolated grounds of reason, or by controversial points in detail, but was protected and justified, even in the use of those secondary or particular arguments, by a great and broad principle.

So, in short, my proposal is this. The MOC are not probabilistic, objectively. Considered apart from subjective assessment – as they stand in the real world – they lead truly to the conclusion that the Church is the guardian of divine revelation (sic LS). However, considered subjectively, certitude only attaches to the internal disposition of the subject toward these MOC and their conclusion after the subject is infused with the gift of supernatural faith. Hence, faith is not fideism, or contrary to reason, because the MOC, when seen in the proper light, and as they stand objectively, conclude to the claims of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, supernatural faith is that proper light which enables the subject to see what is objectively there with a clarity rising to certitude. In this way, grace elevates nature, rather than destroying it. Without that gift, the MOC will seem more or less probable to human beings according to their intellectual and moral powers, opportunities and dispositions. This solution would fail if Catholic dogma demands that the MOC entail subjective certitude, absent the gift of faith. But I do not see – as yet – that it does.

Pax Christi,

Ray

I’m not really qualified to answer your question but I have at least one thought. One is that the term “certain knowledge” needs to be defined. If you’re talking about a certain, demonstrable knowledge, such that faith would no longer be required and that no rational person could deny it, we do not have that (or else as many people who believe 1+1=2 would also believe in the Resurrection.) Furthermore, in such a case, faith would not be necessary. We do not need faith to believe in absolutely demonstrable propositions.

So that to me suggests that the condemnation of a faith based on ‘probable knowledge’ must be something other than a condemnation of anything at all weaker than a demonstrable proposition about a historical event.

How can we acquire this certain knowledge? The Church seems to teach that it is acquired from a scientific investigation of the motiva credibilitatis. The First Vatican Council, for example, decrees that the divine origin of the Christian religion can be known and proven by “certain signs” (i.e., the motiva credibilitatis). And the Catholic Encyclopedia article on fideism harshly criticizes the view that the motiva credibilitatis provides only probable knowledge of the fact of Revelation:

“As to the opinion of those who maintain that our supernatural assent is prepared for by motives of credibility merely probable, it is evident that it logically destroys the certitude of such an assent.”

It is clear to me, then, that the Church teaches that we can and must have certain knowledge of the fact of Revelation prior to the assent of faith and that the motiva credibilitaties furnishes this knowledge.

Here is the problem. The Church also seems to teach (or, at least, her theologians) that the motives of credibility only furnishes probable knowledge of the fact of Revelation, directly contradicting what I showed above. Of course, this discrepancy could only be apparent and due to a misunderstanding on my part, but I have hard time resolving it. Take a look at the Catholic Encyclopedia article on faith. Under the section “Motives of Credibility,” you’ll find this apparent discrepancy. It quotes the earlier condemnation of Innocent XI, but then it goes on to limit the probative force of the motives of credibility to a mere “accumulation of probabilities,” in agreement with Newman.

Take a look at another apparent discrepancy from “A Manual of Catholic Theology” (emphasis mine):

“The Catholic Church therefore teaches…that these external and manifest facts which accompany the proposition of Revelation can produce a perfect certitude of the fact of Revelation in the minds of all.” (124)

vs.

“Besides this primary liberty of Faith, there is also a secondary
liberty, arising from the non-cogency of the motives of credibility, which allows the will to withhold its consent and leaves room for doubt and even denial” (132)

“perfect certitude”

vs.

“non-cogency”

What gives? Can we have certain knowledge of the fact of Revelation or not? And do the motives of credibility provide that knowledge or not?

Also, on a related issue. Assuming that we can have a certain knowledge of all these things prior to the assent of faith, what room does that leave for the freedom of the act of faith? Doesn’t one come under an obligation to have faith after having that kind of knowledge?