and

“In his suffering, sins are cancelled out precisely because he alone as the only-begotten Son could take them upon himself, accept them with that love for the Father which overcomes the evil of every sin; in a certain sense he annihilates this evil in the spiritual space of the relationship between God and humanity, and fills this space with good.”

Evil is the absence or distortion of good, especially a good that ought to be. In His incarnate life and especially in His Passion, Jesus voluntarily willed to enter into and take on all the sin of the world and the effects of sin on the world (suffering and death and loss of eternal life) and, having taken this on/in Himself, in consubstantial loving relation with the Father (and I’d assume the Spirit), overcame all evil separating us from God and filled the gap with His superabundant goodness – to the point that the all the evil ever done is blotted out, overcome and nullified by His Goodness. – the image that comes to mind is of a bright light blasting away all darkness or fierce fire burning up the dross.

Thus, by faith, we are united to Christ and returned with Him to the Father.

Or is it the door is re-opened to eternal life for us? and then we put our trust in Christ and must live rightly to attain eternal life?

Am I on the right track? This seems akin to Christus Victor vs. punished-in-our-place theories of the atonement – which makes a lot of thoughtful people quite mistaken.

I haven’t had the chance to read your other link yet – hope to this afternoon.

I also recommend reading Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic Letter from 1984, titled Salvifici doloris, especially section IV which is titled “Jesus Christ: Suffering Conquered by Love.”

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan

Welcome to Called To Communion. I’m glad you found us. You wrote:

Now, I have tried to get this (all the above), really, but please help me understand why the Father would find the suffering of the Son (even voluntarily offered in charity) to be pleasing? The Father loves the suffering of the Son more than He hates our sins? How is this much better than the wrathful punishing of an innocent in our place. Forgive me, but why would the Father think Christ’s passion a good thing (especially given that He could have forgiven our sins without it?) As a parent, I would not be pleased with my child’s needless suffering.

Suffering itself is not a good, and God takes no pleasure in the death of anyone. “For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone who dies.” (Ez 18:32) But, greater love can be shown through sacrifice and suffering, precisely because in them greater self-giving is made possible. “Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends.” (John 15:13) And it is the Son’s great love (in His human nature) for the Father, (and for us on account of the Father’s love for us), in His self-giving act of sacrifice in His Passion and Death, that is pleasing to the Father. It is not the suffering per se that pleases the Father, but the great love shown in and through the suffering. I explained this a bit more in “Catholic and Reformed Conceptions of the Atonement.”

Lastly, for the moment, the concept of penance, mild or severe, does seem to be a requirement for works for salvation – making Christ’s satisfaction insufficient. (That is where limited atonement actually makes intellectual sense.)

Let me recommend that you read through my post titled “St. Thomas Aquinas on Penance,” and if you still have questions about how Christ’s atonement is compatible with the Catholic doctrine of penance, please don’t hesitate to ask.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan

Now, I have tried to get this (all the above), really, but please help me understand why the Father would find the suffering of the Son (even voluntarily offered in charity) to be pleasing? The Father loves the suffering of the Son more than He hates our sins? How is this much better than the wrathful punishing of an innocent in our place. Forgive me, but why would the Father think Christ’s passion a good thing (especially given that He could have forgiven our sins without it?) As a parent, I would not be pleased with my child’s needless suffering.

“And in like fashion Christ’s voluntary suffering was such a good act that, because of its being found in human nature, God was appeased for every offense of the human race with regard to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the aforesaid manner (1, ad 4).32″ Why would God be appeased by this? Still a case of innocent suffering – and, in keeping with the unity of the Godhead, isn’t this God appeasing God? Obviously there would be no point in that – so I must be missing something.

Lastly, for the moment, the concept of penance, mild or severe, does seem to be a requirement for works for salvation – making Christ’s satisfaction insufficient. (That is where limited atonement actually makes intellectual sense.)

I am strongly drawn to the Roman Catholic Church (but I don’t think I can get in). Nonetheless, I find more coherency in RC theology, usually, than in Reformed. I pray you can help me with the above – even a year after your post!

As I’ve said before, it is my dream/goal for Protestant-Catholic apologetics to get these key issues (largely ignored/misunderstood) to the front of the discussion. This will result in far greater progress than tossing verses back and forth at each other.

Thanks for your reply. Good points. I’m persuaded.

Why is it unjust to give someone something they requested?

We have to distinguish between will and nature. Just because someone requests something (with his will), does not mean that it is just to give it to him (given his nature). Whether or not it is just to give it to him depends upon what he asks for, and his nature. Socrates gives the example of a man from whom you have borrowed a knife. Normally, it is just to give back to someone what you have borrowed from that person. But this knife-owner comes to your front-door in a raging fury, say, having just caught his wife in an act of adultery, and demanding back his knife. Should you give it to him? No, not at that moment. Why? Because of his emotional state. It would be unjust to give him back his knife at that moment. So according to his will (i.e. his request) it might seem you should give it back to him, but given his state, you should definitely not give it to him. A person can request something that you should not give to him. All sorts of sexual examples come to mind. Anyone who thinks that a request is sufficient to make fulfilling that request just, should not walk through a red light district. Consent does not entail a moral green light, because consent is not sufficient. The notion that consent is sufficient is a kind of Kantianism that prescinds from the natures of the persons involved, and from the order of Divine justice.

First, from the perspective of the parent it isn’t unjust to him because he requested it.

That’s Kantianism. When Saul asked his armor bearer to kill him, the armor bearer rightly refused. (1 Sam 31:4) It would have been unjust for the armor bearer to kill Saul, even though Saul was requesting it. (You can think of other ‘assisted suicide’ cases.) We have to distinguish between will and nature, and the role each plays in the morality of an action.

To punish an innocent person, knowing that he is innocent, is unjust, whether or not the person *wills* that he be punished. Giving to someone more good than he is due, is compatible with justice because justice does not restrict mercy. But, giving to someone less good (or more evil) than he is due is not compatible with justice. And what he is due is not based only on what he requests. Therefore, punishing an innocent person, knowing that he is innocent, is unjust, whether or not the person *wills* that he be punished.

A parent could justly be punished for a child’s crimes only insofar as the parent was responsible for the child’s evil behavior. With regard to punishment, justice doesn’t merely demand that *someone* be punished, but that the guilty person be punished. Otherwise justice is blind not merely in the proper sense of being impartial, but in the sense of treating humanity as an indefinite amorphous mass deserving some magnitude of blind fury. But on the Day of Judgment, what is presented is not the total debt due for all men’s sins. Rather, the Just Judge judges according to each man’s works. In other words, justice ‘sees’ each man, and what he deserves. Justice does not vent wrath blindly, as though anyone could jump in to block the blind stream of wrath.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan

As for the two horns of the dilemma, you maintain that the third-option I proffered is a merely a type of the first horn, namely that Jesus was innocent. Your argument posits that if Jesus was innocent (that is to say, undeserving of God’s wrath), then God would be unjust to visit wrath upon him. But suppose Jesus agreed to receive God’s wrath on behalf of those who deserve it. Why is it unjust to give someone something they requested? For example, suppose an adult is convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison. The adult’s parent wants to serve the child’s time. And the judge grants the parents request. Is it unjust to sentence to parent? There are two answers to this question (it seems to me) depending on the perspective we use. First, from the perspective of the parent it isn’t unjust to him because he requested it. He cannot complain of some injustice. So from the perspective of the one requesting to stand in the shoes of the convict, that stand-in cannot complain of injustice if their request is granted. Second, from the perspective of the victims of the convict’s crime it may be unjust because the convict isn’t receiving the appropriate punishment. In this retributive sense, justice isn’t meted out on the one who deserves it.

Turning to the atonement with these two senses in mind, the first sense is Christ’s standing-in-out-place. How could it be unjust to Christ? In the second sense, the victim of our crimes (we’re the convicts, and our crime is sin) is God himself. (It may not be appropriate to speak of God as the *victim* of our sins, but I think you get my point.) So if God is willing to atone for our past sins in this method, how is it unjust?

Thanks for your comment. The dilemma is between the Father knowingly pouring out His wrath on His innocent Son, or knowingly pouring out His wrath on His guilty Son. The option of the Father knowingly pouring out His wrath on His innocent Son who loves us and wants to stand in our place, does not split the horns, but is a more specific case under the first horn of the dilemma. If the Father poured out His wrath on His innocent Son, knowing that His Son was innocent, then the Father would be unjust, whether or not the Son out of love wanted to take our place. The Son’s love for man does not change the fact that it is unjust to punish an innocent person knowing that he is innocent. The Father can receive a gift of satisfaction from Christ, without being unjust. But to punish the innocent Christ, knowing that He is innocent, would be unjust.

Not only that, but if the Father has wrath for men while the Son has love for men, this conflicts with the doctrine of the Trinity. The Father and the Son cannot be at odds. If Christ loves men, then so does the Father. Or, if the Father has wrath for men, then so does Christ. And, if the Father has wrath for the Son, then the Son must have no less wrath for Himself.

According to Aquinas, God could have simply forgiven our debts outright. In ST III Q.47 a.3, Aquinas is arguing that the Father has *some* role in Christ’s Passion. Aquinas is dealing there with objections that argue that the Father had *no* role in Christ’s Passion. But Aquinas is very careful here. God does not cause [moral] evil, not even to bring about a great good. A good end does not justify an evil means. See Summa Theologica I Q.49 a.2, where Aquinas argues that God is not the cause of [moral] evil. Now, if we were to rank moral evils, right up at the top would be knowingly killing God. (This is why Dante puts Judas right down with Lucifer.) So, God the Father cannot be the cause of this evil per se. This is why Aquinas says that God the Father delivered up [tradiderit] i.e. handed over, Christ to the Passion. (ST III Q.47 a.3) That is a very different depiction of the Father’s role from that in which God the Father is pouring out His own wrath on Christ.

In the peace of Christ,

- Bryan